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ABSTRACT 
 
The literature on bank efficiency in transition economies (TEs) is neither exhaustive nor 
conclusive. It mainly investigates bank efficiency in relation to bank size and ownership. 
However, to the best of our knowledge, it ignores several important dimensions related to the 
banking sector in TEs: euroization, macroprudential policy and different types of risk. By 
exploring the relationships between bank efficiency, euroization, macroprudential policy and 
different types of risk in TEs, this research fills this gap.  
The relationship between bank efficiency, euroization and bank risk is explored empirically  
through the estimation of a cost efficiency frontier using time-varying stochastic frontier 
analysis (SFA) whilst controlling initially for euroization at country level and then at bank 
level, using the BankScope database and euroization data collected by the author. The 
findings suggest that euroization at country level is a driver of bank efficiency in TEs, and that 
different risks are important in the context bank efficiency in TEs. Furthermore, it was shown 
that efficiency in TEs has varied over period and it has been affected by the Global Financial 
Crisis. 
The initial research is extended through the qualitative analysis of the phenomena of 
euroization at bank level in selected South East European countries, which again to the best 
of our knowledge, is the first such research. The investigation is conducted through semi-
structured interviews of risk managers of banks at different levels of seniority. The main 
finding of this analysis is that macroprudential policy, widely considered a useful response to 
global financial crisis, is an important determinant of euroization.  
To explore this further an econometric investigation of the impact of macroprudential policy 
on the level of credit euroization in TEs, an aspect ignored in the literature, is undertaken. 
Additionally, the empirical literature on credit euroization is limited as most studies focus on 
deposit euroization, assuming that credit euroization mirrors it, although the latter is larger 
in most TEs. The analysis is conducted employing dynamic and autoregressive panel 
techniques, using data on macroprudential policy from the IMF and central banks. Thus, this 
study fills a gap in this literature by investigating the determinants of credit euroization, 
including the impact of macroprudential policy. Although this is a first attempt at such an 
investigation, it supports the importance of these policies in driving down the level of 
euroization in TEs. 
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1.1 Introduction 
The aim of this introductory chapter is to present the key research questions, provide 
an overview of the phenomena of euroization, bank efficiency and macroprudential 
policy, as well as consider their economic importance for transition economies (TEs). 
Initially, the chapter highlights the importance of the concepts of euroization and 
efficiency and their relevance in the process of transition to a market economy. It 
then continues with an elaboration of the specific objectives of the thesis, upon which 
the key research questions are based. Subsequently, it provides an overview of the 
recent history in TEs of the three main pillars of the thesis as a necessary background 
for the development of the formal models employed throughout the thesis and 
against which the results can be assessed. Specifically, it examines the evolution of 
the phenomenon of euroization throughout the period, describes the development of 
the banking sector in the first two decades of the process of transition from a 
centrally planned to the market based economy and finishes with a summary of the 
recently adopted macroprudential policy in these countries. The last section provides 
an explanation of the structure of the thesis focussing on the content and role of the 
following chapters.  
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1.2 The key research questions 
The aim of the thesis is to investigate the relationships between bank efficiency, 
euroization and macroprudential policy in transition economies, with special 
reference to South East European countries. In the context of this thesis, and 
following the classification by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) which is based 
on each country’s progress in transition (liberalization, macroeconomic stabilization, 
restructuring and privatization and legal and institutional reforms), the TEs are:  
 South East European (SEE) countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina (B & 
H), Bulgaria, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania and Serbia;  
 Central East European (CEE) countries: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia;  
 Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS): Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Georgia, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Russian Federation, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.  
Particular attention is paid to the identification of the risks associated with 
euroization at both country and bank level. The thesis contributes to the existing 
theoretical and empirical literature on euroization and bank efficiency by addressing 
the relationships between bank efficiency, euroization and macroprudential policy. 
The role of an efficient banking sector in economic development has been recognized 
in the literature since Schumpeter, when he argued that the banking sector can be an 
accelerator of growth (King and Levine, 1993a). However, a strong consensus 
regarding its positive role on economic growth, has been reached only in the last 
decade (Bonin and Wachtel, 2003; Borovicka, 2007). The foundation of the banking 
sector’s significance lies in the role of banks as financial intermediaries. Banks 
provide liquidity services (Santos, 2000) and thus provide insurance against liquidity 
risk, enabling greater investment in high-return but illiquid assets (Levine, 1997), 
consequently contributing to accelerated economic growth (Bencivenga and Smith, 
1991). They are considered delegated monitors since they reduce the cost of 
acquiring information and lower post monitoring costs (Bryant, 1980; Diamond, 
1984) thus encouraging investment, which again can lead to faster economic growth. 
Additionally, banks are providers of risk diversification, which enables an 
appropriate degree of high return investments and can accelerate technological 
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change, which in the long run affects economic growth positively (King and Levine, 
1993b; 1993c; Levine, 1997). Consequently, an efficient banking sector facilitates 
financial intermediation and contributes to economic growth. Thus, efficient banks 
create an efficient banking sector, which in turn translates into efficient 
intermediation process. Arguably efficiency of the banking sector is a precondition 
and a facilitator for the economic development of these economies (Wachtel, 2001; 
Beck et al., 2001; Bonin and Wachtel, 2003; Borovicka, 2007). 
In economies such as TEs, where money and capital markets are underdeveloped 
(Grigorian and Manole, 2006; Yildirim and Philipatos, 2007) the role of banks and the 
banking sector is even more important than in mature market economies. In these 
economies, banks dominate financial intermediation, play an important role in the 
process of relocating financial resources (Anderson and Kegels, 1998) and bank 
credit is the major source of external finance (Caviglia et al., 2002). Arguably, 
efficiency of the banking sector is a precondition for the economic development of 
TEs. 
Nevertheless, although bank efficiency has been extensively investigated in advanced 
economies, it has not received the deserved attention in TEs. So far, only relatively 
few studies have addressed the issue of bank efficiency in these countries and they 
are neither exhaustive nor conclusive. Furthermore, the banking sectors of TEs differ 
from those of advanced economies. For instance, in the bank dominated financial 
systems of TEs financial markets are underdeveloped and play a limited role contrary 
to the financial systems of advanced economies where financial markets play a very 
important role (Berglof and Bolton, 2002). In addition, as highlighted in detail in 
section 1.4 the banking sectors in transition economies have gone through dramatic 
structural changes during the first two decades of the transition process. They were 
liberalized, privatized, consolidated and experienced large influx of foreign 
investment (Fang et al., 2011) mostly as a result of several waves of reforms to the 
financial infrastructure applied by their respective governments in order to foster 
well-functioning banking sectors. Thus, the findings of the existing literature on 
advanced economies may not apply to TEs (Weill, 2003). The investigation of bank 
efficiency in TEs is also of timely interest given that several of these countries have 
already joined the EU while others have started negotiations for future accession and 
some others are expected to start soon. Additionally, a better understanding of the 
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factors that influence the efficiency of the banking sectors in TEs is important for both 
researchers and policy makers because, besides the divergence from advanced 
economies, these countries also have specific features that set them apart from each 
other and it is interesting to see whether banking sector development differs in 
relation to these specifics.  
Most of the existing literature on bank efficiency in TEs has concentrated on 
measuring the relative efficiency of banks in terms of costs or profits whilst taking 
into account banks’ size. The relatively new literature on bank efficiency in TEs has 
also focused on ownership and privatization, as determinants of efficiency (Kraft and 
Tirtiroglu, 1998; Opiela, 2000; Hasan and Marton, 2003; Weill, 2003; Fries and Taci, 
2005; Kraft et al., 2002; Grigorian and Manole, 2006; Yildirim and Philippatos, 2007; 
Fang et al., 2011). However, to the best of our knowledge, the literature completely 
ignores an important dimension of the surrounding environment of TEs: the 
phenomenon of euroization. Euroization, which in general accounts for a process 
where the domestic currency is substituted by a foreign currency, is a defining 
characteristic of transition economies. Apart from contributing to the enrichment of 
the existing literature on banking efficiency in TEs, this thesis aims to fill this 
particular gap by investigating the impact of euroization on banking efficiency. More 
precisely, the thesis aims to address the question of what are the determinants of 
bank efficiency in TEs and whether a higher degree of euroization translates into 
higher or lower bank efficiency. Another related question is whether there are 
differences in the impact of the euroization at country level, which is outside an 
individual bank’s control, and the euroization at bank level, which individual banks 
can manage. These questions are addressed by estimating cost efficiency of banks in 
TEs, using BankScope data for the period 2000-2013. The relative efficiency of banks 
is estimated through Stochastic Frontier analysis (SFA), a parametric approach for 
estimating the relative efficiency of banks, which explicitly accommodates multiple 
inputs and outputs and allows for the impact of environmental factors. Therefore in 
estimating the relative efficiency of banks in TEs, whilst taking into account 
euroization both at country and bank levels, this research aims to explore the extent 
to which euroization matters, and thus make a contribution to knowledge. 
As emphasized above, euroization in the context of bank efficiency in TEs has not 
been addressed in the literature, so far. Given this, and the difficulty in adequately 
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capturing its real impact on bank efficiency due to the complexity of the risks 
associated with euroization, the thesis continues with a qualitative analysis of 
euroization. The qualitative analysis, at bank level in a few SEE countries is carried 
out to explore the approaches and attitudes of individual banks to euroization in 
more depth. Employing qualitative and quantitative research methods as 
complementary strategies in addressing the same research area and thus drawing on 
the respective strength of each method within the research design can provide a more 
complete picture of the phenomenon (Bryman, 2006; Gilbert, 2008; Silverman, 2011). 
More precisely, through this analysis, the thesis aims to explore the euroization 
strategy pursued by banks and the factors that influence that strategy, the 
instruments employed by banks to address risks related to euroization and the 
determinants of euroization through banks’ perspectives. Taking into consideration 
that the research questions required exploration of the phenomenon without 
compromising the confidentiality of the participants, a qualitative analysis through 
semi-structured interviews was considered the most appropriate method. To the best 
of our knowledge, euroization, despite its prevalence in TEs, has been ignored in the 
qualitative research literature. Consequently, this study breaks new grounds with the 
potential for making a contribution to understanding some aspects of the euroization 
phenomenon. In addition, the thesis contributes to qualitative literature by 
identifying themes and conceptual frameworks related to euroization that could be 
further examined in future studies. 
Building on the qualitative research, where we find that government policies such as 
macroprudential policy are becoming an important driver of de-euroization, the third 
part of the thesis investigates the impact of macroprudential policy on the level of 
credit euroization in TEs. Macroprudential policy is mainly focused on reducing 
systemic risk, and it has been actively used by TEs before and after the recent 
financial crisis (Lim et al., 2011), mostly due to their pronounced business cycles, 
their greater exposure to volatile international capital flows and other risks and their 
underdeveloped financial markets (Lim et al., 2011; Claessens et al., 2012). The 
literature on macroprudential policy and euroization, to the best of our knowledge, 
ignores the impact of macroprudential policy on euroization. However, taking into 
consideration that a group of macroprudential policy instruments are directly related 
to loans and deposits in foreign currency, it is to be expected that they may influence 
its level. The thesis aims to address this gap by investigating the impact of 
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macroprudential policy in TEs, for the period 2007-2013. The investigation in this 
chapter represents a first attempt of studying the potential impact of the 
macroprudential policy on financial euroization in TEs. 
Thus, in summary the key research questions arising from these three main pillars of 
the thesis are:  
1) What are the models and empirical evidence on bank efficiency and 
euroization in the literature? What are the gaps in knowledge in both areas? 
2) What are the determinants of bank efficiency in TEs and in particular how 
does euroization affect bank efficiency? 
3) What do banks regard as the main determinants of euroization? What are their 
strategies, policies, and procedures with regard to euroization? Do they feel 
that euroization affects their efficiency? 
4) Does macroprudential policy have an impact on the level of credit euroization? 
1.3 Euroization in transition economies (TEs) 
This section attempts to draw an overall picture of euroization through a summary of 
the history and patterns of euroization in TEs, in order to provide the necessary 
background for the investigation of the research questions. The prevalence of 
euroization is a prominent feature of the TEs. Euroization, in general, accounts for a 
process where the domestic currency is substituted by a foreign currency (which in 
the countries under investigation is predominately the euro, but may also include 
other currencies). However, the literature identifies numerous types of euroization, 
which are discussed in detail in the following chapter. For the sake of this statistical 
overview we will limit the discussion to financial euroization which consists of credit 
euroization (the share of foreign currency loans in total loans) and deposit 
euroization (the share of foreign currency deposits in total deposits). As can be seen 
in Figure 1.1 financial euroization is remarkably prevalent in all TEs, though it varies 
quite a lot across different countries.  
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*For few countries in which the data was not available in 2000, the average from the earliest year 
available, usually 2002. 
Source: central banks, Monetary surveys (various years) 
It is worth highlighting that for Kosovo, which has adopted euroization officially 
throughout the period, the degree of financial euroization, which represents the share 
of loans and deposits in currencies other than Euro, such as US dollar, Swiss Franc, 
etc., is very low. Considering the rest of the countries, Figure 1.1 shows that 
throughout the period 2000-2013 the average degree of credit euroization measured 
as the share of outstanding loans given to the non-banking sector denominated in a 
foreign currency in total loans, varies from 13% in the Slovak Republic to 77% in 
Albania. Whereas, the degree of deposit euroization measured as the share of foreign 
deposits in total deposits varies between 11% in Slovak Republic to 71% in Georgia.  
Besides the variation across countries, it is also of importance to explore the degree 
of euroization over time. As documented in Figure 1.2 TEs are very diverse in this 
aspect as well.  
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Figure 1.1 The average degree of credit and deposit euroization,          
2000-2013 
Credit euroization Deposit euroization
 9 
 
 
*For few countries in which the data was not available in 2000, the average from the earliest year 
available, usually 2002. 
Source: central banks, Monetary surveys (various years) 
In countries such Albania, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Moldova and Slovenia 
credit euroization followed a decreasing trend from 2000 and onwards. However, in 
countries such as Bosnia and Herzegovina (B & H), Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, the 
Kyrgyz Republic, Macedonia, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Ukraine credit 
euroization was increasing until 2007 and only from then it had a decreasing trend. 
On the other hand in countries such as Armenia, Belarus, Croatia, Russian Federation 
and Tajikistan credit euroization was decreasing until 2007 and from then it had an 
increasing trend. In other countries such as Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Kosovo, 
Lithuania, Romania and Serbia credit euroization has followed an increasing trend 
throughout the period. These different patterns make these countries interesting in 
exploring the implications of euroization in terms of bank efficiency but also in 
investigating the determinants of euroization.  
As discussed in more detail later in section 2.3 the literature mostly investigates only 
deposit euroization and until very recently had ignored credit euroization. This was a 
result of several reasons. First and the main reason is data availability. Until recently, 
the data on deposit euroization was much more easily available than credit 
euroization. Second, the literature assumed that deposit and credit euroization mirror 
each other, because credit euroization is driven by deposit euroization due to strict 
regulatory requirements and banks’ strategies in matching their balance sheet 
positions. Therefore, they maintained that by investigating deposit euroization one 
could also infer about credit euroization. However, a few recent studies have argued 
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that the degree of deposit euroization and credit euroization do not necessarily match 
across banking sectors in TEs. Figure 1.3 supports this view, showing that the average 
degree of currency mismatch, that is the difference between credit euroization and 
deposit euroization, in the same period, has been relatively high across TEs. 
 
*For few countries in which the data was not available in 2000, the average from the earliest year 
available, usually 2002. 
Source: central banks, Monetary surveys (various years) 
As seen above, in general, the banking sectors tend to be euroized more heavily on 
their assets side than on their liabilities side, which suggests that studies 
investigating deposit euroization in isolation have underestimated the degree of 
euroization. Thus, more research is needed to understand the causes and 
consequences of euroization in TEs. Here, too, there are striking differences across 
countries. The positive currency mismatch varies from 30% in Albania to 1% percent 
in Russia. The sign of the mismatch is negative in countries such as Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Czech Republic, Kosovo, Serbia, and Tajikistan, again with high 
variation from -13% in Serbia to around -1% in Armenia. If we focus on the average 
of degree of currency mismatch during the period 2007-2013, in most countries, the 
positive mismatch increases. In countries such as Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus and 
Tajikistan the negative mismatch deepens. Whereas, in few countries such as Albania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Estonia, Macedonia and Ukraine, the mismatch is positive 
but lower than the average of the entire period. 
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Figure 1.3 The average degree of currency mismatch in TEs 
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Euroization is strongly associated with inflation volatility1 and inflation itself. The 
literature has confirmed inflation volatility as a one of the main driver of euroization 
(for a detailed discussion see section 2.5.2). However, whilst this might be true for the 
first decade of transition, when, as explained in section 1.4.1, the inflation rate and 
inflation rate volatility were very high, it does not hold in the second decade of the 
transition process. As seen below in Figure 1.4 during this period the inflation 
volatility is low for most countries, with the exception of Belarus and Kyrgyz 
Republic, with the average inflation rate  throughout the period 2000-2013 remaining 
low in most countries and moderately high in few.  
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2015  
Euroization is also linked to the interest rate differential, (the difference between the 
interest rate on foreign currency loans and domestic currency loans). The basic idea 
is that the higher the interest differential the higher the demand for foreign currency 
loans. A detailed discussion is given in section 2.5.2. Interestingly, the average 
interest rate differential is very low in some countries with a very high degree of 
euroization such as Estonia, Macedonia, and Lithuania. What is striking is that in few 
countries such as the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Tajikistan the interest rate 
differential is even negative. Whilst, this might be expected for the first two in which 
the degree of euroization is lower than the average in TEs, it is surprising for 
Tajikistan given the high degree of euroization. This is documented in Figure 1.5 
presented below.  
                                                          
1
 In the context of the thesis inflation volatility is measured as standard deviation of the monthly inflation 
rate during one year. 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Figure 1.4 The volatility and average rate of inflation, 2000-2013 
Inflation volatility Average inflation
 12 
 
 
Source: central banks (various reports and years) 
Going further, theoretically, euroization is strongly associated with exchange rate 
volatility, which is directly affected by the type of exchange rate arrangement in the 
sense that higher flexibility leads to higher volatility (Flood and Rose, 1999). Almost 
half of TEs had adopted a floating rate in the early 1990s (Eichengreen and 
Haussman, 1999), which encouraged euroization. Later, due to the fear of the impact 
of high volatility against their major trading partners in their economy many of them 
have introduced currency board arrangements or pegged their exchange rate to euro 
or US dollar with only very limited flexibility (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002). Thus, 
exchange rate volatility remained low as it has been a policy objective. A snapshot of 
exchange rate arrangements in TEs in year 2013, as designed by the IMF, is provided 
in Table 1.1 where it is documented that a large number of TEs still have fixed 
exchange rate regimes.  
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Table 1.1 Exchange Rate Arrangements and Monetary Policy Frameworks in TEs, 2013 
 
Monetary Policy Framework 
 
Exchange rate anchor Monetary 
aggregate 
target 
Inflation-
targeting 
framework 
Other1 Exchange 
rate 
arrangement 
U.S. dollar Euro 
No separate 
legal tender 
  
Kosovo; 
Montenegro 
      
Currency 
board 
  
B & H; 
Bulgaria; 
Lithuania2 
      
Conventional 
peg 
Turkmenistan Latvia2       
Stabilized 
arrangement 
  Macedonia 
Tajikistan3; 
Ukraine3 
Georgia3 Azerbaijan3 
Crawl-like 
arrangement 
Kazakhstan Croatia Uzbekistan3     
Other 
managed 
arrangement 
    Kyrgyz Rep.   
Belarus;   
Russia4 
Floating     Afghanistan 
Albania; 
Armenia; 
Hungary; 
Moldova; 
Romania; 
Serbia 
  
Free floating       
Czech Rep.; 
Poland 
EMU 
Estonia; 
Slovak 
Rep.; 
Slovenia 
1 They have no explicitly stated nominal anchor but monitor various indicators in conducting monetary policy. 
2 The member participates in the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM II). 
3 The country maintains a de facto exchange rate anchor to the U.S. dollar. 
4 The central bank has taken preliminary steps toward inflation targeting. 
Source: IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions 2013 
Foreign ownership in the banking sector of TEs, which has followed an increasing 
trend during the transition process (see section 1.4), has been identified in the 
literature as another determinant of euroization. The rapid increase in foreign 
ownership and euroization during the transition process has raised the interest of the 
researchers in investigating a possible causal relationship. However, as explained in 
detail in section 2.5.2, the literature is not unanimous on the impact of foreign 
ownership. Theoretically, it is expected to affect credit euroization positively given 
that it would lower the cost of funding in foreign currency and most of the studies 
document a positive relationship; however, there are studies that find a negative 
relationship or simply do not find a significant relationship between foreign 
ownership of banks and credit euroization.  
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To sum up, euroization has been an important phenomenon in many TEs that has 
persisted throughout the period despite the moderate inflation and exchange rate 
stability in many of these countries. Arguably, euroization remains an important 
feature of TEs, for which one must account for when investigating any important 
feature of these countries. In particular, low to moderate inflation rate and its 
volatility, low exchange rate volatility and low or even negative interest rate 
differential in most TEs with a high degree of euroization, suggest that the 
traditionally considered determinants do not fully explain the phenomenon in these 
countries during the last decade. Consequently, a further investigation of the 
determinants of euroization is an important addition to the literature.  
1.4 Banking sector and economic development in TEs 
This section aims at presenting an overview of the banking sectors in the TEs, 
outlining their main features and development in relation to the transition process, 
again in order to provide the necessary background for the research questions 
investigated.  
1.4.1  First decade of the transition process 
Before the transition towards market-based economies, the banking sector in most 
TEs was of a one-tier type, i.e. a mono-bank system where the bank was the central 
bank and the commercial bank simultaneously. In the one-tier systems, the mono-
banks were responsible for the management of the central planning process and 
implementation of the payment plan among different state entities rather than 
financial intermediation. Lending activity was focused on crediting different state 
entities based on the central planning, irrespective of credit evaluation and risk 
management (Caviglia et al., 2002; Bonin and Wachtel, 2003). Thus, in fact it was an 
extension of government lending to other state entities and state owned enterprises 
to meet the general output plan. In few of the TEs, besides the mono-banks, there 
were few banks which were specialized along functional lines such as collecting 
deposits, crediting specific sectors (agriculture, construction, etc.) or dealing with 
foreign currency. However, they only played a secondary role alongside the ‘mono’-
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banks.2 Consequently, the banking sector played only a limited role in promoting 
economic growth.  
During the first decade of transition, which started in the early 1990s, the banking 
sectors of TEs were restructured from the one-tier system into a two-tier system. The 
two-tier system consisted of a Central Bank and separate commercial banks 
established out of the existing credit portfolios of the mono-bank. In this system, the 
central banks are responsible for the monetary policy, exchange rate policy, and 
regulation of the commercial banks, whereas commercial banks are responsible for 
financial intermediation. The initial restructuring proved unsuccessful in establishing 
well-functioning banking sectors in TEs. The newly established banking sectors were 
immediately faced with serious structural problems. First, although an objective of 
separating the functions of central banks from the commercial banks was to reduce 
the influence of the government in banking activities, this was not achieved. The 
degree of state-ownership within the banking sector remained high, given that the 
new commercial banks continued to be largely state owned in most TEs, which meant 
that the management of banking activities did not really change. Second, the degree of 
competition was very low immediately after the restructuring. In a few TEs, the entire 
credit portfolio of the mono-bank was transformed into one single state-owned bank.  
Consequently, most of the TEs engaged in additional waves of restructuring to ensure 
a well-functioning banking sector. To address the problem of high degree of 
concentration and promote competition they introduced very lenient entry 
requirements for the newly established domestic banks. This increased rapidly the 
number of banks across TEs but introduced other problems. This meant a very heavy 
supervisory burden on the central banks, which were very inexperienced in this task 
(Berglof and Bolton, 2002). Second, due to relaxed regulatory entry requirements, 
most of the newly established banks were severely undercapitalized and lacked 
adequate banking experience (Bonin and Wachtel, 2003). In addition, as explained 
above, most of the newly established commercial banks had inherited the credit 
portfolios of the previous mono-bank (or specialized banks in few TEs). These banks 
continued to provide credit to state enterprises without applying any credit 
standards or risk management techniques. They behaved similarly with businesses 
                                                          
2
 For an elaborate discussion on the transition process in relation to banking sector, see Bonin and Wachtel 
(2003). 
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and individuals that had ties to the bank owners. Arguably, most of these new banks 
were mismanaged in the sense that they engaged in numerous episodes of 
speculation and fraudulent activities. Consequently, by mid 1990s, most TEs faced 
severe problems with the quality of banking sector portfolios. The share of non-
performing loans in total loans increased dramatically in most TEs reaching about 
31% in Albania; 38% in Czech Republic; 75% in Bulgaria; 75% in Macedonia; etc. As a 
result, a number of banks in these countries faced solvency problems. In the absence 
of adequate legislation and regulatory procedures to address these crises, the central 
banks encouraged the larger state-owned banks to acquire the smaller ones that 
faced solvency problems. This action backfired as it ended up weakening the large 
banks as well. All the above led to severe banking crises that seriously undermined 
confidence in banks in TEs (Berglof and Bolton, 2002). 
The structure of the banking sectors in terms of the number of banks changed 
dramatically during 1990s. From the one-tier system with a mono-bank, and in some 
cases with few additional specialized banks, the number of banks increased 
dramatically in most of the TEs, reached double and in some even triple digits by 
early 1990s. This mostly reflects the initial restructuring and very lenient licencing 
regulations mentioned before. Then the number of banks decreased rapidly by mid-
1990s reflecting the banking crises in these TEs. This is documented in Table 1.2 
presented below.  
Table 1.2 Number of banks in selected TEs during the first decade 
  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Albania 6  6  8  9  10  13  13  
Armenia 41  35  33  30  31  32  31  
Azerbaijan 210  180  136  99  79  70  59  
Belarus 48  42  38  38  37   36  31  
Bulgaria 40  41  42  28  34  34  35  
Croatia 50  54  57  61  60  53   43  
Estonia 22  18   15  12  6  7  7  
Georgia 226   101  61  53  42  36  30  
Kazakhstan 184  130  101  82  71   55   48  
Kyrgyz 18  18  18   20  23  23  22  
Latvia 56   42  35   32  27   23  21  
Lithuania 22   12  12  11  12  13  13  
Macedonia 6   6   8  9  24  23   22  
Moldova 21  22   21   22  23  20   20  
Poland 82  81   81  83  83  77  73  
Russia 
 
2,295  2,029  1,697  1476   1349   1311  
Slovenia 44  41  36  34  30  31  28  
Ukraine 228  230  229  227  175   161  154 
Source: EBRD, Transition Reports (various years) and central banks (annual reports, various years) 
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In countries such as Azerbaijan, Georgia, Lithuania, Moldova and Tajikistan banking 
crises of the 1990s were further exacerbated by the macroeconomic turbulences that 
these countries experienced in the early stages of transition. On the other hand, the 
banking crises themselves prolonged or worsened the macroeconomic conditions in 
many TEs, particularly in countries such as Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Georgia.  
Although transition countries began the transition process with very different initial 
conditions and later followed very different paths and speed of transition, most of 
them experienced a major output decline in the early 1990s. However, when 
analysing economic indicators in TEs, one must recall the data limitation, pointed out 
by Berglof and Bolton (2002), that in the early phases of transition process, real GDP 
statistics were of suspicious quality because of high and variable levels of inflation 
and, thus, these data should be interpreted with caution. Table 1.3 shows the 
development of GDP growth during the period 1992-2000. Unfortunately, the data for 
the earlier years of transition is not available for a number of TEs.  
Table 1.3 Annual real GDP growth (in percent) TEs, 1992-2000 
 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Albania -7.2 9.6 8.3 13.3 9.1 -10.2 12.7 10.1 7.3 
Armenia -41.8 -8.8 5.4 6.9 5.9 3.3 7.3 3.3 5.9 
Azerbaijan -22.6 -23.1 -19.7 -11.8 1.3 5.8 10.0 7.4 11.1 
Belarus -9.6 -7.6 -11.7 -10.4 2.8 11.4 8.4 3.4 5.8 
B & H 
   
20.8 89.0 34.4 15.6 9.6 5.5 
Bulgaria -7.3 -1.5 1.8 2.9 1.6 -1.1 3.5 -5.6 6.0 
Croatia 
    
5.9 6.6 1.9 -0.9 3.8 
Czech  -0.5 0.1 2.9 6.2 4.3 -0.7 -0.3 1.4 4.3 
Estonia 
    
5.9 11.7 6.8 -0.3 9.7 
Georgia -44.9 -29.3 -10.4 2.6 11.2 10.5 3.1 2.9 1.8 
Hungary -3.1 -0.6 2.9 1.5 0.0 3.4 4.2 3.2 4.2 
Kazakhstan -5.3 -9.2 -12.6 -8.2 0.5 1.7 -1.9 2.7 9.8 
Kyrgyz  -13.9 -15.5 -20.1 -5.4 7.1 9.9 2.1 3.7 5.4 
Latvia -32.1 -5.0 2.2 -0.9 3.8 8.3 4.7 4.7 6.9 
Lithuania -21.3 -16.2 -9.8 3.3 5.2 7.5 7.6 -1.1 3.3 
Macedonia  -6.6 -7.5 -1.8 -1.1 1.2 1.4 3.4 4.3 4.5 
Moldova -29.1 -1.2 -30.9 -1.4 -5.2 1.6 -6.5 -3.4 2.1 
Poland 2.5 3.7 5.3 7.0 6.2 7.1 5.0 4.5 4.3 
Romania -8.8 1.5 4.0 7.2 4.0 -6.1 -4.8 -1.2 2.1 
Russia -14.5 -8.7 -12.6 -4.1 -3.6 1.4 -5.3 6.4 10.0 
Serbia 
    
2.4 7.2 2.4 -12.1 7.8 
Slovak 
 
1.9 6.2 5.8 6.8 6.1 4.0 -0.2 1.2 
Slovenia 
    
3.5 5.1 3.3 5.3 4.2 
Tajikistan -29.0 -16.4 -21.3 -12.4 -16.7 1.7 5.3 3.7 8.3 
Turkmenistan -15.0 1.5 -17.3 -7.2 6.7 -11.4 7.1 16.5 5.5 
Ukraine -9.7 -14.2 -22.9 -12.2 -10.0 -3.0 -1.9 -0.2 5.9 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2015 
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As Table 1.3 shows, these TEs differed considerably in the extent of the output decline 
and in terms of the speed of the recovery. Ukraine and Azerbaijan experienced the 
deepest recession, whereas Slovak Republic weathered this period of transition 
better than most in terms of GDP growth.  
In addition, in the early stage of the transition process TEs were experiencing high 
rates of inflation, some of them even experiencing hyperinflation as shown in Table 
1.4. The high volatility of rates of inflation with hyperinflation in some countries was 
a major factor in the high degree of euroization, which is further discussed in the next 
section.  
Table 1.4 Annual rate of inflation in selected TEs, 1990-2000 
 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Albania 85.0 22.6 7.8 12.7 33.2 20.6 0.4 0.1 
Armenia 
 
3373.5 176.0 18.7 14.0 8.7 0.7 -0.8 
Azerbaijan 1128.0 1662.2 411.8 19.8 3.7 -0.8 -8.5 1.8 
Belarus 1190.2 2221.0 709.4 52.7 63.9 72.9 293.7 168.6 
Bulgaria 72.9 96.1 62.1 121.6 1058.4 18.7 2.6 10.3 
Croatia 1500.0 107.3 4.0 4.3 4.2 6.4 4.0 4.6 
Estonia 89.8 47.7 28.8 23.1 10.6 8.2 3.3 4.0 
Georgia 
  
162.7 39.4 7.1 3.6 19.2 4.1 
Hungary 22.5 18.9 28.3 23.4 18.3 14.2 10.0 9.8 
Kazakhstan 
 
1877.4 176.2 39.2 17.4 7.2 8.3 13.2 
Latvia 108.8 35.9 25.0 17.6 8.4 4.7 2.4 2.7 
Lithuania 410.2 72.2 39.7 24.6 8.9 5.1 0.8 1.0 
Macedonia 
 
126.6 16.4 2.5 1.3 0.5 -1.3 6.6 
Poland 36.9 33.3 28.1 19.8 15.1 11.7 7.3 10.1 
Romania 255.2 136.8 32.2 38.8 154.8 59.1 45.8 45.7 
Russia 874.6 307.6 197.5 47.7 14.8 27.7 85.7 20.8 
Serbia 
  
82.7 95.6 23.3 30.2 42.5 71.1 
Slovenia 32.9 21.0 13.5 9.8 8.4 7.9 6.2 8.9 
Ukraine 4734.9 891.2 376.8 80.3 15.9 10.6 22.7 28.2 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2015  
The difficult macroeconomic environment combined with banking crisis meant that 
the full extent of the crisis of the 1990s would not be recognized for several years. 
Nevertheless, most TEs attempted to address the above distortions in their banking 
sectors through several waves of restructuring. Initially they attempted to address 
the problem of the existing non-performing loans in their banking sectors either 
through recapitalization of banks or through writing off the bad loans (Bonin, 2001). 
However, this proved unsuccessful and paved the way for the privatization of state-
owned banks. TEs turned to privatization to diminish the government’s influence on 
banking activity and, at the same time, to bring in better risk management techniques 
and disciplined risk taking (Reininger et al., 2002). The privatization of the banking 
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sector led to a rapid increase in foreign ownership within the banking sectors in all 
TEs. As seen in Figure 1.6 by the year 2002 the average degree of foreign ownership 
had reached around 50%.  
 
Source: EBRD, Transition Report, 2002 
Besides privatization, most TEs were actively engaged in reforming their banking 
sectors during the first decade of the transition process and were successful in this 
regard. One measure of their progress is banking sector reform index (BSRI) 
produced by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) which 
ranks countries on a scale of 1 to 4+, in their progress in liberalisation and 
institutional reform of the banking sector. A score of 1 represents little change from a 
socialist banking sector apart from the separation of the central bank and commercial 
banks, while a score of 4+ represents a level of reform that approximates the 
institutional standards and norms of an industrialised market economy. As can be 
seen in Table 1.5 although most TEs started with the lowest value of the BSRI; by the 
mid-1990s they had reached a value of 2 or higher, implying that all of them had 
achieved some progress in the development of banking sectors, although much 
remained to be done. By 1999, the highest banking reform index observed was in 
Hungary, which suggests that its banking sector was four stages behind the banking 
sectors of the developed countries.  
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Figure 1.6 The degree of  foreign bank ownership in TEs, 2002 
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Table 1.5 The Banking Sector Reform Index (BSRI) in TEs, 1991-1999 
  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Albania 1 1 1.3 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Armenia 1 1 1 1 2 2 2.3 2.3 2.3 
Azerbaijan 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 
Belarus 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 
Bulgaria 1 1.7 2 2 2 2 2.7 2.7 2.7 
Croatia 1 1 2 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 3 
Czech 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3.3 
Estonia 1 2 3 3 3 3 3.3 3.3 3.7 
Georgia 1 1 1 1 2 2 2.3 2.3 2.3 
Hungary 2 2 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 
Kazakhstan 1 1 1 1 2 2 2.3 2.3 2.3 
Kyrgyz 1 1 1 2 2 2 2.7 2.7 2.3 
Latvia 1 2 2 3 3 3 3 2.7 3 
Lithuania 1 1 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 
Macedonia 1 1 1.3 2 3 3 3 3 3 
Moldova 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2.3 2.3 
Poland 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3.3 3.3 
Romania 1 1 1 2 3 3 2.7 2.3 2.7 
Russia 1 1 1 2 2 2 2.3 2 1.7 
Slovak 2 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 
Slovenia 1 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3.3 
Tajikistan 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Ukraine 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 
Source: EBRD, Transition Reports (various years) 
To sum up, the first decade of transition process saw progress in the banking sectors, 
although the progress was uneven and unsatisfactory. Most countries suffered output 
decline and high inflation (some even hyperinflation), however, the scale of these 
recessions varied widely across countries. The main achievement of this period for 
the banking sector was the break-up of the one-tier system and its replacement by a 
two-tier system. The privatization and restructuring of the state owned banks and the 
entry and development of new domestic and foreign banks were also a significant 
achievement (Claessens et al., 2001). Finally, although the regulatory and supervisory 
framework was improved substantially during the period, its enforcement remained 
a problem in many countries. In conclusion, given the macroeconomic turbulence, in 
spite of several waves of restructuring during the first decade of transition, the 
general progress was not satisfactory; hence, the banking crises were happening 
frequently. 
1.4.2  The later stage of transition process 
In contrast to the macroeconomic turbulence experienced during the first decade of 
transition, in the second decade most TEs achieved macroeconomic stabilization and 
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established the foundations of a market economy. Although, initial conditions were 
important to how these countries weathered this period, the policies undertaken 
were the critical component. The countries with better initial conditions and those 
that undertook more aggressive and radical reform, such as the Central European and 
then the Baltic states, achieved stabilization and returned to growth faster (Roaf et al., 
2014).  
The reforms undertaken during the first decade of transition, combined with 
adequate monetary and fiscal policies, enabled the achievement of a stable 
macroeconomic environment in most of the TEs by early 2000s. Although, these 
countries followed relatively different paths with regard to economic performance, all 
of them recorded positive average GDP growth over the period 2000 to 2013 (Figure 
1.7). 
 
 
*For countries in which the data was not available in 2000, the average from the earliest year available. 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2015  
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Of course the diagram showing the average rates of grow (Fig 1.7a) does not pick up 
the effect of the latest Global Financial Crisis (GFC). As Figure 1.7b shows most of the 
TEs continued to record positive GDP growth up until 2009 when the effects of the 
Global Financial Crisis (GFC) reached these countries. Most of the TEs weathered the 
crisis relative well, the exceptions being Croatia, Hungary, Latvia and Slovenia, which 
recorded negative average GDP growths in this latter period.  
During the second decade of transition, most TEs were also successful in bringing 
down the inflation in comparison to the first decade. As Figure 1.4, shows the average 
inflation rate throughout the period 2000-2013 is moderate, with the exception of 
Belarus, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Tajikistan and Ukraine which were not successful in 
bringing the average rate of inflation rate down to single-digit values. Nevertheless, 
the situation is much more stable than that of the 1990s in which some of the TEs 
were still experiencing hyperinflation. 
In this period, TEs recorded remarkable progress in terms of banking sector reforms. 
Figure 1.8 below shows the values of the BSRI across TEs in 2013, and demonstrate 
substantial improvement from the situation in the 1990s (details of which were given 
in Table 1.3). In few countries, such as Estonia, Poland and Slovak Republic, the BSRI 
index is higher than 3+, suggesting that the banking sectors of these countries 
achieved substantial progress.  
 
Source: EBRD, Transition Report 2013 
The highest banking reform index was observed in the Czech Republic suggesting its 
banking sector is almost on par with the banking sectors of the developed countries. 
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In this respect, the TEs that have joined the EU have been able to record the highest 
progress, whilst large differences remain amongst the remaining TEs.  
In addition, during the second decade of transition, the degree of foreign ownership 
in banking sectors continued to have a positive trend in nearly all transition 
countries. The only exceptions are Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, and Poland, in which 
the degree of foreign ownership has actually decreased in the last ten years. As shown 
in Figure 1.9 by 2013 in most of these banking sectors foreign owned banks 
dominated the banking sector by controlling more that 90% of the market. In only 
five countries, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Tajikistan, foreign owned 
banks controlled less than 20% of the banking sector’s assets.  
 
Source: EBRD, Transition Report 2013 
Foreign bank ownership remains an important feature of TEs, for which one must 
account for when conducting any banking/financial sector investigation in these 
countries. In addition, most of the literature on bank efficiency in TEs finds foreign 
ownership a determinant of banking efficiency in these countries, an area further 
discussed in Chapter 3. The thesis will examine the relationships between 
euroization, bank efficiency and foreign ownership. The differences across countries 
in terms of foreign ownership and euroization enable an interesting exploration of 
the implications of the two phenomena for bank efficiency. 
In spite of a stabilized macroeconomic environment, several waves of banking sector 
restructuring, privatization that led to the increased degree of foreign ownership, 
which should have increased the efficiency of the banking sector, TEs continue to lag 
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Figure 1.9 The degree of foreign bank ownership in TEs, 2013 
 24 
 
behind the banking sectors of the Euro Area in terms of the depth of financial 
intermediation. In most TEs the degree of financial depth, measured by domestic 
credit provided by the banking sector as a share of GDP was below 60% in 2013, 
which although, as seen in Figure 1.10, represents considerable improvement in 
comparison with the end of the first decade, it is still only half of the average depth in 
the Euro Area.  
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2015  
As expected the highest degree of development are observed in the EU member 
countries, suggesting that the EU integration process might have had an important 
role in the development of the banking sector. Thus, in other TEs the banking sector 
has yet to fully develop its role in financial intermediation and, as argued in section 
1.2, facilitating economic growth. Taking into consideration this gap and that banking 
sectors dominate the financial system in TEs, a situation that is unlikely to change 
soon, the importance of the banking sector for economic growth means that there is 
much value in further research into the determinants of banks’ efficiency in TEs. 
1.5 Macroprudential policy in TEs       
Macroprudential policy is widely considered a useful response to global financial 
crisis by many countries. As a policy, it is focused on addressing financial stability 
through reduction of the systemic risk “by explicitly addressing the interlinkages 
between, and common exposures of, all financial institutions, and the procyclicality of 
the financial system” (Caruana, 2010). A detailed discussion is given in section 6.2. 
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Taking into consideration the positive impact of euroization on systemic risk (see 
section 2.4) macroprudential policy addresses the phenomenon of euroization as 
well, thus it is of interest for policy makers to assess the impact of macroprudential 
policy on euroization. Emerging market economies, which are highly euroized and 
have pursued this type of policy mostly due to their pronounced business cycles, their 
greater exposure to volatile international capital flows and their underdeveloped 
financial markets (Lim et al., 2011; Claessens et al., 2012) are considered a good 
sample for investigating the impact of the macroprudential policy on euroization.  
A wide range of macroprudential policy instruments (MPIs) have been applied 
throughout the period under consideration in different countries. In the context of 
this thesis, however, the most important ones are the macroprudential policy 
instruments that are directly related to credit and deposit euroization, and which are 
expected to influence the level of euroization. As Figure 1.11 shows these MPIs have 
been actively used in TEs, making this region an interesting area for investigating 
their impact on euroization. 
 
Source: central banks (annual reports various years) and the IMF’s Global Macroprudential Instruments 
Database, 2015 
The figure above shows that there is variation across TEs in terms of the number of 
MPIs directly related to euroization introduced throughout the period. Most countries 
have introduced at least one instrument. We can see that from our sample Serbia is 
the country with the highest number of instruments introduced, followed by 
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Romania. In contrast, three countries: the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia have 
not introduced any instruments related to foreign currency positions.  
Given the importance of various policies aimed at macroeconomic stabilization and 
banking sector development employed in TEs, it is important to investigate their 
impact on the level of credit euroization in these countries. 
1.6 The organization of the thesis 
This chapter has highlighted the importance of the overall research undertaken in the 
thesis. It has provided the background information on the phenomenon of 
euroization, the development of the banking sector and macroeconomic environment 
throughout the two decades of transition in these countries. We now turn to 
explanation of the structure of the thesis, focussing on the content and role of the 
following chapters. 
The first research question is addressed through a review of the literature of 
euroization and bank efficiency presented in Chapters 2 and 3. In Chapter 2, the 
existing theoretical and empirical research on euroization, its determinants and its 
impact on banking sector performance is critically reviewed. In Chapter 3, the 
literature on bank efficiency, on the methodological issues related to the 
measurement of efficiency and its determinants with particular focus on the 
literature in TEs, is discussed. Providing an exhaustive and comprehensive review of 
literature on euroization and bank efficiency is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Nevertheless, the focused reviews of the main contributions to the literature in these 
areas aim to identify the gaps in the literature, which are then addressed through the 
empirical work presented in the subsequent chapters. Thus, the literature reviews in 
Chapters 2 and 3 are used to establish the research hypothesis regarding the impact 
of euroization on banks’ efficiency and to identify the determinants of financial 
euroization.  
The empirical work in this thesis consists of three different investigations and is 
presented in Chapters 4, 5, and 6. In Chapter 4, the empirical investigation of the 
impact of euroization on bank efficiency in TEs is presented. Following the literature 
review on bank efficiency, provided in Chapter 3, the relative cost efficiency of banks 
is estimated employing the stochastic frontier analysis (SFA), explicitly incorporating 
 27 
 
financial euroization and the risk factors in the model. This study broadens the 
literature by investigating possible links between financial euroization and bank 
efficiency. Additionally, by covering an extended period (15 years), the study 
considers a longer period than has previously been available.  
A qualitative analysis of euroization at bank level is presented in Chapter 5. Building 
on the empirical research presented in the Chapter 4, we turn to qualitative analysis 
to further explore and better understand the phenomenon of euroization as seen 
from the bank’s point of view. The investigation is conducted using semi-structured 
face-to-face interviews carried out in the natural settings of individual banks 
operating in two SEE countries: Albania and Macedonia. The chapter provides 
evidence that macroprudential policies are affecting the policies and procedures 
employed by banks in SEE countries, and are becoming an important driver of de-
euroization.  
As an extension to the qualitative analysis presented in Chapter 5, the impact of 
macroprudential policy instruments on euroization in transition economies is 
empirically investigated in Chapter 6. This analysis is conducted for 25 TEs over the 
period 2007-2013, using panel data techniques that incorporate a dynamic element. 
The chapter broadens the literature on euroization and macroprudential policy and 
provides policymakers in TEs, with information on the impact of existing 
macroprudential policy instruments on financial euroization so that they can make 
informed policy decision on the design and implementation of future policy. 
The concluding chapter, Chapter 7, synthesises the main findings of the thesis in 
relation to the key research questions and discusses their implications in terms of 
policymaking in TEs. The chapter highlights the key contributions of the thesis to the 
literature on bank efficiency, euroization, and macroprudential policy. The chapter 
also draws attention to limitations of the work presented and identifies possible 
areas for further research.  
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2.1  Introduction 
Having highlighted the importance of euroization in the context of TEs in Chapter 1, 
we turn to the review of the literature on euroization and bank efficiency, which are 
presented separately in Chapters 2 and 3. This chapter reviews the main theoretical 
approaches and empirical literature on euroization, focusing on the determinants of 
euroization and its impact on financial system, particularly on banking sector 
performance. The literature on euroization is vast and diverse; as the phenomenon 
has been investigated from different perspectives. However, as explained in Chapter 1 
although there are many studies that investigate the impact of euroization on other 
banking performance indicators, to the best of our knowledge, none of them focus on 
efficiency. To identify the extent and the nature of the impact euroization on bank 
efficiency in these countries it is arguably necessary to better understand what drives 
euroization in these countries in the first place. Despite the extensive literature 
analysing the determinants of euroization, the existing research seems to be limited 
in its ability to explain euroization in TEs and ignores the possible impact of 
macroprudential policy. Providing an exhaustive and comprehensive review of 
euroization literature is beyond the scope of this thesis; however, this chapter aims to 
provide a concise critical review of the main literature on different approaches to 
euroization. Consequently, this chapter will provide the basis upon with the research 
hypothesis regarding the impact of euroization on bank efficiency and on the 
determinants of financial euroization will be developed. Thus, the chapter will serve 
as the basis for the empirical research presented in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.  
 
The rest of the chapter is structured in the following manner. Section 2.2 initially 
addresses the phenomenon of euroization in general, it then continues with an 
explanation of a number of definitions euroization used in the literature in order to 
clarify what is used in this thesis. Section 2.3 elaborates on the origins of the process 
of euroization. The discussion of the main theoretical approaches on explaining the 
extent of euroization is provided in section 2.3. The following section identifies the 
role of and consequences of euroization by breaking down its main advantages and 
disadvantages to the economy. A critical review of the empirical literature is provided 
in section 2.5. The discussion is structured in three parts with the first tackling the 
measurement problem in relation to existing research on euroization. The second 
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part seeks to establish the drivers of euroization in TEs, while the third part examines 
the impact of euroization on the financial system. A brief conclusion is offered in the 
last section. 
2.2  Important definitions and concepts  
Euroization occurs when the domestic currency is substituted by a foreign currency. 
In the theoretical and empirical literature, euroization is usually referred to as 
dollarization. This is because for a long time US Dollar was the main currency that 
was used as a substitute for the domestic currency, with countries involved mainly 
located on the American continent. However, lately Euro and Yen have emerged as 
serious competitors to US Dollar in European and Asian countries, respectively. Thus, 
the choice of the foreign currency is heavily depended on where the process is taking 
place. This research will cover transition economies in Europe, that now mostly use 
Euro as a substitute for the domestic currency and, therefore, the term Euroization 
will be used throughout the thesis.  
The word ‘euroization’ has been used in different ways in the literature and we first 
make clear what is the definition in this thesis. There are also differences in the extent 
of substitution and on the money function for which the substitution takes place, 
depending on who initiates it, and the literature defines different sub-types of 
euroization. In the following subsections, these definitions are further explored.  
2.2.1 Official and unofficial euroization 
Some literature differentiates between ‘official euroization’ and ‘unofficial 
euroization’ (Berg and Borensztein, 2000; Eichengreen, 2002; Calvo, 2002; Levy 
Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2003; Jacome and Lonnberg, 2010). In this literature, 
‘official euroization’ refers to the government-led complete abandonment of the 
domestic currency and adoption of a foreign currency as the only legal tender in the 
economy. This is not the use of the term ‘euroization’ in this thesis, which is not 
concerned with the adoption of the euro as the official currency, but with the use of 
the euro and/or other foreign currencies partly substituting the domestic currency of 
the country in specific functions (what this literature terms ‘unofficial euroization’). 
This euroization is initiated by economic agents such as households and firms, not 
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governments. In the period covered by this thesis several countries have formally 
(and with the agreement of the European Commission) joined the European 
Monetary System: Slovenia in 2007, Slovakia in 2009, Estonia in 2011 (EC, 2015). 
Others have unilaterally adopted the euro: Kosovo and Montenegro substituted the 
Serbian Dinar with the German DM in the late -1990s and subsequently substituted 
the DM with the Euro. In these countries, the foreign currency that had been held as 
the major component of their ‘euroization’, the euro, switched to become the 
domestic currency at the adoption dates. The measurement of ‘euroization’ as 
referred to in this thesis in these countries then became in terms of other currencies 
used and was considerably reduced in size.   
2.2.2 Financial, payment and real euroization 
In euroization, the domestic currency can be substituted by the foreign currency in 
one or in all of its main functions. Money has three main traditional functions: 
medium of exchange, unit of account and store of value. As the medium of exchange 
or means of payment, money facilitates exchange and settles payments. Thus, is 
synonymous with the circulating means of payment, whose main attribute according 
to Cohen (2004, p.1) is “its general acceptability to satisfy contractual obligations”. As 
the unit of account money acts as an abstract unit in which contracts, prices and debts 
are expressed (Rochon and Rossi 2003, p.4), thus it conveys pricing information 
quickly and in a reliable manner. As the store of value money retains some of its value 
over the period for which it is held, thus its key attribute is its ability to store 
purchasing power. Depending on the function for which the substitution takes place, 
the literature identifies three different types of euroization: financial, real and 
payment euroization (De Nicolo et al., 2005).  
Financial Euroization 
Financial euroization or asset substitution takes place when assets denominated in 
foreign currency are held as store of value. Calvo and Veigh (1992, p.4) argue that the 
euroization process begins with substitution taking place in the store of value 
function since this is considered the most vulnerable function in inflationary periods. 
Up until the Asian Crisis in the late 1990s, the literature on financial euroization was 
focused only on asset substitution i.e. the use of foreign currency as store of value. 
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Only afterwards, economists started paying attention to the liability side of the 
balance sheet and started researching the holding of foreign currency financial 
liabilities. Financial euroization, as used in the literature in these past few years, is 
defined, by Ize and Levy Yeyati (2003), as the holding of assets and liabilities in 
foreign currency. Financial euroization in terms of balance sheets of households and 
firms, and banks is presented in Figure 2.1 presented below.  
 
As seen above, within households’ or firms’ balance sheets, asset euroization refers to 
their holding of deposits in foreign currency, and liability euroization refers to their 
obtained loans in foreign currency. However, the opposite holds with regard to banks’ 
balance sheets: asset euroization refers to banks’ lending in foreign currency and 
liability euroization refers to banks raising deposits in foreign currency.  
The literature during the last decade treats deposit euroization (DE) as the 
propensity of households, enterprises, and even governments to hold deposits in 
foreign currency, and credit euroization (CE) as the propensity of commercial banks 
to approve loans in foreign currency (Ivanov, et al., 2011). A specific dimension of 
credit euroization commonly found in TEs is index linked (or indexed) lending i.e. 
loans extended in domestic currency but indexed to a foreign currency. Indexed loans 
seem to represent a combined type of euroization where the unit of account is in the 
domestic currency but the store of value is in the foreign currency. However, indexed 
lending is usually ignored in the literature. Most studies do not account for the 
differences between loans approved in foreign currency and those indexed to it, most 
likely due to data limitations. Given that the issue is not usually discussed, it is not 
clear whether indexed loans are ignored or regarded as loans in foreign currency.  
ASSETS 
Figure 2.1 Balance sheets in terms of financial euroization 
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Another particular form of financial euroization, known as the “original sin” 
(Eichengreen and Hausmann, 1999) occurs when governments borrow in foreign 
currency or indexed to foreign currency, because they are unable to borrow in 
domestic currency given the currency’s weaknesses. However, this concept is beyond 
the scope of this thesis and will not be pursued further. 
Arguably, given the main aim of the thesis, which is to explore to role of euroization in 
the context of bank efficiency in TEs, financial euroization is the main concern of the 
thesis. Therefore, when we refer to ‘euroization’, we are referring to financial 
euroization in this thesis unless specified differently. Given that the remaining types 
might play a substantial role in the risks related to the main relationship between 
euroization and bank efficiency, they are also defined in the following subsections. 
Payment Euroization 
Payment Euroization takes place when foreign currency substitutes the domestic 
currency as a medium of exchange. By choosing foreign currency instead of domestic 
one as the means of payment, economic agents trade off the purchasing power risk of 
the domestic currency with the transaction costs of using the foreign currency 
(Engineer 2000). Thus, they will prefer foreign currency if the expected depreciation 
of the domestic currency is high, and the transaction costs such as conversion costs 
are low (Brown and Stix, 2014). Initially most of the literature on Euroization was 
focused only on foreign currency replacing domestic one as means of payment and is 
known as currency substitution literature.  
Real Euroization 
Real euroization takes place when the foreign currency substitutes the domestic 
currency as the unit of account; that is domestic prices and wages are set in the 
foreign currency. According to Calvo and Veigh (1992) real euroization occurs after 
financial euroization. They argue that after the substitution of the store of value 
function has taken place, in the presence of high inflation prices of goods begin to be 
quoted in foreign currency, then finally larger transactions start to be performed in 
the foreign currency. However, Ize and Parrado (2006) documented that real 
euroization is moderate in countries that have high financial euroization. The 
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literature on real euroization is rather limited, which is probably due to the fact that 
direct measurements of real euroization are rather scarce.   
2.3  The origins of Euroization 
Euroization, in terms of this thesis, has a long history and deep roots, which can be 
traced back to early 1900s in the Latin American countries. (In these countries it is 
known as dollarization, given the major currency involved, and in what follows in the 
rest of this section we follow the literature and use that term, but as discussed in 
section 2.2 elsewhere in the thesis we use the term euroization.) As a phenomenon 
dollarization received a push when the convertibility to gold was abandoned in early 
1930s and by 1970s it became important in the region when the foreign exchange 
controls in financial and currency markets were eliminated. Between the end of the 
Second World War and the 1970s the international monetary system followed the 
Bretton Woods system, which established that countries had to maintain fixed 
exchange rates against the US Dollar. The underlying idea was that by gradually 
adjusting the nominal exchange rate over time they could achieve a lower the level of 
inflation. The widespread support at this time for the fixed exchange rate system was 
reflected in the Latin American region as well, which at the time was struggling with 
very high inflation and great macroeconomic instability. 
Unfortunately, the fixed exchange rate systems was not the answer for the Latin 
American countries, given that the inflation rate did not fall and many countries in the 
region experienced massive real currency appreciations and increasing current 
deficits in late 1970s and early 1980s. Different countries attempted various solutions 
to the crisis, although most of them implemented several waves of financial sector 
reform (Corbo and Fischer 1995). A sequence of government interventions, involving 
capital and foreign exchange controls that were first introduced, then abandoned and 
subsequently reintroduced, were employed in the 1970s and 1980s in many Latin 
American countries (Savastano, 1996). Mexico lifted its foreign exchange controls in 
1977, reinstituted them in 1982 and then lifted them again in 1985. Bolivia lifted its 
foreign exchange controls in 1973, reinstituted them in 1982 and then lifted them in 
1986. Peru lifted its foreign exchange controls in 1985, reinstituted them in 1986 and 
lifted them again in 1988 (Gomis-Porqueras, et al., 2000). As capital and foreign 
exchange controls were lifted the foreign currency began to replace the local 
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currencies, starting the process later known as dollarisation. The individuals and 
households of these countries used dollarisation to protect their assets from the high 
inflation and macroeconomic instability that was characterizing these countries at the 
time. The degree of dollarisation grew steadily from the time when restrictions were 
eased until they were reinstated. Therefore, the process was fuelled by the financial 
reforms of the 1970s employed in the Latin American region. 
The struggle of the Latin American region with macroeconomic instability and the 
external debt crisis in the 1980s, combined with the failed government interventions, 
resulted in higher inflation rates, larger deficits, deeper external imbalances and 
continuous capital flight accelerating the process of dollarization (Quispe-Agnoli, 
2002). In the 1990s government policies in Latin American countries shifted 
dramatically from policies based on government intervention to market-oriented 
reforms which sought to control inflation and achieve economic stability by fiscal 
discipline, reduction in the size of the government, privatization, tax reform, and 
trade and financial liberalization (Quispe-Agnoli, 2002). Nevertheless, although the 
macroeconomic stability was achieved, the degree of dollarisation remained high in 
the region. As discussed in section 1.4 a similar process occurred few decades later in 
European Transition economies with the citizens and firms in these countries 
substituting the Deutch Mark (and then Euro) for the domestic currency.  
2.4  Development of Euroization 
Euroization has been investigated in the literature from different perspectives. The 
early literature focused on payment euroization, therefore it is known as currency 
substitution view. The recent literature has focused more on financial euroization and 
is divided into three separate strands. In the subsequent sections, we provide a 
critical analysis of these views.   
2.4.1 The early literature 
The early literature, also known as currency substitution approach maintains that 
euroization is consequence of macroeconomic instability combined with high rates of 
inflation and exchange rate instability. Therefore, the focus is on the relationship 
between the degree of euroization and the level of the inflation and the link between 
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euroization and monetary policy ineffectiveness. This approach maintains that 
economic agents consider euroization because they perceive domestic currency as 
less credible in the presence of high inflation (Balino et al., 1999; Court et al., 2010); 
thus, the demand for domestic currency is negatively correlated with the country’s 
inflation rate (Savastano, 1996). This is in line with the developments taking place in 
the early phase of transition discussed in section 1.4. During the 1990s, TEs 
experienced repeated episodes of high inflation and hyperinflation that decreased the 
credibility of domestic currencies and incentivized people to euroize.  
In terms of its impact on the economy or its consequences, the currency substitution 
approach argues that euroization leads to a less effective monetary policy since the 
money demand for domestic currency becomes more unstable in the presence of 
euroization (Balino et al., 1999). Euroized economies tend to show signs of a more 
unstable demand for money and a more elastic price response to monetary shocks, as 
the currency composition of liquid balances becomes more sensitive to devaluation 
expectations (Levy Yeyati, 2006). Under currency substitution, the central bank is 
considered to be less able to influence the relevant interest rates for consumption and 
investment decisions (Galindo and Leiderman, 2006). Finally, the approach argues 
that once the rate of inflation (or inflationary expectations) decreases and reaches 
certain stability, euroization ceases to increase. Then, eventually economic agents will 
orientate their preference towards the domestic currency, thus with time euroization 
should recede (Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2001).  
The main challenge to this approach is hysteresis or the persistence of euroization, 
which has taken place in developing countries. Although, the approach argues that 
with time euroization should recede, as discussed in section 1.3, the level of 
euroization has remained high in most of TEs during the last two decades. The 
persistence of euroization has attracted attention in the literature, becoming a focus 
of various studies. A theoretical argument for hysteresis is that the high levels of 
inflation encourage the development of new financial instruments (a gradual and 
costly process) which economic agents continue to use even after inflation is reduced 
(Dornbusch and Reynoso, 1989; Wolf, 1990 in Calvo and Veigh, 1992). The inability of 
the currency substitution approach to fully explain the hysteresis of euroization has 
oriented the recent literature towards financial euroization, which is the focus of the 
recent literature.  
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2.4.2 The recent literature 
The more recent literature has mainly explored financial euroization. This literature 
is divided into three strands: the portfolio view, the market failure view, and the 
institutional view.  
Portfolio view 
The portfolio approach focuses on explaining the preference for foreign currency as 
the store of value. The approach was put forward by Ize and Levy Yeyati (2003) and 
considers the level of euroization as an optimal portfolio choice for a given 
distribution of real returns to the assets in domestic and foreign currencies. This 
approach argues that the returns of real cash flow of assets in domestic and foreign 
currencies are uncertain because of inflation and exchange rate volatility (Ize and 
Levy Yeyati, 2003; Basso et al., 2011). Thus contrary to the currency substitution 
view, this approach argues that incentives for euroization centre on volatilities of 
inflation and the exchange rate instead of their levels. The underlying assumption of 
the portfolio approach is that if the uncovered interest rate parity holds, the emphasis 
is placed on the variances (Ivanov et al., 2011). The idea is that the higher the 
variability of inflation relative to real exchange rate depreciation the riskier and less 
attractive the domestic currency assets. Therefore, a stable domestic inflation and 
volatile exchange rate should increase the preference for the domestic currency as 
store of value and thus reduce financial euroization (Rennhack and Nozaki, 2006 p.6).  
The portfolio approach argues that policies that target exchange rate stability induce 
financial euroization. Thus, although many TEs switched to exchange rate targeting 
and aimed at exchange rate stability to remove the macroeconomic imbalances that 
introduced euroization in the first place, the exchange rate stability can induce the 
persistence of euroization. Exchange rate stability remained a policy objective for 
many TEs mostly because of the major difficulties any depreciation would cause due 
to the existing high levels of euroization. This is, what Calvo and Reinhart (2002) 
referred to as “fear of floating” i.e. the interventions of central banks to “avoid sudden 
or large depreciation although exchange rate regime is flexible” (Levy Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger, 2007, p.3). The portfolio approach thus argues that instead of exchange 
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rate stability countries should use a combination of floating exchange rates and 
inflation targeting to reduce euroization incentives (Levy Yeyati, 2006). 
The portfolio approach is criticized on grounds of its underlying assumptions that 
interest rate parity holds. By assuming this, the theory excludes the possibility of a 
risk premium or an interest rate differential being potential cause of euroization. 
Market failure view 
The market failure view considers financial euroization a consequence of market 
imperfections and externalities and an inadequate regulatory framework that fails to 
address these problems (Levi Yeyati, 2006). The argument is that a series of market 
imperfections can distort the choice of currency composition, subsequently leading to 
euroization. A possible market imperfection that could induce financial euroization is 
“currency-blind” policies or regulations that do not differentiate between domestic 
and foreign currency (Broda and Levy Yeyati, 2006). In situations when the deposit 
insurance policy or lender of last resort policy are currency-blind, economic agents 
expect that government will provide a bail out irrespective of the currency in which 
their assets or liabilities are denominated. Consequently, they will attempt to benefit 
from the stability the foreign currency provides, in spite of the associated risks (De 
Nicolo et al., 2005) thus, they will behave recklessly rather than hedge and have the 
tendency to euroize. For instance, if the foreign currency is perceived as the most 
stable currency households will prefer to deposit their money in the foreign currency. 
Banks, faced with a higher supply of deposits in foreign currency, will lower interest 
rates on deposits in foreign currency compared to those in domestic currency. Given 
that now they have substantial liabilities in the foreign currency, they will attempt to 
hedge against currency risk by lending in foreign currency proportional to their 
foreign currency liabilities. The lower interest rates on foreign currency means that 
the funding costs in foreign currency are lower compared to those in domestic 
currency. 
 In addition, the high degree of foreign ownership within banking sectors in TEs 
means that most of the banks in these countries are able to raise faster and cheaper 
additional funds in foreign currency through their ties with foreign banking groups or 
parent banks. Consequently, banks are incentivized to lend in the foreign currency. 
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Additionally, if they believe that the government will bail them out in case of large 
depreciation they will continue to lend in foreign currency without paying enough 
attention to the associated risks. The currency-blind regulations can also induce 
euroization because in situations of bank liquidation banks do not pay the higher 
costs of foreign currency deposits in the event of default and thus find it cheaper to 
finance their project through foreign currency funding (Broda and Levy Yeyati, 2006, 
p. 970). The currency-blind regulatory framework also incentivizes households to 
euroize i.e. hold deposits in foreign currency. For instance, if they believe that their 
deposits are safe given that the government provides the necessary security by 
bailing out banks, they will prefer holding their deposits in the foreign currency and 
thus benefit from its perceived stability. In addition, in the event of bank liquidation 
due to the depreciation of the domestic currency the domestic currency depositors 
are discriminated against, since the foreign currency depositors will have larger 
claims on the bank’s residual values. Consequently, this can lead to a higher level of 
euroization. 
The market failure view is mostly focused on explaining the market failures that 
encourage the acceleration of the degree of euroization in TEs instead of identifying 
the failures that introduced the phenomenon of euroization. 
Institutional view 
The institutional approach maintains that institutional failures and the low quality 
institutional framework can encourage and enhance euroization. The rationale 
behind this approach is that a low quality institutional framework can introduce or 
reinforce market distortions, contributing to the enhancement of euroization (Levy 
Yeyati, 2006). The approach argues that due to a low quality institutional framework 
the government’s commitment to control inflation is not credible for economic agents 
such as household and firms. Consequently, given the lack of confidence in both 
monetary and fiscal policy, because of behaviour in past periods, the rational 
responses of households and firms will be to increase euroization (Calvo and Guidoti, 
1990; Feige, 2003; De Nicolo et al., 2003; Honig, 2005). Faced with low credibility of 
the other economic policies governments can aim to increase its credibility by 
euroizing their obligations, also known as the “original sin” (Eichengreen and 
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Hausmann, 1999), which is considered a “costly way to commit to low inflation” (Levy 
Yeyati, 2006, p.16).  
In addition, this approach argues that low quality institutions, particularly in the 
banking sector, are more prone to engaging in a government bailout (De Nicolo et al., 
2005; Levy Yeyati, 2006). If they are confident that in case of need they will get bailed 
out and they believe that if needed the central bank can provide foreign exchange 
liquidity, they tend to be more reckless in hedging foreign exchange risk. Hence, 
euroization can be considered the “collateral cost of low institutional credibility” 
(Levy Yeyati, 2006, p. 82).  
The main limitation of this approach is that it significantly overlaps with the other 
approaches in its underlying assumptions. It only highlights the role of low quality 
institutions in inducing euroization through the channels already identified by the 
previous approaches. In addition, the institutional approach, as Weymoth (2007) 
points out, argues that low quality institutions encourage euroization but fails to 
identify which institutions are more important and why. Weymoth (2007, p. 14) 
attempts to overcome this limitation by identifying “good” institutions that deter 
euroization. According to him, institutions that enhance the protection of private 
property actually deter euroization. In addition, the approach does not recognize 
institutions related to financial sector itself as potential drivers of euroization.  
To sum up as explained above the existing theoretical approaches tackle euroization 
from different aspects. The existence of various types of euroization has led to 
different theoretical approaches. Consequently, studies usually focus on the most 
relevant type depending on the context of the research. Given that throughout the 
thesis the focus will be on financial euroization the recent theoretical approaches are 
more relevant.  
2.5  The advantages and disadvantages of euroization 
This section further explores euroization by breaking down its main advantages and 
disadvantages derived from the main theoretical approaches. 
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2.5.1 Advantages  
The consensus in the literature is that euroization contributes to macroeconomic 
stability by removing the problem of high inflation and thus solving the credibility 
problem. In general, high inflation contributes to the shallowness of the financial 
system. It raises banks' screening and monitoring costs, thus, banks lend and allocate 
less capital, limiting financing of the economy and induces savers to save less, 
preferring physical assets instead of financial ones (Court et al., 2010). Euroization 
reduces inflation by reducing currency risk and foreign exchange transaction costs 
(Alesina and Barro, 2002; Frankel and Rose, 2002; De Nicolo et al., 2005) solving the 
credibility problem that arises when a domestic central bank is unable to keep the 
rate of inflation low (Winkler et al., 2004). This consequently reduces the transaction 
costs for international trade, especially with the country of the foreign currency, 
which leads to greater economic integration (Frankel and Rose, 1998; Rose and Engel 
2000a; Winkler et al., 2004). Considering that the issuing country tends to be more 
developed, euroization can lead to greater integration with global financial markets 
(Click, 2007), which is usually beneficial. Furthermore, greater integration with global 
financial markets means greater domestic intermediation due to the increased capital 
flow (Komarek and Melecky, 2003) and higher financial sophistication. It also means 
greater financial depth (De Nicolo et al., 2005). The magnitude/significance of all the 
advantages mentioned above depends on the degree of euroization.  
2.5.2 Disadvantages  
The most discussed disadvantages of euroization are the loss of seigniorage, loss of a 
lender of last resort and the loss of the use of monetary policy (Winkler et al., 2004; 
Click, 2007; Honohan, 2007). The loss of seigniorage revenues from issuing a 
domestic currency is a direct substantial cost of euroization. The loss of a lender of 
last resort – ability to inject the necessary liquidity to prevent a default on deposits 
(Berg and Borensztein, 2000) or liquidity risk - is a substantial risk particularly in 
times of banking sector crises. The presence of euroization also weakens, if not 
eliminates, the use of monetary policy as a hedging instrument against asymmetric 
shocks. Therefore, given the important role of monetary policy in accommodating 
asymmetric shocks and stabilizing business cycles, euroization can lead to higher 
macroeconomic instability (Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2001). As with the advantages, 
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the magnitude of the disadvantages depends on the degree of euroization. Another 
substantial disadvantage of euroization is the increased vulnerability of the banking 
sector (Honohan and Shi, 2002). Significant deposit euroization induces credit 
euroization as a hedging mechanism against currency risk. Nevertheless, this is not a 
foolproof hedging strategy given that households and non-exporting firms receive 
their income in the domestic currency but now their debt is may be denominated in 
the foreign currency. By crediting these agents in foreign currency, banks have passed 
the foreign exchange risk to them. However, given their inability to hedge their 
currency positions this risk is partly transformed into default risk. This is what is 
referred in the literature as currency mismatch risk (De Nicolo et al., 2005). In the 
worst case scenario a large number of firms and household will not be able to repay 
the debt, which will lead to widespread bankruptcy. Thus, euroization can also 
increase systemic risk. Higher euroization can also reduce the effectiveness of 
financial safety nets, raise foreign currency demand, and accelerate a currency crisis, 
thereby further worsen the solvency of banks (Jacome, 2004). The currency mismatch 
risk is the basis of the negative impact of euroization on banking sector performance 
and financial stability (Dornbusch, 1998; Krugman, 1999; Studart, 2001; Calvo et al., 
2003 in Galindo and Leiderman, 2006). Another serious consequence of euroization is 
the exacerbation the country risk when banking crises are combined with currency 
crises (Druck et al., 2001; Gruben and Welch, 1996; Honig, 2009).  
2.6  Empirical review 
Euroization has been researched extensively empirically with regard to its 
determinants and its impact on the economy and financial sector. However, 
depending on the type of euroization examined and how it was measured, the results 
differ significantly. In line with the theoretical literature, most of the early empirical 
literature was focused on the determinants of euroization; scholars were interested 
on defining the driving force behind euroization. It was later that the possible impact 
of euroization on the economy and financial sector generated interest. The first part 
of this section will discuss the issues regarding the measurement of euroization, 
depending on the type of the euroization used. The discussion of the measurement 
issues will be followed by a review of the studies that have investigated the 
determinants of the euroization. In the last part the main studies that have 
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researched the the relationship between euroization and banking sector will be 
analysed.   
2.6.1 Measurement of euroization 
Studies of euroization are bound to have measurement issues mainly due to different 
types of euroization but also due to unavailability of data. In the presence of various 
types of euroization there is lack of consistency in choosing an indicator of 
euroization, thus most of the studies address only one aspect of euroization (Levy 
Yeyati, 2006). Nevertheless, even if the issue of the precise definition of the 
euroization is dealt with and an ideal measure of euroization is agreed upon (which 
would include the measurement of currency substitution in all major functions of the 
money) there is the problem of the unavailability and reliability of the data. Every 
empirical investigation on euroization is faced with the obstacle of the unavailability 
of reliable data and forced to use imperfect measures, regardless of whether it is 
investigating transition or industrial economies.  
As explained in section 2.1 most of the early literature explored currency 
substitution, that is payment euroization. Nevertheless, given that as discussed above 
“there is usually no data available on foreign currency circulating in an economy” 
Calvo and Vegh (1992, p.21) empirical literature sidestepped this issue by using the 
share of foreign currency deposits in total deposits. Therefore, this part of the 
literature has problems (Ize and Levy Yeyati, 2003) given that it explains the 
determinants of payment euroization based on the currency substitution theoretical 
framework, whilst using a measure of financial euroization. Using different types of 
euroization interchangeably can be misleading since both determinants and 
conceptual implications of the two phenomena are rather different (Sahay and Veigh, 
1995). The empirical literature on real euroization is rather limited; mostly due to the 
fact that the direct measurement of real euroization is scarce. Due to these 
limitations, the literature is oriented towards financial euroization, which faces less 
empirical problems. The literature on financial euroization, until very recently, 
focused only on deposit euroization. This was first, because data on deposit 
euroization were the most ready available data. However, most of the studies 
employed imperfect measures of deposit euroization that exclude the foreign 
currency deposits held abroad (Savastano, 1996),  a limitation which was made clear 
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in all these studies. Second, most of the studies neglected credit euroization because 
they believed that deposit and credit euroization mirror each other due to regulatory 
requirements, which is not necessarily the case as discussed in section 1.3.  
As explained before financial euroization is the most applicable type of euroization in 
the context of this thesis. This is the most straightforward type in terms of 
measurement issues as well except for the issue of how to treat foreign currency 
indexed loans3 (discussed further in section 5.8.4).  
2.6.2 Determinants of euroization  
This section discusses the literature on the determinants of financial euroization, 
setting the scene for the thesis and feeding through to the discussion in Chapter 6. It 
starts with a concise summary of the main drivers of deposit euroization in relation to 
the existing theoretical approaches. Although we have argued that credit euroization 
is not simply a mirror of deposit euroization, many of the same factors may affect 
both through banks’ and other agents’ decision making. It then continues with a 
particular focus on the determinants of credit euroization. 
The existing empirical literature identifies the following main determinants of deposit 
euroization:   
(i) The past rates of inflation especially high and unstable inflation rates, 
usually captured in the empirical studies by the historic observed inflation 
rates or volatility of inflation rates, are found to be the most important 
determinant supporting the currency substitution view (Savastano, 1996; 
Fischer, et al., 1996; Arteta, 2005; Honig, 2009; Neanidis and Sava, 2009; 
Neanidis, 2010; Ivanov et al., 2011; Vieria et al., 2012; Tkalec, 2013). Whilst, 
the observed rates of inflation are found to be important, the expected rates 
of inflation or the forward-looking aspect is not found of importance in a 
particular study that employees data from a household survey conducted in 
CESEE (Sitx, 2009). 
                                                          
3
 Foreign currency indexed loans are loans that are disbursed in the domestic currency but are indexed or 
linked to a fixed normal exchange rate which is usually set based on a historical average. 
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(ii) Macroeconomic conditions captured by the macro variables such as real 
GDP growth or interest rate differential, as explained in the following page, 
are also found to be important determinants (Savastano, 1996; Honohan and 
Shi, 2002; Ize and Parrado, 2002; Ize and Levy Yeati, 2003; Arteta, 2003; 
Honohan, 2007; De Nicolo et al., 2005; Scheiber and Stix, 2009; Honig, 2009; 
Neanidis and Sava, 2009; Neanidis, 2010; Ivanov et al., 2011; Vieria et al., 
2012; Tkalec, 2013). 
(iii) The minimum variance portfolio (MVP) or the trade-off between inflation 
and real exchange rate variability is also found to be important, supporting 
the portfolio theoretical view (Ize and Levy Yeyati, 1998; Ize and Levy Yeyati, 
2003; De Nicolo et al., 2005; Honig, 2009; Neanidis and Sava, 2009; Basso et 
al., 2011; Neanidis, 2010; Ivanov et al., 2011; Vieria et al., 2012; Tkalec, 
2013). 
(iv) Regulatory framework, consisting of bank safety nets, insurance schemes 
and the presence of last resort, which does not discriminate between 
domestic and foreign currencies i.e., does not differentiate in terms of 
regulatory requirements between domestic and other currencies, is found to 
be a driver, supporting the market failure view (Broda and Levy Yeyati, 
2006). The regulatory framework is usually controlled for in the empirical 
studies through indicator variables which would differentiate between 
countries that have different regulatory requirements between assets and 
liabilities in foreign and domestic currency. 
(v) Institutional quality is another identified determinant, particularly of the 
speed of its development, supporting the institutional quality approach 
(Savastano, 1996; Ize and Levy Yeyati, 2003; De Nicolo et al., 2005; Seater, 
2008; and Neanidis and Sava, 2009). Empirical studies usually use the 
EBRD’s Banking Sector Reform Index, which is explained in detail in section 
1.4 as a proxy for institutional quality. 
As mentioned, credit euroization is the less explored side of the financial euroization, 
which only recently has been given attention in the literature. Deposit euroization has 
been studied considerably more, also because it was investigated in the context of 
currency substitution. The lack of literature on credit euroization has been mainly 
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attributed to the lack of an overall theoretical framework (Basso et al., 2011). The 
existing theoretical approach does not provide a clear explanation for the presence of 
both credit and deposit euroization. The portfolio approach can explain why 
households hold deposits in foreign currency but not why they are borrowing in 
foreign currency. In addition, the lack of data has constrained the existing literature 
to focusing mostly on deposit euroization or credit euroization but typically not both 
(De Nicolo et al., 2005). The use of only one of them was considered a reasonable 
choice given that it was thought that both credit and deposit euroization often mirror 
each other due to prudential regulations in many countries (Levy Yeyati, 2004). 
Nevertheless, it turns out that credit and deposit euroization do not always match and 
often display different patterns (Ize and Levy Yeyati, 1998; Catao and Terrones, 2000; 
and Basso et al., 2011). This triggered a new wave of empirical investigations that 
focused on the determinants of credit euroization either on its own or in comparison 
to deposit euroization.  
The empirical literature takes into account determinants that reflect: the supply side 
(such as foreign currency deposits, foreign ownership); the demand side (interest 
rate differentials); and both sides (inflation volatility, exchange rate volatility, MVP). 
It identifies the following main determinants of credit euroization: 
(i) Interest rate differentials (between the foreign and local currency), 
measured as the difference between the interest rate in the foreign currency 
loans and the one in the local currency, are found one of the most significant 
determinants (Barajas and Morales, 2003; Arteta, 2005; Basso et al., 2011; 
Luca and Petrova, 2008; Neanidis and Sava, 2009; Rosenberg and Tirpak, 
2008; Zettelmeyer et al., 2010; Brzoza-Brzezina et al, 2010; Neanidis, 2010; 
Brown et al., 2011; Haiss and Rainer, 2012; Ivanov et al., 2011; Basso et al., 
2011; Brown and De Haas, 2012). The differential, besides  the relative price of 
foreign currency loans, reflects the macroeconomic stability and its 
significance depends upon the trade-off effect between the currency risk and 
real interest rate risk if the inflation is lower than expected (Cuaresma et al., 
2013; Hake et al., 2014). 
 
(ii)  Bank currency matching, which entails matching of foreign currency 
positions/hedging against exchange rate risk by lending in foreign currency is 
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another main factor of euroization. Lending in foreign currency is the only 
possibility for banks for hedging against currency risk in TEs due the lack of 
hedging instruments in countries with underdeveloped banking systems and 
lack of financial markets. Therefore bank currency matching is widely proxied 
in the empirical studies by the degree of deposit euroization in the country, or 
the difference between deposit euroization and credit euroization (Luca and 
Petrova, 2003; Ize and Levy Yeyati, 2003; Basso et al., 2011; Neanidis and 
Sava, 2009; Haiss et al., 2009; Rosenberg and Tirpak, 2008; Zettelmeyer et al., 
2010; Neanidis, 2010; Ivanov et al., 2011; Brown et al., 2011; Brown and De 
Haas, 2012; Haiss and Rainer, 2012). In terms of bank currency matching, 
Neanidis and Sava (2009) argue that it drives euroization only in the short run 
contrary to Ivanov et al. (2011) who find it a long-term determinant.  
 
(iii) Exchange rate volatility, usually controlled through the standard deviation 
of the exchange rates between domestic and foreign currency(Luca and 
Petrova, 2008; Haiss et al., 2009; Honig, 2009; Rosenberg and Tirpak, 2008; 
Brown and De Hass, 2012; Neanidis, 2010; Brown et al., 2011; Ivanov et al., 
2011) and MVP or the trade-off between real exchange rate variability and 
inflation also have an effect (Ize and Levy Yeyati, 2003; Barajas and Morales, 
2003; De Nicolo et al., 2005, Luca and Petrova, 2008; Scheber and Stix, 2009; 
Neanidis and Sava, 2009; Honig, 2009; Basso et al., 2011; Neanidis, 2010;  
Ivanov et al., 2011). 
 
(iv) Access to foreign funds, usually proxied by the share of foreign bank assets 
in the banking system, also contributes to credit euroization (Luca and 
Petrova, 2003; Arteta, 2005; Basso et al., 2011; Stix, 2009; Rosenberg and 
Tirpak, 2008; Neanidis and Sava, 2009; Haiss et al., 2009; Basso et al., 2011; 
Brown and De Haas, 2012; Haiss and Rainer, 2012).  
 
(v) Poor institutional quality and credibility (particularly in the banking 
sector), usually proxied through the EBRD’s Banking Sector Refrom Index is 
another significant determinant (Ize and Parrado, 2002; Feige, 2003; Jeanne, 
2003; Luca and Petrova, 2003; Arteta, 2005; Scheber and Stix, 2009; Stix, 
2009; Neanidis and Sava, 2009).  
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(vi) Market imperfections such as limited bank competition, network 
externalities and transaction costs such as banks’ cost structures, tradable 
collateral capabilities and the cost of loan enforcement, which are usually 
proxied by the degree of concentration in banking sector or through some 
measure of law enforcement such as corruption indices, also matter (Catao 
and Terrones, 2000; Barajas and Morales, 2003; Feige et al., 2004; De Freitas, 
2004; Haiss et al., 2009).  
Taking into consideration that deposit euroization has been extensively studied in the 
TEs under consideration whereas credit euroization has been neglected until very 
recently, this thesis aims to address this gap and explore the credit euroization side of 
financial euroization whilst analysing the main drivers of drivers of euroization in 
TEs established theoretically and empirically. The details of the most recent studies 
that have investigated credit euroization either on its own or together with deposit 
euroization are presented in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1 Recent empirical investigations of credit euroization in TEs 
Author (year) Methodology Period Sample Data 
Only Credit Euroization 
Haiss & Rainer (2012) FE; RE 1999-2007 
13 countries 
(CESEE) 
Firm, Household 
survey 
Brown et al. (2011) Probit; OLS 2002-2005 
9655 firms in 
26 countries 
Firm survey  
Brown & De Haas 
(2012) 
OLS 2005 
192 banks in 
20 countries 
Bank survey  
Brzoza-Brzezina et al. 
(2010) 
SUR; VAR 2007-2008 
4 countries 
(CESEE) 
Macro-level  
Zettelmeyer et al 
(2010) 
GMM 
2000-2008 
2002-2005 
CESEE & CIS 
Macro, Firm 
survey  
Rosenberg & Tirpak 
(2008) 
OLS; FE; RE 1999-2008 
8 countries 
(CESEE & CIS) 
Macro-level  
Haiss et al. (2009)  OLS 1999-2006 16 countries Macro-level  
Berkmen & Cavallo 
(2010) 
GMM 1970-2003 145 countries Macro-level  
Luca & Petrova (2008) OLS  1990-2003 
21 countries 
(CESEE & CIS) 
Macro-level  
Rosenberg & Tirpak 
(2008) 
OLS; FE; RE 1999-2007 
10 countries 
(CESEE & CIS) 
Macro-level  
Both Deposit and Credit Euroization 
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Ivanov et al. (2011) 
Johanen & Engle-Granger 
threshold coint.;VECM & 
threshold VECM 
1997-2010 Croatia Macro-level  
Basso et al (2011) Panel; Panel-VAR 2000-2006 
24 countries 
(CESEE & CIS) 
Macro-level  
Neanidis (2010) 
Feasible generalized 
least squares (FGLS); 
2SLE RE; 2SLE FE 
1991-2010 
24 countries 
(CESEE & CIS) 
Macro-level  
Honig (2009) OLS; FE; RE 1998-2000 90 countries Macro-level  
Neanidis & Savva 
(2009) 
OLS 1993-2006 
11 countries 
(CESEE & CIS) 
Macro-level  
Neanidis & Savva 
(2009) 
OLS 1993-2007 
9 countries 
(CESEE & CIS) 
Macro-level  
As seen above, the vast majority of the recent empirical literature on credit 
euroization explores the macro level determinants with the exception of few recent 
papers that use household, firm and bank-level survey data. This thesis will use 
macro data to explore the determinants of euroization. A common weakness of these 
studies is their time span: most of them cover the period up to year 2008; thus, do not 
capture the effects of the global financial crisis. The only exceptions are Neanidis 
(2010) and Ivanov et al. (2011) which cover the period until year 2010, but given that 
year 2009 and 2010 are the years in which the effect of the crisis reaches TEs, these 
studies are also limited in capturing fully the impact of the crisis in these countries. In 
this regard the thesis extends the empirical literature by covering a period that is less 
researched, from 2007 up until 2013, which will also enable capturing the effects of 
the global financial crisis given that it had a delayed effect in some of the TEs 
particularly the SEE countries. The data is also of wide sample of countries (24). In 
terms of methodology, only two studies Berkmen and Cavallo (2010) and Zettelmeyer 
et al. (2010) employ GMM techniques, which are arguably the most appropriate given 
the need to capture the dynamics of the investigated relationships. The thesis adds to 
previous research on the determinants of financial euroization in this regard by 
investigating the use of dynamic panel analysis to differentiate between the short-run 
and long-run effect of the determinants of euroization and to adjust for the potential 
endogeneity of conventional determinants.  
Finally, none of the studies control for the impact of macroprudential policy 
instruments, most likely because this policy has been employed more extensively 
from year 2009 onwards (see section 1.5 for a detailed discussion on this). Given this 
background knowledge the thesis extend the euroization literature by being the first 
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study that explores the relationship between macroprudential policy instruments and 
credit euroization. 
2.6.3 Euroization and the financial system 
Although the empirical literature on the impact of euroization on financial system 
performance in the context of TEs has increased during the last decade, it remains 
rather limited. Euroization, given its significant and persistent presence in TEs, 
documented in section 1.3, may well have an impact on bank performance; however, 
the existing literature on determinants of banking efficiency does not recognize it. 
There are only a handful of studies that explore the relationship between euroization 
and financial instability, banking crises and other banking performance indicators 
(De Nicolo et al., 2003; Arteta, 2003; Levy Yeyati, 2006; Shinichi, 2007). However, 
since the global financial crisis, financial euroization started to receive greater 
attention in the literature mostly due to its positive role in increasing the systemic 
risk (Ozsoz 2009; Court et al., 2010; Kutan et al., 2010; Fidrmuc et al., 2013). The 
global financial crisis showed that the unique characteristics of the financial sector in 
the region such as financial euroization, constrain policymakers in containing their 
vulnerabilities and risks when faced with difficulties. Higher financial euroization 
instead of helping economies recover can deepen or trigger recession (Cook, 2004).  
Furthermore, the existing empirical evidence remains inconclusive. Most of the 
studies find that financial system development is adversely impacted by euroization; 
however, there are few studies indicating that euroization is beneficial in terms of 
asset’s quality and a few others that find no significant relationship. These findings 
are summarised in Table 2.2. 
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Table 2.2 Recent empirical investigations of euroization and financial system  
Author 
(year) 
Method. 
Sample/ 
Period 
Dependent 
variable 
Independent 
variables 
Findings 
Fidrmuc 
et al. 
(2013) 
Two-
stage 
Heckman 
selection 
approach 
1000 
individuals, 
in 9 
countries 
/2007-2010 
Financial 
vulnerability 
(Loan 
arrears) 
Credit euroization 
(Dummy variable); 
exchange rate 
depreciation 
It has a  positive impact 
on financial 
vulnerability in 
depreciation countries 
Kutan et 
al. (2010) 
GMM 
5249 banks 
in 36 
countries 
/1991-2001 
Bank 
profitability 
(Profit before 
tax/total 
assets);  
Deposit euroization; 
GDP; inflation; 
interest rate spread; 
LLP/Total loans; 
equity/total assets;  
It could increase 
financial fragility, 
create balance sheet 
problems and affect 
bank profitability 
Court et 
al. (2010) 
OLS 
44 
countries 
/1996-2002 
Financial 
Deepening 
(Credit to the 
private 
sector/GDP) 
Deposit euroization; 
Creditor Rights Index; 
Kauffman 
Institutional quality 
index; MVP 
It has a negative and 
persistent impact on 
bank profitability in 
dollarized economies 
Ozsoz 
(2009) 
OLS; GLS 
11 
countries 
/1991-2004 
Bank 
profitability 
(Profit before 
tax/total 
assets); Loan 
Loss 
Provisioning 
Deposit euroization; 
Inflation; GDP; net 
interest income/total 
assets; overhead 
expenses/total assets; 
average lending rate;  
No impact on 
profitability but a 
strong negative impact 
on provisions set aside 
for their loan losses. 
Shinichi 
(2007) 
OLS 
3 countries 
/1993-2005 
Financial 
Development 
(Credit to the 
private 
sector/GDP) 
Deposit euroization; 
M2/GDP; Rule of Law 
Index of Kauffman 
It deters financial 
development through 
(self-insurance 
mechanism and 
remittances)  
Levy 
Yeyati 
(2006) 
Probit;  
80 
countries 
/1995-2000 
Probability of 
banking crisis 
(dummy 
variable) 
Deposit  euroization; 
real exchange rate; 
interest rate; GDP 
growth 
It positively impacts 
banking crises and 
unstable output growth 
Arteta 
(2003) 
Probit; 
OLS; IV 
regressio
ns 
92 
countries 
/1990-1999 
Finan.Crisis 
(Crisis-binary 
variable; 
currency-
crash-binary 
variable; GDP 
growth) 
Deposit & credit 
euroization; FDI/GDP; 
international 
reserves; current 
account balance/GDP; 
GDP growth; real 
exch. rate; int. rate;  
It increases the 
probability of currency 
crises of crashes. It 
does not find any 
evidence that crises are 
more costly with 
euroization 
De Nicolo 
et al. 
(2003) 
OLS 
100 
countries 
/1990-2001 
Financial 
Deepening 
(Credit to the 
private 
sector/GDP) 
Deposit euroization; 
risk measures; formal 
inflation targeting 
regimes; institutional 
variables; dummy 
regional variables 
It seizes to promote 
financial deepening 
once inflation 
stabilizes; and it can 
increase  and financial 
instability  
As seen in Table 2.2 most of these studies explore the relationship using macro or 
banking sector level data, with the exception of Kutan et al. (2010) and Fidrmuc et al. 
(2013) who use household and bank level data. The thesis adds to the previous 
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research by using bank level data. Most importantly, one third of the studies explore 
the impact of euroization on some measure of financial instability such as banking 
crisis or deterioration of asset quality, one third investigates the impact on financial 
deepening, and the remaining third explores the impact on bank profitability. None of 
the studies explore the relationship between euroization and bank efficiency, which is 
concerning, particularly given the documented positive impact of the efficient, well-
performing banking sectors on economic development (Levine, 1997). The thesis will 
extend the existing literatue by investigating the impact of euroization on bank 
efficiency in TEs. Finally, most of studies cover the period up to early 2000, few up to 
2005, thus do not capture the years up to, during or after the global financial crisis. 
The only exception here is the study of Fidrmuc et al. (2013) who cover the period 
2007-2010, although their time span is very short to capture adequately any 
dynamics. The thesis extends the literature by covering an extended period from 
2000 until 2013 which enables to capture also any effect of the Global Financial Crisis 
on the efficiency of banks operating in TEs. 
2.7  Conclusions 
This chapter has provided a concise critical review of different theoretical approaches 
explaining the phenomenon of euroization developed in the literature. Initially it 
defined the concept of interest in this thesis, that of financial euroization. Financial 
euroization is considered the most applicable euroization pattern in line with the 
main objectives of the thesis that are to investigate the impact of euroization on bank 
efficiency, and explore the determinants of euroization. However, given that 
numerous euroization patterns are inter-related and might have joint as well as 
individual impact, the chapter explored their presence and considered their potential 
impact in the light of the different theoretical approaches. It concluded that there is 
significant overlap between the existing theoretical approaches which tackle 
euroization from different aspects. Thus, it continued with a breakdown of the 
advantages and disadvantages of euroization in order to establish the hypothesis with 
regard to the impact of euroization on bank efficiency.  
Subsequently, the chapter established the main drivers of euroization in TEs in the 
light of different theoretical approaches. The empirical literature review on 
determinants of financial euroization initially showed that deposit euroization has 
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been extensively studied in the TEs under consideration whereas credit euroization 
has been neglected until very recently. It identified a number of potential main 
determinants of credit euroization, but indicates that macroprudential policy is not 
taken into account by the existing literature. Given this background knowledge, the 
thesis aims to address this gap and explore the credit euroization side of financial 
euroization. It specifically aims to investigate its impact on bank efficiency; analyse its 
main drivers in TEs, and to establish whether the macroprudential policy has an 
impact on the level of credit euroization in these countries. These empirical 
investigations are presented in Chapters 5 and 6. 
The literature review shows that the existing theoretical and empirical literature 
completely neglects the impact of euroization on bank efficiency. Having found no 
clear suitable theoretical framework for analysing the impact of euroization on bank 
efficiency in TEs, the chapter sought to explore the literature on the role of 
euroization in financial system performance. The review showed that the empirical 
literature on the role of euroization on financial system performance, although it has 
increased during the last decade, remains limited and inconclusive. There are only a 
handful of studies that explore this relationship and these are limited in terms of the 
time span they cover (mostly short and only up to early 2000) and the fact that they 
completely ignore the aspect of efficiency. This is of concern given the documented 
positive impact of efficient intermediation on economic development (Levine, 1997). 
Consequently, a better understanding of the effect of euroization in TEs with 
underdeveloped domestic financial markets is called for. It is clear that more research 
is needed in order to understand the euroization phenomenon in the region to 
undertake appropriate policy actions. To address this gap in the literature, the thesis 
continues in the next chapter with a concise critical literature review of bank 
efficiency that will offer the foundation for the empirical investigation presented in 
Chapter 4.  
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3.1  Introduction 
Chapter 2 identified the unexplored relationship between bank euroization and bank 
efficiency and the lack of consensus concerning the impact of financial euroization on 
bank performance as gaps in the euroization literature that the thesis intends to 
address. Following on from that, this chapter reviews the literature on bank 
efficiency. To explore the nature of the impact euroization on bank efficiency in TEs it 
is necessary to understand how efficiency is measured and what factors affect it. The 
literature on bank efficiency in TEs is relatively short given that it has only attracted 
the attention of the researchers in the recent years. Moreover, it is limited given that, 
to the best of our knowledge, the existing studies have neglected euroization and the 
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risk-return dimensions. Providing an exhaustive and comprehensive review of the 
bank efficiency literature is beyond the scope of the thesis. However, this chapter 
aims to provide a concise, critical review of the main literature on bank efficiency 
providing a basis upon which the research hypothesis regarding the impact of 
euroization on a bank’s efficiency will be developed. Thus, the chapter will serve as 
the foundation for the empirical research presented in Chapters 4.  
The rest of the chapter is structured in the following manner. Section 3.2 addresses 
the main definitions and concepts of bank efficiency identified in the literature. A 
discussion of the measurement of bank efficiency is provided in section 3.3 and is 
structured in two main parts. The first part considers the traditional financial ratios 
analysis approach, whereas the second one explains the frontier approach which is 
then sub-divided into two parts: nonparametric and parametric techniques. Section 
3.4 discusses one the main challenges facing the literature on bank efficiency: the 
definition of the inputs and outputs and control variables. A critical review of this 
empirical literature is provided in section 3.5. A brief conclusion is offered in the last 
section. 
3.2  Important definitions and concepts  
There are various types of efficiency concepts that are not always used consistently in 
the literature. Broadly speaking, efficiency refers to the comparison between the 
observed and optimal values of output(s) for a given level of inputs, or vice versa. The 
bank efficiency literature identifies three main concepts: technical efficiency (TE), 
allocative efficiency (AE) and economic efficiency (EE). Technical efficiency and 
allocative efficiency can be defined in different ways. We refer to technical efficiency 
as the ability of a bank to produce maximum possible output from a fixed set of inputs 
given the production technology, and allocative efficiency as the bank’s ability to 
optimally combine inputs and outputs, given their respective prices and the 
production technology.  
The definition of economic efficiency, considered in the thesis, is the one used by 
Farrell (1957), who also was the one of the first scholars to measure efficiency 
empirically. Farrell argued that TE and AE combined together produce overall 
 56 
 
efficiency later referred to in the literature as economic efficiency.4 A bank is 
economically efficient if it is able to optimally allocate inputs and outputs, given their 
prices and production technology (Farrell, 1957; Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2003; 
Mokhtar et al., 2006). The economic efficiency of banks can be measured in terms of 
costs or profits (Maudos et al., 2002). Taking into consideration that empirical studies 
have mostly focused on cost efficiency (Berger and Humphrey, 1997) when 
investigating bank efficiency, for the purpose of this thesis we focus on cost efficiency. 
Cost efficiency, specifically, refers to the minimum cost of producing the maximum 
number of outputs given the prices of inputs and the production technology.  
3.3  Methods of estimating efficiency 
The importance of measuring bank efficiency is related to the significant impact of 
bank efficiency on economic development, as discussed in section 1.4. Efficiency 
measurement has been a longstanding challenge in the banking literature largely due 
to the complexity of banking activities and the econometric estimation of efficiency. 
There are two main approaches commonly employed in the literature to measure 
bank efficiency: financial ratio analysis and frontier efficiency analysis.  
3.3.1 Financial ratio analysis 
Financial ratio analysis is a popular method of measuring bank efficiency employed 
by regulatory authorities, potential investors and even banks themselves. This is 
mainly because it is considered a convenient tool given that ratios are easy to 
calculate, understand and interpret. Additionally, they are regarded as reliable tools 
given that they are generally accepted as reflecting the banks’ financial performances. 
Financial ratio analysis consists of numerous indicators that provide important 
insights to the banks’ operations. However, as a tool for measuring bank efficiency it 
is heavily criticised on the following grounds. Firstly, on the lack of a single universal 
ratio that would capture the complexity of a bank’s efficiency. Secondly, in presence 
of numerous ratios, there is no consensus on their relative importance in comparison 
to each other. Thirdly, financial ratios can be heavily distorted by differences in 
capital structure, accounting practices for reporting reserves and provisions and the 
                                                          
4
 Economic Efficiency in the literature is also referred to as X-efficiency. 
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range of business and product mix (Vittas, 1991). Thus, the comparability of banks’ 
efficiencies based on ratios is not reliable. Finally, the analysis cannot capture any 
exogenous factors that affect the ratios themselves (Bauer et al., 1998; Irsova, 2010). 
This is particularly important in cross-country studies where the efficiency 
measurement can be misleading if the cross-country differences are not accounted 
for. Given the focus of this thesis, this is a very strong limitation. On the whole, the 
financial ratio analysis is not considered an adequate method for the purpose of this 
thesis; consequently, we turn to the alternative efficiency method: frontier analysis. 
3.3.2 Frontier Analysis 
Frontier approach, although much more complex, is considered superior to the 
financial ratio analysis. It conveys the information in a single value, thus enabling the 
researcher to capture the complexity of banking activity. It also makes the exclusion 
of the effect of exogenous factors on bank efficiency possible (Bauer et al., 1998). 
Frontier efficiency analysis relies on the use of the measured costs of inputs, outputs, 
costs and profits to assign efficiency relative to the best practice. A best practice 
frontier is initially defined, against which relative efficiencies are then measured. 
Consequently, the efficiency estimates reflect the degree of proximity of banks to the 
best practice frontier. Banks that operate on this frontier are considered efficient and 
those beneath inefficient (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2003).  
Different techniques have been applied in estimating this best practice frontier, which 
are divided into two main groups: non-parametric and parametric techniques. The 
techniques differ in their basic underlying assumptions: the shape of the efficient 
frontier and the distribution of random error (if one is included). The choice between 
the two techniques has been an issue of debate between researchers and there is no 
consensus on the best techniques as there are advantages and disadvantages to each. 
Berger and Humphrey (1997) compare and contrast 130 efficiency studies in 21 
countries and conclude that no approach dominates another, since half of them use 
nonparametric and the other half parametric. They also find that when applied to the 
same data set the two approaches do not necessarily yield consistent results. To 
demonstrate the robustness of the results and overcome their individual limitations 
they advise using both parametric and non-parametric methods with the same data 
set. Thus, the selection is subject to both theoretical and empirical considerations. 
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Consequently, the rest of the section provides a critical review of the main literature 
on both techniques and a careful consideration of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
and Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) as representatives of the two approaches.  
Nonparametric techniques  
Nonparametric techniques do not to explicitly specify a functional form. Instead, the 
efficient frontier is derived from the sample observations. Thus, they allow the data to 
determine the form of the frontier, which makes them simple (Coelli, 2005). The 
flexibility of the frontier efficiency is their main advantage. However, the approach is 
extremely sensitive to outlying observations (Aigner and Chu, 1968; Timmer, 1971) 
and thus can produce misleading information (Mastromarco, 2008). They also do not 
allow noise to be taken into account in the measurement of efficiency, i.e. they assume 
that there is no random error and treat all deviations from the frontier as inefficiency. 
Not allowing for random error is the main limitation of the nonparametric 
techniques, because any such error is then considered to be a change in measured 
efficiency, leading to overstated inefficiency estimates (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). 
They also account only for technical inefficiency of using too many inputs for a 
specified output or vice versa. Thus, they focus on technological optimization rather 
than economic optimization (Berger and Mester, 1997). The most commonly used 
non-parametric technique is the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), which is briefly 
discussed below. 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
The data envelopment analysis (DEA) was developed by Charnes et al. (1978). It is a 
linear programming technique where “the set of best-practice- the frontier 
observations - are those for which no other decision-making unit or linear 
combination of units has as much or more of every output (given inputs) or as little or 
less of every input (given outputs)” (Berger and Humphrey, 1997, p. 177). DEA 
constructs an efficiency benchmark of a linear combination of efficient banks with the 
best combination of inputs and outputs among the observed banks and permits 
efficiency to vary over time. However, it is extremely sensitive to outliers i.e., extreme 
observations (Aigner and Chu, 1968; Timmer, 1971). In addition, DEA produces 
efficiency measures that are point estimates: there is no scope for statistical inference 
 59 
 
and therefore it is not possible to construct standard errors and confidence intervals. 
Another, limitation is that it increases the number of efficient observations by default 
when there are a small number of observations relative to the number of inputs and 
outputs, which can lead to overestimation of efficiency (Berger and Mester, 1997).  
When first developed the initial underlying assumptions were that all banks face the 
same technology; they operate at their optimal scale and have constant returns to 
scale. Constant return to scale is an assumption for which DEA was heavily criticized 
since banking sector is not characterized by constant returns to scale (McAllister and 
McManus, 1993; Wheelock and Wilson, 1995). The later versions of DEA take into 
account variable returns to scale. However, its main limitation that remains is that it 
does not allow for random error. Consequently, it does not account for any 
environmental heterogeneity, external shocks, measurement error and omitted 
variables: the entire deviation from the frontier is considered as inefficiency. This, 
according to Greene (2005), makes efficiency estimates persistently biased. In the 
context of this research given that, the aim of the thesis is to capture the impact of 
euroization as an exogenous factor on bank efficiency this is a very strong limitation. 
Not accounting for environmental differences is particularly problematic also in 
cross-country studies (Weill, 2003). Additionally, taking into account that the focus of 
the thesis is on TEs, where the presence of great uncertainty and measurement 
problems is considerable (Fries and Taci, 2005). 
Recently there were many attempts to develop the DEA further in order to account 
for the environment. Many studies have introduced the two-step approach in order to 
control for environment when using DEA. DEA is applied in the first stage to produce 
efficiency estimates, which are then regressed against a set of environmental 
variables using OLS or TOBIT. However, the approach has been criticized on the basis 
that the second-stage regression parameters are biased due to unknown serial 
correlation among the estimated efficiencies (Simar and Wilson, 2007). Recent 
studies (Fried et al., 2002; Lee, 2008; Gorman and Ruggiero, 2008) have further 
developed the approach and have introduced the three-step DEA in order to control 
for the environmental and statistical noise. According to the Fried et al. (2002) 
approach, DEA is applied in the first stage to produce the initial efficiency estimates. 
Subsequently in the second stage, Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) is employed to 
regress the measures from the first stage against a set of environmental variables. 
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Finally, in the last stage, either outputs or inputs are adjusted to account for the 
impact of the environment and the statistical noise and DEA is applied to re-estimate 
efficiency. This way the variation in efficiency is decomposed into three parts due to:  
environmental effect; managerial inefficiency; and statistical noise. Nevertheless, the 
major criticism of biasedness present in the previous two step version still applies. In 
addition, these extended versions can be considered a stochastic version of DEA given 
that the SFA is integrated as part of the method. 
In conclusion, taking into account that the focus of the thesis is on the impact of 
environmental and bank individual factors such as financial euroization and bank 
risks on bank efficiency rather than estimation of efficiency, the use of the non-
parametric techniques such as DEA cannot be justified; thus we turn to the second 
category: parametric techniques.  
Parametric techniques 
Parametric techniques, contrary to nonparametric ones, define a priori the functional 
form of the efficient frontier. They are further-divided into deterministic and 
stochastic models. The deterministic models identify the distance between the 
observed and the optimal (defined by the frontier and the available technology) as 
inefficiency (Murillo-Zamorano and Vega-Cervera, 2001). The stochastic models 
make a distinction between efficiency and statistical noise. They estimate a frontier 
and decompose the stochastic term of the regression model into an inefficiency 
component and a random error component (Bonin, 2004). They define a specific 
functional form for the best frontier and for the error term. Their main advantage is 
that they allow for noise in the measurement of efficiency. The main limitation of 
parametric techniques is that the a priori specified functional form for the efficiency 
frontier does not necessarily fit the data perfectly (Bauer et al., 1998).  Stochastic 
Frontier Approach (SFA) is the most commonly used methods under the parametric 
approach in the estimation of bank efficiency and is briefly discussed below.  
Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA) 
SFA was developed by Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977). 
The original model was a fully parametric model that assumed a specific functional 
form for the deterministic frontier and specific distributions for noise and technical 
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inefficiency. Since then, the model has been extended in various ways. First, there are 
alternative distributional assumptions about the noise and the inefficiency 
component (Amsler et al., 2009). Then, the model can be applied to different types of 
frontiers such as cost and profit, and it can be carried out through systems of 
equations. Finally, the model has been extended to use panel data, allowing for 
exogenous variables in both the production function and the efficiency term (Berger 
and Humphrey, 1997; Mastromarco, 2008; Amsler et al., 2009). 
The main advantage of the SFA is that it allows for a random error term. By doing so 
SFA accounts for measurement errors and exogenous shocks, and arguably provides 
more accurate efficiency scores. However, this creates a new problem: the separation 
of inefficiency from the random error term. Another advantage is that SFA allows 
control of the influence of environmental variables or bank level variables on the 
structure of efficiency frontier (Weill, 2003). The control variables in SFA can be 
incorporated in the main function or can be modelled in the error term. In the context 
of the thesis this is a very strong advantage. In addition, Eisenbeis et al. (1999) find a 
strong association between inefficiency estimates and risk taking when using SFA, 
suggesting that when focusing on bank risk one should give relatively more weight to 
the SFA results. Given that the risk-return aspect is a major part of this research, this 
is another crucial advantage. In addition, SFA, contrary to DEA, allows the possibility 
of making inference about the contribution of inputs (Pereira and Moreira, 2007). 
Finally, SFA has the advantage that is more robust to outliers than DEA and it 
performs well in small and noisy samples. Therefore, given that in TEs measurement 
errors in banking data are widespread, SFA is considered a more suitable empirical 
tool for analysing bank efficiency (Fries and Taci, 2005) and consequently it is often 
chosen by studies focused on TEs. Given these arguments, the SFA  approach is 
employed in this thesis. 
3.4  Definitions of inputs and outputs   
In order for a model of measurement or estimation of bank efficiency to be 
developed: the outputs and inputs of the bank must be clearly defined. Whilst this is 
straightforward in most industries, it is one of the most debated topics in banking. 
The controversy regarding the lack of agreement concerning appropriate measures of 
outputs and inputs (Berger and Humphrey, 1992) is mainly due to the role and nature 
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of banks. Banks employ multiple inputs simultaneously to produce multiple outputs, 
thus modelling banking production requires simplification of both.  
Studies on bank efficiency usually specify different combinations of inputs and 
outputs (Sturm and Williams, 2010) depending on the theoretical model of the 
banking firm and the concept of optimization. Taking into consideration that 
efficiency estimates are sensitive to the specification of inputs and potential outputs 
(Berger et al., 1993; Berger and Humphrey, 1997) the comparability of studies on 
bank efficiency has been questioned. The two main approaches followed are the 
intermediation approach (asset approach) and the production approach (or value 
added approach). 
3.4.1 The intermediation approach 
The intermediation approach, proposed by Sealey and Lindley (1977), maintains that 
banks intermediate between savers and investors. The approach considers the bank 
production process as a multistage production process where deposits together with 
capital, labour and material inputs are transformed into earning assets. Thus, banks 
inputs such as deposits, labour and capital are employed to produce bank outputs 
such as loans and off balance sheet items. Deposits and their cost are considered 
inputs since they constitute the raw material to be transformed into loans and 
investible funds. Besides production expenses, the intermediation approach also 
takes into account interest expenses, therefore it is often considered appropriate for 
investigating economic viability (Avkiran, 2006). In addition, it maintains that risk 
must be taken into account when modelling bank production (Hughes and Mester, 
2008). Although, the risk aspect is still not explored fully empirically (Chelo and 
Manlagnit, 2011). The intermediation approach has become the dominant approach 
in estimating bank efficiency (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). 
3.4.2 The production approach 
The production approach maintains that the main role of banks is producing services 
for account holders. Under this approach, banks employ inputs such as labour and 
capital to produce outputs such as loans and deposits. Deposits are considered output 
because they involve the creation of value added associated with liquidity, 
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safekeeping and payments services provided for the depositors. It argues that banks 
perform transactions for customers therefore the output is measured by the number 
and type of transactions over a given time period. However, such data is not usually 
available thus the number of deposit or loan accounts serviced is used instead 
(Berger and Humphrey, 1997). Inputs consist of physical inputs such as labour and 
capital together with their respective costs. The production approach does not 
address the non-traditional bank activities, and the associated increased risk aspect 
in bank production (Hughes and Mester, 2008), although they have become 
increasingly important in the banking industry (Guarda et al., 2013). Considering that 
their impact on bank efficiency estimates has been demonstrated in the literature 
(Casu and Girardone, 2006; Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras, 2010), the production 
approach does not fully capture the role of banks.  
According to Berger and Humphrey (1997) neither of these two approaches is perfect 
because they cannot fully capture the role of banks. They argue that the production 
approach may be more adequate for evaluating the efficiencies of bank branches, 
whereas the intermediation approach may be more appropriate for banks as a whole. 
Consequently, the intermediation approach is the one favoured in the literature 
(Fethi and Pasiouras, 2010). Taking into consideration this and the fact that bank 
risk-return aspect is an important dimension of this thesis the intermediation 
approach will be followed. 
3.4.3 Control variables 
The assessment of the bank efficiency through exclusively the input-output approach 
is limited since it assumes that every bank operates under the same conditions and 
therefore it is not influenced by the economic environment. By not allowing for 
exogenous factors, the approach assumes that any difference in efficiency across 
banks is the result of management strategy regarding the scale and mix of inputs. This 
is an unrealistic assumption, particularly in the cross-country investigations given 
that banks’ abilities to perform efficiently depend at least in part on the environment 
in which they operate. This is particularly important in TEs given the dynamics of 
their banking and economic development during the transition process in the last two 
decades. Ignoring the impact of the environment in studies using common frontier 
approach makes efficiency estimates persistently biased and unreliable (Greene, 
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2005). Therefore, to make the common frontier meaningful in cross-country 
investigations, studies need to account for the environment.  
 
Accounting for the environment is possible in the following three ways through SFA. 
The first way, is to capture the impact of the environment though statistical 
associations of efficiency estimates and particular control variables. The second way 
is through the two-step approach, in which efficiency estimates are obtained in the 
first step through SFA, and then regressed against a set of control variables. However, 
in this approach the persistent bias of not accounting for the environment in the first 
step) is carried forward into the second step (Greene, 2005). In order to obtain 
unbiased efficiency estimates the impact of the environment needs to be incorporated 
directly in the efficiency estimates. This is done in the third way also known as the 
single-step approach in which the control variables are incorporated directly in the 
model. For more on this discussion see section 4.2.3. 
   
To allow for the effect of the environment on bank efficiency several sets of control 
variables need to be considered. The impact of country features is captured by 
several country level variables in the bank efficiency estimation. In this context, 
studies usually include variables such as GDP per capita, GDP growth; level of 
nominal interest rates and legal and regulatory framework to allow for the level of 
efficiency to vary systematically across countries (Fries and Taci, 2005). Another set 
of variables that may affect banking efficiency and that the literature control for are 
variables that characterise the structure of the banking industry. These are variables 
such as the degree of market concentration, the share of majority foreign–owned 
banks and the intermediation ratio, that allow for the effect of the features of banking 
sector on efficiency (Grigorian and Manole, 2006). The third set of variables consists 
of bank specific variables that capture the impact of specific bank characteristics. 
These are variables such as bank size, ownership, profitability and capitalization 
(Casu and Molyneux, 2003; Casu and Girardone, 2006). 
Euroization  
An important economic and banking sector’s characteristic of TEs is the high degree 
of euroization. The review of the existing literature on the impact of financial 
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euroization on the financial sector of TEs, presented in section 2.5.3, leans toward a 
negative impact of euroization on the financial sector’s performance. Euroization is 
considered a source of fragility for the financial system due to the currency mismatch 
risk (De Nicolo et al., 2005) which can lead to widespread bankruptcy if it happens on 
a wide scale and, thus, increase systemic risk. Taking into consideration the above it 
is reasonable to assume a possible link between financial euroization and bank 
efficiency in these countries. Yet, researchers have not empirically examined whether 
and how financial euroization interacts with efficiency at sector or individual bank 
level. None of the bank efficiency studies acknowledges the effect of the share of 
euroization on bank’s balance sheet or the risks that can arise from them. This can 
have important policy implications as euroization may have a direct or indirect 
impact on bank efficiency and risk-return aspect in TEs. To the best of the author’s 
knowledge, this is the first study that considers the relationship between financial 
euroization bank efficiency and risk.  
Risk-returns 
Banks are constantly engaged in assessment, monitoring, and diversification of a 
variety of risks. Thus, risk plays a prominent role in banks’ operations. Hughes and 
Mester (1993), Mester (1996), Berger and De Young (1997) and Kwan and Eisenbeis 
(1997) argue that it is crucial to explicitly account for banks’ risk when investigating 
bank efficiency. However, traditional bank efficiency models do not take into account 
the risk-return aspect; “they assume that banks are risk neutral and ignore risk-
taking” (Sun and Chang, 2011, p.1728). Hughes and Mester (1993) argue that this is 
partly due to difficulties in finding good measures of different types of risks and 
difficulties in deciding which of the many types should be incorporated when 
estimating efficiency. But not controlling for risk might lead to biased efficiency 
estimates. According to Mester (1996) banks that are more risk-averse might be 
mislabelled as inefficient, whilst others that are (excessive) risk-takers might be 
mislabelled as efficient, since generally higher returns are associated with the taking 
of higher risks. Research on the relationship between risk and bank efficiency in 
developed economies is extensive but as Haselmman and Wachtel (2007) point out 
this relationship is still not well explored empirically in TEs. The limited research on 
bank efficiency and risk-returns in TEs is somewhat surprising given the importance 
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of the banking sector and its impact on economic development discussed in the 
introductory chapter. This is particularly the case as banks’ behaviour varies under 
different institutional settings (Haselmann and Wachtel, 2007) thus it is safe to 
assume that research findings focused on developed economies may not be applicable 
to transition countries. 
3.5  Review of the empirical literature 
The literature on bank efficiency is rich although the vast majority has focused on the 
banking sector of United States (Berger and Humphrey, 1991; Mester, 1996; Berger 
and Mester, 1997; Berger and De Young, 1997; Hughes and Mester, 1998; Eisenbeis et 
al., 1999). Studies of banking sectors in Europe attracted the attention of researchers 
only later and, although still growing, it is smaller than that focused on US (Altunbas 
et al., 2001; Pastor, 2002; Girardone et al., 2009; Fries and Taci 2005; Fiordelissi et al., 
2011).  
In spite of its significance, bank efficiency has not received much attention in TEs. The 
relatively new empirical literature on bank efficiency in TEs is either focused on 
individual countries or a limited number of TEs. The studies that investigate the 
determinants of bank efficiency, or control for environment, concentrate on the 
possible impact of foreign ownership. This is because during the transition process 
the change in ownership, with the increasing presence of foreign investors, has been 
one of the main structural changes that took place in nearly all TEs. Other 
determinants of bank efficiency in TEs identified in the literature include competition, 
institutional reform, privatization, bank age, size and accession to the EU. A brief 
overview of the studies focusing on individual countries and their key findings is 
presented in Table 3.1.  
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Table 3.1 Empirical investigation of bank efficiency in individual TEs 
Author 
(year) 
Country Period Method. 
Type of 
efficiency 
Findings 
Hasan & 
Marton 
(2003)  
Hungary 
1993-
1998 
SFA 
cost  & 
profit 
efficiency 
A higher degree of foreign ownership 
is associated with lower inefficiency;  
increased entry of foreign banks is 
associated with greater cost efficiency 
in all banks, not just those with 
majority foreign ownership. 
Nikiel & 
Opiela 
(2002)  
Poland  
1997-
2000 
DFA 
cost  & 
profit 
efficiency 
Foreign banks are more cost efficient 
but less profit efficient than other 
banks. 
Kraft  et 
al. (2002) 
Croatia 
1994-
2000 
SFA 
cost   
efficiency 
New and privatized banks are less cost 
efficient; privatization does not seem 
to have an immediate effect on 
efficiency; foreign banks are more 
efficient than all categories. 
Weill 
(2003) 
Czech 
Republic  
& Poland 
1994-
1997 
SFA 
cost 
efficiency 
Foreign owned banks are more 
efficient than domestic owned banks. 
Matousek  
& Taci 
(2002)  
Czech 
Republic  
1993-
1998 
DFA 
cost 
efficiency 
No evidence of greater efficiency in 
foreign-owned banks; the impact of 
foreign ownership is robust to the  
size and structure of activities as well 
as risk preferences. 
Jemric & 
Vujcic 
(2002) 
Croatia 
1995-
2000 
DEA 
technical 
efficiency 
Foreign banks are more efficient than 
state and private owned banks; new 
banks perform better than old banks. 
Kasman 
(2005) 
Poland  & 
Czech 
Republic 
1995-
2003 
SFA 
cost 
efficiency 
& scale 
economie
s 
Foreign banks have significantly 
higher efficiency levels than domestic 
banks. 
Tochkov & 
Neovksy 
(2011) 
Bulgaria 
1999-
2007 
DEA- 
two step 
technical 
efficiency 
Foreign banks are more efficient than 
domestic private banks; privatization 
resulted in efficiency gains; 
capitalization, liquidity, and enterprise 
restructuring enhanced bank 
efficiency, whereas banking reforms 
had an adverse effect;. the Treaty of 
Accession and EU membership were 
associated with significant efficiency 
improvements. 
These individual country studies cover the period from early 1990s up to 2003, with 
the exception of Tochkov and Neovsky (2011) whose sample period extends to 2007. 
They explore predominantly the relationship between bank ownership and bank 
efficiency. Most of them investigate cost efficiency only or both cost and profit 
efficiency. The ones employing SFA control for the exogenous factors directly 
whereas the other studies usually use two step approaches discussed earlier.  
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Regarding foreign ownership most of the studies conclude that foreign ownership 
enhances efficiency and that foreign owned banks are more efficient than domestic 
banks (Hasan and Marton, 2003; Nikiel and Opiela, 2002; Kraft et al., 2002; Jemric 
and Vujcic, 2002; Weill, 2003; Kasman, 2005; Tochkov and Neovksy, 2011). 
Furthermore, Hasan and Marton (2003) observe that increased entry of foreign banks 
is associated with greater cost efficiency in all banks, not just those with majority 
foreign ownership. Nikiel and Opiela (2002) find a positive relationship between 
foreign ownership and cost efficiency but a negative one between foreign ownership 
and profit efficiency. However, the study by Matousek and Taci (2002) finds no 
evidence of a positive impact of foreign ownership on cost efficiency even after 
controlling for size, structure of activities and risk preferences. It is worth noting that 
the two latter studies employ different methods for obtaining efficiency estimates.  
 
The findings regarding the impact of privatization are conflicting. On the one hand, 
Kraft et al. (2002) find privatized banks less efficient and concludes that privatization 
does not have an immediate positive effect on bank efficiency in Croatia. On the other 
hand, Tochkov and Neovsky (2011) find that privatization resulted in efficiency gains 
in Bulgaria. Besides the fact that these studies focus on different countries and cover 
different time periods, the differences in results might also be due to different 
methods employed. The findings are also conflicting regarding the new banks as well, 
although the two studies that investigate this relationship focus on Croatia and cover 
the same time period. Whilst, Kraft et al. (2002) find that new banks are less cost 
efficient. Jemric and Vujcic (2002) conclude that new banks are more efficient. The 
study by Tochkov and Neovsky (2011), given its later time period of investigation, is 
the only one that controls for the impact of accession to EU and finds a positive effect 
on bank efficiency.  
 
The investigation of bank efficiency based on individual countries, thus, do not 
provide unambiguous evidence on the positive impact of foreign ownership, 
privatization, or new the entry of new banks which were the key policies adopted by 
TEs during the first decade of the transition process. These countries handled the 
transition process very differently, followed different policies, and had different 
environments in which banks operated over time and across countries. Therefore, 
accounting for the environment is essential in bank efficiency studies in TEs. 
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Consequently, although the above review of the empirical literature on bank 
efficiency focused on individual countries and given the context of the thesis, the 
main emphasis should be on the second category of studies, those consisting of cross-
country investigations on TEs. Moreover, given that the focus of the thesis is on the 
environment rather than efficiency levels, more weight is given to studies that 
explore the impact of the environment. The brief summary of the studies of focusing 
on several countries and their key findings is presented in Table 3.2.  
Table 3.2 Cross-country empirical investigations of bank efficiency in TEs 
Author 
(year) 
Countries 
Perio
d 
Method 
Type of 
efficiency 
Findings 
Bonin et al. 
(2005) 
11 
countries 
1996-
2000 
SFA 
cost  & 
profit 
efficiency 
Foreign ownership leads to higher 
cost efficiency. 
Fries & Taci 
(2005)  
15 
countries 
1994-
2001 
SFA 
cost 
efficiency 
Foreign ownership leads to lower 
costs and thus higher cost efficiency. 
Grigorian & 
Manole 
(2006)  
17 
countries 
1995-
1998 
DEA 
cost 
efficiency 
Foreign ownership with controlling 
power enhances cost efficiency.  
Staikouras et 
al. (2008)  
6 
countries  
1998-
2003 
SFA 
cost 
efficiency 
Foreign ownership is associated with 
lower inefficiency; there is a negative 
correlation between cost inefficiency 
and bank capitalization. 
Mamatzakis 
et al. (2008)  
10 
countries 
1998-
2003 
SFA 
cost  & 
profit 
efficiency 
Foreign banks outperform both state 
owned and private domestic banks. 
Yildirim & 
Philippatos 
(2007)  
12 
countries 
1993-
2000 
SFA & 
DEA 
cost  & 
profit 
efficiency 
Profit efficiency is lower than cost 
efficiency; profit efficiency is lower 
for foreign banks compared to 
domestic and state owned banks; the 
degree of competition has a positive 
influence on cost efficiency and a 
negative one on profit efficiency, 
whilst market concentration is 
negatively linked to efficiency. 
Koutsomanoli
-Filipaki et al. 
(2009)  
10 
countries 
1998-
2003 
SFA 
bank 
efficiency 
Find strong links between 
competition and concentration, and 
bank efficiency. 
Poghosyan & 
Borovicka 
(2007) 
19 
countries 
1995-
2004 
SFA 
cost 
efficiency 
Positive effect of foreign ownership 
on cost efficiency may be biased due 
to the cream-skimming effect 
(selection bias). 
Kasman & 
Yildirim 
(2006) 
8 
countries 
1995-
2002 
SFA 
cost & 
profit 
efficiency 
Foreign banks perform better that 
domestic banks in terms of profit 
efficiency; no clear relationship 
between size and two efficiency 
measures. 
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Poghosyan & 
Poghosyan 
(2009) 
11 
countries 
1992-
2006 
SFA 
cost 
efficiency 
Greenfield banks are characterized 
by a higher degree of cost efficiency 
relative to the domestic banks and 
foreign banks that entered through 
cross-border acquisitions;  the entry 
of foreign bank has a positive impact 
on competition; the results remain 
unchanged when riskiness of bank 
portfolio, income from non-interest 
banking activities and developments 
in the macroeconomic environment 
are taken into account. 
Fang et al., 
(2011) 
6 
countries 
1998-
2008 
SFA 
cost & 
profit 
efficiency 
Foreign banks are associated with 
higher profit efficiency but 
moderately lower cost efficiency; 
government banks are associated 
with lower profit efficiency; the 
degree of individual bank’s 
competitiveness has a positive 
association with both cost and profit 
efficiency; institutional development 
has a positive impact on bank 
efficiency. 
 
The time period and the number of countries covered in these studies vary. The 
highest cross-sectional coverage is in the study by Pohgosyan and Borovicka (2007), 
whereas the lowest is in the studies of Staikouras et al. (2008) and Fang et al. (2011). 
In terms of time period, most of the studies cover a relatively short time span, in the 
period since early/mid 1990s up to mid-2000s. The study of Fang et al. (2011) covers 
the longest time span of nine years, with the data extending up to year 2008. Given 
their longer span, they also apply a time variant specification. However, none of the 
studies employs more recent data that cover the period of the global financial crisis 
(GFC). In terms of cross-sectional coverage most of these studies are focused on the 
banking sectors in CEE countries, less attention has so far been given to SEE 
countries. Similar to individual country studies these studies investigate 
predominantly cost efficiency only, or both cost and profit efficiency. Most of them 
employ SFA with the exception of few that employ DEA or both SFA and DEA.  
In terms of the environment, the existing cross-country studies also mainly focus on 
the impact of ownership. Most of the studies find a positive relationship between 
bank efficiency, particularly cost efficiency, and foreign ownership (Bonin et al., 2005; 
Fries and Taci, 2005; Grigorian and Manole, 2006; Staikouras et al., 2008; Mamatzakis 
et al., 2008; Poghosyan and Poghosyan, 2009). In terms of profit efficiency, Kasman 
and Yildirim (2006) and Fang et al. (2011) find a positive relationship with foreign 
ownership. However, a negative impact of foreign ownership on cost efficiency is 
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documented by Fang et al. (2011) and on profit efficiency by Yildirim and Philippatos 
(2007). A possible reason behind a negative impact foreign ownership on bank 
efficiency, particularly on cost efficiency, is that most of the foreign banks started 
operating in TEs by acquiring domestic banks which had substantial problems 
particularly with portfolio quality (see section 1.4). Dealing with these issues would 
have required additional costs, which would outweigh any positive impact of the 
foreign investor. Poghosyan and Poghosyan (2009) investigate this issue by 
controlling for whether the foreign bank is a greenfield investment, i.e. was 
established in the country, or an acquisition. They find that greenfield banks are more 
cost efficient relative to the domestic banks and foreign banks that entered through 
cross-border acquisitions.  
As previously discussed, the bank efficiency literature in TEs besides completely 
ignoring the impact of euroization, it largely does not take into account the risk-
return aspect associated with banks’ operations. Nevertheless, the impact of risk-
return aspect on bank efficiency estimates has been demonstrated in a limited 
number studies that are diverse in terms of cross-sectional coverage (most of these 
studies are focused on US or European countries, with a very small number of studies 
focused on TEs). However, most of these studies cover a relatively short time span, 
the period from early 1990s up to mid-2000s, with the most recent study extending 
the sample up to 2008, thus none of them cover the period of the global financial 
crisis (GFC). They mainly use financial capital as a control for risk preferences. In 
addition, they explore the effect of non-performing loans or loan loss provisions 
which can be considered as controls for credit risk. In addition to risk preferences 
and credit risk, most of the existing studies neglect other kinds of risks associated 
with bank efficiency. Important studies that explicitly account for the impact of risk 
on bank efficiency are summarized in Table 3.3. 
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Table 3.3 Empirical investigations of bank efficiency accounting for risk-return aspect 
Author 
(year) 
Sample Period 
Method./ 
Effic. 
Risk control Findings 
Mester 
(1996) 
US 
1991-
1992 
SFA/ cost 
effic. 
Risk preferences 
(financial capital) 
Not controlling for quality and 
risk might be miscalculating 
banks’ level of inefficiency. 
Berger & 
DeYoung 
(1997) 
US 
1985-
1994 
SFA- 2 
stage; 
Granger 
C./ cost 
effic. 
Risk preference 
(financial capital); 
Credit risk (non-
performing loans) 
Problem loans precede 
reduction in measured cost 
efficiency; high measured cost 
efficiency precedes reduction 
in problem loans and 
reductions in capital precede 
increases in problem loans. 
Eisenbeis 
et al. 
(1999) 
US 
1986-
1991 
SFA & 
DEA/ 
cost effic. 
Credit risk (loan 
charge-offs to 
outstanding loans) 
Higher loan losses are 
correlated with lower 
efficiency; the SFA scores are 
more closely related to risk 
taking behaviour, than those of 
DEA. 
Hughes & 
Mester 
(1998) 
US 
1989-
1990 
SFA/ cost 
effic. 
Risk signal and 
cushion (financial 
capital) 
Financial capital serves as a 
cushion against insolvency and 
as a signal of bank risk. 
Pastor 
(2002) 
Spain, 
Italy, 
France, 
Germany 
1988-
1999 
DEA- 3 
stage/ 
technical 
effic. 
Credit risk (loan 
loss provisions) 
Efficiency estimates not 
accounting for risk differ 
significantly from those that 
account for it.  
Williams 
(2004) 
European 
banks 
1990-
1998 
Granger 
C./cost 
effic. 
Credit risk (problem 
loans); Risk 
preferences 
(financial capital) 
Find a positive relationship 
between risk taking and 
efficiency. 
Fries & 
Taci 
(2005) 
15 
European 
countries 
1994-
2001 
SFA/ cost 
effic. 
Risk preferences 
(capital to total 
assets); Credit risk 
(loan losses) 
Banking systems with higher 
ratios of capital to total asset 
and banks with lower loan 
losses also tend to have lower 
costs. 
Havrylchyk 
(2006) 
Poland 
1997-
2001 
DEA/ 
bank 
effic. 
Risk management 
(ROA volatility) 
Find riskier banks more cost 
and profit efficient. 
Yildirim & 
Philippatos 
(2007) 
12 CEE 
countries  
1993-
2000 
SFA & 
DFA/ cost 
& profit 
effic. 
Risk preferences 
(capitalization); 
Credit risk (loan 
losses) 
Higher efficiency levels are 
associated with large and well 
capitalized banks and higher 
level of problem loans is 
associated with lower 
efficiency levels. 
Altunbas et 
al. (2007) 
European 
banks 
1992-
2000 
SUR /cost 
effic. 
Risk preference 
(capital), Credit risk 
(loan loss 
provisions)  
Find a negative relationship 
between cost efficiency and 
bank risk taking. 
Chiu and 
Chen 
(2009) 
Taiwan 
2002- 
2004 
SFA & 
DEA/ 
cost & 
technical 
effic. 
Market risk (vector 
of interest rate 
changes and 
exchange rate 
changes variables) 
Risk measures represent 
significant effects on bank 
efficiency. 
Tochkov & 
Nenovski 
(2011)  
Bulgaria 
1999-
2007 
DEA- 2 
step/ 
technical 
effic. 
Credit risk(LLP/ 
loans); Liquidity 
risk (liqu. level); 
risk pref.(capital.) 
Higher liquidity and 
capitalization have a positive 
impact on efficiency. 
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Fiordelissi 
et al. 
(2011)  
European 
countries 
1995-
2007 
Granger-
causality/ 
cost effic.  
Risk preferences 
(financial capital) 
Increases in bank capital 
precede cost efficiency 
improvements. 
Sun & 
Chang 
(2011) 
8 
emerging 
Asian 
countries 
1998-
2008 
SFA/ cost 
effic. 
Credit risk (loan 
loss reserves/gross 
loans); Market risk 
(exchange rate 
volatility, interest 
rate volatility) 
Risk measures represent 
significant effects on both the 
level and variability of bank 
efficiency; these effects vary 
across countries and over time. 
The limited empirical bank efficiency literature that explicitly account for the risk 
aspect start with the contribution of Mester (1996), Berger and DeYoung (1997), 
Hughes and Mester (1998) and Eisenbeis et al. (1999), who were the first to explicitly 
control for risk in bank efficiency studies in the US. Mester argued that studies not 
controlling for quality and risk might be miscalculating banks’ level of inefficiency, 
and suggested employing the level of financial capital as a control for banks’ risk 
preferences. Berger and DeYoung analysed the relationship between efficiency and 
risk which they controlled for with non-performing loans. However, they do not 
control for risk directly in the SFA, but employ the Granger-causality technique to 
analyse the relationship of efficiency estimates with non-performing loans, and find 
that higher non-performing loans tend to be followed by lower measured cost 
efficiency. Eisenbeis et al. also investigated the relationship between efficiency and 
risk through two stage approaches. They obtain efficiency estimates using SFA and 
DEA and using Spearman rank correlations find a negative relationship between risk 
and efficiency. In addition, they find stochastic frontier scores more closely related 
than linear programing ones to risk taking behaviour. Hughes and Mester investigate 
the relationship between bank efficiency and risk preferences through the inclusion 
of financial capital directly in the cost function and find a negative impact of higher 
financial capital on cost efficiency. Thus, they conclude that financial capital serves as 
a cushion against insolvency and as a signal of bank risk.  
Later, the effect of risk on banking efficiency in European countries started attracting 
the attention of researchers (Pastor, 2002; Williams, 2004; Altunbas et al., 2007; 
Fiordelissi et al., 2011). Pastor (2002) investigates this relationship through non-
performing loans, which she decomposes into two components: those due to bad 
management and those due to economic environment. She finds that efficiency 
estimates not accounting for risk differ significantly from those that account for it. 
Altunbas et al. (2007) account for differences in banks’ risk preferences through the 
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level of equity capital and find that capital has a negative influence on cost efficiency. 
Fiordelissi et al. (2011) try to capture the risk on both cost and revenue efficiency 
through the 5-year ahead cumulative Expected Default Frequency (EDF) for each 
bank calculated by Moody’s KMV and the traditional non-performing loans to total 
loans ratio. Using the Granger-causality methodology in a panel data framework, they 
find that increases in bank capital precede cost efficiency improvements. 
The literature focused on TEs is limited in comparison to the above (Fries and Taci, 
2005; Yildirim and Philippatos, 2007; Tochkov and Nenovski, 2011). Fries and Taci 
(2005) control for risk through the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans and 
the capital to asset ratio. They find that banking systems with higher ratios of capital 
to total asset and banks with lower loan losses also tend to have lower costs. Yildirim 
and Philippatos (2007) regress the efficiency estimates against capitalization, loan 
loss reserves and find that higher efficiency levels are associated with large and well-
capitalized banks and a higher level of problem loans is associated with lower 
efficiency levels. Tochkov and Nenovski (2011) regress the efficiency estimates 
against capitalization, loan loss provisions and liquidity. They find that higher 
liquidity and capitalization have a positive impact on efficiency. This is the only study 
that controls for the level of liquidity, which is considered an indicator of liquidity 
risk. 
As explained, most of these studies are limited in controlling for risk preferences and 
credit risk measures. Most of them investigate the impact of risk-return aspect using 
two-step approaches, which as explained in section 3.4.3 is problematic. In addition 
they focus only on credit risk, in this context, the only exceptions are two studies Chiu 
and Chen (2009) and Sun and Chang (2011), which besides credit risk, control for 
market risk. Chiu and Chen control for market risk through a vector of variables on 
the interest rate and exchange rate (changes and levels) and find that risk measures 
have significant effects on bank efficiency. Sun and Chang (2011) who control for 
market risk through volatilities of the interest rate and exchange rate, find that they 
affect both the level and variability of bank efficiency, and that these effects vary 
across countries and over time. However, both studies focus on Asian emerging 
markets. 
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In conclusion, the bank efficiency literature is limited in exploring the impact of the 
risk-return aspect on bank efficiency. This is a significant gap in literature given the 
increasing importance of the risk dimension in banking sector and the already 
documented impact on banking efficiency. Thus, exploration of the risk dimension in 
TEs is a natural extension of the bank efficiency literature. The thesis intents to fill 
this gap in the literature through inclusion of various risk measures directly in bank 
efficiency estimation through SFA.  
3.6  Conclusion 
This chapter provides the foundation for the analyses in the next chapter as that it 
identifies the gaps in the bank efficiency literature through a critical review. The 
chapter began with the main definitions and concepts of efficiency that are 
considered of interest in this thesis. Given the context of the research it was 
concluded that cost efficiency will be investigated for a number of TEs. Subsequently, 
the main methods of estimation and their respective best representatives were 
discussed in detail. Given its advantages in controlling for the environment, especially 
bank risk, and its superiority in small and noisy samples, it was decided that SFA will 
be used in estimating bank efficiency in Chapter 4. The chapter then considered the 
definitions of the inputs and outputs. Given the advantages over the production 
approach in terms of risk dimension and following most of the studies in the field, the 
inputs and outputs will be defined in accordance with the intermediary approach. The 
discussion then continued with the control variables employed in the literature.  
The empirical review showed that the existing literature on bank efficiency has 
ignored the potential impact of euroization as a key characteristic common to 
banking sectors and individual bank’s balance sheet in TEs. This is a possibly 
important gap in the bank efficiency literature given the already documented impact 
of euroization on other banking sector performance indicators. The thesis intends to 
fill this gap by being the first to provide an investigation of the relationship between 
bank efficiency and the degree of euroization in TEs. The estimation of this 
relationship will be done through SFA, whilst controlling directly for degree of 
euroization in the cost function.   
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In addition, the review showed that the bank efficiency literature in TEs has been 
limited in its exploration of the risk-return aspect associated with banks’ operations, 
although, in spite of its increasing importance in the banking industry. There are a 
handful of studies that explore the risk-return aspect; however, they explore risk 
through a two-step approach which is criticized for biasness. Furthermore, most of 
these studies focus only on credit risk and ignore other types of risk. This is another 
possibly important gap in literature that the thesis intends to fill through inclusion of 
various risk measures directly in bank efficiency estimation through SFA.  
Finally, as the review showed, the existing literature is also limited in terms of the 
time span covered. Most of the studies include a relatively short time span, in the 
period since early/mid 1990s up to mid-2000s; the longest time span covered is nine 
years with the latest year being 2008. Thus, none of the studies employs recent data 
that cover the period of the global financial crisis (GFC). In terms of cross-sectional 
coverage most of these studies are focused on the banking sectors in CEE countries, 
less attention has so far been given to SEE countries. This is an additional gap that the 
thesis intents to fill by investigating the cost efficiency of banks in a larger number of 
20 TEs including SEE countries and covering a longer time span, to be able to 
estimate the effect of the Global Financial Crisis on cost efficiency of the banks 
operating in these countries. 
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4.1  Introduction 
Chapter 3 provided a critical review of the main literature on bank efficiency and 
showed that the current literature has ignored the potential impact of euroization, as 
a key characteristic of banking sectors and individual banks’ balance sheets in TEs, on 
bank efficiency. Furthermore, it showed that, in spite of its increasing importance, the 
literature on TEs has been limited in its exploration of the risk-return aspect. The  
main objective of this chapter is to investigate empirically the cost efficiency of banks 
in TEs, using a stochastic frontier approach (SFA) and explicitly incorporating 
financial euroization and risk factors in the model. By covering an extended period 
from 2000 to 2013 (14 years), this study covers a longer period and more data than 
has previously been available, and broadens the literature by investigating possible 
links between financial euroization and bank efficiency. 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 discusses the SFA 
efficiency estimation technique. The discussion is structured around the decisions 
with regard to the distribution of the composed error term, functional form of the 
frontier, heterogeneity and specific stochastic frontier models. Following the 
literature review on bank efficiency, provided in Chapter 3, the input, output and 
control variables are defined in section 4.3. The data used, its sources and the 
descriptive statistics are elaborated in Section 4.4. The model estimation is discussed 
in section 4.5 and the estimation results for efficiency estimation are then provided in 
section 4.6. Section 4.7 discusses the empirical results of the estimation and their 
implications. The final section concludes the chapter. 
4.2   The stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) 
As explained in section 3.2, for the purpose of this thesis the focus of the empirical 
investigation will be on banks’ economic efficiency, specifically cost efficiency, which 
refers to the ability of banks to produce outputs with minimum costs, given the prices 
of inputs and production technology. The cost efficiency will be estimated through 
SFA (for an extended discussion of the choice of this technique, see section 3.3). In 
Chapter 3, the SFA technique has been analysed mainly in terms of its advantages and 
disadvantages in relation to the DEA technique, whilst in this section it is explored in 
more depth. 
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As a parametric approach, the SFA specifies a functional form for the bank efficiency 
frontier and assumes a compound error term. The best-practice frontier does not 
necessarily represent the best possible frontier, but merely the best practice frontier 
observed among banks in the sample (Berger and Mester, 1997). Whilst the frontier 
is estimated, the stochastic term of the regression model is decomposed into an 
inefficiency component and a random error component (Bonin, 2004). Banks 
operating on the isoquant of the best practice frontier are considered cost efficient 
and those above it inefficient (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2003). Thus, the deviation of 
each bank from the best practice frontier represents the bank’s inefficiency. As 
previously mentioned, the key advantages of the SFA technique is that it allows for 
noise in the measurement of efficiency and for the effects of random exogenous 
shocks that are beyond the control of the bank (Murillo-Zamorano, 2004), and thus 
can lead to more accurate estimation of efficiency scores (Greene, 2005). This is 
particularly important in the context of the thesis given that the focus is on the impact 
of environmental factors such as financial euroization on bank efficiency rather than 
on the efficiency estimates.  
The stochastic cost frontier has as its arguments the level of outputs and input prices, 
and has the following general form:  
  
𝒍𝒏𝑻𝑪𝒊𝒕 = ∫(𝒀𝒊𝒕, 𝑾𝒊𝒕, 𝒁𝒊𝒕) + 𝒆𝒊𝒕                                                                              (4.1) 
𝒆𝒊𝒕 =  𝒖𝒊𝒕 + 𝒗𝒊𝒕 
Where the left hand side represents the natural log of total cost 𝒍𝒏𝑻𝑪𝒊𝒕 observed for 
bank 𝒊 at time 𝒕 and on the right side: 𝒀𝒊𝒕 is a vector of output levels, 𝑾𝒊𝒕 is vector of 
input prices and 𝒁𝒊𝒕 stands for a set of control variables. Finally, 𝒆𝒊𝒕represents the 
compounded error term, which consists of the inefficiency component 𝒖𝒊𝒕 and the 
random error component 𝒗𝒊𝒕.  
With SFA, there are several decisions that need to be made with regard to the 
compound error term, the functional form of the frontier and the specific stochastic 
frontier model, which are discussed in detail below. The specification of the 
functional form for the efficiency frontier can be considered a limitation of this 
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approach, given that the specified form may not necessarily fit the data (Bauer et al., 
1998). 
4.2.1 The compound error term 
Within the compound error term, the 𝒗𝒊𝒕 component corresponds to random 
fluctuations, and follows a symmetric normal distribution around the 
frontier(𝒗𝒊~𝑵(𝟎, 𝜹
𝟐)). The other component 𝒖𝒊𝒕 is the inefficiency component of 
the error term and is assumed to have an asymmetric distribution. The rationale for 
different distributions is that “inefficiency cannot diminish costs and thus must have 
an asymmetric distribution, whereas random error can add to or subtract from costs 
and therefore has a symmetric distribution” (Weill, 2003, p. 579). The 𝒖𝒊𝒕 component 
is assumed to follow either an exponential, half normal/truncated normal, or gamma 
distribution. As suggested by Forsund et al. (1980, p.11) “there do not appear to be 
good a priori arguments for any particular distribution.” Many distribution models 
have found application in the literature: Berger and De Young (1997) use the 
truncated normal model; Mester (1993) uses the half-normal distribution; Greene 
(1990) uses the normal-gamma model. According to Altunbas and Molyneux (1994) 
all distribution models yield similar results and efficiency estimates are relatively 
insensitive to different distributional assumptions. However, the half-normal and the 
truncated normal are the most frequently used models. Whilst the gamma 
distribution can potentially increase the flexibility of the model, in practice the 
problems of identification seem to outweigh the potential gains of this distribution 
(Greene, 1997, p.103). Kumbhakar and Lovell (2003) argue for the use of a relatively 
simple distribution such as half-normal or exponential. However, according to Van 
den Broeck et al. (1994), the truncated normal distribution function better 
distinguishes between statistical noise and inefficiency terms. For the purpose of this 
research the truncated normal distribution will be used as this is one of the most 
frequently used models in the literature. The choice of the distribution can also 
depend on the details of the particular stochastic frontier model (SFM) used (see for 
instance section 4.2.3). 
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4.2.2  Functional form of the frontier 
There are several different functional forms used in the literature with regard to the 
shape of the frontier. The choice between them is not straightforward, given that the 
true shape of the frontier is unknown. According to Greene, (2005, p.98), the choice of 
the functional is generally “tangential to the analysis”. However, empirically the 
choice matters because different assumption may lead to different results, even 
though the authors usually do not explain the rationale behind their choice. Coelli et 
al. (1998) and Kumbhakar and Lovell (2003) discuss this issue at some length. The 
Cobb-Douglas model, the translog model and the Fourier flexible functional form are 
the most common models that have found application in the literature.  
The Cobb-Douglas model, introduced by Cobb and Douglas in 1928, is considered the 
conventional functional form. It has been one of the most popular functional forms 
because of its simplicity in estimation and interpretation. However, according to 
Greene (2007) due to its simplicity the model may produce biased efficiency 
estimates because the un-modelled complexities go into error term. In addition, the 
simple structure does not allow the accommodation of a multiple outputs production 
technology. It also assumes a constant technological change effect and constant 
elasticities making it inadequate in cases when elasticities may vary across banks 
(Coelli et al., 1999). Nevertheless, it is preferred when dealing with small number of 
observations (Fitzpatrick and McQuinn, 2005). 
The translog model, introduced by Christensen et al. (1973), is a more flexible form 
than the Cobb-Douglas. It allows for the technological change effect to vary with the 
level of output. It can accommodate multiple outputs without necessarily violating 
the curvature conditions. The translog model is applicable in banking studies 
because, as Murray and White (1983) suggest, it captures the heterogeneous nature 
of a bank’s intermediation activity. It is also considered appropriate when a large 
sample is available because it requires the estimation of a large number of 
parameters (in comparison with the Cobb-Douglas form) so that to maintain the same 
degree of freedoms it needs more observations. Due to the high number of 
parameters estimated, the translog model may suffer from multicollinearity which 
can lead to high standard errors of the regression coefficients (Cohen and Gujarati, 
1970), particularly if the sample size is small. However, these limitations can be 
eliminated when the model is estimated through a system of equations or with panel 
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data given that this increases the number of observations (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 
2000). Finally, both Cobb-Douglas and translog models are problematic when the 
data contain zeros because this makes it impossible to construct the logarithms of the 
variables (Coelli et al., 1998). 
The Fourier flexible functional form, introduced by Gallant (1982), is more flexible 
than the translog form and provides a universal approximation to any cost or profit 
frontier function. It has been frequently used in the bank efficiency studies (DeYoung 
and Hasan, 1998; Berger and Mester, 1997; Altunbas et al., 2001; Girardone et al., 
2004; Weill, 2004). The Fourier model consists of two parts: the usual translog 
function and the non-parametric Fourier expansion (Koenzler, 2005). Therefore, it 
may suffer from the same disadvantages as the translog form (Coelli et al., 1998), only 
more so. The number of parameters to be estimated in the Fourier form is always 
greater than the translog form, thus a potentially better fit of the Fourier form comes 
at a price of the loss of degrees of freedom and consequently, inferior statistical 
accuracy (Koenzler, 2005).   
The choice of the functional form is not an issue that has received much attention in 
the stochastic frontier applications. Studies usually do not elaborate on the rationale 
behind their choice. In general, the Cobb-Douglas and translog models dominate the 
literature on SFA inefficiency estimation (Greene, 2005). The initial studies used the 
Cobb-Douglas function models, whereas the translog models dominate the literature 
from the mid-1980s onwards (Amsler et al., 2009). The strong underlying 
assumptions of the Cobb-Douglas functional form are considered a high price to pay 
for its simplicity as an advantage. Cobb-Douglas is usually preferred when dealing 
with a small sample size, given the trade-off between flexibility and the degrees of 
freedom. This is not the case with relatively large samples such as the one employed 
in this thesis, enabling the use of a flexible form. Fourier form is the most flexible 
form but its construction is quite complex, which restricts it use. The translog form is 
arguably flexible enough and it is fairly easy to estimate and interpret. Consequently, 
for the purpose of this research the translog form is preferred. 
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4.2.3  Heterogeneity and efficiency estimates 
Greene (2005a) highlights the issue of heterogeneity in SFA which was not 
completely missing from the earlier literature; however, he develops it in much more 
depth. He argues that it is very important to incorporate heterogeneity in SFA models 
because if it is not accounted for, it is most likely that it will be treated as inefficiency. 
Heterogeneity can be observable and unobservable. Observable heterogeneity is 
captured by measured variables that can be explicitly employed in the regression 
functions and shift the cost function or the inefficiency distribution. The variables can 
also be scaled in a way “that enter in the form of heteroskedasticity” (Greene, 2007, 
p.70). Unobserved heterogeneity is captured in the model as an effect or a 
characteristic which can reflect missing variables. Greene argues that that efficiency 
studies must differentiate one type of heterogeneity from the other. In addition, they 
must also make a distinction between heterogeneity in the cost function from the 
inefficiency part, given that they have different implications for modelling and 
estimation (Greene, 2007).  
For a long time, following Pitt and Lee (1981), efficiency studies have accounted for 
observed heterogeneity through a two-step approach. Initially they estimated 
efficiency disregarding any observed heterogeneity or exogenous variables. Then 
they regressed, or in some cases correlated, the obtained efficiency estimates with the 
identified exogenous variables. Later this approach has been heavily criticized for 
persistent bias (Wang and Schmidt, 2002). Disregarding the heterogeneity at the first 
step leads to bias estimates that are then carried forward into the second step. The 
problem is comparable to that with omitted variables. Consequently, any observed 
heterogeneity should be explicitly incorporated in the model at the first step 
(Kumbhakar et al., 1991; Caudill and Ford, 1993; Battese and Coelli 1992; 1995; 
Caudill et al., 1995; Wang and Schmidt, 2002; Kotzian, 2005; Greene, 2007). To avoid 
these problems, observed heterogeneity should be controlled for directly in a one-
stage regression. It can be explicitly introduced into the models through a vector of 
environmental characteristics to model the differences in either the shape of the 
frontier or the mean or/and the variance of the inefficiency component. If the 
environmental characteristics are assumed that influence the shape of the frontier 
they ought to be included directly into the frontier function as regressors. However, if 
they are assumed to influence the degree of efficiency and not the shape of the 
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frontier they ought to be modelled into the inefficiency component. Whilst the first 
approach produces efficiency scores independent of environmental influences, the 
second approach produces efficiency scores which incorporate the above mentioned 
characteristics (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2003; Koenzler, 2005; Greene, 2005a). 
4.2.4   Stochastic frontier model 
Applications of frontier models have involved the use of both cross-section and panel 
data models. Stochastic frontier models employing cross sectional data disregard 
possible time effects and can only estimate the efficiency of each bank in a specific 
period. They are generally estimated by Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE). In 
their efficiency estimates, they cannot separate bank specific effects that are 
unrelated to efficiency (Battese and Coelli, 1995). In addition, they assume that errors 
are independent of regressors. This may be an incorrect assumption, because, as 
argued by Schmidt and Sickles (1984), a bank’s awareness of its inefficiency level 
should affect its input choices.  
Some of the above-mentioned assumptions can be relaxed and limitations overcome 
when panel data is employed. Panel data contains more information than a single 
cross section and increases the sample size, which can increase the precision of 
estimators (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2003). Panel allows for the separation of bank 
specific and time specific effects from efficiency estimates data (Mastromarco, 2008). 
It also allows for the investigation of dynamic changes over time, thus enabling the 
estimation of the time pattern of efficiency for each bank. In addition, with a panel the 
problem of the independence of regressors assumption is solved because banks are 
observed at several points in time, which can serve as a substitute for the 
independence assumption (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2003).  
Stochastic frontier models employing panel data methods, in general, have significant 
advantages over cross section methods. The advantages and limitations are 
extensively summarized in Sena (2003) and Kumbhakar and Lovell (2003). 
Depending on their underlying assumption regarding efficiency, stochastic frontier 
panel models fall into two main categories: time variant and time invariant. Each 
category can then, be further divided into subcategories.  
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Time invariant models 
The time invariant models assume that efficiency varies across banks, but it remains 
constant over time and, following Kumbhakar and Lovell (2003), are sub-categorized 
into Fixed Effects (FEs), Random Effects (REs) and Maximum Likelihood (ML) models.  
The fixed effect model has been employed in efficiency estimation, initially by 
Schmidt and Sickles (1984), to overcome problems with the pooled data model. The 
frontier is shaped by one bank which is regarded as the most efficient. The 
inefficiencies of other banks are measured relative to this bank. FE does not make any 
assumption regarding the distribution of the random noise, but it does assume that it 
is uncorrelated with the regressors. The inefficiencies are treated as fixed effects or 
bank specific constants and are allowed to be correlated with the regressors or the 
random noise. FE is simple; it has good consistency properties and can be estimated 
through Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). However, the fixed effects model instead of 
capturing variations in efficiency across banks, picks up the effect of all of a bank’s 
sources of heterogeneity, including those not related to inefficiency. In addition, it 
does not allow time invariant variables to be included among regressors. 
The random effects model does not assume a specific distributional assumption about 
inefficiencies but assumes they are uncorrelated with the regressors and the random 
noise. It allows the presence of time invariant regressors. REs can be estimated 
through standard two-step generalized least squares (GLS). Its main advantage is that 
it allows time invariant variables among regressors, whereas its main shortcoming is 
that it requires the random effects to be uncorrelated with regressors which removes 
the advantage of using panel data in first place. 
The Maximum Likelihood models, initially used by Pitt and Lee (1981), are in essence 
cross sectional models extended to panel data and estimated through Maximum 
Likelihood Estimators (ML). According to Kumbhakar and Lovell (2003), ML models 
with time invariant efficiency are very similar to the cross section models in the sense 
that the strong distributional assumptions remain. They argue that due to these 
assumptions, they exploit distributional information that FE and RE do not, thus their 
efficiency estimators are preferred to those of FE or RE (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2003, 
p.106). Hallam and Machado (1996) and Bravo–Ureta and Ahmad (1996) also find 
that ML provides better measures of the efficiency scores, and enables the modelling 
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of the impact of external factors on efficiency (Sena, 2003). Consequently, ML models 
are widely applied in the literature. 
The three approaches discussed above impose different requirements on the data and 
have different properties. Nevertheless, the empirical comparison of the approaches 
reported in the literature (Bauer et al., 1993; Bauer and Hancock, 1993) find that 
these three approaches are likely to generate a similar efficiency ranking, particularly 
at the top and the bottom of the distribution. Their main limitation is that they 
maintain that the efficiency is time-invariant. They allow efficiency to vary across 
banks, but assume it remains constant through time for each bank. The assumption of 
time invariance of technical efficiency is strong and does not hold in the long run 
(Cornwell et al., 1990; Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2003; Sena, 2003; Greene, 2005). Given 
the relatively long time series component of our panel, the assumption that efficiency 
is invariant cannot be justified; thus, we turn to the second main category, the time 
variant models. 
Time variant models 
The time variant models allow efficiency to vary across banks and through time. They 
are either cross-sectional MLE models extended to the panel data context or 
traditional panel models (FE or RE) extended to account for time variance. Cornwell 
et al. (1990), Kumbhakar (1990), Battese and Coelli (1992), and Lee and Schmidt 
(1993) are amongst the first to use a stochastic frontier panel data model with time 
varying efficiency. Cornwell et al. (1990) allow efficiency to vary through time by 
including a flexible function of time. In their specification a bank’s inefficiency 
increases or decreases infinitely with time in quadratic form. Kumbhakar (1990) 
treats efficiency as an exponential function of time. In his model, inefficiency 
converges to a finite level as T grows, but this also means that inefficiency varies little 
for large T. Consequently, for both of these approaches their applicability is 
questioned for investigations covering long panels (Ahn et al., 2000). Kumbhakar 
(1990) also includes a time indicator among regressors, and separates the effect of 
technical change from that of efficiency change. His model was the basis of an 
alternative time varying efficiency model proposed by Battese and Coelli (1992). 
Their model treats inefficiency as an exponential function of time. They assume that 
efficiency must either increase at a decreasing rate, decrease at an increasing rate or 
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remain constant. They also include a time element to control for technical change. The 
Kumbhakar (1990), and Battese and Coelli (1992) models also imply that the 
temporal pattern of efficiency is the same for each bank and they do not allow for a 
change in the rank ordering of the banks over time - a bank remains at the same rank 
as in the first period. The Lee and Schmidt (1993) model allows efficiency to vary 
over time through time dummies, thus, whilst the pattern of variation is unrestricted 
it is common to all individual banks. 
The Battese and Coelli (1995) model is another model, extended to panel data, which 
defines efficiency as a function of bank-specific explanatory variables and time. In this 
model efficiency follows a truncated-normal distribution that is independently, but 
not identically, distributed over different banks. This model allows controlling for the 
impact of bank characteristic variables directly into efficiency and does not restrict 
the same ordering of banks in terms of efficiency over time as the Battese and Coelli 
(1992) does. The model permits the investigation of the determinants of efficiency, 
inefficiency and the technological change over time simultaneously. The Battese and 
Coelli (1995) model is the most frequently applied model in the literature and 
continues to be the model of choice in many recent applications (Greene, 2007). 
Other models developed later are the True Fixed and Random Effects introduced by 
Greene (2005b) as a solution to the time invariant efficiency limitation of the 
standard FE and RE approaches. Standard FEs and REs approaches also do not 
control separately for possible heterogeneity unrelated to efficiency: this is forced 
into the inefficiency estimates and, as Greene (2005b) argues, this can lead to 
distorted efficiency estimates. He addresses these limitations through his models, 
which enable the separation of time variant efficiency from bank specific time 
invariant heterogeneity. He integrates the FEs and REs approaches into the original 
Aigner et al. (1977) model, allowing for time variant efficiency while controlling for 
bank specific unobserved heterogeneity through fixed or random effects. They can be 
estimated using MLE given that the inefficiency term follows a distributional form. 
Whilst the estimation of the true REs model is relatively straightforward, the same 
cannot be said for the true FEs model. The main difficulty is that the estimation of a 
true FEs model is numerically cumbersome due to the large number of parameters. 
The second problem is the incidental parameters problem. With a short panel and a 
large number of banks, the fixed effects are inconsistently estimated (Neyman and 
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Scott, 1948; Lancaster, 2002; Greene, 2005b). Belotti and Ilardi (2012), propose the 
use of Maximum Likelihood Dummy Variables (MLDV) approach as a solution to this 
problem when the panel is large enough (at least 10 years). To conclude this 
discussion, the true RE model appears as the most flexible choice among the time 
variant models although it has been criticized on the basis that a part of the time 
invariant unobserved heterogeneity does belong to the inefficiency and that these 
two components should not be separated (Belotti et al., 2012). 
Having described the relevant models for the estimation of bank efficiency, and taking 
into consideration the importance of time variant efficiency due to lengthy panel 
employed in the investigation and the crucial importance of heterogeneity in the 
context of this thesis the Battese and Coelli (1995) model and the Greene TRE (2005) 
model will be both applied in the investigation in this chapter. As explained above the 
BC 1995 model is the most frequently applied model in the literature and continues 
to be the model of choice in many recent applications. Whereas Greene TRE 2005 
although little used, it has the advantage of allowing for unobserved bank random 
effects separately from inefficiency. By employing both specifications, we are able to 
compare and draw on the strengths of both. 
4.3 Definition of variables 
The identification of inputs and outputs is one of the most debated topics in the 
studies on banking efficiency -mainly because the results of efficiency estimates are 
sensitive to the specification of inputs and outputs, whereas their identification is not 
straightforward given the complex nature of banks (Berger et al., 1993). For the 
purpose of this study, the intermediary approach to inputs and outputs is followed. 
The extended discussion on the choice of the approach is eschewed here given that is 
was provided in section 3.4.  
Banks use multiple inputs to produce multiple outputs and are accordingly modelled. 
For the estimation of the cost efficiency frontier, the total costs, prices of inputs and 
volumes of outputs are employed. It is assumed that banks are price takers in input 
markets. Banks are operating either on that frontier, if they are perfectly efficient, or 
beneath the frontier, if they are not fully efficient. Efficiency improvement can be 
achieved through technological change or through a more efficient use of the existing 
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technology (Coelli, 1995). An underlying assumption of efficiency estimations is that 
the technology is common to all banks. Orea and Kumbhakar (2004) argue that this 
can be a strong assumption given that not necessarily all banks use the same 
technology, nevertheless controlling for the technology banks use is virtually 
impossible. Studies usually attempt to do so by categorizing banks in terms of their 
specialization (Mester, 1993) or in terms of the region (Mester, 1997). However, with 
regard to specialization, the differences between categories of banks in TEs are 
typically small. Most banks are heavily focused in retail even if they are identified as 
investment banks, mainly due to the underdeveloped financial markets. Whereas, 
with regard to region controlling for it is not possible when investigating TEs. In 
addition, when the translog functional form is employed no a priori restrictions on 
the underlying technology are necessary given that translog is a locally flexible form. 
Still, following Fries and Taci (2005) by controlling for variables other than inputs 
and outputs which can have a significant effect on the technology, we recognize that 
technology can vary systematically across countries. 
Following the literature review provided in the third chapter, the following variables 
are employed in the model of this investigation.  
4.3.1  Outputs:  
 Loans, measured as total loans less reserve for loan loss provisions (Y1); 
 Investment, measured as the sum of total securities, equity investments and other 
investments (Y2).  
Quality differences in outputs provided is an important issue that deserves a careful 
consideration. Bank efficiency studies have tried to account for variation in the 
quality of output in a variety of ways. One way of controlling for quality differences 
measure is incorporating quality differences directly into the output (Battese and 
Coelli, 2005) which we are doing by subtracting loan loss provisions from total gross 
loans. 
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4.3.2  Input prices: 
The input prices used to estimate the frontiers are:  
 Price of labour, measured by the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets (W1) 
(in absence of the data for total employment);  
 Price of borrowed funds, measured by the ratio of interest expenses to total 
funding (customer deposits and short term funding plus other funding) (W2); 
 Price of physical capital, measured by the ratio of other operating expenses to 
total fixed assets (W3). 
4.3.3  Control variables 
In addition to traditional outputs and input prices, a series of control variables are 
included in the model. This is because ignoring the impact of the environment in 
studies using common frontier approach makes efficiency estimates persistently 
biased and unreliable (Greene, 2005). Accounting for the environment is particularly 
important in TEs given the dynamics of their banking and economic development 
during the transition process in the last two decades (see section 3.4.3 for a more 
detailed discussion). The following are the control variables employed in this 
investigation for this reason. Whilst the rest of the control variables can be 
categorized into two sets: macroeconomic environment variables and bank-specific 
variables, we will start with financial euroization, which is the key variable of interest 
for this study.  
Financial euroization 
In the investigation presented in this chapter, the key contribution is looking at the 
impact of financial euroization on the cost efficiency of bank in TEs. As discussed in 
the literature review presented in Chapters 2 and 3, the existing literature neglects 
this factor. In order to take this into consideration we control for financial euroization 
at country and bank levels to better explore the effect of both the general 
environment and the bank’s own choices. In addition, as previously discussed in 
section 3.4.3, control variables in stochastic frontier analysis can be incorporated in 
the efficiency frontier if they are expected to shift the entire frontier or in the 
inefficiency component of the composed error term if they are expected to impact the 
distance of the individual bank from the efficiency frontier. Financial euroization at 
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country level, measured as the share of foreign currency loans in the total loans of the 
banking sector, is incorporated in the efficiency frontier as an individual bank’s 
decisions has little effect on the degree of euroization of the entire banking sector. 
The financial euroization at bank level, measured as the share of foreign currency 
loans in the total loans of each bank is incorporated in the inefficiency component. 
This is because the bank can change the structure of their portfolio and this is 
expected to influence the distance of individual banks to the frontier i.e. their 
inefficiency.  
Theoretically, the impact of the euroization on bank performance is ambiguous. 
Banks lend in foreign currency in order to hedge against foreign currency risk, which 
they are exposed to when some of their liabilities are denominated in foreign 
currency. However, this hedging strategy is dependent on whether the bank’s clients 
are hedged against foreign currency risk. If not, then by lending in foreign currency, 
banks merely transform a part of the currency risk they are exposed to into credit 
risk. Thus, depending on the degree of the risk passed or transformed the expected 
relationship with performance is ambiguous (an extensive discussion is provided in 
section 2.4). Although the empirical literature ignores the interaction of euroization 
and bank efficiency, it has investigated its impact on bank performance measures 
such as bank stability and crises. However, the existing literature has not reached a 
consensus on the impact of financial euroization and these measures of bank 
performance (De Nicolo et al., 2003; Arteta, 2003; Levy Yeyati, 2006; Shinichi, 2007). 
Most studies find that financial system development is adversely impacted by 
euroization, but a few studies indicate that euroization is beneficial in terms of asset 
quality and some others that find no significant relationship (see section 2.5.3 for a 
detailed discussion). Arguably, either a negative or positive impact of financial 
euroization on bank efficiency can be expected. 
Macroeconomic and banking sector environment 
This set of control variables is included to reflect the changing operating conditions in 
countries in which banks optimize their operations. This allows for the level of 
efficiency to vary systematically across countries. The first few are incorporated to 
control for general economic differences that may affect banks’ operations and the 
latter ones are used to control for important characteristics of the banking sector.  
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 Economic development 
Macroeconomic variables are included to reflect the changing operating conditions in 
which banks optimize their operations. This allows for the level of efficiency to vary 
systematically across countries. They enable control over variation in banking 
technologies that may be related to macroeconomic conditions and to institutional 
features of a country (Fries and Taci, 2005). This approach is preferred to using 
country dummy variables, given that these can only establish cross-country 
differences but cannot explain the sources of differences. Following the findings of the 
literature review provided in Chapter 3, GDP per capita, GDP growth and inflation are 
employed to control for the size of the economy, economic development and 
macroeconomic stability, respectively. Greater economic development and greater 
economic stability are expected to be linked positively to bank efficiency (Grigorian 
and Manole, 2002; Fries and Taci, 2005; Yildirim and Philipatos, 2007). 
 Quality of institutions 
The recent global financial crisis has been a reminder of the impact of institutional 
and regulatory environment on banks’ risk taking and performance (Houston et al., 
2010). The banking sector reform index (BSRI) produced by the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), which ranks countries on a scale of 1 to 4+ 
on the basis of their progress in liberalisation and institutional reform of the banking 
sector, is included to control for the variation of institutional quality across countries. 
A score of 1 represents little change from a socialist banking sector apart from the 
separation of the central bank and commercial banks, while a score of 4+ represents a 
level of reform that approximates the institutional standards and norms of an 
industrialised market economy. By accounting for the variation in banking sector 
quality across countries, this research can provide valuable empirical evidence that 
complements and extends the existing research related to bank efficiency. Higher 
quality of institutions is expected to be linked positively to bank efficiency. 
 Market Competition  
The extent of market competition is proxied by the degree of concentration measured 
by the HH index. The literature is ambiguous on the impact of bank competition on 
bank efficiency. Higher competition should provide an incentive for banks to operate 
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closer to the best practice frontier. However, a bank may have become large because 
it was more efficient in the past. Yildirim and Philipatos (2007) find that competition 
is positively associated with cost efficiency.  
 Foreign ownership  
The degree of foreign ownership is included to control for possible impact of 
ownership. The effect of foreign ownership has been widely investigated in bank 
efficiency studies covering TEs; however, the results are conflicting. Nikile and Opiela 
(2002); Hasan and Marton (2003); Fries and Taci (2005); Bonin et al. (2005); and 
Yildirim and Philippatos (2007) argue that foreign banks apply greater competitive 
pressure in the system in comparison with domestic ones and find that foreign banks 
are more cost efficient. In the other hand, Fang et al. (2011) find that foreign banks 
are associated with moderately lower cost efficiency. 
 Time dummies  
To account for changes in technology over time, and following Battese and Coelli 
(1992, 1995) a time dummy is included in the frontier. Although various studies use a 
time trend to control for technological progress, the use of a time dummy is preferred 
given that technological progress is not necessarily constant or uniform. In addition, 
time dummies pick up other year-specific circumstances, thus reducing the possibility 
of cross sectional dependence increasing the validity of estimation process (Sarafidis 
et al., 2009). 
Bank characteristics  
Besides the macroeconomic variables that establish the environment within which 
banks operate, bank efficiency may depend on bank-specific characteristics. We are 
particularly interested in investigating the relationship between the risk aspect and 
bank efficiency. Traditional bank efficiency models have been criticized on the 
grounds that they do not take into account the risk-return aspect - “they assume that 
banks are risk neutral and ignore risk-taking” (Sun and Chang, 2011, p.1728). Hughes 
and Mester (1993), and Mester (1996) both argue that risk characteristics need to be 
incorporated in bank efficiency studies since not controlling for risk might lead to 
biased efficiency estimates. Most of the studies that control for risk when 
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investigating bank efficiency account only for credit risk through non-performing 
loans and allowance for loan losses, but other risks are also possibly associated with 
bank efficiency. Banks are exposed to various types of risk that, since 2001, are 
categorized by the Basle Committee into three main ones: credit, market, and 
operating. Therefore, the credit risk indicators are no longer good overall 
representative indices of bank risks. For an extensive discussion on the relationship 
between risk and bank efficiency refer to the section 3.5. The following variables are 
employed to control for risk. 
 Credit risk 
Loan loss provision as a fraction of net loans is employed to control for credit risk. 
Following the literature a negative relationship is expected with bank efficiency 
(Hughes and Mester, 1993; Berger and DeYoung, 1997; Esienbeis et al., 1999; Pastor, 
2002; Fries and Taci, 2005; Tochkov and Nenovski, 2011; Fiordelissi et al., 2011).  
 Operational risk 
Following Yildirim and Philipatos (2007), the ratio of total loans over total assets is 
employed to control for operational risk. A negative relationship with bank efficiency 
is expected. 
 Market risk 
Market risk is modelled by controlling for the Net Interest Margin (Haselman and 
Wachtel 2007). A negative relationship with bank efficiency is expected. 
4.4 Data  
Following the vast majority of studies on bank efficiency, this study uses banks' 
balance sheet and income statement data for banks operating in 26 European 
Transition Countries obtained from the BankScope database prepared by Bureau van 
Dijk. The study follows IMF’s classification of European Transition Economies 
namely: CEE (Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, FYR Macedonia, Hungary, 
Kosovo, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia); Baltics (Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania) and CIS (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, 
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Moldova, Russia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan). The length of the panel is fourteen years, from 
2000 to 2013.  
BankScope database is widely used in the literature (Girardone et al., 2009; Casu and 
Molyneux, 2003; Pastor and Serrano, 2006; Lozano-Vivas et al., 2002; Casu and 
Girardone, 2006; Pastor et al., 1997; Weill, 2004; etc.) given than it provides 
harmonized financial data using international accounting standards and a convenient 
statement in a common currency. Thus, it is very attractive for cross country 
comparative studies. However, despite its broad application its limitations are not 
widely addressed. Most studies do not even mention these limitations; they eschew 
their discussion with a few brief statements that the data needed cleaning but do not 
expand further on the matter. The reality is that data for banks operating in less 
developed and transition countries require substantial cleaning before a reliable 
sample can be constructed. Considering that authors do not elaborate on the steps 
undertaken on dataset preparation we developed our own method for cleaning the 
BankScope data.  
- First, the data needed careful reviewing to avoid double counting of banks and to 
exclude central banks and other non-bank financial institutions from the sample. 
- Second, there were numerous banks that had data only for one year. These were 
excluded, given that it was decided to include in the sample banks that have a 
minimum of continuous two years of data. Consequently, Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan were left out of the database 
because the bank data for these countries were barely covering a year 
- Third, a decision on the appropriate accounting standards had to be made for 
cases when banks reported in both international financial reporting standards 
(IFRS) and local generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). IFRS reports 
were used wherever possible, but we were constrained to also rely on the local 
ones (GAAP) where this was the only available data. 
- Fourth, the database has a considerable amount of missing values which might be 
considered problematic. However, the database is used by almost every study on 
bank efficiency, with most of them not even acknowledging the problem of 
missing values. We are following this literature using the database, assuming that 
these values are missing completely at random which is a strong assumption. The 
only possible solution to this would be cross checking with individual annual 
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reports for each bank, which is a very cumbersome task and was considered a too 
lengthy a procedure for this thesis- and may also prove to be problematic. 
- Finally, a number of dubious observations with negative values for several 
important variables such as total loans, total cost, total investment and total 
equity, that could not have been negative, were found. After a careful analysis, it 
was noted that the negative values were usually four or five observations for the 
entire variable, thus they were treated as missing observations (See Appendix 4.1 
for the detailed description of the cleaning process of the database). 
Besides the process of cleaning the BankScope database, obtaining data for the key 
variable of interest, financial euroization, has been one of the main challenges of this 
investigation. BankScope does not report foreign currency loans at the individual 
bank level. This is because this information is considered to be of a sensitive nature 
and even confidential in some countries. Taking this into consideration the analysis is 
conducted in two parts. In the first part, using a large database, the relationship 
between financial euroization and bank efficiency is explored using the degree of 
euroization at country level. The data on euroization at country level was obtained 
from the central banks of respective countries. This required considerable effort 
given that the share of foreign currency loans in total loans of the banking sector is 
not reported in a straightforward manner. Thus, the variable was calculated by the 
author using data from monetary surveys of central banks. This part of the research is 
carried out using an unbalanced panel of 1541 banks operating in 20 TEs. The 
number of banks in each country is shown in Table 4.1.  
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Table 4.1 The number of bank across different countries in the large database  
Country Number of banks Country Number of banks 
Albania 16 Lithuania 10 
Belarus 29 Macedonia, FYR 19 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 32 Moldova 17 
Bulgaria 29 Poland 53 
Croatia 43 Romania 30 
Czech Republic 32 Serbia 34 
Estonia 9 Slovenia 20 
Hungary 43 Slovak Republic  20 
Kosovo 6 Ukraine 31 
Latvia 22 Russian Federation 1062 
Total 1541 
In the second part, the relationship between financial euroization at bank level and 
bank efficiency is explored. Obtaining the data on bank level euroization required a 
huge amount of effort and time. Although the author approached to respective central 
banks for the bank level data on financial euroization, assuring them of the 
confidentiality and proper use of the data, they declined to provide this data. 
Therefore, the author had to refer to individual banks official websites and calculate it 
using data from annual reports or external auditor’s reports published by banks. This 
was a very cumbersome and lengthy task and only a smaller database could be 
constructed for banks in SEE countries. This part of the analysis is carried out using 
an unbalanced panel of 126 banks operating in 7 TEs. The number of banks in each 
country is shown in Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2 The number of bank across different SEE countries in the small database  
Country Number of banks 
Albania 16 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 22 
Bulgaria 27 
Croatia 14 
Macedonia, FYR 11 
Serbia 23 
Slovenia 14 
Total  126 
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In the two sets of data the time period coverage differs considerably by bank, with a 
time span varying from two to thirteen years. Given the length of the time series, 
there is good scope for investigating the evolution of the impact of financial 
euroization on cost efficiency over time.  
Table 4.3 Detailed description of variables  
Variable Symbol Description Source 
Total Cost TC Interest + non-interest expenses BankScope 
Outputs 
Total Loans Y1 
Net loans (Gross loans – reserve for loan loss 
provisions) 
BankScope 
Total Investments Y2 Total securities + equity investment + other investment BankScope 
Inputs prices 
Price of labour   W1 Price of labour=personnel expenses/total assets BankScope 
Price of borrowed 
funds  
W2 
Price of borrowed funds = interest 
expenses/(customers deposits + short term funding + 
other funding) 
BankScope 
Price of physical 
capital  
W3 
Price of physical capital = other operating 
expenses/fixed assets 
BankScope 
Control variables 
Macroeconomic and banking sector environment 
GDP per capita GDPc GDP per capita World Bank 
GDP growth GDPg Real GDP growth World Bank 
Inflation I The percentage change in the CPI World Bank 
Banking Sector 
Reform Index 
BSRI EBRD index   EBRD 
Market 
competition 
HHI Herfindahl Hirschman Index, calculated by the author BankScope 
Foreign ownership FO Banks with assets of foreign ownership > 50% EBRD 
Financial 
Euroization 
FE_sector Share of FC loans/total loans  in the banking sector 
Central 
banks 
Bank characteristics 
Financial 
Euroization 
FE_bank Share of FC loans/total loans of the bank 
Individual 
banks 
Credit risk  CR Loan loss provision/total loans BankScope 
Operational risk  OR Total loans/total assets BankScope 
Market risk  MR Net Interest Margin (NIM)   BankScope 
Time dummy T   
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The remaining aggregate variables, for the countries of our sample are obtained from 
various sources such as EBRD, World Bank and respective central banks. The details 
regarding the variables, in terms of symbols, description and data sources are 
presented in the previous page in Table 4.3. 
Descriptive Statistics  
The descriptive statistics for the variables used in the bank efficiency model is 
presented in Table 4.4. Although natural logarithms of total cost, outputs and input 
prices are used in estimating the efficiency scores, we present the mean and standard 
deviations in levels to be more informative. As seen below, there is a considerable 
variation in most of the variables.  
Table 4.4 Descriptive Statistics  
Large Database Obs Mean ST Dev Min Max 
Total cost  12684 131468 705392 16.7 8184727 
Total Loans  12628 102991 7313931 1.01 400000000 
Investments  10978 327658 1945948 0.3 74000000 
Price of labour  12711 0.30 0.025 0.01 .35 
Price of borrowed funds  12317 38.20 2053 0.1 219887 
Price of physical capital  12677 31.23 274.77 0.1 15224 
GDP_c 21175 5557.2 4300.5 354 26989.7 
GDP_g 21175 3.23 3.29 -17.95 12.23 
Inflation 21047 16.99 24.27 -1.15 168.62 
BSRI 21218 2.67 0.734 1 4.33 
FO 21218 0.58 0.26 0 0.99 
HHI 21218 1279.1 840.37 324 6584 
CR  11882 7.93 9.11 1.01 108.87 
OR 12679 53.79 19.56 1.03 99.44 
MR 12684 6.40 4.01 -28.63 79.1 
FE_sector 21161 0.55 0.22 0 0.94 
Small Database Obs Mean ST Dev Min Max 
Total cost  1337 80413 150902 237.88 1700000 
Total loans  1336 791299 1511327 700 15000000 
Total investments  1250 180254 329363 2.76 2500000 
Price of labour  1339 0.01 0.10 0.01 1 
Price of borrowed funds  1327 0.06 0.18 0.01 3.68 
Price of physical capital  1339 1.67 3.13 0.1 4482 
GDP_c 1698 6507.67 5704.77 809.28 26989.7 
GDP_g 1698 3.11 3.28 -7.94 9.3 
Inflation 1610 7.19 13.74 -0.74 95.01 
BSRI 1698 2.98 0.56 1 4 
FO 1698 0.70 0.26 0 0.95 
HHI 1698 1484.09 674.37 638 4238 
CR  1231 8.25 9.11 0.14 97.95 
OR 1337 55.49 15.48 0 90.39 
MR 1336 5.36 3.05 -0.89 26.01 
FE_bank 1149 3.07 67.41 0 2236.7 
 100 
 
4.5 Model estimations  
Given the considerations of the theoretical and empirical literature described above, 
we specify the empirical models to study the relationships between efficiency, bank 
risk taking, and euroization. In modelling the multiproduct cost function, a translog 
functional form is adopted. Two outputs, total loans and total investments, and three 
input prices, the price of labour, the price of borrowed funds and the price of physical 
capital, are employed.  
Control variables are not included as interactive variables in the models so as not to 
increase the number of the second-order terms in the regression equation. Otherwise 
they would significantly reduce the degrees of freedom due to the expansion of terms. 
The control variables included in the model are GDP per capita, Inflation, BSRI, HHI, 
FO and FE. Time dummies are also included.  
The general specification of the translog cost model does not impose a restriction on 
neutrality, homogeneity or unitary elasticities of substitution. However for a cost 
function to be well behaved it must satisfy certain conditions. It must be linearly 
homogeneous in input prices, non-decreasing in output and concave. The 
homogeneity constraint implies that, for a fixed level of output, total cost must 
increase proportionally when all prices increase proportionally (Banda and Verdugo, 
2008, p.9). The linear homogeneity is imposed by dividing total costs and input prices 
by one of the factor prices, which is arbitrarily chosen. In the case of equations 4.2 
and 4.3 the division by the third input price 𝑾𝟑.  
Symmetry restrictions are required for continuity and this is achieved in estimation 
by combining the terms which contain the same variables in the cross products of 
outputs and inputs. In the models specified as equations 4.2 and 4.3 below this means 
that: 
𝜶𝒊𝒌 = 𝜶𝒌𝒊 and  𝜷𝒋𝒎 = 𝜷𝒎𝒋 
We specify two models for estimating cost efficiency initially following Battese and 
Coelli’s 1995 model and then Greene’s TRE 2005 model. The following definition of 
symbols applies to both models: 
- 𝑻𝑪𝒔𝒕 is the total cost for the bank 𝒔 at a time 𝒕 ;  
- 𝒀𝒊 is the 𝒊 − 𝒕𝒉  output;  
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- 𝑾𝒋 is the price of the 𝒋 − 𝒕𝒉  input;  
- 𝒁𝒍 is the 𝒋 − 𝒕𝒉  control variable and  
- 𝑻𝒕 are the time dummies  
 
1. The  BC 1995 model: 
𝒍𝒏
𝑻𝑪𝒔𝒕
𝑾𝟑𝒔𝒕
=  𝜶𝟎 + ∑ 𝜶𝒊𝒍𝒏𝒀𝒊𝒔𝒕 +
𝟏
𝟐
𝟐
𝒊=𝟏 ∑ ∑ 𝜶𝒊𝒌𝒍𝒏𝒀𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒍𝒏𝒀𝒌𝒔𝒕 +
𝟐
𝒌=𝟏
𝟐
𝒊=𝟏
∑ 𝜷𝒋𝒍𝒏
𝑾𝒋𝒔𝒕
𝑾𝟑𝒔𝒕
+
𝟏
𝟐
∑ ∑ 𝜷𝒋𝒎𝒍𝒏
𝑾𝒋𝒔𝒕
𝑾𝟑𝒔𝒕
𝒍𝒏𝟐𝒎=𝟏
𝟐
𝒋=𝟏
𝟐
𝒋=𝟏
𝑾𝒎𝒔𝒕
𝑾𝟑𝒔𝒕
+
∑ ∑ 𝜹𝒊𝒋𝒍𝒏𝒀𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒍𝒏𝑾𝒋𝒔𝒕 + ∑ 𝜼𝒍𝒁𝒍𝒔𝒕 + ∑ 𝜽𝒕𝑻𝒕 
𝟏𝟒
𝒕=𝟐 + 𝒗𝒔𝒕 + 𝒖𝒔𝒕
𝟔
𝒍=𝟏
𝟐
𝒋=𝟏
𝟐
𝒊=𝟏           
(4.2)                                                                                                        
Where besides the above-defined symbols we have the compound error term which 
consists of: 
-  the 𝒗𝒔𝒕 part that corresponds to random fluctuation, and follows a symmetric 
normal distribution (𝒗𝒊~𝑵(𝟎, 𝜹
𝟐)); 
The 𝒖𝒔𝒕  part is the inefficiency component of the error term and its 
distribution is assumed to be truncated-normal that is independently, but not 
identically, distributed over different banks. The 𝒖𝒔𝒕 is assumed a function of a 
set of control variables 𝒁𝒍𝒕 and an unknown vector of coefficients. 
𝒖𝒔𝒕 = 𝒁𝒍𝒔𝒕𝜹 + 𝑪𝒔𝒕 where 𝒖𝒔𝒕 is truncated-normal distribution with 
𝑵(𝟎, 𝜹𝟐) with point of truncation −𝒁𝒍𝒔𝒕, i.e., 𝑪𝒔𝒕 > −𝒁𝒍𝒔𝒕𝜹. 
 
2. The  TRE 2005: 
𝒍𝒏
𝑻𝑪𝒔𝒕
𝑾𝟑𝒔𝒕
=  𝜶𝟎 + ∑ 𝜶𝒊𝒍𝒏𝒀𝒊𝒔𝒕 +
𝟏
𝟐
𝟐
𝒊=𝟏 ∑ ∑ 𝜶𝒊𝒌𝒍𝒏𝒀𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒍𝒏𝒀𝒌𝒔𝒕 +
𝟐
𝒌=𝟏
𝟐
𝒊=𝟏
∑ 𝜷𝒋𝒍𝒏
𝑾𝒋𝒔𝒕
𝑾𝟑𝒔𝒕
+
𝟏
𝟐
∑ ∑ 𝜸𝒋𝒎𝒍𝒏
𝑾𝒋𝒔𝒕
𝑾𝟑𝒔𝒕
𝟐
𝒎=𝟏
𝟐
𝒋=𝟏
𝟐
𝒋=𝟏 𝒍𝒏
𝑾𝒎𝒔𝒕
𝑾𝟑𝒔𝒕
+
∑ ∑ 𝜹𝒊𝒋𝒍𝒏𝒀𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒍𝒏𝑾𝒋𝒔𝒕 + ∑ 𝜼𝒍𝒁𝒍𝒔𝒕 + ∑ 𝜽𝒕𝑻𝒕
𝟏𝟒
𝒕=𝟐 +𝒔𝒔 + 𝒗𝒔𝒕 + 𝒖𝒔𝒕
𝟔
𝒍=𝟏
𝟐
𝒋=𝟏
𝟐
𝒊=𝟏  
(4.3)         
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Besides the initially defined symbols we have the compound error term which in the 
Greene (2005) model is composed of three parts:  
𝒓𝒔𝒕 = 𝒔𝒔 + 𝒗𝒔𝒕 + 𝒖𝒔𝒕 
- The first part 𝒔𝒔 is the random, time invariant, bank specific effect and follows 
a symmetric distribution (𝒔𝒔~𝑵(𝟎, 𝜹
𝟐)); 
- The second part 𝒗𝒔𝒕 part that corresponds to random fluctuation, and follows 
a symmetric normal distribution (𝒗𝒔𝒕~𝑵(𝟎, 𝜹
𝟐));  
- The third part 𝒖𝒔𝒕 is the inefficiency component of the error term which 
follows a truncated-normal distribution that is independently, but not 
identically, distributed over different banks. The 𝒖𝒔𝒕 is assumed to be a 
function of a set of control variables 𝒁𝒍𝒕 and an unknown vector of 
coefficients. 𝒖𝒔𝒕 = 𝒁𝒍𝒔𝒕𝜹 + 𝑪𝒔𝒕 where 𝒖𝒔𝒕 is truncated-normal distribution 
with 𝑵(𝟎, 𝜹𝟐) with point of truncation −𝒁𝒍𝒔𝒕, i.e., 𝑪𝒔𝒕 > −𝒁𝒍𝒔𝒕𝜹. 
 
4.6 Empirical results  
This section presents the empirical results which are initially structured in two parts. 
The first part considers the first set of results of both models, BC 1995 and TRE 2005, 
whilst controlling for the financial euroization at country level and using the large 
database. The second part discusses the second set of results of both models, BC 1995 
and TRE 2005, whilst controlling for financial euroization at bank level using the 
small database. The discussion in these subsections is then structured into a further 
three parts: the translog component of the results, the control variables and the 
efficiency estimates. 
Given that our independent variables are composed of individual bank-level (micro-
level) and macro county-level variables, applying normal standard errors ignores the 
multi-level nature of the data and can produce exaggerated statistically significant 
results particularly for the macro data (Luke, 2004). To deal with this issue we 
employ robust clustered standard errors. Robust standard errors correct for error 
correlation across the observations within a cluster, in our case within countries. 
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They account for a general form of heteroskedasticity as well as for any within 
country correlation (Primo et al., 2007). Consequently, the robust clustered standard 
errors are considered more suitable for multi-level structural data such as ours and 
thus are applied in each set of results. 
4.6.1  Financial euroization at country level  
This analysis initially explores the relationship between financial euroization at 
country level and cost efficiencies in banks operating in TEs. Using the models 
specified in the previous section, we start with estimations where we initially control 
only for variables that are expected to influence the efficiency frontier, upon which 
individual banks have no direct control (estimates of 4.2a and 4.3a in the following 
Tables). Thus, financial euroization at country level and other control variables are 
explicitly modelled in the efficiency frontier. Then, we estimate the same models but 
include bank risk variables in the inefficiency component, given that these are factors 
that banks can control (estimates 4.2b and 4.3b in the following Tables).   
Translog and time components  
The estimates for these components are given in Table 4.5. The translog component is 
rarely interpreted in bank efficiency studies in terms of the adequacy of the model 
specification, given that the large number of interaction terms means that coefficient 
estimates cannot be individually interpreted. However, these components of the 
model are highly significant and similar across different model specifications. The 
negative impact of the time dummies reflects the downwards shift in the cost frontier 
over time, which would be expected with technology improvements. With a more 
advanced technology available, banks are able to cut their costs each year. The two 
years in which the impact of the time dummies is positive corresponds to the years 
when the effect of global financial crisis reached these countries (2009 and 2010).   
 
 
 
 104 
 
Table 4.5 The results for the translog component5 
Statistics with *, **, or *** are significant at 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively. 
Control variables 
In the context of the thesis, the results of the control variables are of main interest 
particularly those of financial euroization and the risk variables. The regression 
results for these variables are summarized in Table 4.6 
                                                          
5
 Refer to Appendices 4.2 and 4.3 for STATA outputs 
 BC 1995  
4.2a 
BC 1995  
4.2b 
TRE 2005  
4.3a 
TRE 2005 
4.3b 
lnTC Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| 
lnY1 0.391*** 0.000 0.903*** 0.000 0.205** 0.025 0.836*** 0.000 
lnY2 0.302*** 0.000 0.128*** 0.000 0.343*** 0.000 0.131*** 0.000 
lnW1 0.875*** 0.000 0.952*** 0.000 0.860*** 0.000 0.979*** 0.000 
lnW2 -0.007 0.852 0.001 0.973 -0.070** 0.056 -0.052 0.160 
 lnY1lnY2 -0.043*** 0.000 -0.018*** 0.000 -0.045*** 0.000 -0.016*** 0.000 
lnW1lnW2 0.039*** 0.000 0.040 0.000 0.031*** 0.000 0.029*** 0.000 
half_lnY1lnY1 0.075*** 0.001 0.016** 0.023 0.084*** 0.000 0.016*** 0.000 
half_lnY2lnY2 0.033*** 0.000 0.016*** 0.000 0.031*** 0.000 0.013*** 0.000 
half_lnW1lnW1 -0.0007 0.937 -0.002 0.687 0.0004 0.964 0.002 0.726 
half_lnW2lnW2 -0.036*** 0.000 -0.037*** 0.000 -0.029*** 0.000 -0.028 0.000 
lnY1lnW1 0.004 0.735 -0.007 0.598 -0.006 0.469 -0.019** 0.036 
lnY1lnW2 0.013*** 0.001 0.014*** 0.002 0.018*** 0.000 0.016*** 0.000 
lnY2lnW1 -0.012*** 0.000 -0.005*** 0.000 -0.007*** 0.000 -0.002** 0.025 
lnY2lnW2 0.008*** 0.000 0.006*** 0.000 0.005** 0.022 0.005*** 0.001 
T2 -0.076 0.366 -0.079 0.278 -0.056 0.306 -0.069 0.202 
T3 -0.246** 0.038 -0.164 0.131 -0.196** 0.044 -0.164** 0.034 
T4 -0.286** 0.030 -0.157 0.213 -0.201** 0.039 -0.183** 0.026 
T5 -0.454*** 0.003 -0.280** 0.038 -0.262** 0.014 -0.216*** 0.007 
T6 -0.449*** 0.003 -0.272* 0.078 -0.333** 0.005 -0.272*** 0.002 
T7 -0.524*** 0.001 -0.329** 0.033 -0.388** 0.005 -0.337*** 0.001 
T8 -0.593*** 0.001 -0.403*** 0.008 -0.436** 0.012 -0.399*** 0.001 
T9 -0.174 0.236 0.009 0.951 -0.178 0.248 -0.119 0.289 
T10 0.0010 0.999 0.130 0.510 0.001 0.991 0.051 0.686 
T11 -0.245* 0.102 -0.111 0.491 -0.176 0.194 -0.157 0.121 
T12 -0.265* 0.104 -0.096 0.559 -0.120 0.432 -0.113 0.320 
T13 -0.311** 0.042 -0.147 0.357 -0.157 0.289 -0.156 0.165 
T14 -0.314** 0.048 -0.147 0.357 -0.171 0.276 -0.156 0.165 
No of obs 9930 9599 9930 9599 
No of groups 1401 1365 1401 1365 
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Table 4.6 Control Variables results6 
Statistics with *, **, or *** are significant at 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively. 
The estimate for the coefficient associated with financial euroization (FE_sector) is 
highly significant with a positive sign in all model specifications. The level of 
euroization is expected to affect the frontier and the positive sign of the estimate 
indicates banks operating in countries with higher financial euroization tend to face 
higher costs. As discussed in section 2.5.3, the specific relationship between financial 
euroization and bank efficiency has not been previously explored, thus there are no 
grounds for comparison. However, the relationship between euroization and other 
financial sector performance indicator has been explored empirically. Nevertheless 
as, explained in section 2.5.3, this literature is limited and has not reached a 
consensus on the nature of the relationship between financial euroization and 
financial sector performance, although it leans more towards a negative relationship. 
Thus, our results are in line with a part of empirical literature. 
Regarding the risk variables, credit risk (CR), operational risk (OR) and market risk 
(MR), the estimates for the coefficients of all variables (CR, OR and MR) are highly 
significant in both models with the exception of market risk in the TRE 2005 model. 
Given that the risk variables are introduced in the inefficiency component, they affect 
inefficiency directly. The estimates have consistent signs across the models. The 
                                                          
6
 Refer to Appendices 4.2 and 4.3 for STATA outputs 
 BC 1995 
4.2a 
BC 1995 
4.2b 
TRE 2005 
4.3a 
TRE 2005 
4.3b 
lnTC Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| 
Variables introduced in the efficiency frontier 
GDP_c -0.00001 0.117 -0.00001** 0.038 -0.00001 0.248 -0.00001 0.129 
Inf -0.001 0.619 0.0005 0.846 0.001 0.265 0.001 0.178 
BSRI 0.074 0.379 0.120* 0.107 0.225*** 0.001 0.223*** 0.000 
FO -0.253* 0.071 -0.366** 0.005 -0.009 0.943 -0.139 0.180 
HHI -0.0004 0.193 -0.00003 0.205 -5.37e- 0.718 -6.52e- 0.611 
FE_sector 0.354*** 0.012 0.334** 0.022 0.555*** 0.000 0.501*** 0.000 
Variables introduced in the inefficiency component 
CR - - 0.076*** 0.000 - - 0.044*** 0.000 
OR - - -0.297*** 0.000 - - -0.065*** 0.000 
MR - - -0.089*** 0.000 - - -0.008 0.692 
No of obs 9930 9599 9930 9599 
No of groups 1401 1365 1401 1365 
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coefficient of credit risk variables has a positive sign suggesting that on average a 
higher credit risk increases banks’ inefficiency, i.e. decreases efficiency. The estimated 
coefficients of operational and market risk are negative, indicating a negative impact 
on inefficiency thus a positive impact on cost efficiency. Theoretically, risk variables 
are expected to have a negative relationship with bank efficiency, thus the opposite 
sign for two of our risk variables is surprising.  
With regard to other control variables, in terms of statistical significance the results 
are not fully consistent across the BC 1995 model specifications, but highly consistent 
across the TRE 2005 specifications. In the first BC 1995 model (4.2a), besides 
euroization, only foreign ownership (FO) is significant (and then only at the 10% 
level) and has a negative sign. In the second BC 1995 specification (4.2b), foreign 
ownership has the same sign but a level higher significance and size, suggesting that 
the higher the degree of foreign ownership in banking sector the higher the costs that 
banks face. However, the variable is insignificant in both TRE 2005 estimations (4.3a 
and b). These results are perhaps not surprising given the existing empirical 
literature is inconclusive on the relationship between foreign ownership and bank 
efficiency.  
The BSRI variable is significant with a positive sign in models 4.2a, 4.3a and 4.3b. A 
priori it was expected that in the more reformed sectors banks would be more 
efficient; however, given that here we introduce BSRI in the frontier its impact is 
directly related to the frontier rather than efficiency. Our results suggest that banks in 
more reformed banking sectors face higher costs, which might be reasonable given 
that in more reformed sectors the regulatory requirement might be higher. In the 
4.2b BC 1995 specification, GDP per capita is also significant with a negative sign, 
suggesting that in more developed economies banks face less costs, which is in line 
with previous expectations.  
Properties of cost inefficiencies 
Although individual bank efficiency estimates are not of main interest in the thesis, 
we analyse their trend across different models over time and in relation to different 
control variables. The average measured cost inefficiency of all banks and their 
descriptive statistics in the 2000-2013 period are presented in Table 4.7.  
 107 
 
Table 4.7 Descriptive statistics of inefficiency scores 
Consistent with earlier studies, the results show that the mean cost-inefficiency score 
for banks in TEs ranges from 28 to 42 percent across different specifications. The 
mean annual inefficiency scores over the period across different specifications is 
shown in Figure 4.1.  
 
*BC2vce_cluster= average inefficiency scores of the BC 1995 4.2a model; BC4vce_cluster= average 
inefficiency scores of the BC 1995 4.2b model; TRE2vce_cluster = average inefficiency scores of the TRE 
2005 4.2a model; TRE3vce_cluster = average inefficiency scores of the TRE 2005 4.2b model. 
The Figure 4.1 shows that the inefficiency scores obtained from using TRE 2005 
model are lower in comparison to the BC 1995 model. This is not surprising given 
that the TRE model treats the unobserved bank-specific random effects separately 
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Figure 4.1 Annual average bank inefficiency, 2000-2013 
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Year 
BC 1995 
4.2a 
BC 1995 
4.2b 
TRE 2005   
4.3a        
TRE 2005 
4.3b 
2000 0.469 0.559 0.336 0.465 
2001 0.398 0.429 0.288 0.356 
2002 0.398 0.432 0.274 0.353 
2003 0.371 0.331 0.241 0.261 
2004 0.391 0.326 0.273 0.252 
2005 0.391 0.327 0.271 0.245 
2006 0.395 0.335 0.265 0.246 
2007 0.407 0.333 0.275 0.233 
2008 0.420 0.356 0.283 0.239 
2009 0.477 0.507 0.344 0.351 
2010 0.431 0.472 0.282 0.328 
2011 0.437 0.446 0.271 0.300 
2012 0.435 0.437 0.285 0.294 
2013 0.430 0.434 0.296 0.286 
Mean 0.422 0.404 0.284 0.285 
St. deviation 0.303 0.448 0.243 0.396 
No of obs 9930 9599 9930 9599 
No of groups 1401 1365 1401 1365 
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from inefficiency (Greene, 2005). Given that BC 1995 model is the most frequently 
used model in the literature our results suggest that cost inefficiencies found by these 
studies might be overestimated.  
Regarding the development of inefficiency over time, the Figure 4.1 shows that the 
average inefficiency score is the highest in the initial years in all specifications and is 
decreasing up until 2004. From 2004 it remains relatively stable for few years to 
2009 when it increases. The latter deterioration could be the result of the global 
financial crisis of 2008 because TEs were affected with a delayed indirect impact. The 
increased inefficiency during these years would be expected because banks tend to 
have higher operating costs after such a crisis, usually due to the more stringent 
policies imposed by the monetary authorities to stabilize the banking system. In 
addition, banks may not have the necessary flexibility to adjust their inputs amid 
decreasing outputs as loan demand may drop sharply (Kwan, 2006). After a while 
banks adapt and reach lower inefficiency levels. Thus, the results indicate changes in 
the efficiency of banks in TEs during the period, justifying the time variance 
specification. 
4.6.2 Financial euroization at bank level 
In the second part of the analysis in this chapter we explore the relationship between 
financial euroization at bank level and cost efficiencies in banks operating in TEs. 
Here, as in the previous subsection, cost efficiency is estimated through the Battese 
and Coelli (1995) and Greene TRE (2005) models using various control variables. 
However, contrary to the first part here financial euroization at bank level is 
modelled in the inefficiency component of the error term because it is expected to 
affect the distance of individual banks from the frontier rather than the position of the 
frontier.  
Translog and time components  
The regression results of the translog components are summarized in Table 4.8. The 
TRE 2005 model specification (4.3b), with risk variables in the inefficiency 
component, we could not estimate due to the smallness of the sample size given the 
complexity of the model. The results for the other three models are considered but 
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should be interpreted with caution, given this issue. Contrary to the previous section, 
here the results of the translog components are not fully consistent across different 
estimations in terms of significance and sign. The technological improvement is 
documented through the negative sign of time dummies in the BC 1995 models but 
not with the TRE 2005 models.  
Table 4.8 The results for the translog components7 
Statistics with *, **, or *** are significant at 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively. 
                                                          
7
 Refer to Appendices 4.4 and 4.5 for STATA outputs 
 BC 1995  
4.2a 
BC 1995  
4.2b 
TRE 2005 
4.3a 
lnTC Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| 
lnY1 0.243 0.682 0.778 0.126 0.166** 0.095 
lnY2 0.479 0.063 0.247 0.194 0.480*** 0.000 
lnW1 1.361*** 0.003 1.394*** 0.001 1.164 - 
lnW2 -1.466 0.822 -0.330 0.511 -0.123 - 
 lnY1lnY2 -0.567** 0.035 -0.033 0.138 -0.051*** 0.001 
lnW1lnW2 0.200*** 0.000 0.224*** 0.000 0.155 - 
half_lnY1lnY1 0.084 0.174 0.026 0.604 0.076*** 0.001 
half_lnY2lnY2 0.042** 0.007 0.036** 0.015 0.032 - 
half_lnW1lnW1 -0.162** 0.016 -0.213*** 0.000 -0.130 - 
half_lnW2lnW2 -0.141 0.134 -0.147** 0.079 -0.123*** 0.000 
lnY1lnW1 -0.062 0.217 -0.082** 0.063 -0.060*** 0.000 
lnY1lnW2 0.046 0.451 0.078* 0.102 0.037 0.247 
lnY2lnW1 0.0001 0.995 0.010 0.626 0.001 0.898 
lnY2lnW2 0.0145 0.638 0.0005 0.984 0.015 0.713 
T2 0.150** 0.043 0.235** 0.013 0.139 0.503 
T3 -0.087 0.334 0.020 0.800 0.028 0.917 
T4 -0.263* 0.101 -0.180 0.125 -0.037 0.906 
T5 -0.313** 0.012 -0.229** 0.022 -0.052 0.855 
T6 -0.325** 0.013 -0.229 0.022 -0.020 0.948 
T7 -0.301** 0.020 -0.196** 0.061 0.051 0.859 
T8 -0.321** 0.022 -0.220** 0.058 0.102 0.742 
T9 -0.328** 0.030 -0.214 0.124 0.081 0.808 
T10 -0.309** 0.012 -0.228** 0.016 0.100 0.727 
T11 -0.357** 0.012 -0.279** 0.010 0.040 0.897 
T12 -0.453** 0.012 -0.366** 0.012 0.045 0.901 
T13 -0.455** 0.009 -0.378*** 0.005 0.037 0.916 
T14 -0.473** 0.023 -0.404** 0.018 0.028 0.942 
No of obs 1001 971 1001 
No of groups 119 118 119 
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Control variables 
The estimates of the effects of the control variables are summarized in Table 4.9.  
Table 4.9 Control variable results8 
Statistics with *, **, or *** are significant at 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively. 
The estimate of the effect of financial euroization at bank level (FE_bank) is not 
significant in any of the specifications. There is no evidence that inefficiency is 
affected by banks’ choices on the share of foreign currency loans in their portfolio. 
The risk variables are also insignificant across specifications. One possible reason for 
this may be the relatively small sample size given that the translog functional form is 
considered more appropriate for large samples and may suffer from multicollinearity 
with small samples which can lead to high standard errors of regression coefficients 
(Cohen and Gujarati, 1970). 
There are some inconsistencies across specifications in the results for other control 
variables. In all specifications, GDP per capita is significant with a negative sign, 
suggesting that in more developed economies banks face less costs, which is in line 
with previous expectations. Inflation is significant in the first BC 1995 model and the 
TRE 2005 model with a positive sign suggesting that higher inflation increases costs 
banks face. Foreign ownership is also significant in BC 1995 models with a positive 
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 Refer to Appendices 4.5 and 4.6 for STATA outputs 
 
BC 1995 
4.2a 
BC 1995 
4.2b 
TRE 2005 
4.3a 
lnTC Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| 
Variables introduced in the efficiency frontier 
GDP_c -9.336e-** 0.047 -9.33e-* 0.109 -0.00001** 0.003 
Inf 0.013** 0.027 0.009 0.151 0.010** 0.085 
BSRI -0.185** 0.013 -0.169 0.009 0.008 0.935 
FO 0.509*** 0.000 0.504*** 0.000 0.004 0.983 
HHI -0.00002 0.505 -0.00002 0.473 0.00005 0.315 
Variables introduced in the inefficiency component 
FE_bank -0.251 0.584 0.129 0.710 0.602 0.429 
CR - - 0.008 0.619 - - 
OR - - -0.002 0.796 - - 
MR - - - - - - 
No of obs 1001 971 1001 
No of groups 119 118 119 
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sign suggesting that higher degree of foreign ownership increases the costs bank face. 
The BSRI variable is significant only in the first BC 1995 model and has a negative 
sign, suggesting that in the more reformed banking sectors banks face lower costs.  
Properties of cost inefficiencies 
The average measured cost inefficiency of all banks across different specification 
throughout the period 2000-2013 and their descriptive statistics are presented in 
Table 4.10.  
Table 4.10 Descriptive statistics of inefficiency scores 
On average, over the period banks’ costs exceed the minimum level frontier from 17 
percent up to 23 percent depending on the model. Here as well, considerable 
differences are found in the estimates of inefficiency scores between the models, with 
the TRE 2005 model producing lower scores. This is documented in Figure 4.2 as well 
where the annual average inefficiency score across different specifications over the 
period is depicted.  
Year BC 1995 
4.2a 
BC 1995 
4.2b 
TRE 2005   
4.3a        
2000 0.209 0.309 0.162 
2001 0.276 0.243 0.223 
2002 0.226 0.223 0.175 
2003 0.247 0.250 0.190 
2004 0.260 0.286 0.211 
2005 0.241 0.266 0.191 
2006 0.226 0.237 0.184 
2007 0.216 0.219 0.175 
2008 0.205 0.202 0.165 
2009 0.211 0.217 0.153 
2010 0.222 0.234 0.158 
2011 0.227 0.241 0.163 
2012 0.236 0.269 0.157 
2013 0.228 0.251 0.173 
Mean 0.227 0.241 0.171 
St. deviation 0.156 0.202 0.152 
No of obs 1001 971 1001 
No of groups 119 118 119 
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*BC6vce_cluster= average inefficiency scores of the BC 1995 4.2a model; BC7vce_cluster= average 
inefficiency scores of the BC 1995 4.2b model; TRE4vce_cluster = average inefficiency scores of the TRE 
2005 4.3a model. 
Figure 4.2 shows that the inefficiency scores produced by the TRE 05 model are lower 
than those of BC 1995. As argued in section 4.6.1 this is not surprising since the 
model treats the unobserved bank-specific random effects separately from 
inefficiency. The Figure shows that the inefficiency is more volatile in the initial years 
of the period under consideration, which is not surprising given that these years mark 
beginning of the second decade of the transition process. From 2004 inefficiency is 
decreasing across all models until 2008-2009. In the BC 1995 models the trend 
reverses and inefficiency increases reaching a peak in 2012). The deterioration could 
be attributed to the delayed impact of the global financial crisis and difficulties in the 
Euro Area in 2011. However, the inefficiency estimates from the TRE 2004 model 
(4.3a) there is little change over this period. Thus, overall the results indicate changes 
in the efficiency of banks in TEs during the period, justifying the time variance 
specification. 
 
4.7 Conclusions 
The literature review on euroization and bank efficiency, presented in Chapters 2 and 
3, showed that the existing literature completely neglects the impact of euroization 
on bank efficiency and that the bank efficiency literature in TEs has been limited in its 
exploration of the risk-return aspect associated with banks’ operations, in spite of its 
increasing importance. The aim of this chapter was to address these gaps through 
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empirical exploration of the relationship between financial euroization and bank 
efficiency in TEs. The investigation is conducted estimating cost efficiency of banks 
operating in TEs, whilst controlling directly for the impact of financial euroization. 
Furthermore, the investigation explores the risk-return dimension in the context of 
bank efficiency, an under researched area by controlling for the impact of different 
risks on bank efficiency. In addition, by covering an extended period from 2000 to 
2013 (14 years), the investigation considers more data than has been available 
previously, hence broadening the previous bank efficiency literature. 
The investigation is carried out using a stochastic frontier approach (SFA) for 
estimating the cost efficiency. The use of SFA enables the inclusion of the financial 
euroization and risk factors explicitly in the efficiency estimation instead of the two-
step approach which are criticized in the literature for being persistently biased. Two 
different time varying efficiency models are employed for efficiency estimations, the 
Battese and Coelli 1995 and Greene TRE 2005, the first is the most frequently used 
model in the literature whereas the second is used more rarely but is much more 
flexible. These models differ with respect to how they let the efficiency vary and, by 
using them both, we are able to compare and draw on the strengths of both. The 
results showed that the inefficiency scores obtained through TRE 2005 are 
consistently lower than those of BC 1995. Although, this is not very surprising given 
that the TRE model separated the effect of the unobserved bank-specific random 
effects from inefficiency, it does suggest that the previous literature that has 
employed the BC 1995 model might have overestimated the degree of bank 
inefficiency.  
The impact of financial euroization on bank efficiency is explored by controlling for 
the impact of euroization at both country and bank levels. We found evidence that 
financial euroization at country level affects the cost efficiency that banks can achieve 
in TEs. The results of this investigation are very similar in terms of the sign, size and 
significance of the coefficients of financial euroization across different model 
specifications and estimation techniques. They suggest that in countries with higher 
degree of financial euroization banks face higher costs. However, with regard to 
euroization at the bank level we found no evidence that it has any effect on banks’ 
efficiency. However, this might be the result of our sample size, despite our 
considerable effort in obtaining the data for this investigation.  
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Regarding the risk aspect, estimates of operational and market risk are significant 
and suggest a negative impact of risk on cost efficiency, which is in line with previous 
expectations. Thus, the study has found evidence that different risks affect the cost 
efficiency that banks operating in TEs can achieve. In addition, the study found 
evidence of changes over time in cost efficiency in banks TEs, justifying the use of 
time variant specification when using longer time spans in estimating efficiency. 
Finally the study also found evidence that GFC did increase minimum costs that banks 
in TEs faced, and this looked that it might have been a short term problem, given that 
banks managed to adjust rapidly in terms of cost efficiency.  
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5.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to investigate the financial euroization phenomenon in 
depth, through a qualitative investigation. Building on the previously conducted 
quantitative research presented in Chapter 4, where we investigated the implications 
of financial euroization and related risks for bank efficiency, we now turn to 
qualitative analysis to further explore and better understand the phenomenon of 
financial euroization through banks’ lenses. We do so because employing qualitative 
and quantitative research methods as complementary strategies in addressing the 
same research area and thus drawing on the respective strength of each method 
within the research design can provide a more complete understanding of the 
phenomenon (Bryman, 2006; Gilbert, 2008; Silverman, 2011).  
This investigation uses semi-structured face-to-face interviews carried out in the 
natural settings of individual banks operating in two SEE countries (Albania and 
Macedonia). By doing so, we are able to explore different viewpoints and mechanisms 
or linkages related to financial euroization, enabling a deeper understanding of the 
phenomena (Maxwell, 1996; Healy and Perry, 2000). The focus will be on deepening 
our understanding about financial euroization through banks’ perspectives so that 
policy-makers, strategy developers, regulatory authorities and academic communities 
will be more conscious of how individual banks address financial euroization. 
Although the degree of financial euroization, defined as loans and deposits in foreign 
currency, remains relatively high in these banks (as discussed in section 1.3), its 
investigation has been ignored in the qualitative research literature. Given the lack of 
such literature on financial euroization, to the best of the author’s knowledge, this 
study breaks new ground with the potential for making a contribution to 
understanding aspects of the euroization phenomenon. In addition, the study 
contributes to the qualitative literature by identifying themes and conceptual 
frameworks related to financial euroization that could be further examined in future 
studies. 
The rest of the chapter is structured in the following manner. In section 5.2 the 
purpose of the analysis and the research question are explored. Next, in section 5.3 
the ethical considerations relevant to the nature of the study are identified, with 
emphasis on the issue of confidentiality and strategies employed to maintain it. The 
discussion on the design and methodology of the overall qualitative approach is 
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presented in section 5.4. Subsequently, the procedures for data collection and 
analysis are detailed in sections 5.5. and 5.6 respectively. Next, the issue of validity 
and reliability of the study is elaborated in section 5.7. A summary of the financial 
setting in Albania and Macedonia is presented in section 5.8. The main findings and 
the discussion of the findings and their implications are presented in sections 5.9 and 
5.10 respectively. The final section concludes the chapter. 
5.2 Purpose of the analysis  
The primary purpose of this qualitative study is to explore financial euroization 
through individual banks’ lenses. The goal is to make a deeper investigation of the 
general strategies and specific policies and procedures employed by banks to address 
financial euroization. 
The analysis in this chapter addresses the third key research question of the thesis, 
presented in section 1.2: 
What do banks regard as the main determinants of euroization? What are their 
strategies, policies, and procedures with regard to euroization? Do they feel 
that euroization affects their efficiency? 
 In relation to this, the following research sub-questions are devised to guide the 
investigation in this chapter. They are considered of importance because we lack 
knowledge regarding the nature of financial euroization management processes that 
take place within banks operating in SEE. Without this knowledge, we are in poor 
position to understand, assess or improve policies addressing FE.  
What is your strategy with regard to financial euroization? What factors influence 
the need for and nature of the foreign currency (FC) strategy? Does it vary with bank 
characteristics?  
In relation to this first set of questions, this investigation does not attempt to create a 
typology of various types of FC strategies employed by banks, because such an 
attempt would require an unambiguous classification of types of FC strategies. It is 
more concerned with whether the FC strategy is centrally managed i.e. at the level of 
group headquarters or not. In addition, the study attempts to identify the factors that 
influence the FC strategy employed by banks in the study. 
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 What are the procedures and processes employed by the banks to address the risks 
related to financial euroization? Do these vary between banks and over time? 
Through this second set of questions, this investigation attempts to investigate the 
design and functioning of the instruments, procedures and processes employed by 
banks in addressing risks related to FE. The focus is on how the specific instruments 
are used to manage FE risk and whether they are set at the group headquarters or at 
the individual bank. 
What are the drivers of FC lending? Do they vary between banks and over time? 
With regard to this third set of questions, this inquiry is focused on factors that can 
explain the high degree of FC lending in these banks, and countries. The 
interdependence among factors is considered of great importance and explored.  
5.3 Ethical considerations 
Attention to ethical considerations throughout all types of research is being 
increasingly recognized as essential (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000; Fine et al., 2000; 
Maxwell, 2008). However, in qualitative research ethical considerations are 
distinctive compared to quantitative research, mainly due to the flexible research 
design and the unstructured data collection applied in qualitative literature 
(Hammersley and Traianou, 2012). Informed consent, use of information and 
confidentiality are the main issues that ought to be anticipated and planned for when 
conducting qualitative research (Lipson, 1994; Kvale, 1996; Hatch, 2002; Lincoln, 
2009; Mertens and Ginsberg, 2009; Creswell, 2012). The above-mentioned ethical 
issues were considered throughout different stages of the investigation in this 
chapter, from the early design stage through to the findings to maintain the validity 
and reliability of the research. The study was approved by the Faculty Ethics 
Committee at Staffordshire University. 
The issue of gaining access to the interviewees and banks is a challenge that arises 
right at the beginning of research when initiating the first contact with the 
participants. Convincing individuals to participate in the study by building trust and 
credibility is an access challenge relevant to this investigation, given the sensitive 
nature of the banking data. When dealing with sensitive issues, access to participants 
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is easier through an intermediary or gatekeeper, an individual who leads the 
researcher to participants (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995) and this investigation 
employed that approach, initially contacting participants through intermediaries. 
This additional layer can lead to added ethical considerations such as misinformation 
about the nature of research or coercion, the pressuring participants into 
participating in the study. To avoid any sort of miscommunication with regard to the 
study, the gatekeepers were a priori informed in detail regarding the research and 
interview procedure and were provided with a statement letter written in plain 
language  (Appendix 5.1) about the research project and the interview questions 
(Appendix 5.3) to pass on to the to the designated participants. With regard to the 
issue of coercion, the gatekeeper was clearly instructed not to put any form of 
pressure on the participants with regard to taking part in the interview. 
The informed consent, as one of the principal aspects of ethical considerations in 
qualitative research, was another ethical issue considered relevant to this 
investigation. The informed consent mainly entails informing the participants in good 
time about the purpose and intent of the study, the questions they will be asked, and 
giving them the opportunity to make a decision about whether or not to take part in 
the study. Participants should also be provided with the possibility of withdrawing 
later, because by doing so, the researcher will “minimize the possibility of coercion or 
undue influence” (Hatch, 2002, p. 63). In the relationship with participants in this 
investigation, the author communicated the purpose and intent of the study through a 
statement written in plain language, an informed consent form, and the actual 
interview questions, in advance (Appendix 5.1, 5.2, 5.3). Therefore, each participant 
was sufficiently informed about the purpose and intent of the research to be able to 
make informed decisions regarding their voluntary involvement. The participants 
indicated consent by signing the consent form, which acknowledges their voluntary 
participation in the research. In addition, it was made clear to all participants that 
should they wish to withdraw at any stage, or to withdraw any information or data 
which they have supplied to the author, they are free to do so without prejudice.   
The possible consequences of participating in a research project for interviewees 
must be always taken into account when conducting interviews. The main ethical 
issues consist of identifying and addressing potential risks for the participants. In this 
study there were no associated risks other than the normal social/emotional risks of 
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being interviewed, and participants were notified of this fact. In addition, every 
participant was asked to contact the research supervisors if any concerns arose 
regarding the conduct of the project which they do not wish to discuss with the 
researcher.  
Confidentiality was the central ethical issue anticipated in this investigation, given the 
sensitive nature of banking data: financial euroization data is considered ‘sensitive 
information’ by banks, thus participants had to be assured that the information 
provided by them about their individual banks, as well as the identity of their bank, 
will remain confidential. Confidentiality, as an ethical issue, involves protecting the 
privacy of subjects in a study through changing, or not mentioning names and any 
information that makes it possible to identify them (Kvale, 1996). In this study the 
participants were given explicit assurance through a statement written in plain 
language that the study will protect their anonymity and the confidentiality of their 
responses to the fullest possible extent, within the limits of the law. They were 
assured further that their name and contact details and the name of the institution 
they represent would be kept in a separate, password-protected computer file 
separate from any file containing the information that they supplied. The participants 
were assured that they would not be asked for any quantitative data regarding 
financial euroization. The qualitative data given would only be linked to their 
responses by the author, for the purpose of verification and checking. In the thesis, 
and in any publications arising from the research, their names and the name of the 
institution they represent will be referred to by a pseudonym. Any references to 
personal information that might allow someone to guess their identity will be 
removed.  
In addition, background details (including statistical background) will not be 
presented in this chapter because it could possibly lead to identification of the 
participants, given the small banking sectors in these countries. This will limit the 
scope of the study because it is impossible to make specific comparisons given the 
relatively small sizes of the economies in the countries in the research without 
disclosing the institutions’ identities. The data will be kept securely for five years 
from the date of publication, before being destroyed. The ethical dimension of the use 
of information consists of data obtained through interviews not being used for other 
research. Regarding the use issue, the participants were assured explicitly that the 
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data collected is for the sole purpose of this academic research and only accessed by 
the author.  
The issue of undue intrusion, which consists of avoiding approaches that place an 
undue burden on participants (Creswell, 2012) is an important consideration when 
dealing with human participants. In line with this, the author did not burden 
participants with quantitative data regarding financial euroization, to avoid ‘putting 
them on the spot’ given that they are considered sensitive information by banks. 
Throughout the interview, the author avoided questions and discussions on issues 
that could be obtained elsewhere. In addition, the author tried and succeeded in 
conducting each interview within 45 minutes, thus not exceed the 60 minutes as 
promised.  
Reciprocity is an additional ethical issue that must also be taken into account when 
using human participants as means of collecting qualitative data. Whilst benefits for 
the researcher are easily identified, benefits for participants are not always obvious: 
thus, the researcher should clarify how the research will contribute to the 
participants or their organization (Hatch, 2002). In this investigation, the author 
continuously treated participants with dignity and respect and most importantly 
generated a trusting ambience. With regard to giving back something of substance, as 
Hatch stresses, the participants were offered a short summary of the results of the 
study, should they wish to have them as a benefit of participating in the study.  
5.4 Design and methodology  
This section starts by considering the rationale for the research method and goes on 
to consider the details of the design.  
5.4.1 The rationale for the approach of semi-structured interviews 
Initially a case study approach was considered the most appropriate methodological 
approach to address the research sub-questions. The case study approach utilizes 
multiple sources of information, rich in context, which could be used to examine the 
various dimensions of financial euroization and related risks (Yin, 2003). However, 
conducting a case study method was not viable without disclosing the identity of the 
participants and the banks they represent. For instance, the presentation of bank-
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level statistical information, or even detailed background qualitative data on the 
individual banks connected to the individual interviews could have led to possible 
identification of the participants. Therefore, we were constrained into using only 
semi-structured in-depth interviews, using background information only to examine 
the banks as groups, which did not compromise the confidentiality of the participants. 
The underlying assumption of the study is that the participants would provide honest 
answers throughout the interviews. In being careful with the ethical considerations 
and other aspects of the design of the study we hoped to encourage the interviewees 
to do this. 
5.4.2  Role of the researcher 
In qualitative research, the researcher is an instrument “in much the same way that a 
sociogram, rating scale, or intelligence test is an instrument” (Leddy and Ormrod, 
2005, p.133). The role of the researcher consists of creating a comfortable 
atmosphere for the participants, understand them objectively and protect their 
confidentiality. To fulfil this role in this investigation, the author adapted to 
participants’ requests with regard to interview settings and consistently made sure 
they felt at ease.  
Aiming for objectivity and comparability of the responses, the author asked the same 
questions in all interviews. The author did not lead the participants. There was no 
bias from forcing participants to focus only on positive or negative issues: they could, 
and did, bring up both. To ensure confidentiality and consistency the author was the 
only person conducting the interviews and analysing the collected data. 
5.4.3  Sample selection 
In qualitative research, the norm is to use non-random sampling which consists of 
two types: convenient and purposeful (Trochim, 2001). Non-random convenient 
sampling involves using easily accessible sample. This investigation employs non-
random purposeful sampling, which occurs when the sample is chosen in accordance 
to specific characteristics of the population studied. The criteria are usually defined 
theoretically or strategically to create a deeper understanding around the topic of 
interest. The sample consists of participants who can best inform the research about 
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the phenomenon studied, selected within the general population, to whom the 
findings are generalized (Trochim, 2001; Leedy and Ormrod, 2005; Creswell, 2007). 
Miles and Huberman (1994) identify and elaborate on approximately 16 theoretical 
driven sampling strategies that are applied in qualitative research literature. Later, 
Creswell (2007) analyses their application in qualitative literature and lists maximum 
variation; specific criterion; critical cases and convenient cases, which are applied in 
this study as the most popular strategies. Maximum variation consists of selecting 
individuals and/or sites that are quite different based on the criteria selected, to 
increase the likelihood that the findings will reflect the differences or different 
perspectives. Critical cases strategy consists of selecting individuals and/or sites 
which provide specific information about a problem, whereas, convenience cases 
consists of selecting the individuals and/or sites which the researcher can easily 
access (Creswell, 2007).  
Sampling can be at the site level, the event/process level, and at the participant level, 
and one or more levels ought to be present for a better sample (Marshall and 
Rossman, 2006; Creswell, 2007). In selecting the sample for this investigation, three 
levels were identified:  
- Countries  
- Banks  
- Participants  
The nature of the research meant that Albania, Macedonia, and Serbia were countries 
of interest first, because they are geographically located in South-eastern Europe, 
which is the focus of this thesis. Second, they all have their own currencies and are 
significantly euroized. Third, they differ in terms of their financial systems, exchange 
rate regimes, and economies in general, which may affect perceptions regarding 
financial euroization and related risks. Thus, information obtained ought to be more 
richly, textured and thus more informing regarding the focus of the study: financial 
euroization. For practical reasons, banks in Serbia were not pursued: the researcher 
was not able to travel to Serbia or arrange interviews with any bank. Kosovo was also 
considered for comparative purposes as an extreme case - a country without a 
currency of its own. However, banks in Kosovo were dropped from the study because, 
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following two interviews, it became clear that in both cases the use of any currency 
other than euro was either zero or negligible.  
In selecting the banks, three screening criteria were employed to ensure selected 
banks are representatives of the diversity of the banking systems: 
- Size 
- Ownership  
- Convenience  
With regard to size, banks of different sizes were targeted to increase the likelihood 
that the findings will reflect differences in terms of strategies, policies, and 
procedures with regard to financial euroization. Thus, the sample consists of large 
and small banks, currently operating in Albania and Macedonia. Over half of the 
sample consists of large banks (Table 5.1).  
Table 5.1 Bank Characteristics 
Sample size 
Banks in 
Albania 
Banks in 
Macedonia 
Foreign 
owned Large banks Small banks 
7 5 2 7 4 3 
Source: own calculation 
Regarding ownership, the banks selected were all foreign owned, although to 
different degrees. Most of the banks in these countries are foreign owned (see section 
1.4) and for ethical reasons we cannot identify further details. 
Convenience or ease of access was an additional criterion applied in sample selection 
for this study. The nature of the research, given that financial euroization is 
considered sensitive bank data, made accessibility to banks a challenge to the study. 
Although, the participants were not asked for quantitative data regarding the share of 
financial euroization, the sensitive nature of bank specific strategies, policies and 
procedures limited us to target banks where we had sufficient connections to gain 
access. Nevertheless, it must be highlighted that all banks that we approached, with 
exception of one, responded positively. 
The targeted participants in each bank are persons responsible for the risk 
operations of their banks. These include chief risk managers, risk managers and 
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credit risk managers. Including persons at different levels of seniority in the sample 
enabled exploration of the phenomenon through different layers of responsibilities. 
The sample included different levels of seniority of bank representatives, which for 
the sake of confidentiality we are calling risk managers. The overall sample included 
one senior manager, four middle managers, one operational manager, and one non-
manager senior risk officer (Table 5.2).  
Table 5.2 Respondent Characteristics 
Sample 
size 
Male Female 
Seniority level 
High Medium Low 
7 4 3 1 5 1 
Source: own calculations 
We focused largely on middle management because it was expected they would be 
the persons more informed regarding the policies and procedures of the bank as well 
as the general strategies. However, we made sure to include a more senior manager 
to have the perspective of the higher management who are also more responsible for 
the general strategies of the banks. Operational managers were expected to be 
knowledgeable on specific risk procedures; while a non-management senior risk 
officer was expected to be more informed regarding the technical details of their 
bank’s operations. 
In qualitative research, the sample size is a matter of judgment. The focus of 
purposeful sampling is not as much on the size of the sample, as it is on the quality of 
information obtained (Padgett, 1994; Sandelowski, 1995). The sample population 
should allow sufficient in-depth interviews to gather a sufficient understanding of the 
participants’ experiences (Creswell, 2007) given that the intent is to collect extensive 
details about each site or individual studied, to explain the phenomenon and draw 
specific conclusions. In this investigation we planned to conduct approximately ten 
interviews, which were considered enough to achieve good coverage with regard to 
financial euroization. However, one bank did not respond positively and two planned 
interviews could not be held due to civil disturbance in Macedonia on the days of the 
scheduled interviews. With data collected from only seven interviews, we reflected 
carefully and believe the number is sufficient to gain an understanding of the risks of 
financial euroization in banks in SEE countries. 
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5.5 Data collection procedure 
This section details the overall interview design, the interview procedure and the 
secondary data employed in the analysis.  
5.5.1  Interview design 
The qualitative research consisted of face-to-face in-depth interviews with the 
representatives of the targeted banks. For this investigation, the interviews were 
conducted in a semi-structured format, the most widely used interviewing format in 
qualitative research literature. Semi-structured in-depth interviews are generally 
organised around a set of predetermined open-ended questions, which allow the 
interviewees to build on and explain their responses, which can give the researcher 
more detailed and richer data (Flick 2002; Saunders et al, 2003; Bryman, 2006).  
The main advantage of using semi-structured face-to-face in-depth interviews is that 
they provide much more detailed information than fully structured interviews. The 
depth of information is very important for this investigation, considering that the 
focus is in gaining insight, exploring and understanding the perspective of 
participants regarding the phenomenon of financial euroization (Gillham, 2000; 
Ritchie and Lewis, 2003). The face-to-face interviews also overcome the issue of poor 
response rate of a questionnaire survey; face-to-face contact with a researcher can 
motivate respondents to participate who would otherwise not bother with a 
questionnaire (Gordon, 1975). The dimension of the partial structure allows for 
replication of the interviews enabling a certain degree of standardization, which 
increases data comparability and reliability. Validity is facilitated also through the 
opportunity of observing other non-verbal indicators, which is particularly useful 
when discussing sensitive issues (Gordon, 1975). 
The interviews had a structured order of different topics related to the key research 
sub-questions about banks’ perspectives and attitudes towards financial euroization 
and the elements that they believed underpin FE. Sub-questions were grouped 
thematically around main themes and were used for reference; additional prompts 
were used to draw out respondents’ opinions if necessary. The interview questions 
are presented in Appendix 5.3. 
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5.5.2  Interview procedures 
The interview timeline: 
 The researcher approached potential participants through intermediaries. 
 The participants were provided a priori with the informed consent form, a 
statement letter, and the questions of the interview. 
 The interviews were set up at participants’ natural settings, at the date and 
time of the participants’ choice. 
 At the beginning of the interview the researcher introduced the research 
project, the consent form and answered the participants’ questions. 
 The interviews began after the participants signed and dated the consent 
form, which was retained by the researcher. 
The interviews were guided by a set of topics/questions. The potential participants 
were approached through intermediaries, to reassure them of the academic nature of 
the research and the author’s commitment to confidentiality of the interviews. In 
order to put them at ease and ensure a comfortable atmosphere, the location and 
setting for the interviews were set in line with the participants’ requests (Bogdan and 
Biklen, 1992; Hatch, 2002). Each participant, with the exception of one, chose their 
natural work setting as the area where they felt most comfortable speaking. One 
decided that a neutral setting of their choice other than the work setting would be 
preferable for them. The participants were provided a priori with the written 
informed consent form, a statement letter written in plain language and the questions 
of the interview, so they could have an opportunity to look through the material in 
advance and be prepared for the upcoming interview, or withdraw from the 
undertaking altogether, if they so wished. At the beginning of each interview the 
author introduced the research project and elaborated further on the scope and 
objectives of the research, plans for using the results of the interviews, and answered 
the participants’ questions To maximise open discussion, informed consent was 
discussed in detail, with an emphasis on confidentiality and the potential 
consequences of participation. The interview was guided by a set of topics/questions, 
and a list of prompts to draw out respondents’ opinions. The author made sure to ask 
the same questions in all interviews. The new issues that arose in the first interview 
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the author continued to raise in each following interview to ensure comparability of 
the answers.   
The interviews were conducted between June 16th, 2014 and July 24th, 2014, 
throughout Albania and Macedonia. Half of the interviews were conducted in English 
and half in Albanian language. Most of the participants in Albania, with the exception 
of one, preferred the Albanian language given that it was their native language and 
they felt more comfortable expressing themselves in it. Quotes in the discussion were 
translated into English by the author. The remaining respondent in Albania was a 
foreign person (for the sake of confidentiality, her/his national background cannot be 
revealed) and thus preferred the interview be conducted in English. The participants 
in Macedonia preferred the interview to be conducted in the English language. All 
interviews, with the exception of one, were audio-recorded so that the author could 
go back to the tape again for clarification if necessary, and the author could 
concentrate on the participants’ answers rather than note taking. The author 
immediately transcribed the interviews verbatim. In the case of the interview which 
was not recorded extensive notes were taken during the interview.   
The questions were grouped thematically based on different topics related to the key 
research questions. A list of prompts was used to draw out the interviewees’ 
opinions. The partial structure of the interviews enabled the author to ask the same 
questions to all interviewees. Particular impressions regarding the interviewee and 
any observations, limitations to the data that were created by some aspect of the 
interview process, were recorded in field notes, which were used as an additional 
input to the data analysis process. Field notes were written after each interview, 
following the proposed template of Miles and Huberman (1994). A template of the 
field note used is presented in Appendix 5.4. It is worth mentioning that most of the 
interviewees were perceived by the author as dedicated employees, committed to 
their jobs and professionals. All but one participant were well informed regarding 
their bank’s general strategy, policies and procedures and rationale behind them; 
they also responded candidly and seemed to use the questions as prompts to share 
their thoughts. One participant, who in general kept answers rather short, gave the 
impression that he was not very well informed about his bank’s policies and 
procedures, although it was expected he would be given his position at the bank, i.e. 
he did not give the impression of being very professional. Another participant kept a 
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part of the answers rather superficial and at times attempted to give what appeared 
to be politically correct answers or what he thought was expected of him. That 
particular interviewee, although perceived by the researcher to be professional and 
well informed regarding the general strategy of the bank, was a senior manager and 
was not informed in detail regarding specific procedures. Due to the high seniority 
position, he might have been more inclined to give politically correct answers. As a 
priori expected, the one non-management risk officer that was part of the sample 
appeared as very professional and well informed regarding specific policies and 
procedures but not very well informed regarding the general strategies of the bank, 
most likely due to the limited scope of his duties and responsibilities.  
5.5.3  Secondary data 
Secondary data in this analysis are used as an additional input to the data analysis 
process. They provide additional information to strengthen the arguments and are 
used for the purpose of validity, i.e. to triangulate the findings of the study, an issue 
addressed in the following section. Besides field notes of the interviews, for the 
purpose of this analysis different legal documents and official statistics are used as 
secondary data. Legal documents consist of laws and regulations relevant to banking 
system in the countries in which the interviews are conducted, and important 
publications made by the regulatory authorities. They were collected from the official 
web sites of the relevant institutions. They provide information on how the banking 
system is regulated and supervised in these countries and on the regulatory 
authorities’ policy goals with regard to FE. In addition to these legal documents, the 
banks’ annual reports were collected because they were considered useful for a 
better understanding of their activities and current situation. The second category of 
secondary data used in the analysis process is quantitative data on FC. These data 
were collected from different sources (see section 4.4 for a more in depth discussion). 
They were initially collected for investigating quantitatively the impact of FE on bank 
efficiency but were used for validity purposes in this research as well.  
5.6 Data analysis process  
The collected data were analysed employing thematic analysis. Traditional thematic 
content analysis involves examining interview transcripts and finding common as 
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well as uncommon themes, which forms the basis of a draft coding framework 
(Silverman, 2011, Creswell, 2012). However, given the aim of this qualitative research 
is to build up on the previously conducted research, the set of the main themes were 
identified a priori based on the literature review and findings of the previously 
conducted research presented in Chapter 2, 3 and 4.  
The analysis predominantly used deductive reasoning, where the themes were 
identified from previously conducted research. Yet, once the data analysis process 
commenced it was clear that these themes were unable to entirely explain the FE 
phenomenon and an inductive element was employed. The first stage of the analysis 
is examining the transcribed versions of the interviews to apply the previously set 
coding framework. In the second stage, the data are analysed based on the coding 
framework to explore patterns, causal conditions, and specific strategies regarding 
the central phenomenon. Once the analysis commenced in the first stage additional 
themes started to emerge and in few cases, the hierarchy of previously identified 
themes became more complex, these are further elaborated in the next section. The 
full list of themes and sub-themes is presented in Appendix 5.5. In addition to the 
interviews and participant observations noted in field notes, the data analysis process 
was also based on the review of the previously collected secondary data: legal 
documents and quantitative data. The study includes the most representative quotes 
considering their significance in “revealing how meanings are expressed in the 
respondents’ own words, rather than the worlds of the researcher” (Baxter and Eyles, 
1997, p. 508). For the data analysis process, no computer package was used, given the 
small size of the sample.  
The analysis of data began with a list of themes and sub-themes linked to the 
literature and a priori considerations. In considering the first research question (see 
section 5.1.2) the following themes and sub-themes were developed from the 
literature: 
a) FC Strategy  
i. Where established and why? 
ii. Factors influencing the FC strategy 
In considering the second research question (see section 5.1.2) the following themes 
and sub-themes were developed from the literature: 
b) Instruments employed to address the FC risks 
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i. Limits 
ii. Credit standards and procedures 
In considering the third research question (see section 5.1.2) the following themes 
and sub-themes were developed from the literature: 
c) Drivers of FC lending: 
i. Hedging 
ii. Higher returns 
iii. Demand 
Throughout the analysis, it was clear that the interviewees’ discussion brought up in 
detail additional themes, which are addressed as emerging themes and are presented 
below.  
d) FC indexed lending 
e) Performance of FC loans  
f) Encouragement of DC lending 
5.7 Validity and reliability 
The issue of validity and trustworthiness, which in essence is the internal evaluation 
of the quality of the study, is important to increase the credibility of the data and the 
findings (Kvale, 1996; Maxwell, 1996; Creswell, 2007). Validation is carried out 
through different strategies, but reflexivity, triangulation, and respondent checks are 
the most commonly ones employed in qualitative literature (Creswell, 2007). 
Reflexivity involves acknowledging the researcher’s subjectivities, and possible 
biases toward the study (Parker, 1994; Sword, 1999; Finlay, 2002). In this 
investigation, the author at all times tried to be unbiased, however, the reader should 
note that the researcher author is an employee of a central bank (but not in Albania 
or Macedonia) and this may unintentionally influence how she sees things.   
Triangulation is the most rigorous strategy for ensuring validation. It involves using 
multiple methods, multiple sources of data, multiple measures, and multiple 
viewpoints to shed light on the topic of focus (Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Merriam, 
1988; Denzin, 1989; Miles and Huberman, 1994). This study triangulated the data 
from interviews, field notes and secondary data. The triangulation of data sources, in 
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essence refers to the triangulation of findings of qualitative data with the previously 
collected quantitative data. In addition, the study triangulated data between the 
interviews. Any theme identified from the interviews was considered in terms of the 
interviewees who addressed it.  
The strategy of respondents checking their answers allows the researcher to obtain 
feedback from the participants of the study regarding any misinterpretations made 
by the researcher in summarising the data and drawing conclusions from the data 
(Merriam, 1998). However, risk managers are a challenging population to reach for 
academic research purposes, both because they tend to be busy people and because 
of the sensitive nature of their job. Although, the apparent openness with which they 
shared their perspectives is one of the strengths of this study, the inability to validate 
the data through respondent checks is one of the main limitations. However, it should 
be noted that we observed substantial internal consistency in views and themes 
across interviewees and with data findings of earlier quantitative research chapters. 
Finally, taking into consideration that the investigation is limited to the experiences 
of particular banks the generalizability of our findings is unknown. Nevertheless, the 
combined implications of their experiences should shed light on how banks view and 
address the FE phenomenon in SEE, therefore thematic generalizability (Creswell, 
2007) is certainly a possibility.  
5.8 The financial setting in Albania and Macedonia  
In this section, we elaborate on the background of the two countries in which the 
interviews were conducted. A comparative analysis of the two countries is considered 
necessary because the responses may vary given their particular attributes, therefore 
we should consider this in the data analysis process.  
5.8.1  Financial Euroization 
The significant degree of FE is another important characteristic of both countries, 
which will enable the desired exploration of the FE phenomenon. Whilst Albania has 
experienced a broadly stable high level of FE throughout the last decade, Macedonia 
has been characterized with a lower but stable degree of FE until the global financial 
crisis when it increased, reaching an all-time high of almost 60 percent. In the 
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following three years, there was a gradual decline of FE, followed by a sharp decline 
in 2012 to 30 percent (Figure 5.1).  
 
Source: respective central banks 
The different trends in FE make these countries interesting in exploring the 
implications of FE. Prior to year 2012, the central bank policies in both countries can 
be considered to some degree indifferent with regard to FC lending trends. Since 
2012, both central banks have undertaken concrete steps to encourage banks to move 
towards DC lending activities which, according to our interviews, have proven 
successful. This was more highlighted in Macedonia, where the government regarded 
the sharp increase of FE during 2009 as a negative change and the Central Bank 
explicitly stated its strategy to encourage de-euroization of the banking sector 
through measures presented later in this section under monetary policy.  
5.8.2  Economic development 
The countries have followed different paths with regard to economic performance. 
Before the global financial crisis, between 2002 and 2008, Albania was considered 
one of the fastest-growing economies in Europe, with average annual real growth 
rates of 6%, whereas Macedonia experienced an average economic growth of 3.5 
percent and was underperforming in comparison to the region. The economies also 
differ with respect to how they weathered the crisis: whilst the Macedonian economy 
contracted by 1 percent during 2009, the Albanian economy was one of the very few 
economies in Europe that continued to experience positive growth, although at half 
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Figure 5.1 The degree of credit euroization in Albania and Macedonia, 
2000-2013 
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its previous level. The growth of both economies deteriorated further in 2012 and 
2013, reflecting the difficult situation in the Eurozone, but the Macedonian economy 
rapidly recovered in the following year whereas the Albanian economy stagnated. 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicator 2015  
The experience of the two countries also differs with regard to inflation. In Albania, 
the inflation rate in the past ten years remained low, close to two percent. In 
Macedonia, although the inflation rate was largely stable between 2002 and 2007, in 
2008 it reached a high of eight percent but then in the following year dropped to a 
low of minus one percent (Figure 6.3.). Since then the rate has risen to over two 
percent.  
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicator 2015 
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5.8.3  Exchange rate regime 
Another important attribute of the two countries is their exchange rate regime. 
Albania has a flexible exchange rate regime, although the Bank of Albania occasionally 
intervenes in the foreign exchange market with the aim of smoothing temporary 
fluctuations and accumulating the necessary reserves. Macedonia has had a fixed 
exchange rate regime (with very small margins) since 1995, originally against the 
Deutche-Mark and then against the Euro. As seen in Figure 5.4, the exchange rate in 
Macedonia has been relatively stable throughout the years. However, in Albania the 
exchange rate adjusted during the global financial crisis. Therefore, the perceived 
risks regarding FC may differ in two countries.  
 
*ALL is the Albanian Lek; MCD is the Macedonian Denar 
Source: respective central banks 
5.8.4  Monetary and Macroprudential Policy 
The primary monetary policy tool in both countries is the interest rate on central 
bank bills. Both countries in the last few years have loosened their monetary policy 
with interest rates reaching historically low figures in the last year. Both countries 
have followed the Eurozone trend, although not at the same pace, in reducing the 
base rate after the global financial crisis, year 2009. In comparison to the reduction of 
the EURIBOR interest rate, Albania reduced the interest rate very gradually until 
2012 after which the reduction was greater, reaching the historical low of 2.5 percent. 
On the other hand, Macedonia followed more closely the Eurozone, with a sharp 
reduction in the base rate during 2010 and a gradual decrease during the following 
years, reaching a historical low for Macedonia of 3.5 percent (Figure 5.5). However, 
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taking into the consideration the EURIBOR rate has also been at an historical low, the 
gap with the European base rate remains large. 
 
Source: European Central Bank, respective central banks 
Besides monetary policy, governments in both countries have applied 
macroprudential policy instruments directly linked to currency throughout the 
period under consideration. These policies include reserve requirements on domestic 
and foreign currency liabilities, credit growth ceilings, and liquidity ratios. The main 
aim of macroprudential policy has been to contain or reduce the level of euroization. 
Both countries during 2012 changed the reserve requirements on domestic and 
foreign currency liabilities. Albania stopped offering remunerations for required 
reserves in FC. In addition, they increased the required capital holding for the risky 
assets in FC. Macedonia reduced the reserve requirements for DC liabilities and 
simultaneously increased requirements for the FC liabilities.  
5.8.5  Banking Sector  
Albania and Macedonia in the last decade have been characterized by financial 
deepening. Domestic credit has risen substantially relative to GDP, suggesting that 
banks have become more important in both countries; however, it remains relatively 
low, less than 50 percent of GDP. In the years prior to the global financial crisis, both 
countries were experiencing financial deepening at a faster rate, but this has slowed. 
It is worth noting that financial deepening in Albania was faster than in Macedonia 
before the crisis, but also it slowed more after 2009.  
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Table 5.3 Banking sector indicators in Albania and Macedonia 
 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
ALBANIA 
Domestic credit to private 
sector (% of GDP) 
15% 22% 30% 35% 37% 38% 39% 39% 38% 
Number of banks  17 17 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 
Foreign ownership  92% 91% 94% 94% 93% 91% 90% 92% 92% 
MACEDONIA 
Domestic credit to private 
sector (% of GDP) 
24% 29% 35% 42% 44% 44% 45% 48% 49% 
Number of banks  20 19 18 18 18 18 17 16 16 
Foreign ownership (share 
of FO in total assets) 
51% 53% 86% 93% 93% 93% 92% 92% 68% 
Source: EBRD, central banks, World Bank 
The banking sectors of both countries are mainly foreign owned. The share of foreign 
ownership in the Albanian banking sector has been large and stable, above 90 
percent, throughout the period from 2005 (Table 5.3). In the Macedonia, the share of 
foreign ownership increased from just above 50 percent in 2005 to 92 percent in 
2012, but then reduced to 68 percent by 2013. The sharp drop experienced in the last 
year reflects the fact that one bank was transferred from foreign ownership to 
domestic ownership. In both countries, the capital is mostly European, with Greek 
and Slovenian capital dominating the Macedonian banking sector, and Greek and 
Italian dominating the Albanian banking sector. In 2013 there were 16 banks 
operating in each country. Since 2005 the number of banks decreased by one in 
Albania, but the decrease was larger in Macedonia where the number of banks fell 
from 20 to 16 (Table 5.3). The banking sector in both countries has weathered the 
global financial crisis relatively well and remained largely stable during the Eurozone 
crisis. Nevertheless, the banking sector still faces considerable risks from the 
deleveraging pressures from foreign parent banks, prolonged weak growth, and the 
continued deterioration of banks’ loan quality, particularly in Albania where the NPL 
ratio at end November 2013 reached 24.2 percent of total loans with negative 
consequences for credit growth. Therefore, further deleveraging pressures, which 
may result from the European Central Bank’s Comprehensive Assessment of the asset 
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quality of leading Eurozone banks, set to take place in the first half of 2015 could 
influence capital constraints in their subsidiaries operating in Albania and Macedonia.  
5.9 The main findings 
This section presents the main findings of this investigation, which are structured 
around the main themes of the research. We would have liked to have produced a 
cross table of details with more information on individual banks, but to do so would 
enable the identification of banks and compromised the interviewees. In addition, to 
avoid thisbank characteristics have not been linked to respondent’s replies. 
5.9.1  Foreign currency loan and deposit strategy  
Understanding banks’ strategies with regard to FC loans and deposits was the key 
research topic related to the first research sub-question. The questioning related to 
the theme of FC strategy is presented below and branching is presented in Figure 5.6. 
The researcher started with a general question whether the bank had a specific FC 
strategy. If they did, then they would be asked to elaborate on it, with the researcher 
using prompts to develop the depth of the information.  
Figure 5.6 Branching of the answers regarding the FC strategy   
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group, but that it is tailored to specific countries. One of these two had a very general 
strategy according to which at all times “the FC loans should be lower than FC 
deposits; FC loans should be funded completely from the FC deposits within the bank” 
(interviewee No. 3). This interviewee argued that the group decided that each 
country’s bank ought to fund completely the loans in FC with the deposits in FC raised 
in that country. The strategy of the second bank was much more specific. According to 
the respondent, the aim of the strategy was to decrease the exposure to FC lending in 
every country where the group was present. However, the desired degree of exposure 
was different for each country. The strategy had annual and even monthly set targets 
for each bank to meet, thus the FC issue was addressed in a very central manner. In 
addition, the restriction on the FC exposure was even more highlighted in this bank’s 
strategy, under which, since 2012, the bank had stopped issuing loans indexed to FC 
as a product. The interviewees from the two banks that had a specific FC strategy 
which was established within the bank highlighted that their FC strategy was in 
compliance with their groups’ general strategy.  
Three out of seven interviewees responded that their bank does not have a specific FC 
strategy. However, they highlighted that they treat FC lending through different rules 
and procedures, which are set within their general lending policies. Two of them 
pointed out that they are relatively independent from the group in setting and in 
applying these rules and procedures. The third one maintained that their FC rules and 
procedures are very much in line with their group’s requirements.  
With regard to factors influencing the need and type of FC strategy, it was observed 
that banks that were independent in establishing their strategies were usually 
characterized by a different business focus in comparison to the group overall. In 
such cases, the group would decide that given the small share of the individual bank, 
which is the usual case for most of the banks in the region, the exposure to FC risks by 
the group was limited, thus they could afford leaving the FC risk management up to 
the individual bank. The experience with FC risk also seems to influence the need and 
type of FC strategy. It was observed that banks whose group had previous experience 
of problems with FC risk in any of the countries in which they are present in are 
usually characterized by more specific FC strategies, with the group having tighter 
control over the type of FC strategy employed by the individual banks. In addition, it 
was clearly pointed out by most of the interviewees that the government policies of 
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the countries in which they operate has a significant impact on banks’ FC strategies, 
for a further elaboration see section 5.8.6. 
5.9.2  Instruments employed to address the FC risks 
In relation to the second research sub-question, the literature and a priori 
considerations suggests that limits, and credit standards and procedures are the main 
instruments employed by banks to address the FC lending. The currency mismatch 
theme emerged from the data in relation to the risks related to FC, according to the 
banks. The questioning related to the theme of limits is presented below. 
Limits 
The interviewees were explicitly asked whether they have any limits or quotas with 
regard to FC loans. Four out of the seven interviewees responded that they do not 
have written limits (Table 5.4). However, one of these four pointed out that they have 
a certain position regarding limits such as “keeping FC loans lower than deposits” 
(Interviewee 3). The other three interviewees responded they have explicit written 
limits for FC loans. Two of them stated that the FC limits were set within the group 
level. One of these stated that they “have limits on a total base and for specific 
portfolios, which change every year and have to report on to the group every month” 
(Interviewee 4). The other highlighted they have “limits on new loan volumes and on 
the entire loan volume as well” (Interviewee 6.) which also are revised annually and 
they have to report to the group on monthly basis. Only one bank maintained that 
their FC limits were set within the bank and not within the group. In addition, it is 
important to note that the interviewees of banks that had FC limits pointed out that 
the loans extended to naturally hedged clients are not counted within FC limits.  
Table 5.4 The number of banks that had FC limits  
 
Banks with written 
FC limits 
Banks with FC limits 
set within the group 
Banks with FC limits 
set within the bank 
FC limits 3  2  1  
Source: own calculations 
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Regarding regulatory limits, in Albania following the Financial Sector Assessment 
Program’s (FSAP)9 recommendations, the Central Bank established limits regarding 
FC lending by prohibiting banks from having an FC exposure in aggregate exceeding 
400 percent of its regulatory capital. Exposures exceeding the limit are deducted from 
regulatory capital. Moreover, the risk weight for these exposures is set at 150 percent. 
During 2012, Macedonia introduced limits prohibiting banks from exceeding an 
aggregate foreign currency position of more than 30 percent of their funds. 
Credit standards and procedures 
The theme of credit standards and procedures overlaps with the theme that emerged 
of currency mismatch risk. Therefore, this section will explain whether the banks 
employ different credit standards and procedures in relation to FC loans, and if so 
what tends to influence the difference.  
Four interviewees responded that their bank’s credit standards and procedures are 
tailored to clients’ sensitivity with regard to FC risks. They seem to employ stricter 
credit standards and procedures for clients assessed as highly sensitive to FC risks. 
Three banks maintained their credit standards and procedures do not vary with FC 
risk. In assessing their clients they decide to extend the loans or not but do not 
differentiate the criteria by currency. 
Currency mismatch 
Interviewees were also asked to elaborate on the FC risks they face and how they 
manage them. During the analysis of the interview material the sub theme of currency 
mismatch emerged. When discussing FC risk every interviewee mentioned currency 
mismatch, which is lending in FC to firms and households who receive their income in 
DC, as the main risk they face is related to FC lending. For a detailed discussion 
regarding currency mismatch please refer back to sections 1.3 and 2.4. Four out of 
seven respondents responded they have stricter lending policies in the presence of 
currency mismatch risk (Table 5.5). One of them stated that in this situation “debt to 
income ratio (DTI) and collateral coverage requirements are always higher” 
                                                          
9The FSAP program is a joint IMF and World Bank effort, introduced in May 1999, designed to carry 
out an in-depth assessment of a country’s financial sector and produce recommendations of a micro- 
and macro-prudential nature, tailored to country-specific circumstances. 
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(interviewee 1). Another respondent pointed out that although they “operate under 
the principal rule of always aiming for currency matching; they do have mismatches 
in their loan portfolio” (interviewee 4). The remaining three respondents highlighted 
they have very standard credit policies and procedures independently of the presence 
of currency mismatch. All respondents maintained that they take into account natural 
hedging, i.e. if the client is a net exporter  
Table 5.5 The number of interviewees citing the issue of currency mismatch 
 
Interviewees who cited 
this issue 
Interviewees who cited more 
restrictive policies in presence 
of CM 
Currency mismatch 
(CM) 
7  4  
Source: own calculations 
5.9.3  Drivers of FC lending 
One of the three building blocks of the empirical research of this thesis is euroization. 
Given the opportunity, we wanted to explore qualitatively the reasons behind FE 
through banks’ perspectives. The researcher addressed the topic initially through an 
open question of why they lend in FC. Later on, the interviewees were asked to rank 
the reasons according to their importance. 
Figure 5.7 Branching of the answers regarding the drivers of FC lending     
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one respondent as the third reason (see Table 5.6). The simplicity of banking in these 
countries seems to be the rationale behind this, as one respondent points out that “in 
a market where all that banks can offer are loans and deposits- a simple market, we 
totally depend on market demand” (interviewee 1). According to all respondents 
currency stability, or the perception of the foreign currency as the more stable 
currency, is what drives the high demand for FC loans. The respondents in Macedonia 
acknowledge that this is interesting given that in Macedonia the exchange rate had 
been very stable for a very long time. Another respondent argues “the high demand 
for FC is induced, because of the high base rates” (interviewee 3). One respondent 
also suggests “people demand FC loans because they think they will have the euro in 
future so are already focused on moving towards euro” (interviewee 2). Nevertheless, 
it must be noted that all banks pointed out that besides currency stability, lower 
interest rates on FC loans in comparison to the DC loans were a strong reason behind 
the demand for FC loans. This suggests that FC lending is not actually entirely demand 
driven.  
The second most quoted reason behind the high level of FC loans is hedging: one 
interviewee gave it as the first reason, four as the second reason and two as the third 
reason (see Table 5.6). Banks, according to interviewee 4, “have large deposit base 
and are over liquid in euro” thus need to hedge and protect themselves with regard to 
FC positions by having assets in FC. In SEE countries where the banking market is 
simple, lending in FC is virtually the only hedging instrument for these banks because 
there are no other well-established financial hedging instruments at reasonable cost 
(see section 1.4). All banks maintained that the reason given by the respondents 
behind the large deposits base in euro is the currency stability. Banks have been 
consistently offering higher interest rates on the domestic currencies to increase their 
deposits base in domestic currency.  
Table 5.6 Drivers of foreign currency lending according to the banks 
 
Cited this 
reason 
Cited this  as the 
1st reason 
Cited this  as 
the 2st reason 
Cited this  as the 
3st reason 
Hedging 7 1 4 2 
Demand 7 5 1 1 
Higher returns 6 1 2 3 
Source: own calculations 
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Higher returns or higher profitability is the overall third reason behind FC loans 
according to the interviewees. One respondent lists it as the first reason, two 
respondents list it as the second reason and three list it as the third reason for the 
high level of loans in FC (see Table 5.6). These respondents consider profitability as 
an important reason for FC lending given the higher profit margins on FC loans and 
cheaper FC funding. They are in positions where they can obtain FC funds at lower 
cost compared to DC funds, whether it is in the form of a credit line with very 
favourable conditions from the parent bank or the group, or domestic deposits at 
lower interest rates. This enables the bank to obtain a larger profit margin than with 
loans in DC or invested elsewhere with lower interest rates. All interviewees stated 
that the high base rates in the country in comparison to historically low rates of 
EURIBOR and LIBOR limits their profit margins in DC assets. However, one particular 
interviewee did not list higher returns as a reason for loans in FC. He argued that as a 
bank they fund all their FC loans completely through their own FC deposits and thus 
they consider their profit margins very similar to DC loans. It is worth mentioning 
that according to one respondent higher returns might be a very valid reason for 
products such as mortgages, and any type of business loans, however one must bear 
in mind that the products in which banks usually charge the highest interest rates 
such credit cards, overdrafts, and credit lines, are only offered in domestic currency 
thus making the assets in DC relatively more profitable. However, it is not possible for 
the researcher to get the data for FC loans categorized by product type, which would 
enable a more reliable comparison of the profitability of FC loans in comparison to DC 
loans whilst controlling for product type. 
5.9.4  Foreign currency indexed lending 
FC indexed lending is one of the themes that emerged in this qualitative study. In the 
previous theoretical and empirical chapters it was noted that in a few TEs, 
particularly in SEE, banks were also offering a third type of loans in addition to loans 
in FC and DC, referred to as FC indexed loans. In general, this type of lending would 
consist of disbursing the loans in domestic currency but linking or indexing it to 
foreign currency10. Although it would have been interesting to investigate the effect of 
                                                          
10
 The indexed loans are disbursed in DC, with a fixed normal exchange rate on a historical average, and 
the interest rates are more favourable than DC loans and less favourable than FC loans. However, the 
banks reserve the right to change the interest rates, if the ER fluctuates above the threshold. 
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these loans, banks do not report any data on them, so it was not possible to 
quantitatively investigate their implications. FC indexed loans were addressed first 
through a question on whether they had any FC indexed, or linked, loans. The 
branching of the answers is provided below in Figure 5.8. If the interviewee 
responded that they do, they were asked to further expand on the subject, the 
researcher using prompts to get the relevant information.  
Figure 5.8 Branching of the answers regarding the indexed FC loans 
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conditions to DC and FC loans. According to them interviewee indexed loans were less 
favourable than FC loans for the clients because they were charging interest rates 
similar to DC loans, but more profitable than DC loans because they were fixing the 
exchange rate to a historical average, and thus hedging against possible 
depreciations. Both interviewees maintained that the favourable category was 
identified in terms of favourable interest rates and lower required collateral 
coverage.  
5.9.5  Quality of foreign currency loans 
The exploration of the quality of FC loans, and FC indexed loans when present, was 
another area of interest in this analysis. Although, initially there was some doubt 
about whether the interviewees would be comfortable discussing the quality of FC 
loans, the researcher was surprised with how candidly they talked about the issue. 
The interviewees, were initially asked if there are any differences with regard to 
performance, and if yes to compare the loans categories with regard to performance. 
In addition, they were asked for the reasons for their responses to the first question.  
All interviewees responded that there are no significant differences in performance 
between the categories. They all perform stress testing with currency based scenarios 
and different types of sensitive tests and do not find any particular differences with 
regard to currency. As one interviewee pointed out “in all stress testing no 
deterioration attributable to foreign currency loans has been identified” (Interviewee 
1). Another interviewee argued that “the FC risk have not been a decisive element in 
influencing the non-performing; it is mainly other reasons, sectors, individuals or 
behavioural element” (Interviewee 4.). These arguments are very much expected in 
the case of Macedonia where the exchange rate has been stable for the last 15 years, 
but are somewhat surprising in the case of Albania with different government policy 
and the experience of exchange rate variations during the global financial crisis. 
5.9.6  Encouraging lending in DC  
A recurring discussion in all interviews was recent movement of the banks towards 
the DC currency. They pointed out that besides the restrictions on FC exposure they 
were decreasing the gap on interest rates offered on FC and DC deposits. All banks 
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maintained that the recent government policies, such as macroprudential policy were 
the reason behind this movement. All interviewees noted that in the last two years, or 
at least the last year, their regulatory authorities had been directly and indirectly 
encouraging DC lending (previously referred to in section 5.4). According to one 
interviewee the central bank “has stimulated lending in DC by reducing the base rate, 
and by increasing the reserve requirements for deposits in FC whilst decreasing it for 
the deposits in DC” (Interviewee 6). Another interviewee pointed out that their 
Central Bank is stimulating the DC lending “by reducing the base rate, and through 
the new regulatory requirement of requiring significantly more capital set aside for 
risk weighted assets in FC than those in DC” (Interviewee 3).  
Table 5.7 The number of respondent citing issue of DC lending 
 
Cited 
this 
issue 
Cited 
reduction of 
base rate as an 
instrument 
Cited higher reserve 
requirements on FC  
as an instrument 
Cited new regulatory 
changes with regard 
to RWA* as an 
instrument 
Encouragement 
of DC lending 
7 7 2 5 
*Risk weighted assets (RWA) are assets classified in terms of their riskiness to determine a 
bank's exposure to potential losses and the capital needed to sustain those losses. 
Source: own calculations 
5.10   Discussion of the findings and implications  
In this section, the connections between the main findings and the euroization 
literature are explored whilst taking into consideration bank and country contexts, 
which was not possible to fully carry out in the previous section without endangering 
the disclosure of the bank’s identity. The discussion is structured around the key 
research questions underpinning this study.  
What is your strategy with regard to financial euroization? What tends to 
determine or influence the need for and nature of FE strategy? Does it vary with 
bank characteristics? 
In relation to the first research sub-question in this chapter, the lack of earlier 
research made it difficult to construct a comprehensive framework to be used as a 
basis for comparison. Nevertheless, the analysis revealed that FC strategies pursued 
by banks, in general, seem to be sensible in terms of their objectives.  
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The typical strategy of the banks in the sample is hedging against the risks related to 
FC such as currency and currency mismatch risk. In one particular case the FC 
strategy is focused on hedging and reducing the level of FE exposure in terms of 
volumes simultaneously. Of those banks that had a specific strategy, the majority of 
the sample seem to have the FC strategy set at groups’ headquarters, suggesting that 
hedging is being centrally managed. However, all strategies seem to consider 
naturally hedged customers such as net exporters as fully hedged and thus did not 
treat them as FC loans in terms of risk. This is interesting because whilst the risk of 
default for naturally hedged clients in terms of currency mismatch might very well be 
negligible, these loans are still extended in FC. Thus by excluding them from their FC 
limits, banks may not fully be matching the FC assets and FC liabilities in their balance 
sheets. With unmatched currency positions, with a change in the exchange rate banks 
are going to have an immediate effect of an exchange rate change on their books, 
which is not in line with a bank taking a fully hedged position. Thus, the seeming 
complacency towards naturally hedged customers is not in line with the bank taking a 
fully hedged position, and, what it is more, this seems to be in line with the current 
government policies. This is concerning because whilst, from the country’s point of 
view, on the surface this may be sensible because there are limited cases within a 
country and thus the risk to the bank may be considered minimal, the risk to the bank 
overall may not be that small if all the countries have this policy. This implies that the 
countries might need some sort of regional agreement on limiting this source of risk 
to the banks. 
Various factors were linked to the determination of the FE strategy. The parent 
group’s focus seems to be an important determinant. It was observed that banks that 
were independent in establishing their strategies were usually characterized by a 
different business focus in comparison to the group overall. The study indicates that 
previous history with FE risk is another particularly important factor influencing the 
setting of the FE strategy. It seems that if the group has had previous experience with 
a negative outcome of FE risk in any of the countries in which it operates, the FE 
strategy is entirely managed at the group level i.e. centrally. This suggests that banks 
are not being completely proactive but rather reactive with respect to hedging. In 
addition, it was observed that the FE strategy is also constrained by the government 
policies in the county where the bank operates. Most of the banks in both countries 
pointed out that they are restricting their FC loans and deposits and are moving 
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towards DC currency, mostly due to the new government policies. This indicates that 
government policies in the countries where banks operate seem to be effective. 
Regarding bank characteristics, the study suggests that FE strategy does not vary 
with bank size. However, it must be noted that perhaps the findings do not reflect the 
impact of bank characteristics given that, as suggested by the findings, the FE strategy 
of the banks in our sample is largely established at the group level, with the few 
exceptions mentioned above, and that the banks included in this research, despite 
varying between each other in size, are mostly small within their group.   
What are the procedures and processes employed by the banks to address risks 
related to financial euroization? Do these vary between banks and over time? 
In relation to the second research sub-question the review of literature on 
euroization, presented in Chapter 2, we argued that currency mismatch risk is the 
main source of fragility for the financial system in the presence of euroization 
(Goldstein and Turner, 2004; De Nicolo et al., 2005). In the presence of financial 
euroization, banks attempt to hedge against foreign exchange risk in their balance 
sheets by matching their FC liabilities i.e. deposits with FC assets i.e. loans. Lending in 
FC is virtually the only hedging instrument for these banks because in SEE countries 
there are no other well-established financial hedging instruments at reasonable cost 
(see section 1.4). Nevertheless, by lending in FC they are not entirely hedged if their 
customers have not been matching their assets and liabilities in their balance sheets 
in terms of currency as well. In situations when the customers assets i.e. income are 
in DC whilst, their liabilities i.e. loans are in FC they are more vulnerable to the 
foreign exchange risk. Consequently, their ability to repay their obligations to the 
banks is affected, making banks more vulnerable to credit risk. The evidence 
presented above suggests that many banks consider the currency mismatch risk as 
the main risk related to FE. Therefore, the study supports the view that currency 
mismatch risk is of recognised by banks as important. 
The study reveals that the typical procedures and processes employed by many banks 
in the sample seem to be in line with a FC strategy that is concerned with reducing 
the foreign currency risk. Banks in our sample, in general, seem to be concerned with 
hedging against the currency mismatch risk. In terms of instruments, procedures and 
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processes used to manage it, the study showed that banks employ limits, and 
different credit standards and procedures.  
Limits related to FC loans are used with regard to total loan stock, new volumes, or 
specific sector, or with regard to FC deposits. They seem to be usually revised 
annually, but followed monthly. In terms of hedging strategy, this seems to be a 
sensible timescale in a relatively stable environment, but it would need to be adjusted 
quickly in less stable environment. Whether these banks have the right policies and 
procedures in place to respond quickly in times of turmoil remains to be seen. The 
study showed that most of the time the limits are set within the parent group, with 
the exception of the cases in which the bank is already independent in FE 
management from the group. It is worth noting that most of the banks maintain that 
loans extended to naturally hedged customers, such as net exporters, are not included 
in their FC limits. This may, of course, expose the banks themselves to foreign 
currency risk given that by excluding them from their limits they are not fully hedging 
their positions.  
The study also revealed that over half of the banks in our sample seem to employ 
stricter credit standards and procedures in the presence of currency mismatch in the 
assets and liabilities of their clients. Some, but not all, either require higher collateral 
coverage or lower debt to income ratios, or both. However, few banks have standard 
credit procedures, in the sense that they do not apply stricter credit criteria in the 
presence of currency mismatch risk, they only decide to extend the loan or not. 
Albeit, the study suggests that there is much of hedging going on with regard to 
currency mismatch risk, banks acknowledge that a certain degree of currency 
mismatch is present in their portfolios, particularly in their mortgage portfolio loans. 
The fact that the highest degree of currency mismatch is in their mortgage portfolios 
suggests that banks have maturity mismatches in their books as well. The 
combination of currency and maturity mismatches is worrying taking into 
consideration that the first one is considered responsible for triggering the 1997 
Asian financial crisis (Chang and Velasco, 2003; Godlstein and Turner, 2004; De 
Nicolo, et al., 2005) and the second one is considered the major cause of the 2008 
global financial crisis (Brunnermeier et al., 2009; Park, 2011). Nevertheless, this has 
not proved a problem up to this point in time in either country investigated. This is 
not surprising for Macedonia given the exchange rate stability linked to the fixed 
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exchange rate regime. However, in Albania, the exchange rate adjusted during the 
crisis period and the fact that problems of currency mismatch did not materialize is 
perhaps surprising. An explanation might be that Albania’s economy weathered the 
global financial crisis quite well because its exchange rate adjusted, so maybe 
although there was an exchange rate effect, the economy being more positive in 
general, actually meant that there were not a lot of defaults on these debts. 
Alternatively, maybe the degree of currency mismatch risk is not large, as perhaps 
these clients are getting some flows in foreign currency in forms of informal 
remittances, and thus are at least partly FC hedged, although this is not taken account 
of by banks in their processes. 
What are the drivers of foreign currency lending? Do they vary between banks 
and over time? 
In relation to the third sub-question, the euroization literature identifies the drivers 
FC lending as: interest rate differential between the DC and FC; bank currency 
matching i.e. matching of FC liabilities (deposits) with FC assets (loans); exchange 
rate volatility and exchange rate policy; and the openness of the economy in terms of 
easier access to foreign funds, (for a more in depth discussion, please see section 3.2). 
 The findings in this chapter confirm the existing literature. The interviewees clearly 
suggested that currency matching by banks is the most important driver behind FC 
lending. According to them, this is a long-term determinant thus contradicting 
Neanidis and Sava (2009), who argue that bank currency matching is an important 
driver for FC lending only in the short run. This thesis highlighted in section 1.4 that 
the underdeveloped banking systems and financial markets in TEs mean that banks 
operating in these countries can hedge their FC liabilities only by lending in FC. In the 
literature, the preference for foreign currency as store of value is rational in the 
presence of high inflation and exchange rate volatility. However, the literature argues 
that in the long run the domestic currency re-establishes itself (Ize and Levy Yeyati, 
2003; Basso et al., 2011). This investigation partly supports these views given that 
banks maintained that it is the customers who seem to prefer depositing their money 
in FC initially, because they perceive it as more stable. However, the experience in 
these countries does suggest that presence of FC deposits continues for a long time 
after currency stability is established. The investigation suggests that for the DC to re-
establish itself it may need active involvement of the government in setting the 
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correct policies. The recent government policies discriminating against FC lending, 
has encouraged banks to move towards DC lending. Banks have acknowledged that 
the differences in interest rates offered in FC and DC are much lower than before, 
mainly due to such government intervention. The research here suggested that banks 
are very much affected by the government regulations and the movement back to 
domestic currency seems to require the right policy setting.     
The study also supports the literature in finding the interest rate differential between 
the DC and FC an important driver of FC lending. According to the interviewees, 
clients are comfortable with depositing their money in DC only with much higher 
interest rates than in FC because they perceive foreign currency to be more stable. 
Given the lower interest rate offered on deposits in FC, banks are able to offer FC 
loans with lower interest rates, making them more attractive to clients than DC loans.  
The study suggests higher returns or higher profitability is the third identified driver 
of FC loans. Although the interviewees considered that due to cheaper funding FC 
loans have a positive impact on profitability, not all of them argued that this impact is 
large. The study showed that for products in which the profit margin for banks is 
larger, such as personal loans, credit cards and overdrafts, banks are required to offer 
these products only in domestic currency due to the regulatory framework. This then 
has implications with regard to the profitability of DC assets in comparison to FC 
assets. We are limited in further exploring or quantifying the profitability of FC assets 
in comparison to DC assets by product type, due to the lack of data on FC loans 
categorized by product types. 
Finally, the analysis suggests that once euroization is present, a specific government 
initiative is needed to change euroization levels, an aspect not present in the existing 
literature presented in sections 2.3 and 2.5. The literature has not explained the 
persistence of euroization once the macroeconomic conditions in terms of inflation 
and exchange rate volatility have stabilized. This analysis has revealed that it is 
specific government policies such as macroprudential policies that aim the 
containment or reduction of euroization that can actually shift such persistence.  
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5.11    Conclusion 
This chapter involved an investigation of the financial euroization phenomena from 
banks’ perspectives, in SEE economies. The aim of the chapter was to investigate the 
financial euroization phenomenon in depth, through a qualitative investigation. In 
terms of design and methodology of the study ethical considerations constrained the 
investigation in the use of semi-structured face-to-face in-depth interviews without 
supplementing this with additional background data on each bank in order not 
compromise the confidentiality of the participants and banks. The semi-structured 
interviews were conducted by the author in the natural settings of individual banks 
operating in two SEE countries: Albania and Macedonia. The selection of Albania and 
Macedonia was based on the fact that they have their own currencies and are 
significantly euroized; however, they differ in terms of their financial systems, 
exchange rate regimes and economies in general. Consequently, it was expected that 
they might differ in terms of perceptions regarding financial euroization and related 
risks, and thus, the information obtained would enable a deeper understanding of 
financial euroization.  
The findings of the analysis provide timely, informative, and enlightening insights 
into a topic that has influenced banks in TEs, particularly in SEE countries over the 
last two decades. Although the analysis was based in two selected SEE countries, the 
conclusions may have more general applicability in other TEs, at least in those with 
similar banking sectors and a considerable degree of financial euroization.  
Initially the chapter, in line with the literature review in Chapters 2 demonstrates, 
that FE continues to be a significant characteristic of banks and banking sectors in 
these countries. Nevertheless, the main conclusion of this chapter is that government 
policies such as macroprudential policies regarding FE are affecting policies and 
procedures employed by banks. For a long time governments and central banks were 
indifferent towards FE and this seems to have allowed the high degree of FE in these 
countries to continue, given that banks’ and customers’ preference for FC in 
comparison to DC were not in conflict. However, this investigation indicates that 
macroprudential policies are becoming an important driver of de-euroization.  
In addition, the analysis in this chapter revealed that banks seem to be concerned 
with hedging against the risks associated with FE. Furthermore, within our small 
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sample, hedging is being typically centrally managed, at the groups’ headquarters, as 
it needs to be for hedging purposes. However, most of the banks in the sample seem 
to neglect the risks associated with one group of customers, exporters, and overly 
rely on the natural hedging available to this group. They all seem to exclude them 
from their foreign currency lending limits (section 5.8.2), which implies that banks 
are underestimating their own exposures in terms of the risks related to foreign 
currency. Moreover, there are indications that banks are not completely being 
proactive but rather reactive with respect to hedging. The banks with the strictest FC 
strategy seem to be those that had experienced losses with regard to FC risk in the 
past in their operations in another country. 
In terms of the other drivers of euroization the findings of this analysis support the 
conventional view that deposit euroization and the interest rate differential were the 
main determinants of credit euroization in these countries.  
Finally, in terms of the contribution to methods of investigation, the study showed 
that, future qualitative investigations in this research are could result in useful 
insights if they are carefully designed even though the confidential nature of the data 
makes this type of investigation difficult. 
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6.1  Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we looked at the financial euroization phenomena from 
banks’ perspectives through a qualitative investigation. The findings provided 
evidence that government policies such as macroprudential policy are becoming an 
important driver of de-euroization. Macroprudential policy is mainly focused on 
reducing systemic risk, and is quickly gaining recognition as the appropriate policy in 
addressing financial stability. Therefore, as an extension to the qualitative analysis in 
Chapter 5 we decided to investigate the impact of macroprudential policy on financial 
euroization in the context of TEs.  
As discussed in section 2.5.2 where the review of the theoretical framework on 
euroization was presented, there is a vast and diverse literature which 
comprehensively analyses the determinants of euroization, but the existing research 
is limited in its ability to explain financial euroization in TEs because of the following 
reasons. First, until very recently, most of the studies were focused on deposit 
euroization completely ignoring credit euroization, most likely due to lack of data. 
Second, the vast majority of the existing studies have definitional problems: they 
explain the determinants of payment euroization on the basis of currency 
substitution theoretical framework whilst using measures of financial euroization 
(Ize and Levy Yeyati, 2003). This is problematic because the use of measures of 
payment euroization and financial euroization interchangeably can be misleading 
since both determinants and conceptual implications of the two phenomena are 
different (Sahay and Veigh, 1995). Third, and to the best of our knowledge, the 
literature completely ignores the impact of macroprudential policy on financial 
euroization. Nevertheless, taking into consideration that a group of macroprudential 
policy instruments (MPIs) are directly related to credit and deposit euroization, it is 
to be expected that they may influence the level of financial euroization. The 
investigation in this chapter represents the first attempt at studying the potential 
impact of the macroprudential policy on financial euroization in TEs.  
Emerging market economies are more experienced with macroprudential policy 
given that they have pursued it “more extensively than advanced economies, both 
before and after the recent financial crisis” (Lim et al., 2011; Galati and Moessner, 
2014). They did so mostly due to their pronounced business cycles, their greater 
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exposure to volatile international capital flows and other risks, and the 
underdeveloped financial markets (Lim et al., 2011; Claessens et al., 2012). 
Macroprudential policy has been used actively in Central, Eastern and South Eastern 
Europe (CESEE), making this region a fertile ground for the investigation of their 
effectiveness (Vandenbusche et al., 2012).  
In addition, the present investigation adds to previous research on the determinants 
of financial euroization by investigating the use of dynamic panel analysis to 
differentiate between the short-run and long-run effect of the determinants of 
euroization and to adjust for the potential endogeneity not only of the exchange rate 
volatility but also of the macroprudential policy variables. In the existing literature, 
only one study (Vieira et al., 2011) employs dynamic panel analysis to investigate the 
determinants of financial euroization. However, they focus on deposit euroization and 
cover the period before the global financial crisis using data up to 2006. The aim of 
this chapter is to provide policymakers in TEs information on the impact of the 
existing macroprudential policy on financial euroization, specifically credit 
euroization, so that they can make informed policy decision on the design and 
implementation of macroprudential policy.   
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The literature review on macro 
prudential policy is provided in section 6.2. Section 6.3 provides a critical discussion 
of the choice of measures for the model specification, which draws on the analysis 
undertaken in Chapter 2. The subsequent section elaborates on the data used for 
empirical estimations. The discussion regarding the empirical approach employed in 
this investigation is provided in section 6.5. The appropriateness of the model and the 
empirical results are discussed under section 6.6. The final section concludes.  
6.2  Macroprudential policy: literature review 
This section discusses the literature on macroprudential policy. It begins with a 
general discussion of the concept of macroprudential policy, its objective, scope, and 
instruments associated with it. It elaborates on the time and cross sectional 
dimensions of systemic risk. The empirical evidence on macroprudential policy is also 
discussed. The final sub-section concludes and formulates the hypothesis regarding 
the impact of macroprudential policy on financial euroization.  
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6.2.1  Macroprudential policy objective 
Macroprudential policy, which is widely considered as a useful response to global 
financial crisis by many countries, is focused on reducing the systemic risk “by 
explicitly addressing the interlinkages between, and common exposures of, all 
financial institutions and the procyclicality of the financial system (Caruana, 2010). 
Systemic risk is difficult to define and quantify; however, the most widely used 
definition is the one prepared for the G20 Finance Ministers and Governors of central 
banks by the International Monetary Fund, the Bank for International Settlements 
and the Financial Stability Board. They define systemic risk “a risk of disruption to 
financial services that is caused by an impairment of all or parts of the financial 
system and has the potential to have serious negative consequences for the real 
economy” (IMF, BIS, FSB, 2009). As characterized by the International Monetary Fund 
and Bank for International Settlements, macroprudential policy targets the soundness 
of the financial system as a whole, rather than individual institutions, and applies 
instruments that are designed and calibrated to target systemic risk (IMF, 2011a; 
2011b).  
Given that it centres on systemic risk, the literature recognizes two main dimensions 
of macroprudential policy: the time dimension and cross sectional dimension, which 
were initially introduced by Borio and Crockett (2000). The time dimension or 
procyclicality addresses the cyclical systemic risk that occurs when during the 
upswings financial institutions take greater risks and expand their balance sheets, 
and the built-up hidden balance sheet mismatches increase the vulnerability of 
financial system and economy. The procyclicality paradox of credit, therefore, is that 
it is most available when it is least needed and least available when it is most needed, 
drawing directly on Minsky’s observation that the system appears safest precisely 
when it is most vulnerable (Baker, 2012). The cross sectional dimension or 
interconnectedness addresses the risk of a spillover effect from individual 
systemically important institutions or the risk of common exposures of individual 
institutions on the system as a whole. The interconnectedness enables the 
amplification and spread of a shock to an individual institution to the whole financial 
system. In addition, the interaction between the cyclical and the interconnectedness 
can intensify the vulnerabilities (Claessens et al., 2012). 
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6.2.2  Macroprudential policy instruments 
TEs have employed a variety of macroprudential instruments to address both 
dimensions of systemic risk throughout the period, yet their effectiveness is 
uncertain. These instruments can be credit-related, liquidity related, and capital 
related. Lim et al. (2011) identified ten instruments that have been most frequently 
used to achieve macroprudential objectives. These are listed in Table 6.1. 
Table 6.1 The most frequently used macroprudential policy instruments  
Macroprudential policy instruments 
Caps on the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio Limits on maturity mismatch 
Caps on the debt-to-income (DTI) ratio Reserve requirement 
Caps on foreign currency lending Countercyclical capital requirements 
Ceilings on credit or credit growth Time-varying/dynamic provisioning 
Limits on net open currency positions Restrictions on profit distribution 
Source: author based on Lim et al., 2011 
The use of the instruments listed above across countries differs in the manner 
employed. They can either be used individually, where one instrument is employed to 
address a certain risk or together when a number of instruments are employed to 
address a certain risk. An example of the latter would be countries that have set limits 
on foreign currency lending and differentiated reserve requirements on a currency 
basis. Another distinction recognized in practice is that instruments can be employed 
in a broad manner or they can be targeting a specific risk. For example, some 
countries have imposed limits on foreign currency lending to address specifically 
foreign currency lending as a contributor to the increased interconnectedness 
dimension of systemic risk. They can also be fixed or time varying, where the time 
varying are designed to adjust to different phases of the cycle. In addition, the 
instruments can be employed as a rule or can be left at the discretion of the 
regulatory authority. Finally, they can be employed as a standalone policy or can be 
employed in conjunction with monetary and fiscal policies (Lim et al., 2011).  
6.2.3  Macroprudential policy empirical review 
The literature on macroprudential policy has not yet reached a clear consensus on the 
role of the different instruments. Furthermore, the empirical literature on 
macroprudential instruments is limited, mostly due to a scarcity of data as they have 
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become standard policy tools only in recent years. However, recently increasing 
efforts have been made to fill this gap. Studies have been able to investigate, to a 
certain degree, the effectiveness of the macroprudential policy instruments using 
data from the IMF’s Global Macroprudential Instruments of 2010 and 2011, or by 
collecting their own primary data. The vast majority of these studies investigate the 
effectiveness of the macroprudential policy from the banking sector’s perspective. A 
number of them focus on their effectiveness with respect to the housing sector 
(Vandenbussche et al., 2012; Kuttner and Shim, 2012; Crowe et al., 2011; Ahuja and 
Nabar, 2011). Most of them investigate their impact on accelerated credit growth or 
credit busts as measures of financial (in)stability (Dell’ Aricia et al., 2012; Wong et al., 
2011; Tovar et al., 2012; Lim et al., 2011). A very limited number of studies 
(Claessens et al., 2014; Ghosh, 2013) investigate the effectiveness macroprudential 
policy from the individual bank’s perspective. 
Vandenbussche et al. (2012), investigate the impact of macroprudential policy on 
house price inflation in 16 CESEE countries using quarterly data from the early 2000s 
to the end of 2010 employing panel techniques. They group macroprudential policy 
instruments into 29 categories, including a number of instruments related to foreign 
currency, given the high levels of euroization in these countries. They find that capital 
requirements and marginal reserve requirements on foreign funds had an effect on 
house price inflation. Kuttner and Shim (2012) also investigate the degree of 
effectiveness of macroprudential instruments in mitigating housing price and credit 
cycles using data from 57 countries and employing panel techniques. They find that 
caps on loan-to-value (LTV) and debt-to-income (DTI) ratios attenuate housing credit 
growth and are related to lower house price inflation. Crowe et al. (2011) explore the 
effects of these instruments on real estate booms and busts, and find caps on loan-to-
value (LTV) ratios related to the real estate cycle have the best chance to curb a real 
estate boom, whilst dynamic provisioning, although ineffective in avoiding the boom, 
can help during the bust. Ahuja and Nabar (2011) investigate effectiveness of the 
measures in 49 emerging and advanced economies using quarterly data from 2000 to 
2010 employing panel techniques. They find that LTV caps together with DTI caps 
slow property lending growth, which leads to lower inflation.  
Dell’ Aricia et al. (2012) investigate the effect of such policy instruments on mitigating 
credit booms and busts, using cross-country analysis in panel data regressions, and 
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find them effective. They find macroprudential policy helpful in reducing the 
incidence of credit booms and in decreasing the probability that booms end badly. 
Wong et al. (2011) investigate the policy effectiveness using panel data across 13 
economies and find caps on LTV ratios effective in mitigating boom and boost cycles. 
Tovar et al. (2012) analysed the role and effectiveness of macroprudential tools in 
Latin American countries in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. They conclude 
that the employment of macroprudential tools has only a modest and transitory effect 
on the growth of credit in the private sector. In contrats, Lim et al. (2011), using 
cross-country analysis in panel data regressions, explore the role of macroprudential 
policy instruments on credit and leverage growth, and find them effective in reducing 
their procyclicality. Specifically, they find instruments such as caps on LTV and DTI, 
credit growth ceilings, reserve requirements and dynamic provisioning the most 
effective instruments.   
Claessens et al. (2014) investigate the effectiveness of macroprudential policy using 
bank level data on more than 2,800 banks over the period 2000-2010 in 48 countries 
(both advanced and emerging). They employ nine specific macroprudential 
instruments including limits on foreign lending. They find that caps on DTI and LTV 
ratios, limits on credit growth and foreign currency lending are effective in reducing 
asset growth. Overall, they do not find evidence that the effectiveness of these tools 
varies by the intensity of the cycle. Ghosh (2013) investigates how macroprudential 
policy affect the performance of the banking sector across bank ownership, using an 
unbalanced panel with a minimum of 58 banks and maximum of 64 banks in India 
during 1999-2012. He finds that different instruments exert a differential impact on 
banks across ownership and addresses the differences as the outcome of different 
business modes, product sophistication, and risk appetite.  
The existing empirical literature finds macroprudential policy instruments effective 
in attenuating overall credit growth and sectorial credit growth depending on their 
use. Moreover, a few studies found that besides mitigating the credit booms, these 
instruments can decrease the probability that booms end badly. Even though 
macroprudential polices can be powerful tools in mitigating systemic risk, they also 
impose certain costs. Classenss et al. (2014) argue that they affect resource allocation 
and more importantly they can limit efficient financial sector development. The 
existing literature on macroprudential policy instruments mainly advocates their 
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effectiveness in mitigating the systemic risk across countries but largely ignores the 
costs that they entail. One exception here is the study by Benigno et al. (2011) 
investigating the implications of macroprudential policy using a two-sector small 
open economy model, using quarterly Mexican data. They argue that such policy 
aimed at reducing the amount of borrowing or the probability of crisis might be 
counterproductive, suggesting that the distortionary costs imposed by them may be 
bigger than the benefit of eliminating the probability of crisis events. They provide 
evidence that employing macroprudential policy in tranquil times could be welfare 
reducing, because despite reducing the crisis probability, these polices reduce the 
average level of consumption.  
In conclusion, to the best of our knowledge, the existing macroprudential literature 
has ignored the impact of macroprudential dimension on financial euroization. Most 
of the empirical literature on the macroprudential policy, although it usually covers  
transition economies in which the degree of financial euroization is high and can 
increase systemic risk in the interconnectedness dimension, is either focused on 
investigating its impact on the overall accelerated credit growth or specifically on the 
growth of housing sector credit. We extend this work by investigating how this policy 
may affect the levels of financial euroization, thus we analyse the role of 
macroprudential policy in limiting the interconnectedness dimension of the systemic 
risk in these countries.  
This investigation contributes to the empirical discussion on macroprudential policy 
by focusing on a particular set of instruments related to foreign currency. We focus on 
these measures because, first, they directly address foreign currency lending 
therefore, it is expected that they affect financial euroization. Second, the qualitative 
investigation presented in the previous chapter indicated that these instruments are 
becoming an important driver of de-euroization. Third, these instruments are some of 
the most commonly used instruments of macroprudential policy in TEs. In addition, 
although in the existing macroprudential literature these instruments are controlled 
for and found significant in affecting the growth of the overall credit or housing sector 
credit, to the best of our knowledge their impact on the levels of credit euroization 
has not been studied. Furthermore, the macroprudential dimension has not caught 
the attention of the financial euroization literature either. To the best of our 
knowledge, the existing studies do not control for this policy when investigating the 
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determinants of financial euroization. There is a paper that looked at the impact of 
government policies in related area prior to the macroprudential area: Rosenberg and 
Tirpak (2008). They investigate the determinants of credit euroization in 10 CEE 
countries using data from 1999-2007 through OLS techniques. They also control for a 
FX restriction index, which they construct relative to regulatory restrictions with 
regard to financial euroization. The index takes into account regulatory restrictions 
aimed at slowing foreign currency borrowing such as whether central banks monitor 
FX risk, whether banks disclose FX risk to customers, etc. They find that these 
requirements have had only limited success. However, the study is limited in the 
sense that firstly it is conducted prior to the global financial crisis, which introduced 
the need for macroprudential policy. Thus even though some instruments that are 
now considered macroprudential policy instruments were employed even before the 
GFC, they were not employed or calibrated to address the exposure of the whole 
financial system to systemic risk. Second they put all these different instruments into 
one index and assume that each additional requirement with regard to credit 
euroization has the same effect. Third the study covers only 10 CEE countries and 
employs simple OLS techniques.  
6.3   Model Specification  
This section provides a critical discussion of the choice of measures for the model 
specification, which draws on the analysis undertaken in Chapter 2 and the present 
chapter. 
6.3.1  The dependent variable: euroization measure 
In the empirical investigation presented in this chapter, credit euroization is used as 
the dependent variable. The definition of the measure and the appropriateness of 
using it in the empirical investigation are considered below.  
As discussed in the literature review of euroization in Chapter 2, until recently studies 
that examined financial euroization only concentrated on deposit euroization. This 
was considered reasonable given that it was thought that both credit and deposit 
euroization often mirror each other, mostly due to prudential regulations in many 
countries (Levy Yeyati, 2004). However, later it was argued that credit and deposit 
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euroization do not always match and often display different patterns (Ize and Levy 
Yeyati, 1998; Catao and Terrones, 2000; and Basso et al., 2011). Given the purpose of 
this investigation is to explain the impact of macroprudential policy on financial 
euroization and the instruments of interest are directly linked to credit euroization 
this seems to be a more appropriate measure. Therefore, the dependent variable used 
in the investigation is the share of loans in foreign currency in total loans in the 
financial system. 
6.3.2  The independent variables of interest: macroprudential policy 
instruments 
In the investigation presented in this chapter, the main contribution is looking at the 
impact of macroprudential policy on financial euroization. As discussed in the 
literature review presented above, during the last decade, TEs have employed a wide 
range of macroprudential policy instruments among which are a number of 
instruments related directly to foreign currency positions. Ideally, we would employ 
all individual macroprudential policy instruments, since all of them can potentially 
affect the level of euroization and it would be beneficial from the policymaking point 
of view to identify which instruments are effective. However, employing all variables 
would exhaust most or all of the degrees of freedom associated with the dataset, so 
we must find a compromise solution. Studies that investigate the macroprudential 
policy usually include a few instruments separately and decide to use in their final 
model the significant ones. Sometimes they include a large number and then drop 
insignificant ones to save degrees of freedom. Although this is a practical approach, it 
can be problematic in identifying the best instruments given that they are likely to be 
highly correlated.  
Most of the studies investigate this policy through dummy variables, which take the 
value of one when the instrument is introduced and zero, otherwise. An exception is 
the study of Vandenbussche et al. (2012) who investigate the intensity of policy 
change through a complex coding system and Federico et al. (2012) who take into 
account the frequency of changes of certain policies. In this investigation, we will 
initially employ through simple dummy variables a few of the macroprudential policy 
instruments related to financial euroization directly introduced by TEs during the 
2000-2013 periods, presented below in Table 6.2. 
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Table 6.2 Number of macroprudential policy instruments related to FC employed in 
TEs, 2000-2013  
 
Limits 
on FC 
loans 
Limits 
on FC 
open 
posit. 
Counter-
cyclical 
capital 
buffers FC 
Dynamic 
loan-loss 
provis. 
FC 
Caps 
on FC 
LTV 
Caps 
on FC 
DTI 
Different 
Reserve 
require. 
for FC 
Higher 
RWA 
for FC 
Sum 
Albania 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 
Armenia 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 
Azerbaijan 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 
Belarus 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 
B & H 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Bulgaria 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 2 
Croatia 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 
Czech Rep 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Estonia 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 
Georgia 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 4 
Hungary 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 3 
Kazakhstan 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 
Kosovo 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Kyrgyz 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Latvia 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 3 
Lithuania 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 3 
Macedonia 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 
Moldova 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Poland 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 4 
Romania 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 6 
Russia 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 
Serbia 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 7 
Slovak 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Slovenia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Tajikistan 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 4 
Ukraine 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 4 
Sum 7 19 2 1 7 5 11 16  
Source: central banks, IMF Global Macroprudential Policy Instruments database, 2014  
Table 6.2 provides a snapshot of the number of  macroprudential policy instruments 
employed in the countries in our sample, which is used to argue the decision to 
pursue the analysis using only few of these measures. As discussed above the wide set 
of macroprudential policy measures were initially filtered to identify instruments that 
are directly related to financial euroization. The table distinguishes between eight 
macroprudential instruments related to foreign currency: (i) limits on foreign 
currency loans, (ii) limits on foreign currency positions, (iii) countercyclical capital 
buffers with regard to foreign currency loans, (iv) dynamic loan-loss provisioning for 
foreign currency loans, (v) loan-to-value (LTV) ratios with regard to foreign currency 
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loans, (vi) debt-to-income (DTI) ratio with regard to foreign currency loans, (vii) 
reserve requirements with regard to foreign currency funds and (viii) higher capital 
for risk weighted assets in FC.  
Then the variation between countries and instruments was analysed to avoid 
instruments that may have little variation and thus be problematic to investigate with 
this set of countries. We can see that from our sample Serbia is the country with the 
highest number of instruments introduced, followed by Romania. In contrast, three 
countries: the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Slovenia have not introduced any 
instruments related to foreign currency positions. Most countries have introduced at 
least one instrument. Limits on foreign currency positions is the most used 
instrument, introduced in 19 countries, followed by limits on foreign currency loans 
introduced in 7 countries. Dynamic loan-loss provisioning for foreign currency loans 
and countercyclical capital buffers with regard to foreign currency loans are the least 
used instruments, introduced in only one and two countries, respectively. Thus given 
the data constraints we will initially focus on the impact of the most used 
instruments. Finally, the degree of correlation between the instruments must be 
investigated given that, as discussed above, possible high correlation between the 
macroprudential instruments could be problematic in identifying the best 
instruments. In this analysis, this does not seem to be a problem for most of the 
macroprudential policy instruments taking into consideration that correlation indices 
between the macroprudential instruments included in the final model specification 
seem to be much lower than 0.5. (see Appendix 6.1). The only exception seem to be 
the correlation between the caps on LTV and caps on DTI which is slightly higher than 
0.5. However, this is to be expected given that most countries have introduced them 
together. In the final model specification it was decided to keep the caps on LTV ratio 
given that it was used slightly more often.   
In conclusion, it was decided to investigate the impact of the following 
macroprudential policy instruments, (i) limits on FC lending, (ii) limits on FC open 
positions; (iii) caps on FC LTV ratio and (iv) risk weighted assets in FC, on the level of 
credit euroization. Limits on FC lending is one of the tightest macroprudential policy 
instruments. If a country introduces an explicit limit on foreign currency, this should 
a have a negative impact on the level of credit euroization. The limits on FC open 
positions could be expected to have either a positive or negative impact depending on 
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the structure of banks’ balance sheets. Introducing limits with regard to open 
positions in foreign currency would have a positive impact on the level of the credit 
euroization if banks have liabilities in foreign currency to begin with. This is most 
likely the case in TEs given the high level of deposit euroization. On the other hand, if 
banks do not have liabilities in foreign currency the introduction of limits would drive 
down the level of credit euroization. Caps on the LTV ratio restrict banks’ lending in 
foreign currency in comparison to the value of collateral. By restricting the riskier 
lending which would have higher return this is expected to negatively impact the 
level of credit euroization if credit euroization is mostly supply driven. If the opposite 
holds, i.e. credit euroization is more demand driven, the instrument might be 
ineffective. The same applies to the last instrument RWA which increases the 
requirement for capital holding for riskier assets in FC.  
Table 6.3 Definition of Macroprudential Policy Instrument Variables  
Variables Definition Exp. sign 
Limits on FC lending 
(FC_lim) 
Dummy variable (0= if the instrument is 
not employed; 1=otherwise) 
- 
Limits on FC open positions  
(FC_op_lim) 
Dummy variable (0= if the instrument is 
not employed; 1=otherwise) 
+ 
Caps on LTV ratio 
(FC_LTV) 
Dummy variable (0= if the instrument is 
not employed; 1=otherwise) 
- 
Different risk weighted assets_ 
(FC_RWAl) 
Dummy variable (0= if the instrument is 
not employed; 1=otherwise) 
- 
There are some concerns about modelling these macroprudential policy instruments 
as dummy variables. For the first two, the limits on FC loans and FC open position, 
dummy variables are likely to be a more adequate modelling strategy to capture their 
possible effect on the level of credit euroization, given their simple nature and taking 
into account that they are the tightest/strictest instruments that most likely will have 
a strong immediate impact once introduced. However, the same does not necessarily 
apply to the next two, the caps on LTV ratios related to FC and the different risk 
weighted assets in terms of FC. These instruments are of much more complex nature 
in comparison to the first two and not as strong. In addition, whilst the first two are 
designed to affect the level of credit euroization, the second two are designed to affect 
the growth of credit euroization, which might make it more difficult to capture their 
impact. 
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6.3.3  The independent control variables: drivers of euroization 
The review of the literature on euroization in Chapter 2 has identified factors that are 
expected to affect euroization in TEs on the theoretical basis. Drawing on these 
discussions, a list of key independent variables to be included in the model is now 
provided, together with a critical discussion of the respective measures available. We 
then focus on the main contribution of our work looking at the impact of 
macroprudential policy on financial euroization. 
 Interest rate differential 
The interest rate differential between the foreign and domestic currencies is the 
predominant explanatory variable in the empirical literature. It reflects the relative 
price of foreign currency loans, hence a higher interest rate differential, i.e. a lower 
interest rate on foreign currency loans, ceteris paribus, means lower costs for FC 
loans and thus increased demand (Zettelmeyer et al., 2010; Cuaresma et al., 2013). In 
addition, the differential reflects macroeconomic stability and its significance 
depends upon the trade-off effect between the currency risk and real interest rate 
risk if the inflation is lower than expected (Cuaresma et al., 2013; Hake et al., 2014). 
However, the empirical literature presents mixed results on the matter. A range of 
studies find a positive impact of the interest rate differential on credit euroization 
(Rosenberg and Tirpak, 2008; Neanidis and Savva, 2009; Basso et al., 2011). In 
contrast to them, using firm level data, Brown et al. (2011) do not find a significant 
positive relationship. Similarly, Cuaresma et al., (2013) find that interest rate 
differential does not influence credit euroization in these countries. Hake et al. (2014) 
find the interest rate differential significant in explaining credit euroization in Latin 
America, but insignificant in CESEE countries. 
 Deposit euroization 
Bank currency matching is one of the main determinants of credit euroization (Basso 
et al., 2010; Luca and Petrova, 2003; Ize and Levy Yeyati, 2003; Neanidis and Sava, 
2009; Haiss et al., 2009; Ivanov et al., 2011; Haiss and Rainer, 2012). Banks also are 
constrained by the regulatory authorities to have large currency mismatches on their 
balance sheets therefore, they engage in currency matching (Calvo, 2001; Luca and 
Petrova, 2003; Ozsoz et al., 2010; Haiss and Rainer, 2012). This entails matching of 
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foreign currency positions or hedging against exchange rate risk by lending in foreign 
currency. This way the banks shift the risk to the customers (at least to some extent 
depending on the clients’ hedging possibilities, see section 2.4) and decrease their 
exposure to currency risk. Whilst some argue that this happens only in the short run 
(Neanidis and Sava, 2009), others find it a long-term determinant (Ivanov et al., 
2011). Brown and De Haas (2012) argue that besides banks, borrowers also are 
focused on matching their currency deposits with loans, which according to 
Cuaresma et al. (2013) is also strengthened by the large share of remittances in some 
of the Central and East European countries. Lending in foreign currency is the only 
possibility for banks to hedge against currency risk given the lack of hedging 
instruments in the countries due to underdeveloped banking systems and lack of 
financial markets. 
 Exchange rate volatility 
Theoretically, the impact of exchange rate volatility on credit euroization can be 
positive or negative given that it affects the behaviour of both lenders and borrowers 
(see section 2.5.2). Likewise, the results of the empirical literature are mixed. 
Rosenberg and Tripak, 2008; Cuaresma et al., 2013 find a negative effect on credit 
euroization. A few studies (Bajaras and Morales 2003; Luca and Petrova, 2008) 
conclude that exchange rate volatility impacts negatively credit euroization only in 
the short run. In contrast, Ivanov et al. (2011) and Honig, (2009) find a positive effect 
in the long run. 
 Inflation volatility 
Inflation volatility has been found to be significant in explaining credit euroization. Its 
influence depends on the trade-off effect between currency risk and interest rate risk, 
see section 2.5.2. Consequently there are studies that find a positive impact on credit 
euroization (Zettelmeyer et al., 2010; Cuaresma et al., 2013) and those that find a 
negative impact (Steiner, 2011). 
 Minimum Variance Portfolio- MVP 
The portfolio theory view highlighted the MVP as a key driver of credit euroization 
(see section 2.3.2). It stipulates that the higher the variability of inflation relative to 
real exchange rate depreciation, the riskier and less attractive the domestic currency 
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assets, inducing credit euroization. A low and stable domestic inflation rate, and 
volatile exchange rate should increase the preference for the domestic currency as 
store of value (Rennhack and Nozaki, 2006). The empirical literature mostly reports a 
positive impact of the trade-off between exchange rate variability and inflation on 
credit euroization (Ize and Levy Yeyati, 2003; De Nicolo et al., 2005, Basso et al., 
2010; Scheber and Stix, 2009; Barajas and Morales, 2003; Luca and Petrova, 2008; 
Ivanov et al., 2011). 
 Institutional quality 
The institutional approach maintains that institutional failures and a low quality 
institutional framework can encourage and enhance euroization (see section 2.3.4). 
The empirical literature also finds that a lack of institutional quality and credibility 
(particularly in the banking sector) induces credit euroization (Ize and Parrado, 
2002; Feige, 2003; Jeanne, 2003; Luca and Petrova, 2003; Scheber and Stix, 2009; 
Stix, 2009; Neanidis and Sava, 2009; Zettelmeyer et al., 2010).  
 Access to foreign funds 
Theoretically, it is expected that easier access to foreign funding positively affects 
credit euroization. In line with theory most of the studies find that access to parent 
bank funding in foreign currency has a positive impact on credit euroization (De Haas 
and Van Lelyveld 2006, 2010; Basso et al., 2011; Haiss and Rainer 2012). However, 
there are few studies that find a negative relationship between foreign banks and 
credit euroization, (Brown and De Has, 2012) or simply do not find a significant 
relationship (Luca and Petrova, 2008; Brown et al., 2011). 
 Other control variables 
Following the literature, when conducting a cross country investigation it is 
important to include in the model specification controls for different country 
characteristics to reduce possible endogeneity. We consider including variables that 
have often been used in recent studies such as GDP growth, GDP per capita and 
financial deepening to control for the business cycle, size of the economy and 
development of the financial sectors across countries. 
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These independent variables are summarized below in Table. 6.4, which provides the 
detailed definitions to be used in this study and the expected sign.  
Table 6.4 The detailed description of independent variables 
Variables Definition Exp. Sign 
Credit Euroization  
(Credit_FE) 
Share of Loans in Foreign Currency to Total 
Loans 
Dependent 
variable 
Deposit Euroization 
(Deposit_FE) 
Share of Deposits in Foreign Currency to Total 
Deposits 
+ 
Interest rate differential 
(IntRate_diff) 
The difference between interest rates on Foreign 
loans to Domestic Loans (in p.p) 
+/- 
Inflation volatility     
(Inf_vol) 
Standard deviation over the period + 
Exchange rate volatility 
(Err_vol) 
Standard deviation over the period +/- 
Minimum variance portfolio 
(MVP) 
Standard deviation of inflation over standard 
deviation of Exchange rate 
- 
Banking Sector Regulatory 
Indicator 
(BSRI) 
EBRD index - 
Foreign Ownership 
(FO) 
Asset share of foreign owned banks in banking 
sector 
+/- 
GDP growth 
(GDP_g) 
Annual GDP growth - 
GDP per capita 
(GDP_c) 
GDP per capital - 
Financial deepening 
(FD) 
Domestic credit to private sector by banks (% of 
GDP) 
- 
 
6.4  Data 
In the analysis of the impact of macroprudential policy on financial euroization in TEs 
in this chapter, we employ panel data with annual frequency obtained from different 
databases. The data spans a period from 2007 to 2013, and covers 25 countries 
namely Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the 
Czech Republic, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, 
Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, the Slovak Republiv, Slovenia, 
Tajikistan, and Ukraine. Panel data offers the advantage of “more variability, less 
collinearity among variables, more degrees of freedom and more efficiency” (Baltagi, 
1985, p. 4). That this is a panel with a relatively small number of cross sectional 
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groups and not a long time dimension is of some concern when choosing the 
appropriate estimator (for further discussion see section 6.5). 
The choice of countries within European transition economies and the time span 
covered in this empirical analysis were determined by data availability. Covering the 
aftermath of the global financial crisis, while investigating the determinants of 
financial euroization and accounting for the macroprudential dimension, is 
particularly interesting. As discussed in the section 1.4 in Chapter 1, during this 
period financial euroization was already widespread in TEs, in many countries 
reaching a peak before the global financial crisis, making this period well suited to 
investigate the determinants of the financial euroization. In addition, the 
macroprudential policy was mostly pursued in these countries during this period (see 
section 6.1). Therefore, this database is well suited to investigate the macroprudential 
dimension. Given that some countries are missing data for certain years the panel is 
not balanced.  
The macroprudential data in this investigation are obtained from IMF surveys, central 
banks, and Claessens et al. (2014) and Vandenbussche et al. (2012) papers. In 
addition, the data set was enriched with additional information thanks to the 
Vandenbussche et al. (2012) who provided us with the updated version of their data 
set on macroprudential measures employed in 15 of the countries in our sample 
covering the 2000-2010. The data on the other explanatory variables are obtained 
from different sources, including the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and central banks. 
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Table 6.5 Variables and the sources they are obtained from 
Variables Source 
Limits on FC lending  (FC_lim) Central banks; IMF, 2014; Claessens et al. 
(2014); Vandenbussche et al. (2012) 
Limits on FC open positions  (FCop_lim) Central banks; IMF, 2014; Claessens et al. 
(2014); Vandenbussche et al. (2012) 
Caps on LTV ratio  (FC_LTV) Central banks; IMF, 2014; Claessens et al. 
(2014); Vandenbussche et al. (2012) 
Different risk weighted 
assets 
(FC_RWA) Central banks; IMF, 2014; Claessens et al. 
(2014); Vandenbussche et al. (2012) 
Credit Euroization   (Credit_FE) Central banks;  
Deposit Euroization  (Deposit_FE) Central banks;  
Interest rate differential  (IntRate_diff) EBRD; central banks 
Inflation volatility  (Inf_vol) World Bank 
Exchange rate volatility  (Err_vol) World Bank 
Minimum variance portfolio  (MVP) World Bank 
Banking Sector Regulatory 
Indicator  
(BSRI) EBRD 
Foreign Ownership  (FO) EBRD 
GDP growth (GDP_g) World Bank 
GDP per capita  (GDP_c) World Bank 
Financial deepening  (FD) World Bank 
 
Descriptive Statistics  
The descriptive summary of the variables used in model is given in Table 6.6. As the 
table shows there is a considerable variation in most of the variables.  
Table 6.6 Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean ST Dev Min Max 
Credit Euroization 0.498 0.235 0 0.94 
Deposit Euroization 0.418 0.203 0.2 0.85 
Interest rate 
differential 
3.142 4.612 -6.57 25.88 
Inflation volatility 1.947 3.858 0.13 35.22 
Exchange rate volatility 0.004 0.009 0 0.07 
Minimum variance 
portfolio 
4.15e+ 2.00e+ 0 1.40e+ 
Banking Sector 
Regulatory Indicator 
3.033 0.619 2 4.33 
Foreign Ownership 0.636 0.299 0.07 0.99 
GDP growth 2.749 5.371 -17.95 25.05 
GDP per capita 8997.432 6211.711 523.06 26989.7 
Financial deepening 48.519 21.724 10.9 106.35 
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6.5  Empirical approach 
In investigating the impact of macroprudential policy on financial euroization it is 
important to account for the dynamics of the relationship based on inertia. The 
behaviour of households in depositing their money in foreign currency or requiring 
loans in foreign currency, and banks in offering loans in foreign currency is expected 
to change slowly. This is because of the force of habits i.e. psychological reasons: 
households are creatures of habit and react slowly to changes in the market. 
Additionally, the slow reaction can be attributed to potential high costs attached to 
making changes. Therefore, both households and banks can wait until stimulated 
enough to justify the cost of reacting. Banks can continue to offer loans in foreign 
currency through attractive interest rates until stimulated enough by a significant 
change in the households’ behaviour in depositing in foreign currency, or government 
policy in pushing for or encouraging local currency. Omitting dynamics introduces 
bias and therefore leads to inconsistent estimates of the effects of the variables of 
interest, even when the dynamic effect is not of direct interest (Bond, 2002). 
Moreover according to Greene (2008), in presence of dynamics, the variables of 
interest only measure the impact of the new information which still is conditional of 
the past, thus dynamics should be modelled. Consequently, we dismiss static panel 
models apply with dynamic panel models, which enable the inclusion and 
exploitation of the adjustments explicitly in the model. 
The simplest way of accounting for dynamics is modelling it within the estimated part 
of the model thorough inclusion of the lagged value of the dependent variable. 
However, such a model cannot be estimated without problems through OLS, or 
conventional FE and RE estimators. The lagged dependent variable is correlated with 
the error term, thus there is the problem of endogeneity. These estimators would be 
biased, inconsistent, and inefficient. Unlike OLS, FE and RE, the system General 
Methods of Moments (GMM) estimator  accounts for potential endogeneity problem 
by instrumenting from within the sample the variables that are not strictly exogenous 
by using lagged levels and (their lagged differences as instrumental variables. This 
estimator does not require distributional assumptions and can allow for 
heteroscedasticity of unknown form (Verbeek, 2000, pp. 143 and 331; Greene, 2002, 
pp.201, 525 and 523). However, it must be noted that GMM estimators are designed 
for panels with a wide cross-section (N) and short time series (T). Arellano and Bond 
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(1991) had a panel with N=140 and T=7 whereas, Arellano and Bover (1995) had 
N=1306 firms and T= 4. According to Greene these estimators require as few as three 
periods of data to be usable, although ‘four or more will be preferable’ (Greene, 2007, 
E11-83). Roodman (2006, p.35) suggests that cross-sectional groups ought to be at 
least more than 20 (N > 20). Although with N=25 and T=7 we meet his absolute 
minimum requirements, the size of the cross section is a problem that we are aware 
of throughout this investigation and will return to. 
A problem when employing system GMM with relatively small samples is the 
overfitting bias. In small samples too many instruments which “by virtue of being 
numerous, can overfit endogenous variables, failing to expunge their endogenous 
components and biasing coefficient estimates towards those from non-instrumenting 
estimators” (Roodman, 2009, p.6). Too many instruments can weaken the Hansen 
test of overidentifying restrictions, which is relied upon to test the validity of 
instrument. The literature does not provide a clear guidance on the size of this bias 
but it shows that in small samples the biasedness of these estimators rises with the 
increasing number of instruments relative to the number of cross-sectional groups 
(Arellano, 2003; Windemeijer, 2005; Roodman, 2009). 
As a first model, we initially specify a dynamic panel model that includes explanatory 
variables described earlier, the structure of which is presented below (Equation 6.1). 
It is important to note that, given our small sample, it was not possible to include all 
control variables without sacrificing too many degrees of freedom. Thus, in terms of 
control variables it was decided to keep EBRD’s banking sector reform index as the 
only control variable for the development of the financial sectors and size of the 
economy (expecting that bigger economies have more developed financial sectors). In 
addition, the minimum variance portfolio (MVP) when included is collinear with 
inflation and exchange rate volatility, therefore it was excluded.  
 
In the first model, we treat all independent variables as exogenous with the exception 
of the lagged values of the dependent variable.   
 
ittititit
it
uTxβyyy    121110                             (6.1) 
itiit evu                                                                                                                             
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Where i = 1..., N indexes the cross-section groups, in this case countries and t = 1,..., T 
indexes the time periods, in this case years from 2007 to 2013. The dependent 
variable i.e. credit euroization is y
it
 , and y
it 1
and y
it 2
, respectively, represent the first 
and second lags of credit euroization.  1 ,  2  are parameters; and 1  ,  are vectors 
of parameters to be estimated. The x it is a vector of exogenous variables that do not 
depend on the current or past errors and T t  is a vector of year dummies. Taking into 
consideration that in this model we are treating all dependent variables, except of the 
lagged dependent variables, as exogenous thus the x it  vector includes deposit 
euroization (Deposit_FE); the interest rate differential (IntRate_diff); inflation 
volatility (Inf_vol); exchange rate volatility (Err_vol); banking sector reform index 
(BSRI); foreign ownership (FO); and our variables of interest,  the macroprudential 
policy instruments (FC_lim; FC_op_lim; FC_LTV; FC_RWA). 
Finally, u it  represents a composed error term, made up of two components:v i  i.e. the 
group-level, time invariant effects, which control for all unobserved influences on 
credit euroization, and eit i.e. the observation-specific term that varies over both 
groups and time and includes the general ignorance of the determinants of credit 
euroization. 
 
Generally, the literature on euroization has not examined whether any of the 
independent variables is endogenous. Though, Kumamoto and Kumamoto (2014) 
suggest exchange rate volatility to be potentially endogenous, since in the presence of 
a high degree of euroization, money demand for the domestic currency depends on 
both domestic and foreign nominal interest rate, increasing the exchange rate 
volatility. However, for many of the countries in our sample exchange rate stability 
has been a policy objective of the government for many years, so it cannot be 
endogenous in those countries. In addition, some of the other countries under 
consideration have an active policy to reduce the exchange rate volatility (see section 
1.2). Nevertheless, we investigate the possibility of exchange rate volatility 
influencing credit euroization in an unobservable manner by including it in the 
group-specific effect in one model specification. 
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In addition, the literature on macroprudential policy suggests that our main variables 
of interest, macroprudential policy instruments, may be influenced by credit 
euroization itself. According to Claessens et al. (2014, pp. 14) the probability that 
“macroprudential policy is adopted in response to the behaviour of the credit, is 
considerable... This implies a possible bias when studying the effects of 
macroprudential policy on these aggregate variables”. However, regarding this 
possible endogeneity of macroprudential policy instruments, the timing of their 
introduction does not coincide with high euroization levels, since the degree of 
financial euroization has been high in TEs for at last two decades before the 
instruments were introduced.  
 
As discussed above if potential endogeneity is present and is not accounted for, it 
leads to biased and inconsistent estimates, and can invalidate the results of 
econometric studies. Consequently, we specify other models with an almost identical 
structure to the (6.1) but in which these suspected variables are specified as 
endogenous.  
 
ittitititit
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Where the only addition to the 6.1 model is wit  which represents a vector of 
endogenous covariates, all of which may be correlated with unobserved group-
specific influences on credit euroization and therefore correlated with past and 
present error terms. In the (6.2a) model the wit  vector includes only the exchange 
rate volatility (Err_vol) as possibly endogenous and every other variable specified in 
the (6.1) model is treated exogenous. Whereas, in the (6.2b) model the wit  vector 
includes the exchange rate volatility (Err_vol) and our variables of interest i.e. the 
macroprudential policy instruments (FC_lim; FC_op_lim; FC_LTV; FC_RWA) as 
possibly endogenous, with everything else is treated as exogenous.  
6.6  Empirical Results 
This section discusses the appropriateness of the model and the empirical results. It 
begins with a discussion of the diagnostic checks and then it continues with 
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commenting of the results of the preferred model. The estimates were obtained using 
Roodman’s (2006) user-written programme xtabond2. 
Given the possible severity of the overfitting bias of GMM in small samples such as 
ours, and in absence of a clear theoretical guidance regarding the instruments set and 
the number of lags at any level of the model, choosing the best specification in 
relation to instruments is not straightforward. Whilst a larger number of instruments 
provide more information, the literature suggests that in small samples with a rising 
number of instruments relative to the number of cross-sectional groups, the bias of 
these estimators rises (Arellano, 2003; Windemeijer, 2005; Roodman, 2009). In his 
user-written programme xtabond2, Roodman (2006, p.13) issues a warning about the 
number of instruments being larger than the number of cross sectional groups ‘as a 
minimally arbitrary rule of thumb’. In this regard the investigation was carried out 
following closely the general practice, which is to start with a fully specified model 
with the maximum number of instruments. Then, the number of instruments was 
reduced through limiting lags and the use of collapse command.  
In Table 6.7 (with details in Appendix 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4), all the final model 
specifications satisfy Roodman’s minimal rule of thumb, though only just (with model 
6.2b having the number of cross sectional groups equal to the number of 
instruments). It must be noted that this is not a strong diagnostic check as the bias in 
the parameter estimates is expected to rise with fewer degrees of freedom; it only 
suggests that system GMM estimator cannot be immediately rejected.  
Table 6.7 Number of groups vs. instruments in different specifications 
Model specification Model 6.1 Model 6.2a Model 6.2b 
No Cross sectional groups 25 25 25 
No Instruments 20 21 25 
 
Our final choice of the best model specification is based on the diagnostic checks of 
first and second serial correlation, the Sargan test, and the Hansen test. Table 6.8 
below summarises the specifications tests for the three model specifications (6.1), 
(6.2a) and (6.2b), estimated with two-step System GMM, Windmeijer-corrected 
standard errors, using orthogonal deviations (see Appendices 6.2, 6.3, 6.4 for 
printouts of specification tests). 
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Table 6.8 Diagnostic checks of different specifications  
Model specification Model 6.1 Model 6.2a Model 6.2b 
Treating endogenous - Err_vol Err_vol  and MPIs 
No of observations 173 173 173 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) 
 in first differences  
z = -1.15     
Pr > z = 0.251 
z = -1.30     
Pr > z = 0.192 
z = -1.63     
Pr > z = 0.103 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2)  
in first differences  
z = -1.17   
Pr > z = 0.242 
z = -1.06 
Pr > z = 0.289 
z = -1.19 
Pr > z = 0.234 
Sargan test of overid. 
restrictions:  
chi2(1)= 0.25    
Prob > chi2 =  
0.880 
chi2(6)= 0.30    
Prob > chi2 =  
0.959 
chi2(7)= 2.54    
Prob > chi2 =  
0.924 
Hansen test of overid. 
restrictions:  
chi2(1)= 0.62  
Prob > chi2 =  
0.733 
chi2(6)= 1.17 
Prob > chi2 =  
0.760 
chi2(7)= 3.99 
Prob > chi2 =  
0.781 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
Hansen test excluding group:      chi2(1)= 0.38   
Prob > chi2 =  
0.536 
chi2(1)= 0.38    
Prob > chi2 = 
0.538 
chi2(1)= 0.30    
Prob > chi2 = 
0.583 
Difference (null H = 
exogenous):  
chi2(1)= 0.24   
Prob > chi2 =  
0.625 
chi2(2)= 0.79    
Prob > chi2 =  
0.673 
chi2(6)= 3.69    
Prob > chi2 =  
0.719 
Gmm (lagcredit_fe, collapse lag(2 3)) 
Hansen test excluding group:       chi2(0)= 0.00    
Prob > chi2 =  . 
chi2(4)= 2.45 
Prob > chi2 = 
0.653 
Difference (null H = 
exogenous):  
 chi2(3)= 1.17 
Prob > chi2 =  
0.760 
chi2(4)= 1.53 
Prob > chi2 =  
0.674 
Gmm (ERR_vol, collapse lag(1 1)) 
Hansen test excluding group:       chi2(1)= 0.30   
Prob > chi2 = 
0.582 
 
Difference (null H = 
exogenous):  
 chi2(3)= 0.87 
Prob > chi2 =  
0.648 
 
 
The GMM estimator does not require distributional assumptions and allows for 
heteroskedasticity, but it is consistent only if there is no second-order serial 
correlation in the error term of the first-differenced equation. As Roodman notes, 
GMM estimator uses lagged values as instruments, thus the error independence 
assumption is a crucial condition for the exogeneity and hence validity of the 
instruments (2009, p. 97). Consequently, the test for second order serial correlation 
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in the error terms serves as a test for the validity of the instruments as well. In this 
analysis, in all specifications the AR(2) test does not reject the null hypothesis of no 
second-order serial correlation at the 20 percent level, which is desirable in such 
diagnostic tests, also supporting the validity of the instruments introduced in the 
model specification (see Table 6.5). Besides the second order correlation, Smith 
argues to check for the first order serial correlation (m1 test) as well, as a robustness 
and reliability check of the m2 test (Smith, 2010, p. 13). Regarding the AR(1) test both 
specifications have problems because they do not reject the null hypothesis of no first 
order correlation as expected, but this test is regarded as having a subsidiary role to 
the AR(2) test. First-order serial correlation is expected in differences thus 
diminishing the role of the AR(1) test (Roodman, 2006, p.33).  
Within the discussion of diagnostics checks in dynamic panel, Hansen and Sargan 
tests are used to test for over-identifying restrictions to validate the model 
specification. Sargan’s test is considered a special case of the Hansen test, valid under 
the assumption of homoscedasticity. Nevertheless, given that heteroskedasticity is 
generally present in panel data (Roodman, 2006; p.11), studies rely more on the 
Hansen test, which is seen as a more robust test. In this analysis, the Hansen test 
yields p-values ranging between 0.73 and 0.78, which are within the lower and upper 
bounds suggested by Roodman (2007, 2009). Roodman notes that, as a rule of thumb, 
the Hansen test p-value should be at least 0.25 to indicate valid instruments (2007, p. 
10) but less than 1, because that would suggests weakness of the test (2009, p. 10). In 
terms of the Sargan test which according to Roodman (2009) can also be used as a 
test of structural specification of the model, all models are well specified. 
Another diagnostic check is the difference-in-Hansen tests of the exogeneity of 
instrument subsets. As seen in the Table 6.5 the critical values of these tests applied 
to the differences used to instrument the levels equation find insufficient evidence to 
reject the null hypothesis of valid over-identifying restrictions. Consequently, the 
system GMM is preferred to the difference GMM estimator.  
The final diagnostic check is with regard to results of the lagged dependent variable. 
The results from all three model specifications confirm the usefulness of using a 
dynamic panel model, since the statistical significance is a simple validation of the 
presence of the dynamics in the estimated relationship (see Table 6.6). A credible 
estimate of the coefficient of the lagged dependent value should be a lower value than 
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1.00 because a higher value can “imply an unstable dynamics, with accelerating 
divergence away from the equilibrium values” (Roodman 2009, pp. 103) and all 
specifications meet this requirement. However, an important check is the comparison 
of the values of the estimated coefficient on the lagged dependent variable across 
three estimators: OLS, FE, and system GMM. According to Bond (2002) and Roodman 
(2009) good estimates of the true parameter of the coefficient of the lagged 
dependent variable are expected to lie in or near the credible range between the 
highest bound estimator obtained by OLS and the lowest bound estimator obtained 
by the FE estimator. They do not always do so because as Roodman points out “these 
numbers are themselves point estimates with associated confidence intervals” (2007, 
p. 18). On the other hand, being a little outside of the range is much better than being 
a lot outside. In this analysis, the coefficient obtained from FE estimator is the lowest 
bound, but the coefficient obtained from the OLS estimator is slightly lower than the 
coefficients obtained from the system GMM estimator. In this check all estimated 
coefficients obtained through the system GMM fall outside the range but the 
coefficient of the (6.2b) model specification is the closest to the range, followed by the 
(6.1) model. Thus, in this sense, the (6.1) and (6.2b) model specifications may be 
slightly preferable to the (6.2a) model. 
Table 6.9 Comparison of coefficients FE, system GMM and OLS11 
 
FE 
System GMM 
OLS 
(6.1) (6.2a) (6.2b) 
Coefficient of lagged dependent 
variable (lagcredit_fe) 
0.184 
(0.003) 
0.479    
(0.019) 
0.524  
(0.004) 
0.460  
(0.016) 
0.402   
(0.000) 
In conclusion, there is little to distinguish which model specification is preferable in 
terms of diagnostics. All specifications are similar in terms of Hansen, Sargan and 
Hansen-in-difference tests. The (6.2b) model specification is marginally preferred in 
terms of the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable; however, although all 
specifications have a relatively low number of cross sectional groups compared to the 
number of instruments, this model has the lowest, increasing the concern of 
overfitting bias. Given the lack of a clear choice it seems reasonable to proceed by 
comparing the parameter estimates, which are detailed in Table 6.9.  
                                                          
11 See Appendix 6.5 for the Stata Outputs 
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Table 6.10 below summarises the results of the three model specifications (6.1), 
(6.2a) and (6.2b), as estimated with two-step System GMM, Windmeijer-corrected 
standard errors, using orthogonal deviations (see Appendices 6.2, 6.3, 6.4 for 
printouts). 
 
Table 6.10 Estimation results of different specifications 
System GMM (6.1) (6.2a) (6.2b) 
Variables Coeff. P>|t| Coeff. P>|t| Coeff. P>|t| 
Credit_FE (dependent variable) 
Lagcredit_fe   0.479*** 0.019 0.524*** 0.004 0.460*** 0.016 
Deposit_FE   0.286 0.132 0.257 0.135 0.003 0.993 
IntRate_diff    0.005 0.133 0.005 0.153  0.007** 0.039 
Inf_vol    0.002 0.521 0.002 0.527  0.005 0.235 
Err_vol  -0.634 0.330 -1.146 0.408  2.600 0.240 
BSRI   0.024 0.515  0.025 0.555 -0.008 0.897 
FO   0.069 0.287  0.058 0.404  0.109 0.194 
FC_lim -0.029* 0.072 -0.028* 0.093 -0.082** 0.043 
FCop_lim  0.110*** 0.008  0.104*** 0.015   0.198 0.306 
FC_LTV  0.106** 0.005  0.098** 0.011  0.152*** 0.012 
FC_RWA  0.010 0.618   0.006 0.739  0.125*** 0.001 
D_2008 -0.004 0.932   0.002 0.961 -0.019 0.593 
D_2009 -0.035 0.550 -0.021 0.728 -0.030 0.542 
D_2010 -0.027 0.574 -0.022 0.688 -0.033 0.384 
D_2011 -0.062 0.437 -0.057 0.530 -0.123 0.138 
D_2012 -0.062 0.334 -0.056 0.456 -0.111 0.114 
D_2013 -0.053 0.405 -0.046 0.539 -0.099 0.153 
_cons   0.064 0.705   0.065 0.736   0.029 0.908 
No. of observations     173               173              173 
No. of cross sectional 
groups 
25                 25                25 
Statistics with *, **, or *** are significant at 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively. 
The estimated coefficients obtained through the system GMM dynamic approach only 
directly give the short-run impact i.e. the effect of the new information on 
determinants of financial euroization. As Greene (2008, p. 469) points out “with the 
lagged dependent variable, we now have in the equation the entire history of the 
right-hand-side variables, so that any measured influence is conditional on this 
history; in this case, any impact of (the independent variables x it ) represents the 
effect of new information”. In fact, in our models the relatively large size of the 
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estimated coefficient of the lagged dependent variable in comparison to other 
variables indicates that a large part of the effect of the entire time path of the other 
variables is being included in this variable, with this being a little more pronounced in 
the (6.2a) specification. In all specifications, this coefficient is positive, suggesting a 
persistence or inertia effect from previous financial euroization, as expected.  
Overall, the results in terms of the significance, sign and size, are similar in the first 
two models, but there are some differences in the estimates of model (6.2b) in which 
the macroprudential policy instrument variables are treated as endogenous. The 
difference between model (6.2b) and the other two models are not always in line with 
a priori expectations, which might indicate that, as discussed in section 6.5, the 
grounds for treating macroprudential policy instruments as endogenous might be 
questionable. At this point we do not have a preferred specification and briefly 
compare and contrast all three. In the detailed consideration of the results that follow 
and in the next section, the interpretation of the estimates is on average, ceteris 
paribus. 
Across three models, besides the lagged dependent variable, three out of the four 
variables of interest, i.e. the macroprudential policy instruments, are statistically 
significant. The estimated impact of the tightest macroprudential policy instrument, 
limits on foreign currency loans (FC_lim), which controls for if the country has 
introduced explicit limits on foreign currency lending on the level of credit 
euroization, is consistent across the specifications. The statistical significance of the 
variable varies from four percent in the (6.2b) model to nine percent in the (6.2a) 
model. The coefficient of this variable has a negative sign which is in line with the 
literature review and the findings of the qualitative study presented in the previous 
chapter. The introduction of explicit limits on foreign currency lending decreases the 
level of credit euroization by about 3 percentage points in models (6.1) and (6.2a), 
but the estimate is higher in model (6.2b) indicating a decrease ofabout 8 percentage 
points.  
The other variable of interest, which is statistically significant and with the expected 
sign, is macroprudential policy instrument limits on foreign currency open positions 
(FCop_lim), which controls for if the country has introduced limits in foreign currency 
open positions. Thus, if limits are in place banks are expected to match their liabilities 
in foreign currency with assets on foreign currency. This variable is highly significant 
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at one percent, but only in the first two models: (6.1) and (6.2a). The coefficient of 
this variable has a positive sign which is in line with the literature review and the 
findings of the qualitative study presented in the previous chapter. The introduction 
of limits on foreign currency open positions increases the level of credit euroization 
by about 11 percentage points.  
The third macroprudential policy instrument variable which controls for if the 
country has introduced caps on LTV ratios with regard to FC loans (FC_LTV), is also 
highly significant at the one percent level across the three models, but it consistently 
has an unexpected sign. The coefficient on this variable has a positive sign meaning 
that if the country has introduced caps on LTV ratios for foreign currency loans this 
increases the level of credit euroization. The introduction of caps on LTV ratios with 
regard to FC loans is estimated to increases the level of credit euroization from 
between nine and 15 percentage points. This is not line with previous expectation or 
with the findings of the analysis presented in the previous chapter.  
The final macroprudential policy instrument variable, which controls for if the 
country has stricter classification for risk weighted assets in FC (FC_RWA), is only 
significant in the (6.2b) model, although there is significant at the one percent level. 
However, the coefficient on this variable also has an unexpected positive sign. If the 
country has introduced stricter classification for risk weighted assets in FC, the level 
of credit euroization increases by 13 percentage points. This is not line with previous 
expectation or with the findings of the analysis presented in the previous chapter.  
What is striking about the results is the insignificance of the conventional drivers of 
credit euroization such as deposit euroization, inflation volatility, exchange rate 
volatility, and foreign ownership across all model specifications in spite of the high 
explanatory power of the three models12. In three models, at the conventional one, 
five and ten percent, all of these conventional drivers are statistically insignificant, 
the only exception being the interest rate differential in the third specification when 
we control for possible endogeneity of exchange rate volatility and macroprudential 
policy instruments. In the model (6.2b) the coefficient of the interest rate differential 
(IntRate_diff) is statistically significant at 4 percent, and has the expected sign. On 
average, ceteris paribus, 1 percentage point increase in the spread between the 
                                                          
12
 See Appendices 6.2, 6.3, 6.4 
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interest rates on loans in FC and DC increases the level of credit euroization by 0.7 
percentage points. It is worth noting that the size of the estimate is consistently small 
across all specifications. 
From the remaining conventional drivers of credit euroization, although statistically 
insignificant most of them such as deposit euroization (Deposit_FE), inflation 
volatility (Inf_vol), exchange rate volatility (Err_vol) and foreign ownership (FO) have 
the expected sign. The exception here is the banking sector reform index (BSRI) 
through which we are controlling for the quality of institutions, has the opposite sign 
than the a priori expected one.  
As explained above, the coefficients discussed above explain the effect of the new 
information on the level of credit euroization. The long-run effects can be obtained by 
dividing the regressors by one minus the estimated coefficient on the lagged 
dependent variable. The estimated long-run coefficients for the models (6.1) (6.2a) 
and (6.2b) are presented in Table 6.10, presented below. 
Table 6.11 Long-run coefficients of different specifications 
System GMM (6.1) (6.2a) (6.2b) 
LONG RUN COEFFICIENTS 
Variables  Coeff. P>|t| Coeff. P>|t| Coeff. P>|t| 
Deposit_FE   0.550** 0.021 0.541** 0.042 0.005 0.993 
IntRate_diff    0.011 0.231 0.012 0.216  0.014* 0.106 
Inf_vol    0.004 0.559 0.005 0.559  0.009 0.323 
Err_vol  -1.218 0.236 -2.410 0.380  4.816 0.303 
BSRI   0.047 0.493  0.052 0.540 -0.014 0.899 
FO   0.133 0.261  0.123 0.401  0.203 0.247 
FC_lim -0.056* 0.070 -0.058* 0.100 -0.152** 0.055 
FCop_lim  0.212*** 0.003  0.219*** 0.007   0.367 0.333 
FC_LTV  0.204*** 0.000  0.207*** 0.003  0.282** 0.022 
FC_RWA  0.010 0.618   0.013 0.741  0.232** 0.026 
Statistics with *, **, or *** are significant at 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively. 
In the long run the deposit euroization variable (Deposit_FE) is significant in the (6.1) 
and (6.2a) specifications at 2% and 4% respectively. On average, in both models in 
the long run, an increase of 1 percentage point in the level of deposit euroization is 
associated with a 0.5 percentage point increase in the level of credit euroization. 
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Again, macroprudential policy instruments are the only other factors that are found 
significantly affecting the level of credit euroization in TEs. 
Given the discussion above and on the diagnostics, particularly bearing in mind the 
small number of groups compared to the instrument count in our estimations it is 
difficult to argue for a ‘preferred’ model. In addition, the slightest change of 
instrumentation did considerably change the results in terms of the estimated 
coefficients, see Appendix 6.6. This instability in terms of instrumentation might 
mean that the system GMM might not be the best estimator for our case, most likely 
because, as initially suspected, not having a wide enough cross section might be 
problematic given that these methods were devised for wide and short panels, 
although we did meet the absolute minimum criteria. Consequently, we turn to 
another possible method that allows modelling of dynamic economic relationships. 
Autoregressive (AR) models 
When the system GMM estimator is not the appropriate econometric approach, 
studies turn to autoregressive (AR) models which enable the modelling of dynamics 
in the error term. These models are commonly used in the literature on determinants 
of financial euroization (see section 2.5.2). In AR models the slope coefficients of the 
static panel model are estimated conditional on the dynamics modelled in the errors 
(Cochrane-Orcutt, 1949).  
First step 
We start with a first order autoregressive model without a lagged dependent variable, 
(for simplicity with only one independent variable): 
itit
it
uxβy  10                                                                                                    (6.4) 
ititit euu  1                                                                                                                       (6.5) 
 
Where all other variables are defined the same as (6.3) but the u it represents the 
error term containing the dynamic effect, that is taken into account by   and which 
lies between 0 and 1. 
 
Second step 
Lagging each component of this model once leads to: 
1110
1


 itit
it
uxβy                                                                                         (6.6) 
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Third step 
Solving (6.6) for the lagged error term u it 1  we get: 
110
11


 it
itit
xβyu                                                                                          (6.7) 
 
Fourth step 
Substituting (6.7) into (6.5) we get: 
ititit
it
exβyu   )( 1101    
ititit
it
exβyu   1101                                                                         (6.8) 
 
Fifth step 
Substituting (6.8) into (6.4) leads to: 
itititit
it
exβyxβy    110110                                                              (6.9) 
As Sargan (1964) explains, specification (6.9) is a restricted version of the 
specification in equations (6.4 and 6.5). The coefficient of xit 1  in (6.9) of 1β  is 
equivalent to minus the product of the coefficient on y
it 1
 and x it . Specifically, the 
negative of the coefficient on the lagged independent variable equals the product of 
the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable and the coefficient on the current 
value of the independent variable. This is the common factor restrictions (CFRs). 
Therefore the autoregressive model defined in equations (6.4 and 6.5) is equivalent 
to a dynamic linear model if these CFRs restrictions hold, which in essence test 
whether the dynamics can be modelled in the unobserved part of the model (McGuirk 
and Spanos, 2009). These restrictions must be tested on each continuous variable 
jointly and individually. If they hold, the autoregressive model is considered a 
suitable alternative approach to model a dynamic relationship.  
Therefore, to estimate the AR model in this investigation, we must initially test 
whether the CFRs hold. In this analysis, the common factor restrictions were tested 
using the FE, and RE estimators. We start from simple static FE and RE estimations 
and run the Hausman test, the results of which suggest between the FE and the RE 
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estimators we could use the RE estimator.13 We then test if the common factor 
restrictions can be assumed to hold using this estimator. For the model estimated 
through RE, the common factor restrictions hold for each variable individually and for 
all of them jointly.14 Taking into consideration this and the fact that the comparative 
analysis between the FE and RE through Hausman test suggested that we can use the 
RE estimator, this analysis is extended further by estimating the (6.10) model by the 
preferred RE AR (1) estimator.15 The results are given in Table 6.12. 
 
Table 6.12 Estimation results of RE with AR(1) model16 
 RE with AR (1)  (6.10) 
Variables Coeff. P>|t| 
Credit_FE (dependent variable) 
Lagcredit_fe - - 
Deposit_FE         0.404*** 0.000 
IntRate_diff      0.008** 0.006 
Inf_vol  0.000 0.750 
Err_vol -0.616 0.699 
BSRI  0.000 0.996 
FO      0.189** 0.037 
FC_lim   -0.032* 0.085 
FCop_lim        0.164*** 0.000 
FC_LTV        0.159*** 0.000 
FC_RWA   0.021 0.484 
D_2008  0.012 0.623 
D_2009 -0.021 0.480 
D_2010 -0.018 0.582 
D_2011     -0.075** 0.047 
D_2012     -0.086** 0.026 
D_2013     -0.084** 0.034 
_cons  0.066 0.621 
rho_ar 0.570 
(estimated autocorrelation coefficient) 
sigma_u 0.052 
sigma_e 0.099 
rho_for 0.217 
 (fraction of variance due to u_i 
No. of observations 174 
No. of Cross sectional groups 25 
Statistics with *, **, or *** are significant at 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively. 
                                                          
13
 The STATA outputs  are presented in Appendix 6.7  
14
 The STATA outputs  are presented in Appendix 6.8 
15
 As seen in the results presented in Appendices 6.8, for the model estimated through FE, the null 
hypothesis that common factor restrictions hold can be rejected.  
16
 The STATA outputs are presented in Appendix 6.9. 
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Given that with the RE AR (1) model we have estimated a model equivalent to the 6.1 
model specification estimated through system GMM, in which all the variables are 
treated as exogeneous, the estimated autocorrelation coefficient rho_ar is comparable 
to the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable in the model 6.1. In terms of the 
size the coefficient, the rho_ar (0.570) is a little larger than the equivalent in the 6.1 
(0.479), 6.2 (0.524) and 6.3 (0.460) models.  
 
As seen above, in relation to the macroprudential policy instruments the results of the 
model 6.10 estimated through RE AR (1) are similar to the results of the equivalent 
model 6.1 estimated through system GMM presented in Table 6.7. In this model, the 
same three variables of interest are statistically significant. The MP instrument limits 
on foreign currency loans (FC_lim) here is significant at nine percent whilst in the 6.1 
model was significant at seven percent. In both models (6.1 and 6.10) the coefficient 
of this variable has the expected sign suggesting a negative relationship with the level 
of credit euroization, and is of a similar size, suggesting a decrease the level of credit 
euroization by about three percentage points with the imposition of a limit. For the 
limits on foreign currency positions (FCop_lim), similarly to 6.1, the sign is as 
expected, but the significance level is higher in the AR(1) model and the estimated 
size is also a little higher at 16 percentage points (11 percentage points in 6.1 model). 
The results give higher the significance and size of the estimate of the third 
instrument caps on LTV ratio (FC_LTV) as well, but the sign, as in 6.1, is not as 
expected. 
The major difference between the RE AR (1) estimates of model 6.10 (given in Table 
6.10) and the GMM estimates in Table 6.9 is that many of the conventional 
determinants of credit euroization are also significant. In model 6.10 three 
conventional drivers are significant and are of the expected sign. The coefficient of 
the deposit euroization (Deposit_FE) suggests a 1 p.p. increase in deposit euroization 
increases credit euroization by 0.4 percentage points. The interest rate differential 
(IntRate_diff) estimate suggests that an increase of 1 p.p. in the interest rate 
differential increases the level of credit euroization by 0.8 percentage points. The 
final conventional driver of credit euroization that is significant is the foreign 
ownership (FO), where the estimate suggests that a one percentage point increase in 
foreign ownership increases the level of credit euroization by 19 percentage points. 
 190 
 
In addition, in this model (6.10) a few of the time dummies are significant (none 
where significant in the GMM model estimates). This suggests that there are some un-
modelled changes of variables over time that are being captured by these dummies.  
To sum up across both the dynamic panel and AR(1) estimations, we have seen above 
the results of two macroprudential policy instruments, limits on foreign currency 
loans and limits on foreign currency open positions are quite consistent, in terms of 
the statistical significance, sign and size of the coefficients, across different model 
specifications and different estimators. The estimated effects of the caps on LTV ratio 
and RWA are not as expected. However, this may be because, as argued in section 
6.3.2, the complex nature of these instruments means that dummy variables may not 
be adequate in capturing their effect on the level of credit euroization, whereas the 
first two macroprudential instruments are much more straightforward. 
Consequently, a part of the results presented here are not in line with prior 
expectations and the findings of the previous analysis presented in Chapter 5, needs 
to be interpreted with caution.  
One aspect of this might be that there are hidden differences in terms of the dynamic 
effects of individual policy instruments, which we are not capturing given that we are 
assuming the effect of each individual policy instrument has the same lag structure. 
For example the limits in foreign currency loans (FC_limits) and limits in FC open 
positions (FCop_lim), tight macroprudential policy instruments which are expected to 
have an immediate effect, and are found consistently significant and of the right sign 
in the specifications. Caps on LTV ratios (FC_LTV) and different RWAs (FC_RWA) are 
less tight and have a more complex pattern and might not have an immediate effect. 
Consequently, it is not clear whether the insignificance and inconsistency of results 
with regard to these two macroprudential policy instruments is because of 
theoretical model misspecification, limitations of the data in terms of the estimation 
technique or inadequacy in terms of how the dummy variables are modelling the 
underlying variation of instruments. Another possible reason for the unexpected 
estimates of the effect of these two variables might be that we are investigating the 
impact of these policy instruments on the level of credit euroization rather than its 
growth. This might be particularly problematic for these two variables which are 
designed to directly affect the growth of the credit euroization rather than its level. 
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Regarding the conventional drivers of credit euroization, finding some of them 
insignificant is not necessary surprising given that the existing empirical literature is 
not very consistent in the signs found, consequently, the insignificance might be a 
result of opposing effects cancelling out. One other possible explanation for their 
insignificance in spite of the high explanatory power of the models might be the 
composition of the model itself, although the model is specified in line with the 
critical review of the theoretical and empirical literature presented in the second 
chapter. A possible reason could might be that deposit euroization, besides driving 
credit euroization, is likely in itself to be driven by the other credit euroization 
determinants explicitly included in the model. Although, they are not correlated in a 
simple manner (given that we checked for simple correlation, see Appendix 6.1), they 
might be correlated in some more complicated fashion which would explain the 
insignificance of the individual variables but the high explanatory power of the 
models. To investigate this we estimated the model 6.1 excluding the deposit 
euroization (Deposit_FE), see Appendix, 6.10. The results give a significant effect of 
interest rate differential and the degree of significance of the previously significant 
variables is higher. However, this also increases the significance and the size of the 
lagged dependent variable suggesting that an additional part of the explanatory 
power has been included in the history. Additionally to further investigate the issue of 
complex correlation, we run an auxiliary equation to the 6.1 model specification 
through OLS, having the deposit euroization (Deposit_FE) on the left hand side and all 
other independent variables of the 6.1 specification on the right hand side (Appendix 
6.11). This is to check the degree of variation of the deposit euroization can be 
explained through the other independent variables. The adjusted R-squared of this 
model is 0.56 suggesting our suspicion of a more complex type of correlation between 
the independent variables is present in our model specification to some extent. This 
might be a factor in the low significance of the independent variables in an overall 
statistically powerful model.    
6.7  Conclusions 
In this chapter we presented the results of the empirical investigation of the impact of 
macroprudential policy on financial euroization in transition economies. This study 
represents a first attempt in studying the potential impact of the macroprudential 
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policy on financial euroization in TEs. In addition, it adds to previous research on the 
determinants of financial euroization by investigating the use of dynamic panel 
analysis to adjust for the potential endogeneity not only of the exchange rate volatility 
but also of the macroprudential policy variables.  
Initially the system GMM estimator was employed to investigate the effect of the 
macroprudential policy on credit euroization. Although the GMM estimator was 
acceptable in terms of the diagnostic checks, the slightest change of instrumentation 
gave considerably different coefficient estimates. The results of the three final model 
specifications were fairly similar in terms of the sign, size, and significance of the 
coefficients, although we had variables that were estimated with an unexpected sign.  
In addition, most of the conventional drivers of credit euroization were not significant 
across the different specifications. To investigate whether the above mentioned 
problems were possibly a consequence of the inadequate estimation technique for 
our data, given the smallness of the sample in terms of cross section groups, we 
turned to autoregressive models with the dynamics modelled in the error term. The 
common factor restrictions did hold individually and jointly for the RE AR (1) 
estimator suggesting that modelling dynamics in the unobserved part of the model, 
was appropriate. The RE AR (1) estimate has higher significance and size for the 
macroprudential policy instruments that are significant in the GMM estimates and 
three conventional drivers of credit euroization are also significant. Arguably, this 
may show improvement, although this estimation does not take account of possible 
endogeneity of the explanatory variables.  
Finally, we have found some, although limited, evidence that macroprudential policy 
may be affecting the level of credit euroization in TEs. Two instruments are 
significant and of the right sign and magnitude of size, across different model 
specification and estimators, and they are the ones that we thought were most 
appropriately modelled by dummy variables. However, much more needs to be done 
on this, because modelling of these policy variables is a difficult task given the 
complex nature of some of them.  
Another possible limitation of the analysis is the estimation technique, which might 
not enable the correct capturing of some hidden differences in terms of the dynamic 
effects of the individual policy instruments on the level of credit euroization. 
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However, this has been just a first look, which suggests that further research into this 
area may be rewarding. Additional work with better quality data and longer time and 
cross-section series is needed to corroborate the initial assessment and confirm the 
causal relationships identified. These caveats notwithstanding, the investigation still 
provides valuable insights into the impact of macroprudential policy on the level of 
credit euroization.  
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7.1 Introduction 
The main aim of the thesis was to empirically investigate the relationships between 
bank efficiency, euroization and macroprudential policy in TEs while taking into 
account the impact of different risks associated with euroization. This was achieved 
through formulating a set of research questions and responding to them using both 
quantitative and qualitative methods. The investigation of these relationships is of 
importance to the development of these economies given that the level of euroization 
in most TEs has remained high over a considerable period, while the degree of 
financial intermediation in TEs along with their reliance on bank lending as the 
source of finance have lagged behind advanced economies. In addition, these 
countries have recently adopted macroprudential policies that in general aim to 
reduce systemic risk, which might have an impact on the level of euroization.  
The rest of the chapter is structured in the following manner. Section 7.2 provides an 
overview of the main findings of the thesis which are synthesized in relation to the 
analyses presented in the individual chapters in response to the research questions. 
The main contributions to knowledge in relation to the key research questions are 
elaborated in the following section 7.3. The chapter also includes a discussion of the 
policy implications following from the findings, which is presented in section 7.4. The 
main limitations of the investigations of the thesis are summarized in section 7.5 and 
the chapter concludes with section 7.6 where a discussion of the suggested avenues 
for future research is presented. 
7.2 Findings of the thesis 
The thesis was focused in undertaking a critical review of the theoretical and 
empirical literature, developing new empirical framework, and providing new 
evidence on three distinctive but interrelated dimensions of financial intermediation 
in TEs, namely the three main pillars of the thesis: euroization, bank efficiency, and 
macroprudential policy.  
Chapter 1 of the thesis highlighted the importance of the concepts of euroization, 
bank efficiency and macroprudential policy and their relevance in the process of 
transition to a market based economy. The chapter established that the level of 
euroization in most TEs has remained high over a considerable period, with the 
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average degree of euroization varying from 13% in the Slovak Republic to 77% in 
Albania, throughout the period of 2000 to 2013 (section 1.3). Furthermore, it 
examined the evolution of the phenomenon of euroization throughout the period and 
documented that euroization followed different patterns across different countries, 
making its exploration of interest for policy makers in these countries. Section 1.4 
described the development of the banking sector in the first two decades of the 
transition process establishing that the banking sector in most TEs, has yet to fully 
develop their role in financial intermediation and facilitating economic growth, 
highlighting the value in further research into the determinants of banks’ efficiency in 
these countries. As a potential determinant of the level of euroization, the chapter 
finishes with a discussion of the recently adopted macroprudential policy in many 
TEs. Thus, Chapter 1 established the importance of empirical exploration of the 
relationships between euroization, bank efficiency and macroprudential policy. 
Having established the importance of the research area in the context of TEs in the 
first chapter the first key research questions were: What are the models and 
empirical evidence on bank efficiency and euroization in the literature? What 
are the gaps in knowledge in both areas? In pursuance of these questions, the 
critical review of the theoretical and empirical literature on euroization and bank 
efficiency was presented in the Chapters 2 and 3. This enabled a critical evaluation of 
the models and empirical evidence on euroization and bank efficiency, and the 
identification of the gaps in the existing literature. These chapters provided a base on 
which the models used in the empirical chapters were developed in order to explore 
the identified gaps in the literature. The review of literature on euroization disclosed 
that whilst euroization has been extensively researched during the last two decades 
the empirical literature remains limited. First, most of these studies focused solely on 
deposit euroization, assuming that it mirrored credit euroization. However, as shown 
in section 1.3, credit euroization is higher than deposit euroization in most TEs; thus, 
by focusing solely on deposit euroization most studies have underestimated the 
degree of credit euroization. Second, the review showed that the relationship 
between euroization and bank efficiency has been completely neglected in the 
literature. Consequently, the chapter sought to explore the literature on the role of 
euroization in financial system performance, which although it has increased during 
the last decade, remains limited and inconclusive. There are only a handful of studies 
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that explore this relationship and they are restricted in terms of the time span they 
cover (mostly short and only up to early 2000). In addition, they are conflicting in 
terms of the impact of euroization on bank efficiency although more studies lean 
towards a negative impact (section 2.5.3). Finally, the literature is limited in 
explaining the persistence of euroization in TEs in a stable macroeconomic 
environment.  
The review of the bank efficiency literature indicated that it has mostly focused on 
advanced economies, the findings of which may not apply to TEs (Weill, 2003). The 
recent literature on TEs mainly investigates bank efficiency in relation to bank size 
and ownership; however, to the best of our knowledge it completely ignores 
euroization, which, as argued in section 1.3, is an important feature of the banking 
sector in TEs. In addition, the literature has been limited in its exploration of the risk-
return aspect associated with banks’ operations, in spite of its increasing importance. 
The few studies that do explore the risk aspect employ a two-step approach that is 
criticized for biasness (see section 3.4.3), and mostly focus on credit risk, ignoring 
other types. Finally, the chapter showed, the existing literature is also limited in terms 
of the time span covered. Most of the studies include a relatively short time span that 
ends up to mid-2000s; thus, none of the studies employs recent data that cover the 
period of the global financial crisis (GFC). In terms of cross-sectional coverage most of 
these studies are focused on the banking sectors in CEE countries, less attention has 
so far been given to SEE countries.  
Chapter 4 covered the first of the empirical investigations of the thesis, concerning 
the second research question: What are the determinants of bank efficiency in 
TEs and in particular how does euroization affect bank efficiency? A 
comprehensive stochastic frontier model, which has the advantage of accommodating 
the multiple input-output production technology of banks, was developed to estimate 
cost efficiency. The model chosen was time variant to allow efficiency to vary across 
banks and over time, given the relatively long timescale of our data. Two different 
time varying efficiency models were employed for the estimation of efficiency: the 
Battese and Coelli (1995) and Greene TRE (2005), the first is the most frequently 
used model in the literature whereas the second is used more rarely but is much 
more flexible. The models are estimated using the one-step approach, which allows 
for the impact of control variables such as euroization and risks directly in the model, 
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thus overcoming the serious limitations of the commonly used two-step approach 
discussed in section 4.3.3. The investigation was conducted using the BankScope 
database for the period 2000-2013. Two samples were employed which span 14 
years from 2000 to 2013, the first one encompassed 1541 banks operating in 20 TEs 
with data on euroization at country level collected by the author. The second sample 
encompassed 126 banks operating in seven SEE countries with data on euroization at 
bank level collected by the author. The relative cost efficiency of banks using the first 
sample was estimated whilst explicitly including euroization at country level in the 
frontier and incorporating the risk factors in the inefficiency component. We found 
evidence that financial euroization at country level affects the cost efficiency of banks 
in TEs. The results on this are very similar in terms of the sign, size and significance of 
the coefficients of financial euroization across different model specifications and 
estimation techniques. They suggest that in countries with a higher degree of 
financial euroization banks face higher costs, addressing the second key research 
question presented in section 1.2. As previously highlighted, the bank efficiency 
literature ignores the impact of euroization in TEs; thus, there is no basis for direct 
comparison of our results with those in the literature. However, the more general 
literature, focusing on the impact of euroization on the financial sector, although 
inconclusive tends more towards a negative impact. The findings of the analysis in 
Chapter 4 are in line with this.  
Having found evidence for the importance of euroization for the cost efficiency of 
banks at country level, the relationship was also examined for financial euroization at 
bank level. The relative cost efficiency of banks was estimated whilst explicitly 
incorporating euroization at bank level and risk factors in the inefficiency component. 
However, we found no evidence that euroization at bank level affects efficiency. This 
finding has to be taken with caution given our relatively small sample size. The small 
sample size in relation to the regressors and the low coverage of the data did not 
allow the exploration of the impact of all the risk variables and those included were 
insignificant. In addition, the investigation, in Chapter 4, added to the previous 
literature in TEs by exploring the risk-return aspect in the context of bank efficiency, 
an under-researched area. The risk variables, credit risk, operational risk and market 
risk were introduced in the inefficiency component of the models as they are under a 
bank’s control. These variables were highly significant (with the exception of market 
risk in the TRE 2005 estimate) and had consistent signs across different estimations. 
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The finding suggests a positive impact of credit risk, and a negative impact of 
operational and market risk on cost efficiency. Theoretically, risk variables are 
expected to have a negative relationship with bank efficiency, thus the opposite sign 
for one of our risk variables is surprising.  
In Chapter 4, particular attention was paid to the impact of the associated risks on the 
relationship between euroization and bank efficiency. However, their impact could 
not be fully captured through the initial analysis here, or in other studies, mostly due 
to their complex nature and the low coverage of the data. Taking into consideration 
this and the fact that overall there is lack of consistency in the euroization literature 
in terms of its impact on banking sector performance the research is extended 
through a qualitative analysis of the phenomenon of euroization at bank level in 
selected SEE countries. Besides the risk aspect, the qualitative research is used to 
further explore the relationship between bank efficiency and euroization, addressing 
the third key research question presented in section 1.2, What do banks regard as 
the main determinants of euroization? What are their strategies, policies, and 
procedures with regard to euroization? Do they feel that euroization affects 
their efficiency? In terms of methodology, we used semi-structured face-to-face in-
depth interviews and did not supplement this with additional background data on 
each bank in order not compromise the confidentiality of the participants and banks. 
Attention to ethical considerations was given throughout different stages of the 
investigation, from the early design stage through to the findings, to maintain the 
validity and reliability of the research. Informed consent, use of information and 
confidentiality were the main issues that were anticipated and planned for when 
conducting the qualitative research. The semi-structured interviews were conducted 
by the author in the natural settings of individual banks operating in two SEE 
countries: Albania and Macedonia. The nature of the research meant that Albania and 
Macedonia were countries of interest because they have their own currencies and are 
significantly euroized. However, they differ in terms of their financial systems, 
exchange rate regimes and economies in general, which may affect perceptions 
regarding financial euroization and related risks. Thus, it was expected that 
information obtained would be more richly textured and thus more informative 
regarding the focus of the study: financial euroization. The analysis based on banks in 
these two TEs led to a number of conclusions, which may have more general 
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applicability in other TEs, at least in those with similar banking sectors and a 
considerable degree of financial euroization.  
The findings presented in section 6.6 provide evidence that the governments’ 
macroprudential policy affects the policies and procedures employed by banks in SEE 
countries and is becoming an important driver of de-euroization. In terms of the 
other drivers of euroization the findings of this analysis support the conventional 
view that deposit euroization and the interest rate differential are the main 
determinants of credit euroization in these countries. With regard to risks, the 
qualitative analysis revealed that banks seem to be concerned with hedging against 
the risks associated with FE, see section 5.9, and within our small sample, hedging 
was typically managed centrally at the group’s headquarters. However, with one 
group of customers, exporters, most of the banks seemed to overly rely on the natural 
hedging available to this group and seemed to exclude them from their foreign 
currency lending limits (section 5.8.2). This policy, while giving a low credit risk from 
this lending, implies that banks are underestimating their own exposures in terms of 
the risks related to foreign currency. There are also indications that banks are not 
completely proactive but rather reactive with respect to hedging, with tighter 
controls being a feature of those which suffered losses in their operations in another 
country.  
Given the finding in Chapter 5 that euroization is affected by macroprudential policy 
in selected SEE countries, the issue was quantitatively investigated in Chapter 6. The 
chapter starts with the review of the literature on macroprudential policy and it 
suggests that the literature on macroprudential instruments is limited, mostly due to 
scarcity of data as they have become standard policy tools only in recent years. 
Moreover, the review showed that, to the best of our knowledge, the existing 
macroprudential literature has ignored the impact of macroprudential dimension on 
financial euroization. Most of the empirical literature on the macroprudential policy is 
either focused on investigating its impact on the overall accelerated credit growth or 
specifically on the growth of housing sector credit. This thesis extends this literature 
by investigating how this policy may affect the levels of financial euroization in TEs. 
This section of the chapter therefore responds to the first key research question 
presented in section 1.2. The empirical investigation that follows is for 25 TEs over 
the 2007-2013 period, using data on macroprudential policies collated by the author. 
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The investigation used panel techniques incorporating a dynamic element. To 
account for the dynamics of the relationship initially a GMM estimator was employed. 
Advantages of this estimator are: instrumenting from previous levels and differences 
from within the sample is possible for the variables that are not strictly exogenous; it 
does do not require distributional assumptions; and can allow for heteroscedasticity 
of unknown form (Verbeek, 2000, pp. 143 and 331; Greene, 2002, pp.201, 525 and 
523). However, the findings suggested that the slightest change in instrumentation 
changed the estimated results considerably and we suspected this was because of the 
width of our panel, as these methods were devised for wide and short panels. Thus, 
we also estimated the relationship using an autoregressive (AR1) model, which 
enables the modelling of dynamics in the error term. The results provided some 
limited evidence that macroprudential policy may affect the level of credit euroization 
in TEs. Two macroprudential policy instruments, limits on foreign currency loans and 
limits on foreign currency open positions, were significant and had the correct sign 
and magnitude across different model specifications and estimators. The results 
support the findings of the qualitative analysis presented in Chapter 5 given that in 
both analyses the impact of the same policy instrument was explored. The results for 
the other two instruments investigated were not as expected, but this could be 
because our model does not capture the more complex nature of these instruments 
(section 6.3.2). Thus, Chapter 6 addressed the last key research question presented in 
section 1.2, Does macroprudential policy have an impact on the level of credit 
euroization in TEs? 
The main findings of the thesis provide some timely, informative, and enlightening 
insights into the three pillars the thesis. The findings of the individual analyses 
presented in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, presented above, are consistent with each other. In 
general, the thesis suggests that euroization has negatively affected the cost efficiency 
of banks operating in TEs during the last decade. In addition, the findings suggest that 
the euroization phenomenon in TEs is persistent despite a stable monetary policy, but 
specific government policies targeting euroization, such as macroprudential policy, 
may have some success in reducing it.  
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7.3 Contributions to knowledge 
In relation to the three main pillars of this thesis: bank efficiency, euroization, and 
macroprudential policy, the models and empirical evidence in the respective 
literatures were investigated to identify the existing gaps, which were explored in 
empirical Chapters 4, 5 and 6, and resulted in the following contributions to 
knowledge.  
This study contributes to the bank efficiency literature with respect to TEs by being, 
to the best of our knowledge, the first study that comprehensively analyses bank 
efficiency whilst considering the effect of euroization. The thesis explores the impact 
of euroization at both country and bank level on bank efficiency, finding evidence 
supporting a negative impact at the first level. An additional contribution of the thesis 
is the exploration of the impact of risks on bank efficiency, given that the previous 
literature has neglected the impact of risks (other than credit risk). The thesis 
addresses this gap and confirms the negative impact of market and operational risk 
on bank efficiency, further extending the bank efficiency literature. Furthtermore, by 
covering an extended period (14 years) the study considers more years than has 
previously been studied which is important in terms of capturing the impact of the 
continuing presence of euroization in TEs and the time variation of banks’ efficiency. 
The findings suggested that efficiency has varied throughout the period under 
consideration. 
The thesis contributes to the existing literature on euroization in several ways. First, 
the thesis contributes to knowledge by being the first qualitative research of the 
euroization phenomenon through the banks’ lenses. Specifically the analysis 
investigates: the main determinants of euroization according to the banks; and banks’ 
strategies, policies, and procedures with regard to euroization. Again, to the best of 
our knowledge, such an investigation has not been conducted before in this context. 
Given the lack of such literature on financial euroization, this study breaks new 
ground and contributes to a better understanding of the euroization phenomenon. 
The study also contributes by identifying macroprudential policy as a determinant of 
euroization. Another conceptual framework related to financial euroization identified 
by this study, which could be further examined in the future, is the effect of banks’ 
lending policy towards exporters on the outcomes of banks’ hedging strategies.   
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Second, although the euroization literature is extensive, the existing empirical 
literature remains limited given that most of these studies focus solely on deposit 
euroization, assuming that credit euroization mirrors this. However, credit 
euroization is higher than deposit euroization in most TEs; thus, by focusing solely on 
deposit euroization most studies have underestimated the degree of credit 
euroization. Accordingly, this study extends the existing literature by investigating 
euroization focusing on credit euroization. 
Third, the thesis contributes to knowledge also by extending the quantitative 
empirical literature on determinants of euroization and addressing the relationship 
between euroization and macroprudential policy. This is the first study to consider 
the impact of macroprudential policy in addition to the effect of the conventional 
drivers of euroization. The findings confirm the theory and the research in Chapter 5, 
by providing evidence that macroprudential policy negatively affects the level of 
credit euroization in TEs. In addition, the thesis adds to previous research on the 
determinants of financial euroization by investigating the use of dynamic panel 
analysis to differentiate between the shortrun and longrun effects of the 
determinants of euroization and to adjust for the potential endogeneity not only of 
the exchange rate volatility but also of the macroprudential policy variables. In the 
existing literature, only one study (Vieira et al., 2011) employs dynamic panel 
analysis to investigate the determinants of financial euroization. However, they focus 
on deposit euroization and cover the period before the global financial crisis using 
data up to 2006. 
In terms of the contribution to methods of investigation, the thesis showed that: 
- Future qualitative investigations could result in useful insights if they are 
carefully designed, even though the confidential nature of the data makes this 
type of investigation difficult; 
- In addition, the thesis supports Greene’s view that not taking account of 
unobserved heterogeneity between banks in efficiency studies could have led 
to higher estimated levels of inefficiency.  
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7.4 Policy implications  
The thesis has addressed the relationships between bank efficiency, euroization and 
macroprudential policy in TEs. The findings have shed important lights on policy 
implications for governments and banks and led to the following policy 
recommendations in TEs.  
The main findings of the thesis suggested that euroization is an important feature of 
the banking sector in TEs. First, the thesis showed that the degree of euroization has 
remained high during the last 14 years in most of the TEs. It also documented the 
continuous presence of currency mismatches in the banking sector of TEs throughout 
this period, something which was ignored by the early empirical literature on 
euroization. As discussed in sections 1.3, 2.2.2 and 2.3 the literature on euroization, 
particularly the early studies, maintained that currency mismatches in banks’ balance 
sheets was not an issue because they believed that euroization in assets and liabilities 
sides should mirror each other mostly due to regulatory requirements. Furthermore, 
given this and also the lack of readily available data, the previous authors focused 
only the liabilities side of banks’ balance sheets and generalized the findings. 
However, in addition to documenting the continuous presence of currency 
mismatches in the banking sector of TEs throughout this period, this thesis also 
showed that these sectors were more euroized in their assets side, thus suggesting 
that the existing literature that ignored this side and studied the liabilities side in 
isolation may have underestimated the degree of euroization in these countries. The 
continuous high degree of euroization and the presence of currency mismatches is of 
particular interest to policymakers in TEs given that the estimates in section 4.6.1 
suggested that banks operating in countries with a higher degree of euroization faced 
higher costs. Thus, if the level of euroization has a negative impact on the cost 
efficiency of banks operating in TEs, policymakers in  these countires should be 
concerned with the issue of euroization given that this may be one of the reasons why 
banking sectors in their countries are still lagging behind advanced economies in 
terms of financial intermediation. The finding of the thesis may also be of interest to 
the governments in TEs given the importance of efficient financial intermediation 
from the perspective of economic growth in these countries, where the banking 
sector dominates the financial system. Taking this into consideration, and given that, 
as discussed in detail previously in section 2.4.2, euroization also weakens the 
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monetary transmission mechanisms and reduces the power of central banks over 
their monetary policy, the thesis suggests that these countries should be concerned 
with reducing the degree of financial euroization in their banking sectors. 
Second, regarding the risks associated with euroization and bank efficiency in TEs the 
thesis provided support for the view that banks operating in TEs are concerned with 
risks related to euroization and with hedging against these risks (section 5.9). 
However, they seem to rely mainly on natural hedging and ignore naturally hedged 
clients (exporters) in terms of their limits to foreign currency exposures- thus, they 
are underestimating their own exposure to foreign currency risks. This could also be 
the reason behind the continuous presence of currency mismatches in banks’ balance 
sheets documented in the thesis (section 1.3), which could prove problematic in times 
of crisis. In addition, the evidence provided in section 5.9 suggested that banks are 
being reactive with regard to foreign currency risk management rather than 
proactive, taking into consideration that those that had the strictest strategy with 
regards to hedging were the ones that had losses due to foreign currency risk 
materializing in their operations in another country. This may be of interest to both 
bankers and regulators because it can mean that the current risk management 
approaches might only seem reasonable because the risks related to foreign currency 
have not materialized, given the low exchange rate volatility and the fixed exchange 
rate regimes pursued in many TEs. Thus, a more active hedging policy may be 
preferable.  
Third, the thesis provided evidence that euroization is very entrenched  in TEs given 
that it has remained high during the last 14 years as initially discussed in section 1.3 
of the thesis which is later supported also by the estimates presented in section 6.6, 
providing evidence of a strong lagged effect. The descripitive sections 1.3 and 1.4 
together with the empirical evidence provided in section 6.6 suggest that reducing 
inflation to moderate levels and applying other responsible macroeconomic policies 
is not enough to reduce high levels of eurozation, once established. Thus, the thesis  
strongly suggests that governments need a specific active policy if they wish to 
reduce euroization.    
Fourth, the thesis provided evidence that macroprudential policy has a negative 
impact on the level of euroization (section 6.3.2). Considering that the thesis has 
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found a negative relationship between euroization and cost efficiency of banking 
sectors in TEs, the thesis supports the view that macroprudential policy is an 
appropriate strategy to reduce the levels of financial euroization in TEs. Although it is 
a first examination of this relationship, both the qualitative analysis in chapter 5 and 
the quantitative empirical investigation in chapter 6 provide evidence of the negative 
impact of these policies, particularly of the instruments directly linked with 
euroization, on the level of euroization. Thus the recommendation is that the 
governments in these countries should continue to pursue these policies, specifically 
these instruments, given that the same were explored in both analyses or consider 
adopting them if they have not already done so. Moreover, if the immediate reduction 
of euroization is the forefront of government policies, they should consider adopting 
a specific de-euroizing strategy given that the findings of the qualitative analysis 
presented in section 5.9 suggest this to be a very successful strategy. 
In addition, given the findings in this thesis, by reducing the level of euroization 
through the adoption of specific macroprudential policy instruments, TEs are likely to 
improve the cost of efficiency of their banking sectors, as well as having certain 
macroeconomic effects such as recovering some degree of their lost power over 
monetary policy. Of course, the impact of the macroprudential policy should be 
assessed and monitored carefully, taking into consideration that this could be a shock 
to the banking sector and it could in the short run lead to greater inefficiency in the 
banking sectors. Thus governments in these countries should carefully analyse and 
compare the benefits of the reduction of the degree of euroization and increased cost 
efficiency in the long run with possible higher inefficiency in the short run. Moreover, 
given the extended recent attention that macroprudential policy is receiving and the 
latest European discussion on standardising it, TEs might be obliged to  employ them 
as such thus, they ought to invest more in understanding their impact. Particulary, 
given that as previously discussed in section 6.2. macroprudential policy instruments 
have been adopted only very recently and their implications for the economy as a 
whole are still not fully understood and possible side effects are not fully clear at this 
stage, thus governments need to continually monitor their effects carefully.   
Finally, the thesis showed that the banking sector performance in TEs was affected by 
the global financial crisis through their reduced cost efficiency during the crisis years, 
but they also seem to have recovered rapidly. However, the thesis is limited in 
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pinpointing the specific factors that led to the effect of the crisis on cost efficiency or 
the factors that contributed to the rapid recovery. Nevertheless, the evidence 
provided suggests that concerns about external exposure do not have to be the 
forefront of these governments’ policies.  
7.5 Limitations of the thesis 
As with most empirical investigations, this thesis has faced a number of limitations. 
The first issue of concern was the quality of the data. As discussed in section, 4.4 
although the BankScope database has many advantages, particularly providing 
researchers with comparable analyses across banks in different countries, it requires 
extensive cleaning. The process of data cleaning has been described in detail in 
Appendix 4.1 and, given the large degree of missing observations, attention should be 
drawn to the data quality when discussing the findings results should be treated with 
some caution. A more important limitation of the data was the fact that BankScope 
did not have the data on credit euroization and this had to be obtained by searching 
individual banks’ reports and websites. As a result, the number of bank for which the 
full data was available was much smaller than that of the main empirical work. The 
results therefore had to be interpreted with even greater caution. 
 
Another limitation in terms of methodology was that with frontier analysis the 
rankings of banks by their measured cost efficiency can differ, although the central 
tendency of average cost-efficiency values for banks is generally similar across 
frontier techniques (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). To overcome this, studies usually 
compare efficiency estimates from different techniques. This thesis initially 
considered to estimate efficiency through both DEA and SFA to enable comparability, 
however after a careful consideration the DEA was not pursued given that SFA is 
considered more appropriate when the focus of interest is in the impact of the 
environment, in this case the impact of the euroization on bank efficiency, rather than 
the rankings of the efficiency estimates.   
 
Another methodological issue with efficiency estimates obtained through frontier 
techniques is that they are only a relative measure of efficiency against the most 
efficient bank within the sample. Thus, if the most efficient bank within the sample it 
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is not fully efficient, the measurement of the efficiency would be inaccurate. Although 
as mentioned above, the focus of the thesis was not on the ranking of the efficiency 
estimates, to address this issue the quantile techniques suggested by Koenker (2004) 
were considered. However, the quantile panel techniques are not technically mature 
and there are fundamental difficulties in interpreting the parameters and ensuring 
that the dynamics are accounted for; thus the method was not pursued.    
 
In terms of the qualitative analysis, presented in Chapter 5, concerns about 
confidentiality affected the research design and methodology from the start. We used 
only semi-structured face-to-face in-depth interviews and did not supplement the 
interview results with data from other published sources, in order to retain the 
confidentiality of participants and banks and not to identify them. With a larger 
sample size, these concerns may be lessened, at least in economies with a large 
number of banks, although this would be very time consuming. In addition, although 
the apparent openness with which the interviewees shared their perspectives is one 
of the strengths of this study, the inability to validate the data through respondent 
checks (and use of data from various databases) is one of the main limitations. 
However, as explained in section 6.6, substantial internal consistency in views and 
themes across interviewees was observed. Another issue, with this analysis is that the 
investigation is limited to the experiences of particular banks; thus, the 
generalizability of the findings are not clear. Nevertheless, the combined implications 
of their experiences should shed light on how banks view and address the FE 
phenomenon in SEE, therefore thematic generalizability (Creswell, 2007) is certainly 
a possibility.  
In the analysis of macroprudential policy, the limitations are mainly related to data. 
Initially, given that we are exploring the impact of macroprudential policy on the level 
of credit euroization through dynamic panel techniques we have a rather narrow 
panel, we meet the minimum criteria for the investigation but the panel was not wide 
enough to ensure the stable modelling of the dynamics through system GMM. 
Therefore, we explored an additional method of modelling dynamics: the 
autoregressive regressions. A main limitation remains the specifications of the 
macroprudential policy instruments variables, which were in the form of dummy 
variables. However, for two of the policies this was perceived as problematic given 
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their complex nature and the empirical results for these two polices were not as 
expected. This might be due to the limitations of the estimation technique that might 
not enable the correct capturing of some hidden differences in terms of the dynamic 
effects of the individual policy instruments on the level of credit euroization.  
7.6 Avenues for future research 
The findings of the thesis suggest several avenues for future research. The thesis 
initially has contributed to knowledge by estimating bank efficiency through SFA in 
TEs, whilst controlling for euroization initially at country level then at bank level. The 
findings of this analysis suggested the importance of the euroization dimension in 
financial intermediation in TEs. A similar approach could be used to test the same 
hypothesis in a different sample of countries, such as those of Latin America where 
‘dollarization’ is very common. A comparison between the two samples would be an 
interesting validation strategy of this finding. Other possible extensions of the 
research could be estimation of bank efficiency by choosing a different set of inputs-
outputs and accounting for the impact of deposit euroization on bank efficiency, or a 
fuller investigation of the effect of credit euroization at bank level if more data on 
bank level euroization became available. 
The second main contribution to knowledge was the qualitative investigation of the 
euroization phenomenon. For practical reasons the investigation was limited to two 
selected countries in which the author could conduct the interviews. This 
investigation could be extended by conducting a qualitative analysis of euroization in 
a larger sample of banks and countries. A wider comparison would be interesting 
because it would enable the comparison of the findings of this investigation. In 
addition, the lack of previous similar studies meant that this analysis was very wide 
in terms of themes, and subthemes. Therefore, this first attempt could be extended by 
more detailed qualitative investigations into specific themes providing a deeper 
investigation of different dimensions of euroization. This could shed more light on the 
factors that influence euroization and the impact of euroization on bank performance 
according to the supply side, i.e. banks. 
The third main contribution to the knowledge was the empirical investigation of the 
macroprudential policy on the level of credit euroization. Whilst the findings support 
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the qualitative analysis in finding that this policy has a negative impact on the level of 
credit euroization, we have been cautious in recommending specific policy actions. 
This investigation could be extended by conducting a similar investigation in different 
settings, for instance with the highly dollarized economies in Latin America, or 
further exploration of the macroprudential instruments that may impact euroization.  
Finally, the thesis provided evidence that the banking sectors in TEs have suffered in 
terms of their cost efficiency during the global financial crisis but also have very 
rapidly recovered. Another area for future research is an empirical exploration of the 
specific factors that have contributed to the rapid recovery from the consequences of 
the global financial crisis given that the thesis only indicates the overall effect.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 211 
 
References 
 
Ahn, S.C., Good, D.H., and Sickles, R.C., (2000) Estimation of Long-Run Inefficiency 
levels: A Dynamic Frontier Approach. Econometric Reviews, Vol. 19, No. 4, 461-492. 
Ahuja, A. and Nabar, N., (2011) Safeguarding Banks and Containing Property Booms: 
Cross-Country Evidence on Macroprudential Policies and Lessons from Hong Kong 
SAR. International Monetary Fund (IMF) Working Paper, No. 284. 
Aigner, D.J., and Chu, S.F., (1968) On estimating the industry production function. 
American Economic Review, Vol, 58, pp. 826-839. 
Aigner, D.J., Lovell, C.A.K., and Schmidt, P., (1977) Formulation and Estimation of 
Stochastic Frontier Production Function Models. Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 6, pp. 
21-37. 
Alesina, A., and Barro, R., (2002) Currency Unions. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
Vol. 117, No.2, pp. 409-436. 
Altunbas, Y., Carbo, S., Gardener, E.P.M., and Molyneux, P., (2007) Examining the 
relationships between capital, risk and efficiency in European banking. European 
Financial Management, Vol. 13, pp. 49-70. 
Altunbas, Y., Gardener, E.P.M., Molyneux, P., and Moore, P., (2001) Efficiency in 
European banking. European Economic Review, Vol. 45, pp. 1931-1955. 
Altunbas, Y., Liu, M., Molyneux, P., and Seth, R., (2000) Efficiency and risk in 
Japanese banking. Journal of Banking & Finance, Vol. 24, pp. 1605-1628.  
Altunbas, Y., and Molyneux, P., (1994) "Sensitivity of Stochastic Frontier Estimation 
to Distributional Assumptions: the Case of the German Banks", Institute of European 
Finance Publication/Bangor, Discussion paper. 
Altunbas, Y., Marqués-Ibáñez, D., and Manganelli, S., (2011) Bank risk during the 
financial crisis: do business models matter? European Central Bank Working Paper, 
Series No. 1394. 
 212 
 
Alvares-Plata, P., and Garcia Herrera, A., (2007) To Dollarize or to De-dollarize: 
Consequences for Monetary Policy. Bank for International Settlements Publication and 
Research. Accessed at: http://www.bis.org/author/patricia_alvarez-plata.htm  
Amsler, C., Lee, Y.H., and Schmidt, P., (2009) A survey of stochastic frontier models 
and likely future developments. Seoul Journal of Economics, Vol. 22, No.1, pp. 5-27. 
Anderson, R., and Kegels, C., (1998) Transition banking: Financial development of 
central and eastern Europe. Oxford, Clarendon Press Oxford. 
Arellano, M. & Bond, S., (1991) Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte 
Carlo evidence and an application to employment equations. Review of Economic 
Studies, Vol. 58, No. 2, pp. 277-97. 
Arellano, M., (2003) Panel Data Econometrics, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Arellano, M., and Bond, S., (1991) Some tests of Specification for Panel Data:  Monte 
Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations. Review of Economic 
Studies, vol. 58, pp. 277-297. 
Arellano, M., and Bover, O., (1991) Another look at the instrumental variable 
estimation of error-components models. Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 68, pp. 29-51. 
Arteta, C., (2003) Are financially dollarized countries more prone to costly crises? 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. International Finance Discussion 
Paper, No. 763.  
Arteta, C., (2005) Exchange rate regimes and financial dollarization: Does flexibility 
reduce currency mismatches in bank intermediation? Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System International Finance Discussion Papers, No. 738. 
Avkiran, N., (2006) Developing foreign bank efficiency models for DEA grounded 
finance theory. Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Vol. 40, No.4, pp. 275-296. 
Baker, A., (2012) The New Political Economy of the Macroprudential Ideational Shift. 
New Political Economy, Vol. 18, No.1, pp. 112-139 
Baliño, T., Bennett, A., and Borensztein, E., (1999) Monetary Policy in Dollarized 
Economies. International Monetary Fund Occasional Paper, No. 171. 
 213 
 
Baltagi, B., (1985) Pooling Cross-Sections with Unequal Time-Series Lengths. 
Economics Letters, Vol. 18, pp. 133-136. 
Baltagi, B., (2001, 2nd Ed.) (2005, 3rd Ed.) Econometric Analysis of Panel Data. John 
Wiley, Chichester, England, New York, NY. 
Banda, H.S., and Verdugo, E.B., (2008) Translog Cost Functions: An Application for 
Mexican Manufacturing. Banco de México Working Papers. 
Bank of Albania, (various years) Annual Reports and Monetary Surveys 
www.bankofalbania.org.  
Bank of Latvia, (various years) Annual Reports and Monetary Surveys www.bank.lv. 
Bank of Slovenia, (various years) Annual Reports and Monetary Surveys www.bsi.si. 
Barajas, A., and Morales, A., (2003) Dollarization of Liabilities: Beyond the Usual 
Suspects. International Monetary Working Paper, No.11.  
Basso, H., Calvo-Gonzales, O., and Jurgilas, M., (2011) Financial Dollarization. The 
Role of Banks and Interest Rates. Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 35, pp. 794-806.   
Battese, G., and Coelli, T., (1992) Frontier Production Functions, Technical 
Efficiency and Panel Data: With Application to Paddy Farmers in India. Journal of 
Productivity Analysis, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 153-169. 
Battese, G.E., and Coelli, T.J., (1995) A Model of Technical Inefficiency Effects in a 
Stochastic Frontier Production Function for Panel Data. Empirical Economics, Vol. 20, 
pp. 325-332. 
Bauer P., Berger, A., and Humphrey D., (1993) Efficiency and Productivity Growth 
in U.S. Banking, in The Measurement of Productive Efficiency: Techniques and 
Applications. (Editors: H. Fried, C.A.K. Lovell, P. Schmidt), Oxford University Press, 386-
-413. 
Bauer, P., Berger, A., Ferrier, G., and Humphrey, D., (1998) Consistency Conditions 
for Regulatory Analysis of Financial Institutions: A comparison of Frontier Efficiency 
Methods. Journal of Economics and Business, Vol. 50, No.2, pp. 85-114. 
 214 
 
Bauer, P.W., and Hancock, D., (1993) The Efficiency of the Federal Reserve in 
Providing Check Processing Services. Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 
287-311. 
Baxter, J., and Eyles, J., (1997) Evaluating Qualitative Research in Social Geography: 
Establishing ‘Rigour’ in Interview Analysis. Transactions of the Institute of British 
Geographers, Vol. 22, No. 4, pp. 505–525.  
Beck, T., Demirguc-Kunt, A., and Levine, R., (2001) Law, Politics and Finance. 
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, No. 2585. 
Belotti, F., and Ilardi, G., (2012) Consistent Estimation of the “True” Fixed-effects 
Stochastic Frontier Model. Tor Vergata University CEIS Research Paper, No. 231. 
Belotti, F., Daidone, S., Ilardi, G., and Atella, V., (2012) Stochastic Frontier Analysis 
Using Stata. University of Rome II - Centre for International Studies on Economic 
Growth (CEIS) Working Paper, No. 251. 
Bencivenga, V., and Smith, B.D., (1991) Financial Intermediation and Endogenous 
Growth. The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 58, No. 2, pp. 195-209. 
Benigno, G., Otrok, C., Rebucci, A., Young, E.,  (2011) Financial Crisis and Macro-
Prudential Policies. IDB Working Paper Series, No. Inter-American Development Bank, 
IDB No. 238.  
Berg, A., and Borensztein, E., (2000) The Pros and Cons of Full Dollarization. 
International Monetary Fund Working Paper, No. 50. 
Berger, A. N., and Mester, L. J., (2003) "Explaining the dramatic changes in 
performance of US banks: technological change, deregulation, and dynamic changes 
in competition," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, Vol. 12, No. 1, pp. 57-95. 
Berger, A., and DeYoung, R., (1997) Problem loans and cost efficiency in commercial 
banks. Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 21, pp. 849–870. 
Berger, A., and Humphrey, D., (1991) The dominance of inefficiencies over scale 
and product mix economies in banking. Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 28, No.1, 
pp. 117 - 148. 
 215 
 
Berger, A., and Humphrey, D., (1992) Measurement and efficiency issues in 
commercial banking. Griliches, Z. (Ed.), Measurement Issues in Service Sectors. 
National Bureau of Economic Research, Chicago Press, University of Chicago, IL. 
Berger, A., and Humphrey, D., (1997) Efficiency of Financial Institutions: 
International Survey and Directions for Future Research. European Journal of 
Operational Research, Vol. 98 pp. 175-212. 
Berger, A., and Mester, L., (1997) Inside the Black Box: What Explains Differences in 
the Efficiencies of Financial Institutions? Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 21, pp. 
895-947. 
Berger, A., Hunter, W., and Timme, S., (1993) The Efficiency of Financial 
Institutions: A Review and Preview of Research Past, Present, and Future, Journal of 
Banking and Finance, Vol. 17, pp. 221-249. 
Berger, A., Hunter, W.C., and Timme, S.G., (1993) The efficiency of financial 
institutions: a review and preview of research past, present, and future. Journal of 
Banking and Finance, Vol. 17, pp. 223-227. 
Berglof, E. and Bolton, P., (2002) The Great ivied and Beyond: Financial Architecture 
in Transition. Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 77-100. 
Berkmen, S.P., and Cavallo, E., (2010) Exchange rate policy and liability 
dollarization: What do the data reveal about causality? Review of International 
Economics, Vol. 18, No. 5, pp. 781-795. 
Bogdan, R., and Biklen, S.K., (1992) Qualitative research for education: An 
introduction to theory and methods. Allyn & Bacon, Boston,.  
Bogdan, R.C., and Biklen, S.K., (2007) Qualitative research for education: An 
introduction to theories and methods (5th ed.). Pearson Education, Boston. 
Bond, S., (2002) Dynamic Panel Data Models: A Guide to Micro Data Methods and 
Practice. The Institute for Fiscal Studies, Working Paper No. O9. 
 216 
 
Bond, S., (2002a) Dynamic Panel Models: A Guide to Micro Data Methods and 
Practice. Institute for Fiscal Studies / Department of Economics, UCL, CEMMAP (Centre 
for Microdata Methods and practice) Working Paper, CWPO9/02.  
Bonin, J., (2001) Financial Intermediation in Southeast Europe: Banking on the 
Balkans, The wiiw Balkan Observatory, Working Papers, No. 006. 
Bonin, J., (2004) Banking in the Balkans: The Structure of Banking Sectors in 
Southeast Europe. Economic Systems, Vol. 28, No. 2, pp. 141–153. 
Bonin, J., and Wachtel, P., (2003) Financial Sector Development in Transition 
Economies: Lessons from the First Decade. Financial Markets, Institutions and 
Instruments, Vol. 12, pp. 1-43. 
Bonin, J., Hasan, I., and Wachtel, P., (2005) Bank performance, efficiency and 
ownership in a transition countries. Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 29, pp. 31–53. 
Borio, C., and Crockett, A., (2000) In search of anchors for financial and monetary 
stability. Greek Economic Review, Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 1-14. 
Borovicka, J., (2007) Banking Efficiency and Foreign Ownership in Transition: ls 
there Evidence of a Cream-Skimming Effect? Oesterreichische Nationalbank Financial 
Stability Report, No. 13, pp. 68-82. 
Bravo-Ureta, B., and Ahmad, M., (1996) Technical Efficiency Measures for Dairy 
Farms Using Panel Data: A Comparison of Alternative Model Specifications, JPA, Vol. 7, 
No. 4, pp. 399-415. 
Brissimis, S.N., Delis, M.D., and Papanikolaou, N.I., (2008) Exploring the nexus 
between banking sector reform and performance: evidence from newly acceded EU 
countries. Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 32, No. 12, pp. 2674-2683. 
Broda, C., and Levy Yeyati, E., (2006) Endogenous Deposit Dollarization. Journal of 
Credit, Money and Banking, Vol. 38, No.4, pp. 963-988. 
Brown, M., and De Haas, R., (2012) Foreign banks and foreign currency lending in 
emerging Europe. Economic Policy, CEPR; CES; MSH, Vol. 27, No. 69, pp. 57-98. 
 217 
 
Brown, M., and Stix, H., (2014) The euroization of bank deposits in Eastern Europe. 
Economic Policy, Vol. 30, No. 81, pp. 95-139. 
Brown, M., Ongena, S., and Yesin, P., (2011) Foreign currency borrowing by small 
firms in the transition economies. Journal of Financial Intermediation, Vol. 20, pp. 285–
302. 
Brunnermeier, M. K., Crocket, A., Goodhart C., Persaud Avi and Shin Hyun, 
(2009), Fundamental Principles of Financial Regulation, 11th Geneva Report on the 
World Economy. 
Bryant, J., (1980) A model of Reserves, Bank Runs, and Deposit Insurance. Journal of 
Banking and Finance, Vol. 4, p. 335-344.  
Bryman, A., (2006) Integrating quantitative and qualitative research: how is it done? 
Qualitative research, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 97 – 113. 
Brzoza-Brzezina, M., and Chmielewski, T., and Niedzwiedzinska, J., (2010) 
Substitution between domestic and foreign currency loans in Central Europe. Do 
central banks matter? European Central Bank Working Paper, 1187. 
Bulgarian National Bank, (various years) Annual Reports and Monetary Surveys 
www.bnb.bg. 
Calvo and Reinhart, (2002) Fear of floating. Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 117, 
No. 2, pp. 379-40. 
Calvo, G., (2001) Capital Markets and the Exchange Rate: with Special Reference to 
the Dollarization Debate in Latin America. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking Vol. 
33, No. 2, pp. 312-334. 
Calvo, G., (2002) On Dollarization. Economics of Transition, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 3939-
403. 
Calvo, G., and Guidotti, P., (1990) Credibility and Nominal Debt. Exploring the Role 
of Maturity in Managing Inflation. International Monetary Fund Staff Papers, Vol. 47, 
No. 3.   
 218 
 
Calvo, G., and Veigh, C., (1992) Currency Substitution in Developing Countries – An 
Introduction. International Monetary Fund, Working Papers, No. 40. 
Caruana, J., (2010) Macroprudential policy: working towards a new consensus. 
Remarks at the high-level meeting on “The Emerging Framework for Financial 
Regulation and Monetary Policy” jointly organised by the BIS’s Financial Stability 
Institute and the IMF Institute, Washington DC, 23 April. 
Casu, B. and Molyneux, P., (2003) A comparative study of efficiency in European 
banking. Applied Economics, Vol. 35, No.17, pp. 1865-1876. 
Casu, B., and Giradone, C., (2006) Bank competition, concentration and efficiency in 
the single European market. The Manchester School, Vol. 74, No.4, pp. 441-468. 
Catao, L., and Terrones, M., (2000) Determinants of Dollarization: The banking Side. 
International Monetary Fund Working Paper, No.146. 
Caudill, S.B., and Ford, J.M., (1993) Biases in frontier estimation due to 
heteroscedasticity. Economics Letters, Vol. 41, No. 1, pp. 17–20. 
Caudill, S.B., Ford, J.M., and Gropper, D.M., (1995) Frontier estimation and firm-
specific inefficiency measures in the presence of heteroscedasticity. Journal of 
Business & Economic Statistics, Vol. 13,  No. 1, pp. 105–111. 
Caviglia, G., Krause, G., and Thimann, C., (2002) Key features of the financial 
sectors in EU accession countries. European Central Bank Financial Sectors in EU 
Accession Countries No.15 -3. 
Central Bank of Armenia, (various years) Annual Reports and Monetary Surveys 
www.cba.am. 
Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina, (various years) Annual Reports and 
Monetary Surveys www.cbbh.ba. 
Central Bank of Russia, (various years) Annual Reports and Monetary Surveys 
www.cbr.ru. 
Central Bank Of the Republic of Azerbaijan (various years) Annual Reports and 
Monetary Surveys www.cbar.az. 
 219 
 
Central Bank of the Republic of Kosovo, (various years) Annual Reports and 
Monetary Surveys: www.bqk-kos.org. 
Central Bank of the Republicof Lithuania, (various years) Annual Reports and 
Monetary Surveys www.lb.lt. 
Chang, R., and Velasco, A., (2003) Dollarization: Analytical Issues. In Levy Yeyati, E., 
and Sturzenegger, F., (2001) Dollarization: A Primer. Cambridge and London: MIT 
Press: 1-5. 
Charnes, A., Cooper, W., and Rhodes, E., (1978) Measuring Efficiency of Decision 
Making Units. European Journal of Operations Research, Vol.6, pp. 429-444.  
Chelo, M., and Manlagnit, V., (2011) Cost efficiency, determinants, and risk 
preferences in banking: A case of stochastic frontier analysis in the Philippines, 
Journal of Asian Economics, Vol. 22, pp. 23-35. 
Chiu, Y., and Chen, Y., (2009) The analysis of Taiwanese bank efficiency: 
Incorporating both external environment risk and internal risk. Economic Modelling, 
Vol. 26 pp. 456-463.  
Claessens, S., Demirgüç-Kunt, A., and Huizinga, H., (2001) How does Foreign Entry 
Affect Domestic Banking Markets?, Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 25: 891-991. 
Claessens, S., Pozsar, Z., Ratnovski, L., and Singh, M., (2012) Shadow Banking: 
Economics and Policy. International Monetary Fund, IMF Staff Discussion Note, No. 12. 
Classenss, S., Ghosh, S.R., Mihet, R., (2014) Macro-Prudential Policies to Mitigate 
Financial System Vulenrabilities. International Monetary Fund Working Paper, No.155. 
Click, R., (2007) The Latin American Dollar Standard in the post-crises era. George 
Washington University. Accessed at Social Science Research Network, (SSRN); 
http://www.ssrn.com.  
Cochrane, D. and Orcutt, G. (1949), Application of Least Squares Regression to 
Relationships Containing Autocorrelated Error Terms. Journal of the American 
Statistical Association, Vol. 44, pp. 32–61.  
 220 
 
Coelli, T., Prasada, D., and Battese, G., (1998) An Introduction to Efficiency and 
Productivity Analysis. Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Coelli, T., Rao, D., and Battese, G., (2005) An introduction to efficiency and 
productivity analysis (2nd ed.). Springer Science Business Media, New York New York. 
Coelli, T.J., (1995) Recent developments in frontier modelling and efficiency 
measurement. Australian Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 39, No. 3, pp. 219-245. 
Cohen, B., and Gujarati, D., (1970) The Student's t Test in Multiple Regression under 
Simple Collinearity. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 5, No. 03, pp. 
341-351 
Cohen, B.J., (2004) The Future of Money. Princeton University Press, New Jersey. 
Cook, D., (2004) Monetary Policy in Emerging Markets: Can Liability Dollarization 
Explain Contractionary Devaluations? Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 51, No. 6, 
pp. 1155-1181. 
Cornwell, C., Schmidt, P., and Sickles, R., (1990) Production Frontier with Cross-
Sectional and Time-Series Variation in Efficiency Levels. Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 
46, pp. 185-200. 
Court, E., Ozsoz, E., and Rengifo, E., (2010) Deposit Dollarization and Its Impact on 
Financial Deepening in the Developing World. Fordham University Department of 
economics Discussion Paper, Series No. 8. 
Creswell, J.W., (2007) Qualitative inquiry and research design: Choosing among five 
approaches. SAGE Publications Inc, Thousand Oaks, CA. 
Creswell, J.W., (2012) Educational research: Planning, conducting, and evaluating 
quantitative and qualitative research (3rd ed.). SAGE Publications Inc, Los Angeles, CA . 
Croatian National Bank, (various years) Annual Reports and Monetary Surveys 
www.hnb.hr. 
Crowe, C., Dell'Ariccia, G., Igan, D., and Rabanal. P.,  (2011) Policies for 
Macrofinancial Stability: Options to Deal with Real Estate Booms. IMF Staff Discussion 
Note. 
 221 
 
Cuaresma, J.C., Fidrmuc, J., and Hake, M., (2013) Determinants of Foreign Currency 
Loans in CESEE Countries: A Meta-Analysis. In: Focus on European Economic 
Integration, Q4/2011, Österreichische Nationalbank OeNB. 69–87. 
Czech National Bank, (various years) Annual Reports and Monetary Surveys 
www.cnb.cz. 
De Freitas, M., (2004) The Dynamics of Inflation and Currency Substitution in a small 
Open Economy. Journal of International Money and Finance, Vol. 23, pp. 133–142. 
De Haas, R., and Van Lelyveld, I., (2006) Foreign banks and credit stability in 
Central and Eastern Europe. A panel data analysis. Journal of Banking & Finance, Vol. 
30, No. 7, pp. 1927–1952. 
De Nicolo, G., Honohan, P., and Ize, A., (2005) Dollarization of bank deposits: 
Causes and consequences. Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 29, No. 7, pp. 1697-
1727. 
De Nicolo, G., Ize, A., and Honohan, P., (2003) Dollarization of the banking system: 
good or bad? International Monetary Fund Working Paper, No. 146. 
Dell'Ariccia, G., Bakker, B.B., Laeven, L., Vandenbussche, J., Deniz Igan, D., and 
Tong, H., (2012) Policies for Macrofinancial Stability; How to Deal with Credit Booms. 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) Staff Discussion Notes, No. 06. 
Denzin, N.K., (1989) The Research Act: A Theoretical Introduction to Sociological 
Methods (3rd ed.). Prentice Hall, Englewood Chffs, New Jersey. 
Denzin, N.K. and Lincoln, Y.S., (2000) Handbook of Qualitative Research (2nd ed.). 
SAGE Publications, Inc, Thousand Oaks, CA.  
DeYoung, R., and Hasan, I., (1998) The performance of de novo commercial banks: A 
profit efficiency approach. Journal of Banking & Finance, Vol. 22, pp. 565-587. 
Diamond, D., (1984) Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring. The Review 
of  Economic Studies Vol. 51, No. 3, pp. 393-414. 
Dornbusch, R., (1998) International Financial Crises. CES- Ifo Working Paper, No. 
926.  
 222 
 
Dornbusch, R., and Reynoso, A., (1989) Financial factors in economic development. 
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper, No. 2889.   
Douglas A.D., (2004) Multilevel Modeling. SAGE Publication Ltd, Thousand Oaks, CA. 
Druck, P., Moron, E., and Stein, E., (2001) The Twin Risks in the Dollarization 
Debate: Country and Devaluation Risks, Universidad Del Cema.  
EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (various years), 
Transition Report, London. 
Edwards, S., (2002) The Great Exchange Rate Debate after Argentina. North American 
Journal of Economics and Finance, Vol. 13, No. 3, pp. 237-252.  
Eichengreen, B., (2001) What Problems Can Dollarization Solve? Journal of Policy 
Modelling, Vol. 23, No. 3, pp. 267-277. 
Eichengreen, B., (2002) When to Dollarize. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 
34, No. 1, pp. 1-24. 
Eichengreen, B., and Hausmann, R., (1999) Exchange Rates and Financial Fragility 
in New Challenges for Monetary Policy: Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pp. 329-
68. 
Eisenbeis, R., Ferrier, G., & Kwan, S. (1999). The informativeness of stochastic 
frontier and programming frontier efficiency scores: Cost efficiency and other 
measures of bank holding performance. Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ,Working 
Paper Series, No.23. 
Engineer, M., (2000) Currency Transactions Costs and Competing Fiat Currencies. 
Journal of International Economics, Vol.52, p.113-136. 
Esti Pank, (various years) Annual Reports and Monetary Surveys www.eestipank.ee 
Fang, Y., Hasan, I., and Marton, K., (2011) Bank efficiency in transition economies: 
recent evidence from South-Eastern Europe. Research Discussion Papers Bank of 
Finland. 
 223 
 
Farrell, M., (1957) The measurement of productive efﬁciency. Journal of the Royal 
Statistical Society, Series A. 120, pp. 253–281 
Federico, P., Vegh, C.A., and Vuletin, G., (2012) Macroprudential policy over the 
business cycle. Working Paper, University of Maryland.  
Feige, E., (2003) Dynamics of Currency Substitution, Asset Substitution and De Facto 
Dollarisation and Euroisation in Transition Countries, Comparative Economic Studies, 
Vol. 45, No.3, pp. 358–83. 
Feige, E., and Dean, J., (2004) Dollarization and Euroization in Transition Countries: 
Currency Substitution, Asset Substitution, Network Externalities, and Irreversibility, 
in V. Alexander, J. Melitz & G. M. von Furstenberg (eds), Monetary Unions and Hard 
Pegs: Effects on Trade, Financial Development, and Stability. Oxford University Press, 
New York and Oxford, pp. 303–319. 
Fethi, M.D., and Pasiouras, F., (2010) Assessing bank efficiency and performance 
with operational research and artificial intelligence techniques: A survey. European 
Journal of Operational Research, Vol. 204, pp.189-198. 
Fidrmuc, J., Hake, M., and Stix, H., (2013) Households’ foreign currency borrowing 
in Central and Eastern Europe. Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 37, pp.1880–1897. 
Fine, M., Weis, L., Weseen, S. and Wong, L., (2000) For Whom: Qualitative Research, 
Representations, and Social Responsibilities. In Denzin, N.K., and Lincoln, Y.S. (2000) 
Handbook of Qualitative Research (2nd ed.). SAGE Publications Inc, Thousand Oaks, CA.  
Finlay, L., (2002) Negotiating the swamp: the opportunity and challenge of reflexivity 
in research practice. SAGE Publications Ltd, London England.  
Fiordelissi, F., Marques-Ibanez, D., and Molyneoux, P., (2011) Efficiency and risk 
in European banking. Journal of Banking and Finances, Vol. 35, pp. 1315-1326. 
Fischer, S., (1982) Seigniorage and Fixed Exchange Rates: An Optimal Inflation Tax 
Analysis. Journal of Political Economy 90, no. 2 (April): 295-313. Reprinted in Stanley 
Fischer, Indexing, Inflation, and Economic Policy (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987). 
 224 
 
Fischer, S., Sahay, R., and Veigh, C., (1996) Economies in transition: the Beginnings 
of Growth. American Economic Association Papers and Proceedings, Vol. 86, pp. 229-
233.  
Flick, U., (1992) Triangulation revisited: strategy of validation or alternative? Journal 
for the Theory of Social Behaviour, Vol. 22, No. 2, pp. 175-97. 
Flick, U., (2002) An Introduction to Qualitative Research. SAGE Publications, Inc, 
London England. 
Flood, P.R., and Rose, K.A., (1999) Understanding Exchange Rate Volatility Without 
the Contrivance of Macroeconomics. The Economic Journal, Vol. 109, No. 459, pp. 660–
672. 
Forsund, F.R., Lovell, C.A.K., and Schmidt, P., (1980) A survey of frontier 
production functions and of their relationship to efficiency measurement. Journal of 
Econometrics, Vol. 13, pp. 5-25. 
Frankel, J., and Rose, A., (1998) The endogeneity of the optimum currency area 
criteria. The Economic Journal, Vol.108, pp.1009-25.  
Frankel, J., and Rose, A., (2002) An Estimate of the Effect of Common Curencies 
Unions on Trade and Income. Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 117, No. 2, pp. 437-
466.  
Fried, H., Lovell, C., Schmidt, S., and Yaisawarng, S., (2002) Accounting for 
environmental effects and statistical noise in data envelopment analysis. Journal of 
Productivity Analysis, Vol. 17, pp. 157–174. 
Fried, H., Lovell, K., and Schmidt, S., (2007) The Measurement of Productive 
Efficiency and Productivity. Oxford University Press, the Red Book. 
Fries, S., and Taci, A., (2005) Cost Efficiency of banks in transition: Evidence from 
289 banks in 15 post-communist countries. Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 29, 
No. 1, pp. 55-81. 
Galati, G., and Moessner, R., (2014) What do we know about the effects of 
macroprudential policy? De Nederlandsche Bank DNB Working Paper, No. 440. 
 225 
 
Galindo, A., and Leiderman, L., (2006) Living with Dollarization and the route to 
Dedollarization. Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department, Working 
Papers, No. 4397. 
Gallant, R., (1982) The Fourier Flexible Form. American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics, Vol. 66, No. 2, pp.204-208. 
Ghosh, S., (2013) Macroprudential Regulation and Bank Performance: Evidence from 
India. Munich Personal RePEc Archive MPRA Paper No. 51226. 
Gilbert, N., (2008) Researching social life (3rd ed.). SAGE Publications Ltd,  London 
England. 
Gillham, B., (2000) Developing a Questionnaire (2nd ed.). Continuum International 
Publishing Group, London England. 
Giovannini, A., and Turtelboom, B., (1994) Currency Substitution in F.van der Ploeg 
(ed.), Handbook of International Macroeconomics, Mass: Blackwell, Cambridge. 
Girardone, C., Nankervis, J.C., and Velentza, E., (2009) Efficiency, ownership and 
financial structure in European banking. Managerial Finance, Vol. 35, No. 3, pp. 227–
245. 
Goldstein, M., and  Turner, P., (2004) Banking  crises in emerging economies; 
Origins and policy options. Bank for International Settlements, BIS Economic papers, 
No. 46. 
Gomis-Porqueras, P., Serrano, C., and Somuano, J., (2000) Currency Substitution in 
Latin America: Lesson from the 1990s, World Bank Publications. 
Gordon, R.L., (1975) Interviewing: Strategy, Techniques and Tactics. Dorsey Press, 
Illinois. 
Greene, W.. (2002) Limdep Version 8.0: Econometric Modelling Guide, Plainview 
Econometric Software, Inc Vol. 2. 
Greene, W., (1990) A Gamma-Distributed Stochastic Frontier Model. Journal of 
Econometrics, Vol. 46, pp. 141. 
 226 
 
Greene, W., (2003; 5th Ed.) Econometric Analysis. Prentice Hall, New Jersey. 
Greene, W., (2005a) Reconsidering heterogeneity in panel data estimators of the 
stochastic frontier model. Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 126, pp. 269-303. 
Greene, W., (2005b) Fixed and random effects in stochastic frontier models. Journal 
of Productivity Analysis, Vol. 23, pp. 7-32. 
Greene, W., (2007) Functional form and heterogeneity in models for data. 
Foundations and Trends in Econometrics, Vol. 1, pp. 113-218. 
Greene, W., (2008) The Measurement of Efficiency, chapter in The Econometric 
Approach to Efficiency Analysis. Oxford University Press. 
Grigorian, D., and Manole, V., (2002) Determinants of Commercial Bank 
Performance in Transition: An Application of Data Envelopment Analysis. World Bank 
Working Paper, No. 2850. 
Grigorian, D., and Manole, V., (2006) Determinants of Commercial Bank 
Performance in Transition: An Application of Data Envelopment Analysis. 
Comparative Economic Studies Vol. 48, No. 3, pp. 497–522. 
Gruben, W., and Welch, J., (1996) Default Risk and Dollarization in Mexico. Journal 
of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 28, No. 3, pp. 393-401.  
Guarda, P., Rouabah, A., abd Vardanyan, M., (2013) Identifying bank outputs and 
inputs with a directional technology distance function. Journal of Productivity 
Analysis, Vol. 40, No.2, pp. 185-195. 
Guilde, A., Hoelscher, D., Ize, A., Marton, D., and De Nicolo G., (2004) Financial 
Stability in Dollarized Economies. International  Monetary Fund Occasional Paper, No. 
230.  
Haiss, P., and Rainer, W., (2012) Credit euroization in CESEE: The “Foreign Funds” 
channel at work. Comparative Economic Studies, Vol. 54, No. 3, pp. 471–505. 
Haiss, P., Paul Hart, A., and Rainer, W., (2009) Do foreign banks drive foreign 
currency lending in Central and Eastern Europe? Paper presented at the 6th Annual 
 227 
 
INFINITI Conference on International Finance, June 9-10, Trinity College, Dublin, 
Ireland. 
Hake, M., and Lopez-Vicente, F., (2014) Do the drivers of loan dollarization differ 
between CESEE and Latin America? A meta-analysis. Banco de Espana, Eurosystem, 
No. 1406. 
Hallam, D., and Machado, F., (1996) Efficiency Analysis with Panel Data: A Study of 
Portuguese Dairy Farms. European Review of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 23, pp. 79-
93. 
Hammersley, M., and Atkinson, P., (1995) Ethnography: Principles in practice (2nd 
ed.). Routledge Ltd, New York New York. 
Hammersley, M., and Traianou, A., (2012) Ethics in Qualitative Research: 
Controversies and Contexts. SAGE Publications Ltd, London England. 
Hasan, I., and Marton, K., (2003) Banking in Transition Economy: Hungarian 
Evidence. Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 27, pp. 2249-2271. 
Haselmann, R., and Wachtel, P., (2007) Risk taking by banks in the transition 
countries. Comparative Economic Studies, Vol. 49, pp.411-29. 
Hatch, J.A., (2002) Doing qualitative research in education settings. Albany: State. 
University of New York Press.  
Healy, M. and Perry, C., (2000) Comprehensive criteria to judge validity and 
reliability of qualitative research within realism paradigm. Qualitative Market 
Research: An International Journal, Vol. 3 No. 3, pp. 118-26. 
Honig, A., (2005) Fear of Floating and Domestic Liability Dollarization. Emerging 
Markets Review, Vol. 6,  No. 3,  pp. 289-307. 
Honig, A., (2009) Dollarization, exchange rate regimes and government quality. 
Journal of International Money and Finance, Vol. 28, No. 2, pp. 198-214. 
Honohan, P., (2007) Dollarization and Exchange Rate Fluctuations. World Bank 
Policy Research, Working Paper, No. 4172. 
 228 
 
Honohan, P., and Shi, A., (2002) Deposit Dollarization and the Financial Sector in 
Emerging Economies. The World Bank Series Policy Research, Working Paper, No. 
2748.  
Houston, J., Lin, C., Lin, P., and Ma, Y., (2010) Creditor rights, information sharing, 
and bank risk taking. Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 96, pp. 485–512. 
Hughes, J., and Mester, L., (1993) A quality and risk-adjusted cost function for 
banks: Evidence on the ‘Too-Big-to-Fail’ doctrine. Journal of Productivity Analysis, Vol. 
4, pp. 293–315.  
Hughes, J., and Mester, L., (1998) Bank capitalization and cost: Evidence of scale 
economies in risk management and signaling. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 
Vol. 80, pp. 314–325.-163. 
Hughes, J., and Mester, L., (2008) Efficiency in Banking: Theory, Practice and 
Evidence. Oxford Handbook of Banking.   
IMF International Monetary Fund (2011a) Macroprudential Policy: An Organizing 
Framework. Background Paper. 
IMF International Monetary Fund (2011b) Macroprudential Policy: What 
Instruments and How to Use Them? Lessons from Country Experiences. Background 
Paper. 
IMF International Monetary Fund (2014) Global Macroprudential Policy 
Instruments Database. 
IMF, BIS, FSB, (2009) Guidance to Assess the Systemic Importance of Financial 
Institutions, Markets and Instruments: Initial Considerations. Briefing Paper for the 
G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, October 28, 2009. 
Irsova, Z., (2010) Bank Efficiency in Transitional Countries: Sensitivity to Stochastic 
Frontier Design. William Davidson Institute Working Paper, No. 998 
Ivanov, M., Tkalec, M., and Vizek, M., (2011) The Determinants of Financial 
Euroization in a Post-Transition Country: Do Threshold Effect Matter? Czech Journal 
of Economics and Finance, Vol. 61, No. 3. 
 229 
 
Ize, A., and Levy Yeyati, E., (2003) Financial dollarization. Journal of International 
Economics, Vol. 59, No. 2, pp. 323-347. 
Ize, A., and Levy-Yeyati, E., (1998) Dollarization and Financial Intermediation: 
Causes and Policy Implications. International Monetary Fund Working Paper, No.22. 
Ize, A., and Parrado, E., (2002) Dollarization, Monetary Policy, and the Pass-
Through. International Monetary Fund Working Paper, No.188.  
Ize, A., and Parrado, E., (2006) Real Dollarization, Financial Dollarization, and the 
Monetary Policy. Central Bank of Chile Working Paper, No. 375.  
Jacome, L., (2004) The Late 1990s Financial Crisis in Ecuador: Institutional 
Weaknesses, Fiscal Rigidities and Financial Dollarization at Work. International 
Monetary Fund Working Paper, No.12. 
Jacome, L., and Lonnberg, A., (2010) Implementing Official Dollarization. 
International Monetary Fund Working Paper, No.106. 
Jeanne, O., (2003) Why do emerging market economies borrow in Foreign currency? 
International Monetary Fund, Working Paper, No.177.  
Jemric, I., and B. Vujcic (2002) Efficiency of Banks in Croatia: A DEA Approach. 
Croatian National Bank, Working Paper, No.7. 
Kasman, A., (2005) Efficiency and Scale Economies in Transition Economies: 
Evidence from Poland and the Czech Republic. Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, 
Vol. 41, No. 2, pp. 60–81. 
Kasman, A., and Yildirim, C., (2006) Cost and profit efficiencies in transition 
banking: the case of new EU members. Applied Economics, Vol. 38, pp.1079-1090. 
King, R., and Levine, R., (1993a) Finance and Growth: Schumpeter Might Be Right. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 108, No. 3, pp. 717-37. 
King, R., and Levine, R., (1993b) Financial Intermediation and Economic 
Development, in: Financial intermediation in the construction of Europe. Eds.:COLIN 
MAYER AND XAVIER VIVES. London: Centre for Economic Policy Research, pp.156-89. 
 230 
 
King, R., and Levine, R., (1993c) Finance, Entrepreneurship, and Growth: Theory 
and Evidence. J. Monet. Econ. Vol. 32, No. 3, pp. 513-42. 
Koenker, R., (2004) Quantile regression for longitudinal data. Journal of Multivariate 
Analysis, Vol. 91, pp. 74 – 89. 
Komarek, L., and Melecky, M., (2003) Currency Substitution in a Transitional 
Economy with an Application to the Czech Republic. Eastern European Economics, Vol. 
41, No. 4, pp. 72-79.  
Kotios, A., (2002) Southeastern Europe and the Euro Area: the Euroization Debate. 
Eastern European Economics Vol. 40, No. 6, pp. 24-50. 
Kotzian, P., (2005) Productive Efficiency and Heterogeneity of Health Care Systems: 
Results of a Measurement for OECD Countries. Working Paper, London School of 
Economics, London.  
Koutsomanoli-Filipaki, A., Margaritis, D., and Staikouras, C., (2009) Efficiency and 
productivity growth in the banking industry of Central and Eastern Europe. Journal of 
Banking and Finance, Vol 33, pp. 557-567. 
Kraft, E., and Tirtiroglu, D., (1998) Bank efficiency in Croatia: A Stochastic - Frontier 
Analysis. Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 26, No. 2 p. 282 - 300. 
Kraft, E., Hofler, R., and Payne, J., (2002) Privatization, foreign bank entry and bank 
efficiency in Croatia: A Fourier-flexible function stochastic cost frontier function 
analysis. Croatian National Bank, Working Paper, No. 9.  
Krugman, P., (1999) Balance Sheets, the Transfer Problem, and Financial Crises. 
International Tax and Public Finance Vol. 6, No. 4, pp. 459-472.  
Kumamoto, H., and Kumamoto, M., (2014) Does Currency Substitution Affect 
Exchange Rate Volatility? International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, Vol. 
4, No. 4, pp.698-704. 
Kumbhakar, S., (1990) Production Frontiers, Panel Data, and Time-Varying 
Technical Inefficiency. Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 46, No.2, pp. 201-212. 
 231 
 
Kumbhakar, S., and Lovell, C., (2003ed.) Stochastic Frontier Analysis. University 
Press, Cambridge. 
Kumbhakar, S.C., Ghosh, S., and McGuckin, J.T., (1991) A Generalized Production 
Frontier Approach for Estimating Determinants of Inefficiency in U.S. Dairy Farms." 
Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, Vol. 9, pp. 279-286. 
Kutan, A.M., Ozsoz, E., and Rengifo, E.W., (2010) Evaluating The Effects Of Deposit 
Dollarization In Bank Profitability. Fordham University Department of Economics 
Discussion Paper, No.07. 
Kuttner, K., and Shim, I., (2012)  Can non-interest rate policies stabilize housing 
markets? Evidence from a panel of 57 economies. National Bureau of Economic 
research working paper No. 19723. 
Kvale, S., (1996) InterViews: An introduction to qualitative research interviewing. 
SAGE Publications Ltd, Thousand Oaks, CA. 
Kwan, S.H., (2006) The X-efficiency of commercial banks in Hong Kong. Journal of 
Banking and Finance. Vol. 30, No. 4, pp. 1127-1147. 
Laeven, L., and Levine, R., (2009) Bank governance, regulation and risk taking. 
Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, Vol. 93, No. 2, pp. 259-275. 
Lahiri, A., and Veigh, C., (2001) Living with the Fear of Floating: An Optimal Policy 
Perspective. National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 8391.  
Lancaster, T., (2002) The Incidental Parameters Problem Since 1948. Journal of 
Econometrics, Vol. 95, pp. 391-414. 
Lee, Y., and Schmidt, P., (1993) A Production Frontier Model with Flexible Temporal 
Variation in Technical Inefficiency. In Fried, H., and Lovell, K., eds., The Measurement 
of Productive Efficiency: Techniques and Applications, Oxford University Press, New 
York. 
Leedy, P. D., and Ormrod, J. E., (2005) Practical research: Planning and design (8th 
ed.). Prentice Hall Ltd, Upper Saddle River, NJ. 
 232 
 
Levi Yeyati, E., (2006) Financial Dollarisation: Evaluating the Consequences. 
Economic Policy, Vol. 21, No. 45, pp. 63-118.  
Levine, R., (1997) Financia Development and Economic growth: Views and Agenda. 
Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 35, No. 2, pp. 688-726 
Levy Yeyati, E., and Sturzenegger, F., (2001) Dollarization: A Primer. Cambridge and 
London: MIT Press: 1-5. 
Levy-Yeyati, E., (2004) Dollars, Debts and the IFIs: De-dollarizing Multilateral 
Lending, CIF Working Paper, No. 11 (Buenos Aires: Universidad Di Tella). 
Levy-Yeyati, E., and Sturzenegger. F., (2007) Fear of floating in reverse: exchange 
rate policy in the 2000s. Department of Economics, Universidad Torcuato di Tella, 
Buenos Aires.  
Lim,C., Columba, F., Costa, A.,Kongsamut, P., Otani, A., Saiyid, M., Wezel, T., and 
Wu,X., (2011). Macroprudential Policy: What Instruments and How to Use Them? 
Lessons from Country Experiences. International Monetary Fund Working Paper No. 
238. 
Lincoln, Y.S., (2009) Ethical practices in qualitative research. In Mertens, D. M., and 
Ginsberg, P. E. The handbook of social research ethics (pp. 150–169). SAGE Publications 
Ltd, Los Angeles CA. 
Lincoln, Y.S., and Guba, E.G., (1985) Naturalistic inquiry. SAGE Publications Ltd, 
Beverly Hills, CA.  
Lipson, J.G., (1994) Ethical issues in ethnography. In Morse, J. M. Critical issues in 
qualitative research methods. SAGE Publications Ltd, Thousand Oaks CA. 
Lozano-Vivas, A., and Pasiouras, F., (2010) The impact of non-traditional activities 
on the estimation of bank efficiency: International evidence. Journal of Banking & 
Finance, Vol. 34, pp.1436-1449. 
Lozano-Vivas, A., Pastor, J.T., and Pastor, J.M., (2002) An efficiency comparison of 
European banking systems operating under different environmental conditions. 
Journal of Productivity Analysis, Vol.18, pp. 59-77. 
 233 
 
Luca, A., and Petrova, I., (2003) Credit Dollarization in Transition Economies: Is it 
Firms’ or Banks’ Fault? Mimeo Drexel University. 
Luca, A., and Petrova, I., (2008) What drives credit dollarization in transition 
economies? Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 32, No. 5, pp. 858-869.  
Luke, D. A., (2004) Multilevel Modeling. SAGE Publications Ltd, Thousand Oaks CA. 
Mamatzakis, E., Staikouras, C., and Koutsomanoli-Filipaki, A., (2008) Bank 
efficiency in the new European Union member states: Is there convergence? 
International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Vol. 17, pp. 1156-1172. 
MarshaIl, C., and Rossman, G.B., (2006) Designing qualitative research (4th ed.). 
SAGE Publications Ltd, Thousand Oaks, CA. 
Mastromarco, C., (2008) Stochastic Frontier Models. Department of Economics and 
Mathematics-Statistics, CIdE University of Salento.  
Matousek, R., and Taci, A., (2002) Banking efficiency in transition economies: 
Empirical evidence from the Czech Republic. Discussion Paper No. 02-3, Centre for 
International Capital Markets, London Metropolitan University. 
Maudos, J., Pastor, J., Perez, F., and Quesada, J., (2002) Cost and profit efficiency in 
European banks. Journal of International Financial Markets Institutions and Money, 
Vol. 12, pp. 33-58. 
Maxwell, J., (1996 Ed.); (2005 Ed.) Qualitative Research Design: An Interactive 
Approach. SAGE Publications Ltd, Thousand Oaks, CA:. 
Maxwell, J., (2008) Designing a qualitative study. In Bickman, L., and Rog, D.J. (2008) 
The handbook of applied social research methods, second edition. SAGE Publications 
Ltd, Thousand Oaks CA:. 
McAllister, P., and McManus, D., (1993) Resolving the scale efficiency puzzle in 
banking. Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol.17, pp. 389–405. 
McGuirk, A., and Spanos, A., (2009) Revisiting Error Autocorrelation Correction: 
Common Factor Restrictions and Granger Non-Causality. Oxford Bulletin of Economics 
and Statistics, Vol. 71, Issue 2, pp. 273-294.  
 234 
 
Meeusen, W., van dan Broeck, J., (1977) Efficiency Estimation from CobbDouglas 
Production Functions with Composed Error. International Economic Review, Vol.18, 
No.2, pp. 435-444. 
Merriam, S.B., (1998) Qualitative research, and case study applications in education. 
Josey-Bass Publisher, San Francisko. 
Mertens, D.M., and Ginsberg, P.E., (2009) The handbook of social research ethics. 
SAGE Publications Ltd, Los Angeles CA. 
Mester, L., (1993) Efficiency in the savings and loan industry, Journal of Banking and 
Finance, Vol. 17, No. 2-3,  pp. 267-286. 
Mester, L., (1996) A study of bank efficiency taking into account risk-preferences. 
Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 20, pp. 1025–1045. 
Mester, L., (1997) Measuring efficiency at U.S. banks: Accounting for heterogeneity is 
important. European Journal of Operational Research, Vol. 98, pp. 230–248. 
Miles, M.B., and Huberman, A.M., (1994) Qualitative data analysis: A sourcebook of 
new methods (2nd ed.). SAGE Publications Ltd, Thousand Oaks, CA. 
Mokhtar, H., AlHabshi, S., and Abdullah, N., (2006) A Conceptual Framework for 
and Surey of Banking Efficiency Study. Unitar E-Journal Vol. 2, No 2. 
Mouton, J., (1996) Understanding Social Research. Pretoria: JL Van Schaik Publishers. 
Murillo-Zamorano, L., (2004) Economic Efficiency and Frontier Techniques. Journal 
of Economic Surveys, Vol. 18, No. 1. 
Murillo-Zamorano, L., and Vega-Cervera, J., (2001) The use of parametric and 
nonparametric frontier methods to measure the productive efficiency in the 
industrial sector: A comparative study. International Journal of Production economics, 
Vol. 69, No. 3, pp. 265-275. 
Murray, J.D., and White, R.W., (1983) Economies of Scale and Economies of Scope in 
Multiproduct Financial Institutions: A Study of British Columbia Credit Unions. 
Journal of Finance, Vol. 38, pp. 887–902 
 235 
 
National Bank Of Georgia, (various years) Annual Reports and Monetary Surveys 
www.nbg.gov.ge. 
National Bank of Moldova, (various years) Annual Reports and Monetary Surveys 
www.bnm.org 
National Bank of Poland, (various years) Annual Reports and Monetary Surveys 
www.nbp.pl. 
National Bank of Romania, (various years) Annual Reports and Monetary Surveys 
www.bnr.ro. 
National Bank of Serbia (various years) Annual Reports and Monetary Surveys 
www.nbs.rs. 
National Bank of Slovakia, (various years) Annual Reports and Monetary Surveys 
www.nbs.sk. 
National bank of Tajikistan, (various years) Annual Reports and Monetary Surveys 
www.nbt.tj. 
National Bank of the Kyrgyz Republic, (various years) Annual Reports and 
Monetary Surveys www.nbkr.kg. 
National Bank of the Republic of Belarus, (various years) Annual Reports and 
Monetary Surveys www.nbrb.by. 
National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia, (various years) Annual Reports and 
Monetary Surveys www.nbrm.mk. 
National Bank of Ukraine, (various years) Annual Reports and Monetary Surveys 
www.bank.gov.ua. 
Neanidis, K.C., (2010) Financial Dollarization and European Union Membership. 
International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 257-282. 
Neanidis, K., and Sava, C., (2009) Financial Dollarization: Short Run Determinants in 
transition Economies. Centre for Growth and Business Cycle Research, economic 
Studies, University of Manchester, Working Paper, No. 113. 
 236 
 
Neyman, J., Scott, E.L., (1948) Consistent estimation from partially consistent 
observations. Econometrica, Vol.16, pp.1-32. 
Nikiel, E., and Opiela, T., (2002) Customer Type and Bank Efficiency in Poland: 
Implications for Emerging Banking Market. Contemporary Economic Policy, Vol. 20, 
No. 3, pp. 255–271. 
Opiela, T., (2000) Assessing the evaluation of Polish commercial banks. National 
Bank of Poland, Paper, No. 18. 
Orea, L., and Kumbhakar, S.C., (2004) Efficiency measurement using a latent class 
stochastic frontier model. Empirical Economics, Vol. 29, No. 1, pp. 69–183. 
Ozsoz, E., (2009) Evaluating the Effects of Deposit Dollarization in Financial 
Intermediation in Transition Economies. Eastern European Economics, M.E. Sharpe, 
Inc., Vol. 47, No.4, pp. 5-24. 
Ozsoz, E., Rengifo, E., and Salvatore, D., (2010) Deposit Dollarization as an 
Investment Signal in Transition Economies: The Cases of Croatia, the Czech Republic, 
and Slovakia. Emerging Markets Finance & Trade, Vol. 46, No. 4, pp. 5–22. 
Padgett, D.K., (2004) The qualitative research experience. Wadsworth/Thomson 
Learning, Belmont, CA. 
Parker, L.D., (1994) The Case For Field Studies in Management and Accounting: 
Towards Informed Policy and Practice in Asia. Accounting and Business Review, Vol. 1, 
No. 2, pp. 211-231.  
Pasiouras, F., (2008) Estimating the technical and scale efficiency of Greek 
commercial banks: the impact of credit risk, off-balance sheet activities, and 
international operations. Research in International Business and Finance, Vol. 22, pp. 
301–318. 
Pastor, J., (1999) Efficiency and risk management in Spanish banking: a method to 
decompose risk. Applied Financial Economics, Vol. 9, pp. 371–384. 
Pastor, J., (2002) Credit risk and efficiency in the European banking system: A three-
stage analysis. Applied Financial Economics, Vol. 12, pp. 895–911. 
 237 
 
Pastor, J.M., and Serrano, L., (2006) The effect of specialization on Banks’ Efficiency: 
An International Comparison. International Review of Applied Economics, Vol. 20, No. 
1, pp. 125-149.  
Pastor, J.M., Perez, F., and Quesada, J., (1997) Efficiency Analysis in Banking Firms: 
An International Comparison. European Journal of Operational Research, Vol. 98, No. 2, 
pp. 395-407.  
Pereira, M.C., and Moreira, S., (2007) A Stochastic Frontier Analysis of Secondary 
Education Output in Portugal. Banco de Portugal, No.34. 
Pitt, M., and Lee, L.F., (1981) The Measurement and Sources of Technical Inefficiency 
in the Indonesian Weaving Industry. Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 9, pp.43- 
64. 
Poghosyan, T., and Borovicka, J., (2007) Banking efficiency in emerging economies: 
The impact of ownership endogeneity and EU accession. CERGE-EI Discussion Paper, 
No. 189, pp. 1–39. 
Poghosyan, T., and Poghosyan, A., (2010) Foreign bank entry, bank efficiency and 
market power in Central and Eastern European Countries. Economics of Transition, 
Vol.18, No.3, pp. 571-598. 
Primo, D. M., Jacobssmeier, L.M., and Milyo, J., (2007) Estimating the Impact of 
State Policies and Institutions with Mixed-Level Data. State Politics & Policy Quarterly 
Vol.7, No.4, pp. 446-459. 
Quispe-Agnoli, M., (2002) Costs and Benefits of Dollarization, Conference 
“Dollarization and Latin America: Quick Cure or Bad Medicine?” Latin American and 
Caribbean Center, Sumit of the Americas Center, Florida. 
Rajan, R., and L. Zingales, (1998) Financial Dependence and Growth. The American 
Economic Review, Vol.88, No.3, pp. 559–586.  
Rao, A., (2005) Cost frontier efficiency and risk-return analysis in an emerging 
market. International Review of Financial Analysis, Vol.14, pp. 283–30 
Reinhart, C., Rogoff, K., and Savastano, M., (2003) Addicted to dollars. National 
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series No. 10015.  
 238 
 
Reininger, T., Schardax, F., and Summer, M. (2002) Financial System Transition in 
Central Europe: The First Decade, Société Universitaire Européenne de Recherches 
Financières. 
Rennhack, R., and Nozaki, M., (2006) Financial Dollarization in Latin America. 
International Monetary Fund Working Paper, No. 7.  
Ritchie, J., and Lewis, J., (2003) Qualitative Research Practice: A Guide for Social 
Science Students and Researchers. SAGE Publications Ltd, London England. 
Roaf, J., Atoyan, R., Joshi, B., and Krogulski, K., (2014) 25 Years of Transition Post-
Communist Europe and the IMF, Regional Economic Issues, International Monetary 
Fund IMF Special Report.  
Rochon, L., and Rossi, S., (2003) Modern Theories of Money: the nature and role of 
money in capitalist economies. Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, Cheltenham, UK. 
Rogers, K., (1998) Nontraditional activities and the efficiency of US commercial 
banks. Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 22, pp. 467-482. 
Roodman, D., (2006) How to do xtabond2: An introduction to “difference” and 
“system” GMM in Stata. Center for Global Development Working Paper No. 103. 
Roodman, D., (2007) A short note on the theme of too many instruments. Centre for 
Global Development Working Paper No. 125. 
Roodman, D., (2008) A note on the theme of too many instruments. Oxford Bulleting 
of Economics and Statistics Vol. 71,  pp. 135-158. 
Roodman, D., (2009) How to do xtabond2: An introduction to difference and system 
GMM in Stata. The Stata Journal, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 86-136. 
Rose, A., and Engel, C., (2000) Currency Unions and international integration. The 
National Bureau of Economic Research NBER Working Paper, No. 7872. 
Rosenberg, C., and Tirpak, M., (2008) Determinants of Foreign Currency Borrowing 
in the New Member States of the EU,” International Monetary Fund Working Paper 
No.173.  
 239 
 
Sahay, R., and Veigh, C., (1995) Dollarization in Transition Ecoonomies. Finansije 
Vol. 50, No. 9-10, pp. 635-641.  
Sanchez, A., (2006) Financial dollarization, the portfolio approach and expectation: 
Evidence for Latin America (1995-2005). Central bank of Peru and University of Oxford 
Working Paper, No. 10. 
Sandelowksi, S., (1995) Sample size in qualitative research. Research in Nursing & 
Health, Vol. 18, No.2, pp. 179–183. 
Santos, J.A., (2000) Bank Capital Regulation in Contemporary Banking Theory: A 
Review of the Literature. Bank for International Settlements (BIS) Monetary and 
Economic Department Working Paper, No. 90. 
Sarafidis, V., Yamagata, T., and Robertson, D., (2009) A Test of Cross Section 
Dependence for a Linear Dynamic Panel Model with Regressors. Journal of 
Econometrics, Vol. 148, No. 2, pp. 149-161. 
Sargan, J.D., (1964) The maximum Likelihood Estiamtion of Economic Relationships 
with Autoregressive Residual. Econometrica, Vol. 29, pp. 414-426. 
Saunders, M., Lewis, P., and Thornhill, A., (2003) Research method for business 
students, (3rd ed.) Prentice Hall, New York New York. 
Savastano, M., (1996) Dollarization in Latin America: Recent Evidence and Some 
Policy Issues. International Monetary Fund Working Paper, No.4.  
Scheber, T., and Stix, H., (2009) Euroisation in Central Eastern and Southeastern 
Europe- new Evidence on its Extent and Some Evidence on its Causes. Osterreichische 
Nationalbank Eurosystem, Working Paper, No. 159.  
Schmidt, P., and Sickles, C.R., (1984) Production frontiers and panel data. Journal of 
Business and Economic Statistics Vol. 2, No. 4, pp. 367–374. 
Schmitt-Grohe, S., and Uribe, M., (2001) Stabilization policy and the costs of 
dollarization. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 33, No. 2, pp. 482-509.  
Schuler, K., (2005) Some Theory and History of Dollarization. Cato Journal, Vol. 25, 
No.1. 
 240 
 
Schuler, K., and Stein, R., (2000) The mack dollarization plan: An analysis. Presented 
at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Conference. Dollarization: A Common Currency 
for the Americas? 
Sealey, C., and Lindley, J., (1977) Inputs, Outputs, and a Theory of Production and 
Cost at Depository Financial Institutions, Journal of Finance, Vol. 32, pp. 1251-1266. 
Seater, J., (2008) The Demand for Currency Substitution. Economics Discussion Paper 
No. 2. 
Sena, V., (2003) The Frontier Approach to the Measurement of Productivity and 
Technical Efficiency. Working paper, University of Leeds. 
Shinichi, S., (2007) De facto dollarization and its effect on financial development and 
economic growth of Cambodia, Lao PDR and Viet Nam. Paper presented at the 
Conference: Policy Options and Challenges for Developing Asia- Perspectives from the 
International Monetary Fund and Asia. 
Silverman, D., (2005) Doing qualitative research: a practical handbook (2nd ed.). SAGE 
Publications Ltd, London England. 
Silverman, D., (2011) Qualitative Research (3rd ed.). SAGE Publications Ltd, London, 
England. 
Simar L., and Wilson P.W., (2007) Estimation and inference in two-stage, semi-
parametric models of production processes. Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 136, No. 1, 
pp. 31–64. 
Simar, L. and Wilson, P., (2007) Estimation and inference in two-stage, 
semiparametric models of production processes. Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 136 No. 
1, pp. 31-64. 
Sitx, H., (2009) Euroization: What drives its persistence? Household Data Evidence 
for Croatia, Slovenia and Slovakia. Oesterreichische Nationalbank Eurosystem Working 
Paper, No. 140. 
 241 
 
Staikouras, C., Mamatzakis, E., and Koutsomanoli-Filipaki, A., (2008) Cost 
efficiency of the banking industry in the South Eastern European region, International 
Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Vol. 18, pp. 483-497. 
Steiner, K., (2011) Households’ Exposure to Foreign Currency Loans in CESEE EU 
Member States and Croatia. In: Focus on European Economic Integration Q1/2011. 
OeNB pp. 6–24. 
Studart, R., (2001) Dollarization: “an intellectual fad or a deep insight”? Journal of 
Post Keynesian Economics, Vol. 23, No. 4, pp. 639-661. 
Sturm, J., and Williams, B., (2010) What Determines Differences in Foreign Bank 
Effciiency? Australian Evidence. Finance and Corporate Governance Conference.  
Sun, L., and Chang, T., (2011) A comprehensive analysis of the effects of risk 
measures on bank efficiency: Evidence from emerging Asian countries. Journal of 
Banking and Finance, Vol. 35, pp. 1727-1735. 
Sword, W., (1999) Accounting for the presence of self: reflections on doing 
qualitative research. Qualitative Health Research, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 270-278. 
The Central Bank of Hungary, (various years) Annual Reports and Monetary 
Surveys www.mnb.hu. 
The National Bank of Kazakhstan, (various years) Annual Reports and Monetary 
Surveys www.nationalbank.kz. 
Timmer, C., (1971) Using a probabilistic frontier production function to measure 
technical efficiency. Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 79, pp. 776-794. 
Tochkov, K., and Nenovsky, N., (2011) Institutional reforms, EU Accession, and 
Bank Efficiency in Transition Economies: Evidence from Bulgaria. Emerging Markets 
Finance & Trade, Vol. 47, No. 1, pp. 113-129. 
Tovar, C., Garcia-Escribano, M., and Martin, M.V., (2012) Credit Growth and the 
Effectiveness of Reserve Requirements and Other Macroprudential Instruments in 
Latin America. International Monetary Fund IMF Working Paper No. 142. 
 242 
 
Trochim, W. M., (2001) The research methods knowledge base (2nd ed.). Atomic Dog 
Publishing, Ohio Cincinnati. 
Trost, J.E., (1986) Statistically nonrepresentative stratified sampling: A sampling 
technique for qualitative studies. Qualitative Sociology, Vol. 9, No. 54, pp. 57. 
Van den Broeck, J., Koop, G., Osiewalski, J., and Steel, M.F.J., (1994) Stochastic 
Frontier Models: A Bayesian Perspective. Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 61, pp. 273-303. 
Vandenbussche, J., Ursula, V., and Detragiache, E., (2012) Macroprudential 
Policies and Housing Prices—A New Database and Empirical Evidence for Central, 
Eastern and Southeastern Europe. International Monetary Fund (IMF) Working Paper. 
No. 303.  
Verbeek, M., (2000) A Guide to Modern Econometrics. John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 
Chichester. 
Vieira, F.A.C., Holland, M., and Resende, M.F., (2012) Financial Dollarization and 
Systemic Risks: New Empirical Evidence. Journal of International Money and Finance, 
Vol. 13, pp. 1695-1714. 
Wachtel, P., (2001) Growth and finance: what do we know and how do we know it? 
International Finance, Vol. 4, No.3, p.353-362. 
Wang, H.J., and Schmidt, P., (2002) One-Step and Two-Step Estimation of the Effects 
of Exogenous Variables on Technical Efficiency Levels. Journal of Productivity Analysis, 
Springer, Vol. 18, No.2, pp. 129-144. 
Weill, L., (2003) Banking efficiency in transition economies: The role of Foreign 
Ownership. Economics of Transition, Vol. 11, No. 3, pp. 569-592. 
Weill, L., (2004) Measuring cost efficiency in European banking: A comparison of 
frontier techniques. Journal of Productivity Analysis, Vol. 21, pp.133–152.  
Weymoth, S., (2007) Political Institutions, Policy Instability, and Financial 
Dollarization. University of California Working Paper. 
Wheelock, D., and Wilson, P., (1995) Explaining Bank Failures: Deposit Insurance, 
Regulation, and Efficiency. Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 77, pp. 689-700. 
 243 
 
Williams, J., (2004) Determining management behaviour in European banking. 
Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 28, pp. 2427-2460. 
Windmeijer, F., (2005) A finite sample correction for the variance of linear efficient 
two-step GMM estimators. Journal of Econometrics, No. 126, pp. 25-51. 
Winkler, A., Mazzaferro, F., Nerlich, C., and Thimann, C., (2004) Official 
dollarization/euroization: motives, features and policy implications. European Central 
Bank Occasional Paper, No. 11.  
Wong, E., Fong, T., Ka-fai Li, and Choi. H., (2011) Loan-to-Value Ratio As a 
Macroprudential Tool – Hong Kong’s Experience and Cross Country Evidence”. Hong 
Kong Monetary Authority, Working Paper. 
World Bank (2015) World Development Indicators Database. 
Yildirim, H., and Philippatos, G., (2007) Efficiency of Banks Recent Evidence from 
the Transition economies of Europe. The European Joumal of Finance, Vol. 13, No. 2, 
pp. 23-143. 
Yin, R. K., (2003) Case study research: Design and method (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, 
SAGE Publications Ltd, London. 
Zettelmeyer, J., Nagy, P., and Jeffrey, S., (2010) Addressing Private Sector Currency 
Mismatches in Emerging Europe. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD) Working Paper, No. 115. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 244 
 
Appendices 
 
 
Appendix 4.1 The detailed description of the cleaning process of the database ......................... 245 
Appendix 4.2 Estimated models through BC95 controlling for euroization at country level 249 
Appendix 4.3 Estimated models through TRE05 controlling for euroization at country level252 
Appendix 4.4 Estimated models through BC95 controlling for euroization at bank level ...... 255 
Appendix 4.5 Estimated models through TRE05 controlling for euroization at bank level ... 258 
Appendix 5.1 The statement letter written in plain language ............................................................. 260 
Appendix 5.2 The informed consent form ................................................................................................... 262 
Appendix 5.3 The interview outline ............................................................................................................... 264 
Appendix 5.4 The field note template ............................................................................................................ 266 
Appendix 5.5 The complete list of themes and subthemes ................................................................... 267 
Appendix 6.1 Correlation matrix of MPIs ..................................................................................................... 269 
Appendix 6.2 Estimation of the 6.1 model and its long-run coefficients......................................... 269 
Appendix 6.3 Estimation of the 6.2a model and its long-run coefficients ...................................... 273 
Appendix 6.4 Estimation of the 6.2b model and its long-run coefficients ...................................... 276 
Appendix 6.5 The comparison of coefficients of 6.1 and 6.2a and 6.2b across FE, OLS System 
GMM estimators ...................................................................................................................................................... 279 
Appendix 6.6 Instability of the model in relation to instrumentation ............................................. 281 
Appendix 6.7 Comparison of coefficients across FE, OLS System GMM .......................................... 285 
Appendix 6.8 Testing for CFR for FE and RE ............................................................................................... 288 
Appendix 6.9 Estimated results of 6.9 RE with AR(1) ............................................................................ 293 
Appendix 6.10 Complex correlation (model 6.1 estiamted excluding deposit euroization) .. 294 
Appendix 6.11 Additional test of complex correlation (model 6.1 estimated through OLS with 
deposit euroization o nthe left hand side) ................................................................................................... 295 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 245 
 
Appendix 4.1 The detailed description of the cleaning process of the 
database 
 
1st step 
The database was cleaned in terms of status of the bank: 
1. Banks that were bankrupt from the initial periods were removed.  
There were 12 banks in total classified as bankrupt since 1997; 1998 and 2000. They 
were from Croatia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania , Russian Federation, Serbia and 
Slovenia. 
2. Banks that were dissolved from the initial periods were removed  
There were 70 banks that were dissolved in the sample. They were cleaned in 
relation to the date of dissolution. Banks that were inactive sin 1990s and early 2000s 
were removed sofinally we were left with 30 banks that were dissolved but the 
earliest data of dissolution was 2005 in two banks and 2008, 2009 and 2010 in 
others. 
3. Banks that were in liquidation were removed. 
There were 11 banks in the sample that were in liquidation: most of them since 1996, 
1997 and others since early 2000s. All of them were removed. 
4. Banks that were inactive with no precision date were removed  
There were three banks classified as inactive with no precision date which were 
removed as well. 
5. Banks that were active but with no longer active account on BankScope from 
the initial periods were removed. 
There were 78 banks that were classified as active but had no longer active accounts 
with  Bankscope. They were cleaned in terms of the last account date, 33 banks were 
finally kept in the sample. 
2nd  step 
The database was cleaned in terms of status of the specialization of the bank: 
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1. Banks classified as central banks were removed. 
There were 26 banks classified as central banks which were removed from the 
sample. 
2. Banks classified as securities firms were removed. 
There were two banks classified as securities firms which were removed 
3. Banks classified as investment trust corporations were removed 
There were 3 banks classified as investment trust corporations which were removed. 
4. Banks classified and finance leasing companies were removed 
There were 60 banks under this category that were removed. 
5. Banks classified and group finance companies were removed. 
There was one bank classified as a group finance company that was removed. 
6. Banks classified a clearing institutions and custody were removed 
There was one banks that was classified as clearing institution and custody that was 
removed. 
7. Banks classified as multilateral government banks were removed. 
There was one bank classified as multilateral government bank that was removed. 
8. Banks classified as other non-banking credit institutions were removed. 
There were three banks classified as other non-banking credit institutions that were 
removed. 
9. Banks classified as micro-finance institutions were removed. 
There were 16 banks classified as microfinance institutions; however, 12 of them 
were subsidiaries of Erste Bank; Intesa Bank and ProCredit bank which operate in 
SEE countries as commercial banks. The remaining four were micro-finance 
institutions such as Finca, etc. The above mention ones that the author know for a fact 
that operate as bank in SEEs were kept and re-classified as commercial banks. The 
remaining four were removed. 
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10. Banks classified as private banking and asset management were removed. 
There was one bank classified as private banking and asset management which was 
removed.  
3rd step 
The database was cleaned in terms of missing data. 
1. There were 12 banks from Armenia that were only listed and all of them were 
completely blank in terms of data. Thus, we had to remove them, which meant 
loosing Armenia as a country in the final sample. 
2. There were 20 banks from Azerbaijan that were only listed and all of them 
were completely blank in terms of data. Thus, we had to remove them, which 
meant loosing Azerbaijan as a country in the final sample. 
3. There were 10 banks from Georgia that were only listed and all of them were 
completely blank in terms of data. Thus, we had to remove them, which meant 
loosing Georgia as a country in the final sample. 
4. There were 26 banks from Kazakhstan that were only listed and all of them 
were completely blank in terms of data. Thus, we had to remove them, which 
meant loosing Kazakhstan as a country in the final sample. 
5. There were 3 banks from Kyrgyz Republic that were only listed and all of them 
were completely blank in terms of data. Thus, we had to remove them, which 
meant loosing Kyrgyz Republic as a country in the final sample. 
6. There were 4 banks from Tajikistan that were only listed and all of them were 
completely blank in terms of data. Thus, we had to remove them, which meant 
loosing Tajikistan as a country in the final sample. 
7. There were 2 banks from Turkmenistan that were only listed and all of them 
were completely blank in terms of data. Thus, we had to remove them, which 
meant loosing Turkmenistan as a country in the final sample. 
There were 13 banks from Uzbekistan that were only listed and all of them were 
completely blank in terms of data. Thus, we had to remove them, which meant loosing 
Uzbekistan as a country in the final sample.  
4rth step 
1. The database was carefully examined for multiple entries for the same bank.  
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2.  The unconsolidated financial reports of commercial banks were choses, since 
they give the financial data for the bank rather than the holding company.  
3. Finally it was checked the accounting standards. International Accounting 
Standards (IAS) data are used wherever available. 
4. Third, a number of dubious observations with negative values for several 
important variables such as total loans, total cost, total investment and total 
equity, that could not have been negative, were found. After a careful analysis, 
it was noted that the negative values were usually four or five observations for 
the entire variable, thus they were treated as missing observations. 
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Appendix 4.2 Estimated models through BC95 controlling for 
euroization at country level 
 
The 4.2a Battesse and Coelli 1995 model estimated controlling for 
euroization at country level in the frontier  
. sfpanel lntc lny1 lny2 lnw1 lnw2 lny1lny2 lnw1lnw2 half_lny1lny1 
half_lny2lny2 half_lnw1lnw1 half_lnw2lnw2 lny1lnw1 lny1lnw2 lny2lnw1 lny2lnw2 
gdp_c inf bsri fo hhi fe_sector  T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 T8 T9 T10 T11 T12 T13 T14, 
cost model (bc95) distribution (tnormal) vce (cluster c_name) 
 
 
Inefficiency effects model (truncated-normal)        Number of obs =      9930 
Group variable: id                                Number of groups =      1401 
Time variable: year                             Obs per group: min =         1 
                                                               avg =       7.1 
                                                               max =        14 
 
                                                     Prob > chi2   =    0.0000 
Log pseudolikelihood = -7502.0273                    Wald chi2(18)  = 641986.11 
 
                                 (Std. Err. adjusted for 18 clusters in c_name) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              |               Robust 
         lntc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Frontier      | 
         lny1 |   .3910001   .0529291     7.39   0.000      .287261    .4947392 
         lny2 |   .3028052   .0190405    15.90   0.000     .2654866    .3401238 
         lnw1 |   .8750473   .1426755     6.13   0.000     .5954084    1.154686 
         lnw2 |  -.0071694   .0384996    -0.19   0.852    -.0826273    .0682885 
     lny1lny2 |  -.0436721   .0027683   -15.78   0.000    -.0490977   -.0382464 
     lnw1lnw2 |   .0398369   .0064179     6.21   0.000     .0272581    .0524158 
half_lny1lny1 |   .0753817   .0054161    13.92   0.000     .0647663     .085997 
half_lny2lny2 |   .0337036   .0033582    10.04   0.000     .0271215    .0402856 
half_lnw1lnw1 |  -.0007644   .0096566    -0.08   0.937    -.0196909    .0181622 
half_lnw2lnw2 |  -.0360345   .0058779    -6.13   0.000    -.0475549   -.0245141 
     lny1lnw1 |   .0043347   .0128181     0.34   0.735    -.0207883    .0294577 
     lny1lnw2 |   .0132898   .0039648     3.35   0.001     .0055189    .0210607 
     lny2lnw1 |  -.0122904   .0024588    -5.00   0.000    -.0171097   -.0074712 
     lny2lnw2 |   .0084779   .0020236     4.19   0.000     .0045116    .0124441 
        gdp_c |  -.0000152   9.66e-06    -1.57   0.117    -.0000341    3.77e-06 
          inf |  -.0012518   .0025199    -0.50   0.619    -.0061907    .0036871 
         bsri |   .0744052   .0846468     0.88   0.379    -.0914994    .2403098 
           fo |   -.253709   .1405096    -1.81   0.071    -.5291028    .0216848 
          hhi |  -.0000462   .0000354    -1.30   0.193    -.0001157    .0000233 
    fe_sector |   .3541581   .1411813     2.51   0.012     .0774479    .6308684 
           T2 |   -.076047   .0842097    -0.90   0.366    -.2410949     .089001 
           T3 |  -.2465617   .1187861    -2.08   0.038    -.4793782   -.0137451 
           T4 |  -.2866108   .1322343    -2.17   0.030    -.5457853   -.0274363 
           T5 |  -.4549638   .1511165    -3.01   0.003    -.7511467   -.1587809 
           T6 |  -.4497895   .1531467    -2.94   0.003    -.7499515   -.1496274 
           T7 |  -.5243696    .156177    -3.36   0.001     -.830471   -.2182683 
           T8 |  -.5935073   .1723817    -3.44   0.001    -.9313693   -.2556452 
           T9 |  -.1742741   .1470208    -1.19   0.236    -.4624295    .1138813 
          T10 |   .0001956   .1642673     0.00   0.999    -.3217623    .3221536 
          T11 |   -.245946   .1504244    -1.64   0.102    -.5407724    .0488805 
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          T12 |  -.2658592   .1634547    -1.63   0.104    -.5862246    .0545062 
          T13 |  -.3113939   .1534303    -2.03   0.042    -.6121118   -.0106761 
          T14 |  -.3149513   .1593662    -1.98   0.048    -.6273034   -.0025992 
        _cons |    3.89871   .3762834    10.36   0.000     3.161208    4.636212 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Mu            | 
        _cons |  -.8715584   .2444152    -3.57   0.000    -1.350603   -.3925133 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Usigma        | 
        _cons |  -.3382599   .2100867    -1.61   0.107    -.7500222    .0735024 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Vsigma        | 
        _cons |  -2.058819   .1121543   -18.36   0.000    -2.278637      -1.839 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |   .8443992   .0886985     9.52   0.000     .6872817    1.037435 
     sigma_v |   .3572179   .0200318    17.83   0.000      .320037    .3987183 
      lambda |   2.363821   .0741031    31.90   0.000     2.218582    2.509061 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. estimates store BC2vce_cluster 
 
. predict BC2vce_cluster, u 
(11384 missing values generated) 
(11384 missing values generated) 
(11384 missing values generated 
 
 
The 4.2b Battesse  and Coelli 1995 model estimated controlling for 
euroization at country level in the frontier and risk variables in 
the inefficiency component 
 
. sfpanel lntc lny1 lny2 lnw1 lnw2 lny1lny2 lnw1lnw2 half_lny1lny1 
half_lny2lny2 half_lnw1lnw1 half_lnw2lnw2 lny1lnw1 lny1lnw2 lny2lnw1 lny2lnw2 
gdp_c inf bsri fo hhi fe_sector  T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 T8 T9 T10 T11 T12 T13 T14, 
cost model (bc95) usigma ( cr or mr) distribution (tnormal) vce (cluster  
c_name) 
 
Inefficiency effects model (truncated-normal)        Number of obs =      9599 
Group variable: id                                Number of groups =      1365 
Time variable: year                             Obs per group: min =         1 
                                                               avg =       7.0 
                                                               max =        14 
 
                                                     Prob > chi2   =    0.0000 
Log pseudolikelihood = -5767.5549                    Wald chi2(18)  = 146971.73 
 
                                 (Std. Err. adjusted for 18 clusters in c_name) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              |               Robust 
         lntc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Frontier      | 
         lny1 |    .903138   .0276189    32.70   0.000     .8490059    .9572701 
         lny2 |    .128333   .0313551     4.09   0.000     .0668781    .1897879 
         lnw1 |   .9524457   .1406054     6.77   0.000     .6768641    1.228027 
         lnw2 |   .0017271   .0503688     0.03   0.973    -.0969938    .1004481 
     lny1lny2 |  -.0184854   .0047641    -3.88   0.000    -.0278229   -.0091478 
     lnw1lnw2 |   .0405835    .004797     8.46   0.000     .0311815    .0499855 
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half_lny1lny1 |   .0167496   .0073563     2.28   0.023     .0023316    .0311676 
half_lny2lny2 |   .0165544   .0045017     3.68   0.000     .0077313    .0253775 
half_lnw1lnw1 |  -.0021009   .0052124    -0.40   0.687     -.012317    .0081151 
half_lnw2lnw2 |  -.0375273   .0047302    -7.93   0.000    -.0467984   -.0282563 
     lny1lnw1 |  -.0072709   .0137787    -0.53   0.598    -.0342767    .0197349 
     lny1lnw2 |   .0142382   .0046807     3.04   0.002     .0050641    .0234123 
     lny2lnw1 |  -.0054515   .0013832    -3.94   0.000    -.0081625   -.0027404 
     lny2lnw2 |   .0065916     .00133     4.96   0.000     .0039849    .0091982 
        gdp_c |  -.0000187   9.00e-06    -2.08   0.038    -.0000363   -1.06e-06 
          inf |   .0005101   .0026214     0.19   0.846    -.0046278    .0056479 
         bsri |   .1204972   .0747739     1.61   0.107    -.0260569    .2670513 
           fo |   -.366516   .1301952    -2.82   0.005     -.621694    -.111338 
          hhi |  -.0000327   .0000258    -1.27   0.205    -.0000833    .0000179 
    fe_sector |   .3346037   .1464566     2.28   0.022     .0475541    .6216533 
           T2 |   -.079673   .0733999    -1.09   0.278    -.2235341    .0641882 
           T3 |  -.1649494   .1090924    -1.51   0.131    -.3787665    .0488677 
           T4 |  -.1574187   .1262779    -1.25   0.213    -.4049189    .0900815 
           T5 |  -.2805369   .1351964    -2.08   0.038     -.545517   -.0155568 
           T6 |  -.2724505   .1546482    -1.76   0.078    -.5755554    .0306544 
           T7 |  -.3292572   .1541926    -2.14   0.033    -.6314692   -.0270452 
           T8 |  -.4039659   .1518337    -2.66   0.008    -.7015545   -.1063773 
           T9 |   .0094843   .1559012     0.06   0.951    -.2960763     .315045 
          T10 |   .1306431   .1984231     0.66   0.510     -.258259    .5195452 
          T11 |  -.1111876   .1613732    -0.69   0.491    -.4274733    .2050981 
          T12 |  -.0962737   .1648975    -0.58   0.559    -.4194669    .2269195 
          T13 |  -.1476462   .1538987    -0.96   0.337    -.4492822    .1539898 
          T14 |  -.1472379   .1600156    -0.92   0.357    -.4608628     .166387 
        _cons |   1.455669   .3109775     4.68   0.000     .8461643    2.065174 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Mu            | 
        _cons |  -.7033142   .1534879    -4.58   0.000    -1.004145   -.4024833 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Usigma        | 
           cr |   .0767311      .0215     3.57   0.000     .0345917    .1188704 
           or |  -.0297913   .0054024    -5.51   0.000    -.0403799   -.0192027 
           mr |  -.0898995   .0175523    -5.12   0.000    -.1243015   -.0554976 
        _cons |   .7727765   .2169797     3.56   0.000     .3475041    1.198049 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Vsigma        | 
        _cons |  -2.274719   .1020075   -22.30   0.000    -2.474651   -2.074788 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  E(sigma_u) |   .7967975                                 .7656801    .8279149 
     sigma_v |   .3206645   .0163551    19.61   0.000     .2901593    .3543769 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. estimates store BC4vce_cluster 
 
. predict BC4vce_cluster, u 
(11384 missing values generated) 
(11384 missing values generated) 
(11715 missing values generated) 
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Appendix 4.3 Estimated models through TRE05 controlling for 
euroization at country level 
 
The 4.2a Greene True Random Effect 2005 model estimated whilst 
controlling for euroization at country level in the frontier 
. sfpanel lntc lny1 lny2 lnw1 lnw2 lny1lny2 lnw1lnw2 half_lny1lny1 
half_lny2lny2 half_lnw1lnw1 half_lnw2lnw2 lny1lnw1 lny1lnw2 lny2lnw1 lny2lnw2 
gdp_c inf bsri fo hhi fe_sector T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 T8 T9 T10  T11 T12 T13 T14, 
cost model(tre) distribution (tnormal) nsim(50) simtype(halton) base(7)rescale 
vce (cluster c_name) 
 
True random-effects model (truncated-normal)         Number of obs =      9930 
Group variable: id                                Number of groups =      1401 
Time variable: year                             Obs per group: min =         1 
                                                               avg =       7.1 
                                                               max =        14 
 
                                                     Prob > chi2   =    0.0000 
Log simulated-likelihood = -5531.4080                Wald chi2(18)  =  9.58e+08 
 
Number of Halton Sequences = 50 
Base for Halton Sequences  = 7 
                                 (Std. Err. adjusted for 18 clusters in c_name) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              |               Robust 
         lntc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Frontier      | 
         lny1 |   .2055112   .0914091     2.25   0.025     .0263527    .3846698 
         lny2 |   .3430688   .0398161     8.62   0.000     .2650307    .4211068 
         lnw1 |   .8602045   .1158101     7.43   0.000     .6332209    1.087188 
         lnw2 |   -.070458   .0368523    -1.91   0.056    -.1426872    .0017712 
     lny1lny2 |   -.045037   .0051009    -8.83   0.000    -.0550346   -.0350394 
     lnw1lnw2 |   .0310633   .0066508     4.67   0.000      .018028    .0440987 
half_lny1lny1 |   .0848906   .0073069    11.62   0.000     .0705693    .0992118 
half_lny2lny2 |   .0311675   .0029162    10.69   0.000     .0254519    .0368832 
half_lnw1lnw1 |   .0004342   .0095975     0.05   0.964    -.0183766     .019245 
half_lnw2lnw2 |  -.0292681   .0075364    -3.88   0.000    -.0440391    -.014497 
     lny1lnw1 |  -.0063512   .0087672    -0.72   0.469    -.0235345    .0108321 
     lny1lnw2 |   .0188657    .003766     5.01   0.000     .0114845    .0262469 
     lny2lnw1 |   -.007974   .0019161    -4.16   0.000    -.0117295   -.0042184 
     lny2lnw2 |   .0059133   .0025737     2.30   0.022     .0008689    .0109577 
        gdp_c |  -.0000152   .0000132    -1.15   0.248     -.000041    .0000106 
          inf |   .0013827   .0012413     1.11   0.265    -.0010501    .0038155 
         bsri |   .2250184   .0667006     3.37   0.001     .0942877    .3557491 
           fo |  -.0092213    .129266    -0.07   0.943     -.262578    .2441353 
          hhi |  -5.37e-06   .0000148    -0.36   0.718    -.0000345    .0000237 
    fe_sector |   .5558098    .127669     4.35   0.000     .3055832    .8060365 
           T2 |  -.0567754   .0554476    -1.02   0.306    -.1654506    .0518998 
           T3 |  -.1967589   .0977235    -2.01   0.044    -.3882933   -.0052244 
           T4 |  -.2019765    .097716    -2.07   0.039    -.3934963   -.0104566 
           T5 |  -.2623084   .1062856    -2.47   0.014    -.4706245   -.0539924 
           T6 |  -.3330621   .1175306    -2.83   0.005    -.5634179   -.1027062 
           T7 |  -.3882945   .1386065    -2.80   0.005    -.6599582   -.1166308 
           T8 |  -.4360177   .1725506    -2.53   0.012    -.7742107   -.0978248 
           T9 |   -.178055   .1542632    -1.15   0.248    -.4804053    .1242954 
          T10 |   .0016111   .1404229     0.01   0.991    -.2736128    .2768349 
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          T11 |  -.1763488   .1357693    -1.30   0.194    -.4424517    .0897541 
          T12 |  -.1207019   .1534536    -0.79   0.432    -.4214653    .1800615 
          T13 |  -.1576515   .1487677    -1.06   0.289    -.4492309    .1339279 
          T14 |  -.1710949   .1569092    -1.09   0.276    -.4786314    .1364415 
        _cons |   4.083293    .656625     6.22   0.000     2.796332    5.370254 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Mu            | 
        _cons |  -394.4695   .0813083 -4851.53   0.000    -394.6288   -394.3101 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Usigma        | 
        _cons |   4.723153    .000495  9541.54   0.000     4.722182    4.724123 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Vsigma        | 
        _cons |  -2.848134   .2382161   -11.96   0.000    -3.315029    -2.38124 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Theta         | 
        _cons |   .4614715   .0142132    32.47   0.000     .4336141    .4893289 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |   10.60766   .0026254  4040.33   0.000     10.60251    10.61281 
     sigma_v |   .2407329   .0286732     8.40   0.000     .1906121    .3040328 
      lambda |   44.06402   .0286187  1539.70   0.000     44.00793    44.12011 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. estimates store TRE2 
 
. predict TRE2, u 
(11384 missing values generated) 
(11384 missing values generated) 
(11384 missing values generated) 
 
. predict TRE2o, u0 
(11384 missing values generated) 
(11384 missing values generated) 
 
The 4.2b Greene True Random Effect 2005 model estimated whilst 
controlling for euroization at country in the frontier and risk 
variables in the inefficiency component 
. . sfpanel lntc lny1 lny2 lnw1 lnw2 lny1lny2 lnw1lnw2 half_lny1lny1 
half_lny2lny2 half_lnw1lnw1 half_lnw2lnw2 lny1lnw1 lny1lnw2 lny2lnw1 lny2lnw2 
gdp_c inf bsri fo hhi fe_sector T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 T8 T9 T10  T11 T12 T13 T14, 
cost model(tre) distribution (tnormal) usigma (cr or mr) nsim(50) 
simtype(halton) base(7) rescale vce (cluster c_name) 
 
True random-effects model (truncated-normal)         Number of obs =      9599 
Group variable: id                                Number of groups =      1365 
Time variable: year                             Obs per group: min =         1 
                                                               avg =       7.0 
                                                               max =        14 
 
                                                     Prob > chi2   =    0.0000 
Log simulated-likelihood = -4110.6550                Wald chi2(17)  = 151618.03 
 
Number of Halton Sequences = 50 
Base for Halton Sequences  = 7 
                                 (Std. Err. adjusted for 18 clusters in c_name) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              |               Robust 
         lntc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
 254 
 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Frontier      | 
         lny1 |   .8369324   .0572305    14.62   0.000     .7247627    .9491021 
         lny2 |   .1318219   .0196986     6.69   0.000     .0932134    .1704303 
         lnw1 |   .9792558   .1298452     7.54   0.000     .7247638    1.233748 
         lnw2 |  -.0524378   .0373238    -1.40   0.160     -.125591    .0207155 
     lny1lny2 |  -.0165945   .0024045    -6.90   0.000    -.0213073   -.0118817 
     lnw1lnw2 |   .0294636   .0053416     5.52   0.000     .0189942     .039933 
half_lny1lny1 |   .0166495   .0034746     4.79   0.000     .0098394    .0234596 
half_lny2lny2 |   .0133957   .0015953     8.40   0.000      .010269    .0165224 
half_lnw1lnw1 |    .002729   .0077948     0.35   0.726    -.0125485    .0180065 
half_lnw2lnw2 |  -.0282318   .0050478    -5.59   0.000    -.0381253   -.0183383 
     lny1lnw1 |  -.0194347   .0092811    -2.09   0.036    -.0376253   -.0012441 
     lny1lnw2 |   .0166689   .0041969     3.97   0.000     .0084431    .0248947 
     lny2lnw1 |  -.0025712   .0011468    -2.24   0.025     -.004819   -.0003234 
     lny2lnw2 |   .0058549   .0018214     3.21   0.001      .002285    .0094248 
        gdp_c |  -.0000167    .000011    -1.52   0.129    -.0000384    4.88e-06 
          inf |   .0018126   .0013463     1.35   0.178    -.0008262    .0044514 
         bsri |   .2232963   .0605022     3.69   0.000     .1047141    .3418784 
           fo |  -.1395216   .1040996    -1.34   0.180     -.343553    .0645098 
          hhi |  -6.52e-06   .0000128    -0.51   0.611    -.0000316    .0000186 
    fe_sector |   .5017104   .1097588     4.57   0.000     .2865871    .7168338 
           T2 |  -.0691453   .0541889    -1.28   0.202    -.1753535    .0370629 
           T3 |  -.1644573   .0774409    -2.12   0.034    -.3162388   -.0126759 
           T4 |  -.1833601   .0821241    -2.23   0.026    -.3443204   -.0223999 
           T5 |  -.2165509   .0799451    -2.71   0.007    -.3732405   -.0598614 
           T6 |  -.2720211   .0890252    -3.06   0.002    -.4465072   -.0975349 
           T7 |  -.3372157   .0999419    -3.37   0.001    -.5330982   -.1413331 
           T8 |  -.3990571   .1250124    -3.19   0.001    -.6440769   -.1540372 
           T9 |  -.1195289   .1128403    -1.06   0.289    -.3406918    .1016341 
          T10 |   .0519379   .1285141     0.40   0.686    -.1999452     .303821 
          T11 |  -.1574119   .1013945    -1.55   0.121    -.3561414    .0413177 
          T12 |  -.1131761   .1138549    -0.99   0.320    -.3363277    .1099754 
          T13 |  -.1574578   .1066807    -1.48   0.140    -.3665481    .0516324 
          T14 |  -.1560853   .1123093    -1.39   0.165    -.3762075     .064037 
        _cons |   1.245488    .522057     2.39   0.017     .2222754    2.268701 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Mu            | 
        _cons |  -.2741843   .0782121    -3.51   0.000    -.4274771   -.1208915 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Usigma        | 
           cr |   .0447461   .0045907     9.75   0.000     .0357485    .0537436 
           or |  -.0652411   .0027336   -23.87   0.000    -.0705988   -.0598833 
           mr |  -.0084039   .0211985    -0.40   0.692    -.0499522    .0331444 
        _cons |   1.213783   .0625754    19.40   0.000     1.091138    1.336428 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Vsigma        | 
        _cons |  -2.798343   .1951946   -14.34   0.000    -3.180918   -2.415769 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Theta         | 
        _cons |   .3656624   .0195194    18.73   0.000     .3274052    .4039197 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  E(sigma_u) |   .4601938                                 .4479133    .4724743 
     sigma_v |   .2468013   .0240871    10.25   0.000     .2038321    .2988288 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. estimates store TRE3 
 
. predict TRE3, u 
(11384 missing values generated) 
(11715 missing values generated) 
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(11715 missing values generated) 
 
. predict TRE3o, u0 
(11384 missing values generated) 
(11716 missing values generated) 
 
Appendix 4.4 Estimated models through BC95 controlling for 
euroization at bank level 
 
The 4.2a Battesse  and Coelli 1995 model estimated controlling for 
euroization at bank level in the inefficiency component 
. . sfpanel lntc lny1 lny2 lnw1 lnw2 lny1lny2 lnw1lnw2 half_lny1lny1 
half_lny2lny2 half_lnw1lnw1 half_lnw2lnw2 lny1lnw1 lny1lnw2 lny2lnw1 lny2lnw2 
gdp_c inf bsri fo hhi  t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 t8 t9 t10 t11 t12 t13 t14, cost model 
(bc95) usigma (fe_bank) distribution (tnormal) vce (cluster c_name) 
 
Inefficiency effects model (truncated-normal)        Number of obs =      1001 
Group variable: id                                Number of groups =       119 
Time variable: year                             Obs per group: min =         1 
                                                               avg =       8.4 
                                                               max =        14 
 
                                                     Prob > chi2   =    0.0000 
Log pseudolikelihood =  -238.4960                    Wald chi2(7)  =    416.57 
 
                                  (Std. Err. adjusted for 7 clusters in c_name) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              |               Robust 
         lntc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Frontier      | 
         lny1 |   .2430892   .5939358     0.41   0.682    -.9210036    1.407182 
         lny2 |   .4793007   .2580966     1.86   0.063    -.0265592    .9851607 
         lnw1 |    1.36185   .4655118     2.93   0.003     .4494636    2.274236 
         lnw2 |  -.1466858   .6526763    -0.22   0.822    -1.425908    1.132536 
     lny1lny2 |  -.0567303   .0268405    -2.11   0.035    -.1093367   -.0041239 
     lnw1lnw2 |   .2008896   .0515088     3.90   0.000     .0999342     .301845 
half_lny1lny1 |   .0845435   .0621879     1.36   0.174    -.0373425    .2064295 
half_lny2lny2 |   .0425756   .0158968     2.68   0.007     .0114184    .0737327 
half_lnw1lnw1 |   -.162898   .0678834    -2.40   0.016    -.2959469    -.029849 
half_lnw2lnw2 |  -.1412977   .0941896    -1.50   0.134    -.3259059    .0433105 
     lny1lnw1 |  -.0621021   .0503224    -1.23   0.217    -.1607322    .0365279 
     lny1lnw2 |   .0468212    .062066     0.75   0.451     -.074826    .1684684 
     lny2lnw1 |   .0001348   .0199111     0.01   0.995    -.0388901    .0391598 
     lny2lnw2 |   .0145064   .0308286     0.47   0.638    -.0459167    .0749294 
        gdp_c |  -9.36e-06   4.72e-06    -1.98   0.047    -.0000186   -1.05e-07 
          inf |   .0132871   .0060166     2.21   0.027     .0014948    .0250793 
         bsri |  -.1852572   .0744509    -2.49   0.013    -.3311783    -.039336 
           fo |   .5091341    .117488     4.33   0.000     .2788618    .7394065 
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          hhi |  -.0000248   .0000372    -0.67   0.505    -.0000977    .0000481 
           t2 |   .1509387   .0745066     2.03   0.043     .0049085    .2969689 
           t3 |  -.0878126   .0908119    -0.97   0.334    -.2658006    .0901754 
           t4 |  -.2639472   .1610892    -1.64   0.101    -.5796763    .0517818 
           t5 |  -.3130585   .1250977    -2.50   0.012    -.5582454   -.0678716 
           t6 |  -.3253451   .1315458    -2.47   0.013      -.58317   -.0675201 
           t7 |  -.3013848   .1292617    -2.33   0.020    -.5547331   -.0480364 
           t8 |  -.3219744   .1403192    -2.29   0.022     -.596995   -.0469538 
           t9 |  -.3287885   .1517937    -2.17   0.030    -.6262987   -.0312784 
          t10 |  -.3097805   .1227687    -2.52   0.012    -.5504027   -.0691584 
          t11 |  -.3571616   .1425242    -2.51   0.012    -.6365039   -.0778192 
          t12 |  -.4539718   .1816916    -2.50   0.012    -.8100807   -.0978628 
          t13 |  -.4551972   .1753042    -2.60   0.009    -.7987871   -.1116073 
          t14 |  -.4736404   .2075792    -2.28   0.023    -.8804881   -.0667927 
        _cons |   4.915675   3.054683     1.61   0.108    -1.071394    10.90274 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Mu            | 
        _cons |  -.6634376          .        .       .            .           . 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Usigma        | 
      fe_bank |  -.2517109    .460287    -0.55   0.584    -1.153857     .650435 
        _cons |  -1.290893   .3350792    -3.85   0.000    -1.947636   -.6341503 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Vsigma        | 
        _cons |   -2.92173   .3885121    -7.52   0.000      -3.6832   -2.160261 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  E(sigma_u) |   .4899491                                 .4889747    .4909234 
     sigma_v |   .2320354   .0450743     5.15   0.000     .1585635    .3395513 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. estimates store bc6 
 
. predict bc6, u 
(688 missing values generated) 
(688 missing values generated) 
(763 missing values generated) 
 
The 4.2b Battesse  and Coelli 1995 model estimated controlling for 
euroization at bank level and risk variables in the inefficiency 
component 
. sfpanel lntc lny1 lny2 lnw1 lnw2 lny1lny2 lnw1lnw2 half_lny1lny1 
half_lny2lny2 half_lnw1lnw1 half_lnw2lnw2 lny1lnw1 lny1lnw2 lny2lnw1 lny2lnw2 
gdp_c inf bsri fo hhi  t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 t8 t9 t10 t11 t12 t13 t14, cost model 
(bc95) usigma (fe_bank cr or) distribution (tnormal) vce (cluster c_name) 
 
Inefficiency effects model (truncated-normal)        Number of obs =       971 
Group variable: id                                Number of groups =       118 
Time variable: year                             Obs per group: min =         1 
                                                               avg =       8.2 
                                                               max =        14 
 
                                                     Prob > chi2   =    0.0000 
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Log pseudolikelihood =  -191.9113                    Wald chi2(7)  =    535.72 
 
                                  (Std. Err. adjusted for 7 clusters in c_name) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              |               Robust 
         lntc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Frontier      | 
         lny1 |   .7783362   .5093222     1.53   0.126     -.219917    1.776589 
         lny2 |   .2476129   .1904684     1.30   0.194    -.1256983    .6209241 
         lnw1 |   1.394737    .415274     3.36   0.001     .5808152    2.208659 
         lnw2 |  -.3309803   .5033993    -0.66   0.511    -1.317625    .6556642 
     lny1lny2 |  -.0338121   .0227811    -1.48   0.138    -.0784623     .010838 
     lnw1lnw2 |   .2242307   .0375093     5.98   0.000     .1507138    .2977475 
half_lny1lny1 |   .0261478    .050472     0.52   0.604    -.0727754    .1250711 
half_lny2lny2 |   .0361562    .014876     2.43   0.015     .0069997    .0653127 
half_lnw1lnw1 |  -.2131058    .045181    -4.72   0.000    -.3016589   -.1245526 
half_lnw2lnw2 |   -.147434   .0838373    -1.76   0.079    -.3117521     .016884 
     lny1lnw1 |  -.0820603   .0440997    -1.86   0.063    -.1684941    .0043735 
     lny1lnw2 |   .0788359   .0481511     1.64   0.102    -.0155384    .1732103 
     lny2lnw1 |   .0103893   .0213196     0.49   0.626    -.0313963     .052175 
     lny2lnw2 |   .0005763   .0280747     0.02   0.984     -.054449    .0556017 
        gdp_c |  -9.33e-06   5.82e-06    -1.60   0.109    -.0000207    2.07e-06 
          inf |   .0094575   .0065838     1.44   0.151    -.0034465    .0223616 
         bsri |  -.1692893   .0646901    -2.62   0.009    -.2960796    -.042499 
           fo |   .5043783   .1245512     4.05   0.000     .2602624    .7484942 
          hhi |  -.0000298   .0000415    -0.72   0.473    -.0001111    .0000515 
           t2 |    .235196   .0950446     2.47   0.013      .048912      .42148 
           t3 |   .0208344   .0821894     0.25   0.800    -.1402539    .1819226 
           t4 |   -.180786   .1177166    -1.54   0.125    -.4115063    .0499344 
           t5 |   -.229511   .0905145    -2.54   0.011    -.4069162   -.0521059 
           t6 |  -.2299933   .1001691    -2.30   0.022     -.426321   -.0336656 
           t7 |  -.1966565   .1050687    -1.87   0.061    -.4025874    .0092744 
           t8 |  -.2209951   .1167481    -1.89   0.058    -.4498172     .007827 
           t9 |  -.2149839   .1398816    -1.54   0.124    -.4891467     .059179 
          t10 |  -.2280973   .0944194    -2.42   0.016    -.4131559   -.0430386 
          t11 |  -.2795924    .108081    -2.59   0.010    -.4914272   -.0677576 
          t12 |  -.3665696   .1463978    -2.50   0.012    -.6535039   -.0796352 
          t13 |  -.3782687   .1361375    -2.78   0.005    -.6450933   -.1114441 
          t14 |  -.4041463   .1702228    -2.37   0.018    -.7377769   -.0705157 
        _cons |    2.40441   2.981185     0.81   0.420    -3.438606    8.247426 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Mu            | 
        _cons |   -2.18537   .2608992    -8.38   0.000    -2.696724   -1.674017 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Usigma        | 
      fe_bank |   .1295541   .3490257     0.37   0.710    -.5545236    .8136318 
           cr |   .0089296   .0179406     0.50   0.619    -.0262333    .0440925 
           or |  -.0021865   .0084562    -0.26   0.796    -.0187604    .0143874 
        _cons |  -.4458687   .7610189    -0.59   0.558    -1.937438    1.045701 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Vsigma        | 
        _cons |  -3.191566   .2768205   -11.53   0.000    -3.734124   -2.649007 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
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  E(sigma_u) |   .8054521                                 .8030877    .8078164 
     sigma_v |   .2027498   .0280626     7.22   0.000     .1545772    .2659349 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
. estimates store bc7 
 
. predict bc7, u 
(688 missing values generated) 
(688 missing values generated) 
 
 
Appendix 4.5 Estimated models through TRE05 controlling for 
euroization at bank level 
 
The 4.2a Greene True Random Effect 2005 model estimated whilst controlling for 
euroization at bank level in the inefficiency component  
. sfpanel lntc lny1 lny2 lnw1 lnw2 lny1lny2 lnw1lnw2 half_lny1lny1 
half_lny2lny2 half_lnw1lnw1 half_lnw2lnw2 lny1lnw1 lny1lnw2 lny2lnw1 lny2lnw2 
gdp_c inf bsri fo hhi  t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 t8 t9 t10 t11 t12 t13 t14, cost 
model(tre) distribution (tnormal) usigma (fe_bank) nsim(50) simtype (halton) 
base(7)rescale vce (cluster c_name) 
 
 
True random-effects model (truncated-normal)         Number of obs =      1001 
Group variable: id                                Number of groups =       119 
Time variable: year                             Obs per group: min =         1 
                                                               avg =       8.4 
                                                               max =        14 
 
                                                     Prob > chi2   =    0.0000 
Log simulated-likelihood =   -34.6472                Wald chi2(7)  =   8043.17 
 
Number of Halton Sequences = 50 
Base for Halton Sequences  = 7 
                                  (Std. Err. adjusted for 7 clusters in c_name) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              |               Robust 
         lntc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Frontier      | 
         lny1 |    .166386   .0996047     1.67   0.095    -.0288356    .3616075 
         lny2 |   .4802405   .0131251    36.59   0.000     .4545158    .5059652 
         lnw1 |   1.164188          .        .       .            .           . 
         lnw2 |   -.123213          .        .       .            .           . 
     lny1lny2 |  -.0515825   .0158332    -3.26   0.001     -.082615     -.02055 
     lnw1lnw2 |   .1551022          .        .       .            .           . 
half_lny1lny1 |   .0767426   .0223597     3.43   0.001     .0329185    .1205668 
half_lny2lny2 |   .0326046          .        .       .            .           . 
half_lnw1lnw1 |  -.1300481          .        .       .            .           . 
half_lnw2lnw2 |  -.1235042   .0316573    -3.90   0.000    -.1855515    -.061457 
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     lny1lnw1 |  -.0604149    .015027    -4.02   0.000    -.0898672   -.0309626 
     lny1lnw2 |   .0373369   .0322417     1.16   0.247    -.0258557    .1005296 
     lny2lnw1 |   .0015724   .0122387     0.13   0.898     -.022415    .0255598 
     lny2lnw2 |   .0151529   .0412581     0.37   0.713    -.0657115    .0960174 
        gdp_c |  -.0000181   6.07e-06    -2.98   0.003      -.00003   -6.21e-06 
          inf |   .0100323   .0058304     1.72   0.085     -.001395    .0214596 
         bsri |   .0084606   .1040682     0.08   0.935    -.1955093    .2124305 
           fo |   .0049357   .2371412     0.02   0.983    -.4598526     .469724 
          hhi |   .0000515   .0000512     1.00   0.315    -.0000489    .0001519 
           t2 |   .1397391   .2086268     0.67   0.503    -.2691619    .5486402 
           t3 |    .028855   .2760211     0.10   0.917    -.5121364    .5698464 
           t4 |  -.0371208   .3157008    -0.12   0.906    -.6558829    .5816413 
           t5 |  -.0526343   .2885519    -0.18   0.855    -.6181857    .5129171 
           t6 |  -.0204248    .312836    -0.07   0.948    -.6335722    .5927225 
           t7 |   .0519046   .2913644     0.18   0.859    -.5191591    .6229683 
           t8 |   .1022181   .3106515     0.33   0.742    -.5066477    .7110839 
           t9 |   .0813182   .3346422     0.24   0.808    -.5745684    .7372048 
          t10 |   .1006004   .2883775     0.35   0.727    -.4646091      .66581 
          t11 |    .040587   .3125576     0.13   0.897    -.5720147    .6531887 
          t12 |   .0455695   .3676301     0.12   0.901    -.6749722    .7661112 
          t13 |   .0376102    .358486     0.10   0.916    -.6650094    .7402298 
          t14 |   .0286283    .395572     0.07   0.942    -.7466785    .8039351 
        _cons |   5.093802          .        .       .            .           . 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Mu            | 
        _cons |  -74.51911   37.63674    -1.98   0.048    -148.2858   -.7524564 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Usigma        | 
      fe_bank |   .6029396   .7621067     0.79   0.429    -.8907622    2.096641 
        _cons |   2.212328   .8578673     2.58   0.010     .5309384    3.893717 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Vsigma        | 
        _cons |  -3.911606   .3648591   -10.72   0.000    -4.626717   -3.196496 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Theta         | 
        _cons |    .302202   .0491728     6.15   0.000     .2058251    .3985789 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  E(sigma_u) |   3.572025                                 3.555565    3.588485 
     sigma_v |   .1414508   .0258048     5.48   0.000     .0989284    .2022506 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  estimates store tre4 
 
. predict tre4, u 
(688 missing values generated) 
(763 missing values generated) 
(763 missing values generated) 
 
. predict tre4o, u0 
(688 missing values generated) 
(763 missing values generated 
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Appendix 5.1 The statement letter written in plain language   
 
Business School 
Staffordshire University  
Plain Language Statement for persons participating in the research project 
PROJECT TITLE:  
Euroization and its impact on bank efficiency in transition economies: with special 
reference to South-East European countries 
Albulena Xhelili, 
 PhD Candidate 
Researcher Business School, Staffordshire University  
Leek Road, Stoke on Trent ST4 2DF 
United Kingdom 
e: A.Xhelili@staffs.ac.uk 
Prof. Dr. Iraj Hashi, Supervisor Business School, Staffordshire University  
Leek Road, Stoke on Trent ST4 2DF 
United Kingdom 
e: I.Hashi@staffs.ac.uk  
Prof. Jean Mangan, Supervisor Business School, Staffordshire University  
Leek Road, Stoke on Trent ST4 2DF 
United Kingdom 
e: J.T.Mangan@staffs.ac.uk 
Dr. Valentin Toci, Supervisor Faculty of Economy, University of Prishtina 
Rr. Agim Ramadani Prishtina, 10000,Kosovo 
e: V.Toci@staffs.ac.uk 
 
Introduction 
As someone who has experience in the field of interest for this research, we would 
like to invite you to participate in our research project. The aim of this research is to 
investigate the impact of euroization on bank efficiency in European transition 
economies, with special reference to South-East European countries. The research is 
undertaken in partial fulfilment of the requirements of Staffordshire University for 
the award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. The project has been approved by 
the Research Ethics Committee.  
What will I be asked to do? 
Should you agree to participate, you would be asked to contribute in the following 
manner. We would ask you to participate in an interview of about 45 minutes, and 
with your permission, the interview would be recorded so that we can make an 
accurate record of what you say.  When the recording has been transcribed, you 
would be provided with a copy of the transcript, so that you can verify that the 
information is correct and/or request deletions.  We estimate that the total time 
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commitment required of you would not exceed 60 minutes.  Please note, you will not 
be asked for any data, the disscusion will be strictly about policies and procedures. 
How will my confidentiality be protected? 
We intend to protect your anonymity and the confidentiality of your responses to the 
fullest possible extent, within the limits of the law.  Your name and contact details and 
the name of the institution you represent will be kept in a separate, password-
protected computer file from any data that you supply. This will only be able to be 
linked to your responses by the researchers, for example, in order to know where we 
should send your interview transcript for checking.  In the final report, you will be 
referred to by a pseudonym. We will remove any references to personal information 
that might allow someone to guess your identity. The data will be kept securely for 
five years from the date of graduation, before being destroyed. 
How will I receive feedback? 
Once the thesis arising from this research has been completed, a brief summary of the 
findings will be available to you, upon request.  It is also possible that the results will 
be presented at academic conferences.   
Do I have to take part? 
Participation in this study is voluntary.  Should you wish to withdraw at any stage, or 
to withdraw any unprocessed data you have supplied, you are free to do so without 
prejudice.  
Where can I get further information? 
Please contact the researchers if you have any questions or if would like more 
information about the project.  The email address is A.Xhelili@staffs.ac.uk and the 
contact telephone number is: +377 44110873. 
If you have any concerns about the conduct of the project which you do not wish to 
discuss with the researcher please contact the above mentioned research 
supervisors. 
How do I agree to participate? 
If you would agree to participate, please indicate that you have read and understood 
this information by signing the consent form and returning it in the envelope 
provided.  The researcher will then contact you to arrange a mutually convenient 
time for you to complete the interview. 
 
 
 262 
 
Appendix 5.2 The informed consent form 
 
Business School 
Staffordshire University  
Consent form for persons participating in the research project  
 
PROJECT TITLE:  
Euroization and its impact on bank efficiency in transition economies: with special 
reference to South-East European countries 
 
Name of participant: 
Name of researcher(s): 
 
1. I consent to participate in this research, the details of which have been explained to 
me, and I have been provided with a written plain language statement to keep. 
 
2.  I understand that after I sign and return this consent form, the researcher will retain 
it. 
 
3. I understand that my participation will involve an interview and I agree that the 
researcher may use the results as described in the plain language statement.  
 
4. I acknowledge that: 
 
(a) the possible effects of participating in the interview have been explained to my 
satisfaction; 
 
(b) I have been informed that I am free to withdraw from the project at any time 
without explanation or prejudice; 
 
(c) the project is for the purpose of research; 
 
(d) I have been informed that the confidentiality of the information I provide will be 
safeguarded subject to any legal requirements; 
 
(e) I have been informed that with my consent the interview will be audio-taped and 
I understand that audio-tapes will be stored in secure place with the researcher and 
will be destroyed after five years;  
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(f) my name and the name of the institution I represent will be referred to by a 
pseudonym and the identity will be disguised in any publications arising from the 
research; 
 
(g) I have been informed that a copy of the research findings will be forwarded to me, 
should I agree to this. 
 
I consent to this interview being audio-taped           □ yes   
□ no 
(please tick) 
I wish to receive a copy of the summary project report on research findings       □ yes    
□ no 
(please tick) 
 
Participant signature: Date: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 264 
 
Appendix 5.3 The interview outline 
 
 
Business School 
Staffordshire University  
Interview outline for persons participating in the research project 
PROJECT TITLE:  
Euroization and its impact on bank efficiency in transition economies: with special 
reference to South-East European countries 
Abbreviations 
FC – Foreign Currency 
DC - Domestic Currency  
 
Questions 
1. Do you have FC loans or loans that are indexed to or linked in someway to FC (or 
Inflation)? If YES, do you treat the linked loans as FC loans?and WHY? 
□ yes   □ no 
(please tick) 
2. Does the bank have a strategy regarding FC loans and deposits? If NO, then how does 
the bank deal with the FC loans and deposits? If YES, is this strategy established 
within the group/headquarter or within branch/subsidiary? 
□ yes   □ no 
(please tick) 
 
If within the group: 
 
3. Is the FC strategy tailored to specific group member conditions? If YES, how does your 
bank’s strategy differ from the group’s? If NO, does the negotiation process depend on 
your banks size within the group? 
□ yes   □ no 
(please tick) 
4. Does the group impose quotas or hard number limits for FC and FC linked lending? If, 
YES what are they and how often they change? 
□ yes   □ no 
(please tick) 
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If within the bank: 
5. How does your bank’s strategy differ from the group’s? Do you have entirely different 
procedures? Do you offer different conditions in comparison with the group? Do you 
have different limits in comparison with the group?   
6. Why do you lend in FC? Do you lend in FC because you have FC deposits and want to 
hedge; or because FC loans are more profitable; or because there is a higher demand 
for FC loans? 
□ Hedge, FC deposits   
□ FC loans, higher returns    
□ Demand for FC loans  
                              (please tick and rank which is more important) 
 
7. Do your banks’ credit standards and conditions differ for FC loans/deposits versus DC 
loans/deposits? What about the FC linked loans/deposits to FC loans/deposits?and if 
YES, for which category are there more favorable? 
□ yes   □ no 
(please tick) 
□ FC loans more favorable    
□ FC indexed more favorable  
□ DC loans more favorable 
(please tick) 
 
8. How is the favored category treated? Do you offer only lower interest rates for those 
loans or also have more relaxed credit standarts and conditions for them? Eg.  require 
less colateral.  
 
9. Can you tell us more regarding the performance of FC loans?Do they perform better 
than DC loans? What about FC linked loans, in comparison to FC loans or DC loans? 
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Appendix 5.4 The field note template 
 
Business School 
Staffordshire University  
Field note  
PROJECT TITLE:  
Euroization and its impact on bank efficiency in transition economies: with special 
reference to South-East European countries 
Background information 
Date: 
Name: 
Position within the bank: 
 
Impressions from the contact: 
 
 
The main issues or themes that struck you in this contact: 
 
 
Concerns: 
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Appendix 5.5 The complete list of themes and subthemes 
 
g) FC Strategy  
i. Yes 
i. Where established and why? 
1. Within the group; 
a. Tailored to countries? 
i. How different from your country? 
2. Same for every country? 
a. How much say you have in it? 
3. Does you group impose FC quotas or limits? 
a. Yes 
i. What are they and how often they change? 
b. No 
4. Within the bank: 
a. How different from the group 
i. Do you have FC quotas or limits 
1. Yes  
a. What are they and how often they 
change? 
2. No 
ii. No 
i. How do you deal with FC loans 
iii. Factors influencing the FC strategy 
i. Business focus of the group vs bank 
ii. Size of the bank within the group 
iii. Previous experience with regard to FC risk 
h) Instruments employed to address the FC risks 
iii. Limits 
i. Yes  
1. Set at the group 
2. Set at the bank 
ii. No 
iv. Credit standards and procedures 
i. Different treatment of FC loans 
ii. Currency mismatch  
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i) Drivers of FC lending: 
iv. Hedging 
i. FC deposits 
v. Higher returns 
i. Higher profit margin 
ii. Cheaper funding 
vi. Demand 
i. Currency stability 
ii. Higher return 
 
j) FC indexed lending 
i. Yes  
i. Different treatment vs FC and DC? 
1. Which category is more favourable for the clients? 
ii. No 
k) Performance of FC loans  
i. Yes  
ii. No  
l) Encouragement of DC lending 
i. Yes  
i. Through base rate 
ii. Through reserve requirements on FC funds 
iii. Different RWA for FC assets 
ii. No 
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Appendix 6.1 Correlation matrix of MPIs  
 
Correlation between the Macroprudential Policy Instruments 
. cor FC_lim FCop_lim FC_LTV  FC_DTI FC_RR FC_RWA 
(obs=175) 
 
             |   FC_lim FCop_lim   FC_LTV   FC_DTI    FC_RR   FC_RWA 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------ 
      FC_lim |   1.0000 
    FCop_lim |   0.1432   1.0000 
      FC_LTV |   0.1694  -0.2649   1.0000 
      FC_DTI |   0.3165  -0.0778   0.5742   1.0000 
       FC_RR |   0.1799   0.4015  -0.1929   0.0847   1.0000 
      FC_RWA |   0.2614   0.1233   0.3032   0.2965   0.3511   1.0000 
 
 
 
Appendix 6.2 Estimation of the 6.1 model and its long-run 
coefficients 
 
Model 6.1 estimated through system GMM, whilst treating all independent 
variables exogenous 
. xtabond2 Credit_FE lagCredit_FE Deposit_FE IntRate_diff Inf_vol ERR_vol BSRI 
FO  FC_lim FCop_lim FC_LTV FC_RWA d_2008 d_2009 d_2010 d_2011 d_2012 d_2013, 
gmm (lagCredit_FE, collapse lag (2 3)) iv (Deposit_FE IntRate_diff Inf_vol 
ERR_vol BSRI FO FC_lim FCop_lim FC_LTV FC_RWA d_2008 d_2009 d_2010 d_2011 
d_2012 d_2013) small two orthog robust 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: C_Id                            Number of obs      =       173 
Time variable : Year                            Number of groups   =        25 
Number of instruments = 20                      Obs per group: min =         6 
F(17, 24)     =     43.28                                      avg =      6.92 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =         7 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
   Credit_FE |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lagCredit_FE |   .4792535   .1902614     2.52   0.019     .0865732    .8719338 
  Deposit_FE |    .286824   .1841474     1.56   0.132    -.0932375    .6668855 
IntRate_diff |   .0057909   .0037283     1.55   0.133     -.001904    .0134857 
     Inf_vol |   .0025608    .003934     0.65   0.521    -.0055585    .0106801 
     ERR_vol |  -.6347735   .6382351    -0.99   0.330    -1.952026    .6824791 
        BSRI |   .0248599   .0376291     0.66   0.515    -.0528028    .1025227 
          FO |   .0696386   .0639344     1.09   0.287    -.0623156    .2015927 
      FC_lim |  -.0293111   .0155477    -1.89   0.072       -.0614    .0027779 
    FCop_lim |   .1108633   .0381106     2.91   0.008     .0322068    .1895197 
      FC_LTV |    .106586   .0348172     3.06   0.005     .0347268    .1784453 
      FC_RWA |   .0100658   .0199502     0.50   0.618    -.0311094     .051241 
      d_2008 |  -.0043824   .0508325    -0.09   0.932    -.1092955    .1005307 
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      d_2009 |  -.0353655   .0583231    -0.61   0.550    -.1557383    .0850074 
      d_2010 |  -.0272478   .0478384    -0.57   0.574    -.1259814    .0714858 
      d_2011 |  -.0622388   .0786733    -0.79   0.437    -.2246126     .100135 
      d_2012 |  -.0625347   .0634661    -0.99   0.334    -.1935222    .0684529 
      d_2013 |  -.0538282   .0635053    -0.85   0.405    -.1848967    .0772402 
       _cons |  -.0642763   .1674744    -0.38   0.705    -.4099265    .2813738 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for orthogonal deviations equation 
  Standard 
    FOD.(Deposit_FE IntRate_diff Inf_vol ERR_vol BSRI FO FC_lim FCop_lim 
    FC_LTV FC_RWA d_2008 d_2009 d_2010 d_2011 d_2012 d_2013) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).lagCredit_FE collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    Deposit_FE IntRate_diff Inf_vol ERR_vol BSRI FO FC_lim FCop_lim FC_LTV 
    FC_RWA d_2008 d_2009 d_2010 d_2011 d_2012 d_2013 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.lagCredit_FE collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -1.15  Pr > z =  0.251 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -1.17  Pr > z =  0.242 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(2)    =   0.25  Prob > chi2 =  0.880 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(2)    =   0.62  Prob > chi2 =  0.733 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.38  Prob > chi2 =  0.536 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(1)    =   0.24  Prob > chi2 =  0.625 
 
The long-run coefficients of 6.1  
. nlcom _b[ Deposit_FE]/(1-_b[ lagCredit_FE]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ Deposit_FE]/(1-_b[ lagCredit_FE]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Credit_FE |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   .5507939   .2231615     2.47   0.021     .0902111    1.011377 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[  IntRate_diff]/(1-_b[ lagCredit_FE]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ IntRate_diff]/(1-_b[ lagCredit_FE]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Credit_FE |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   .0111203   .0090551     1.23   0.231    -.0075684     .029809 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[  Inf_vol]/(1-_b[ lagCredit_FE]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ Inf_vol]/(1-_b[ lagCredit_FE]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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   Credit_FE |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   .0049176   .0082945     0.59   0.559    -.0122014    .0220365 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[  ERR_vol]/(1-_b[ lagCredit_FE]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ ERR_vol]/(1-_b[ lagCredit_FE]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Credit_FE |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -1.218968   1.003035    -1.22   0.236    -3.289131    .8511947 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[   BSRI]/(1-_b[ lagCredit_FE]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ BSRI]/(1-_b[ lagCredit_FE]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Credit_FE |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |    .047739   .0685864     0.70   0.493    -.0938163    .1892944 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[   FO]/(1-_b[ lagCredit_FE]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ FO]/(1-_b[ lagCredit_FE]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Credit_FE |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   .1337284    .116267     1.15   0.261     -.106235    .3736918 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[   FC_lim]/(1-_b[ lagCredit_FE]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ FC_lim]/(1-_b[ lagCredit_FE]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Credit_FE |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -.0562867   .0296975    -1.90   0.070    -.1175794     .005006 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[  FCop_lim]/(1-_b[ lagCredit_FE]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ FCop_lim]/(1-_b[ lagCredit_FE]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Credit_FE |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |    .212893   .0648269     3.28   0.003     .0790967    .3466892 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[   FC_LTV]/(1-_b[ lagCredit_FE]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ FC_LTV]/(1-_b[ lagCredit_FE]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Credit_FE |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
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-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   .2046793   .0499074     4.10   0.000     .1016754    .3076832 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[  FC_RWA]/(1-_b[ lagCredit_FE]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ FC_RWA]/(1-_b[ lagCredit_FE]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Credit_FE |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   .0193296   .0368848     0.52   0.605    -.0567969    .0954561 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Appendix 6.3 Estimation of the 6.2a model and its long-run 
coefficients 
 
Model 6.2a estimated through system GMM, whilst treating exchange 
rate volatility as possibly endogenous and everything other 
independent variable exogenous 
. xtabond2 Credit_FE lagCredit_FE Deposit_FE IntRate_diff Inf_vol ERR_vol BSRI 
FO  FC_lim FCop_lim FC_LTV FC_RWA d_2008 d_2009 d_2010 d_2011 d_2012 d_2013, 
gmm (lagCredit_FE, collapse lag (2 3)) gmm (ERR_vol , collapse lag (1 1)) iv 
(Deposit_FE IntRate_diff Inf_vol BSRI FO FC_lim FCop_lim  FC_LTV FC_RWA d_2008 
d_2009 d_2010 d_2011 d_2012 d_2013) small two orthog robust 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: C_Id                            Number of obs      =       173 
Time variable : Year                            Number of groups   =        25 
Number of instruments = 21                      Obs per group: min =         6 
F(17, 24)     =     48.37                                      avg =      6.92 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =         7 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
   Credit_FE |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lagCredit_FE |   .5245608   .1659174     3.16   0.004     .1821242    .8669975 
  Deposit_FE |    .257628   .1666408     1.55   0.135    -.0863016    .6015576 
IntRate_diff |    .005935   .0040217     1.48   0.153    -.0023653    .0142353 
     Inf_vol |   .0025564   .0039777     0.64   0.527    -.0056532     .010766 
     ERR_vol |  -1.146111   1.359853    -0.84   0.408    -3.952711    1.660488 
        BSRI |   .0250342    .041801     0.60   0.555    -.0612389    .1113072 
          FO |   .0586732   .0690228     0.85   0.404    -.0837829    .2011294 
      FC_lim |  -.0280109   .0160048    -1.75   0.093    -.0610432    .0050213 
    FCop_lim |   .1042617   .0396824     2.63   0.015     .0223613     .186162 
      FC_LTV |   .0987738   .0359688     2.75   0.011     .0245379    .1730098 
      FC_RWA |   .0063314   .0187725     0.34   0.739    -.0324131    .0450759 
      d_2008 |    .002776   .0562806     0.05   0.961    -.1133814    .1189334 
      d_2009 |   -.021826   .0619911    -0.35   0.728    -.1497693    .1061173 
      d_2010 |  -.0226723   .0557334    -0.41   0.688    -.1377004    .0923557 
      d_2011 |  -.0572753   .0899758    -0.64   0.530    -.2429762    .1284256 
      d_2012 |  -.0568477    .074992    -0.76   0.456    -.2116236    .0979282 
      d_2013 |  -.0468313   .0752046    -0.62   0.539     -.202046    .1083833 
       _cons |  -.0654325   .1914566    -0.34   0.736    -.4605796    .3297145 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for orthogonal deviations equation 
  Standard 
    FOD.(Deposit_FE IntRate_diff Inf_vol BSRI FO FC_lim FCop_lim FC_LTV FC_RWA 
    d_2008 d_2009 d_2010 d_2011 d_2012 d_2013) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L.ERR_vol collapsed 
    L(2/3).lagCredit_FE collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    Deposit_FE IntRate_diff Inf_vol BSRI FO FC_lim FCop_lim FC_LTV FC_RWA 
    d_2008 d_2009 d_2010 d_2011 d_2012 d_2013 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.ERR_vol collapsed 
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    DL.lagCredit_FE collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -1.30  Pr > z =  0.192 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -1.06  Pr > z =  0.289 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(3)    =   0.30  Prob > chi2 =  0.959 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(3)    =   1.17  Prob > chi2 =  0.760 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.38  Prob > chi2 =  0.538 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.79  Prob > chi2 =  0.673 
  gmm(lagCredit_FE, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(0)    =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =      . 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.17  Prob > chi2 =  0.760 
  gmm(ERR_vol, collapse lag(1 1)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.30  Prob > chi2 =  0.582 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.87  Prob > chi2 =  0.648 
 
The long-run coefficients of 6.2a 
. nlcom _b[ Deposit_FE]/(1-_b[ lagCredit_FE]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ Deposit_FE]/(1-_b[ lagCredit_FE]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Credit_FE |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   .5418737    .252789     2.14   0.042      .020143    1.063604 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[  IntRate_diff]/(1-_b[ lagCredit_FE]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ IntRate_diff]/(1-_b[ lagCredit_FE]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Credit_FE |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   .0124833   .0098341     1.27   0.216    -.0078133    .0327798 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[  Inf_vol]/(1-_b[ lagCredit_FE]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ Inf_vol]/(1-_b[ lagCredit_FE]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Credit_FE |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   .0053769   .0090695     0.59   0.559    -.0133417    .0240956 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[  ERR_vol]/(1-_b[ lagCredit_FE]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ ERR_vol]/(1-_b[ lagCredit_FE]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Credit_FE |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -2.410637   2.697913    -0.89   0.380    -7.978857    3.157582 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[   BSRI]/(1-_b[ lagCredit_FE]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ BSRI]/(1-_b[ lagCredit_FE]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Credit_FE |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   .0526548   .0846363     0.62   0.540     -.122026    .2273356 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[   FO]/(1-_b[ lagCredit_FE]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ FO]/(1-_b[ lagCredit_FE]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Credit_FE |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   .1234085    .144235     0.86   0.401    -.1742779    .4210949 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[   FC_lim]/(1-_b[ lagCredit_FE]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ FC_lim]/(1-_b[ lagCredit_FE]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Credit_FE |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -.0589159   .0344737    -1.71   0.100    -.1300661    .0122344 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[  FCop_lim]/(1-_b[ lagCredit_FE]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ FCop_lim]/(1-_b[ lagCredit_FE]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Credit_FE |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   .2192955   .0738947     2.97   0.007     .0667843    .3718066 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[   FC_LTV]/(1-_b[ lagCredit_FE]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ FC_LTV]/(1-_b[ lagCredit_FE]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Credit_FE |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   .2077529   .0617102     3.37   0.003     .0803893    .3351165 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[  FC_RWA]/(1-_b[ lagCredit_FE]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ FC_RWA]/(1-_b[ lagCredit_FE]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Credit_FE |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |    .013317    .039872     0.33   0.741    -.0689747    .0956087 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Appendix 6.4 Estimation of the 6.2b model and its long-run 
coefficients 
 
Model 6.2b estimated through system GMM, whilst treating exchange 
rate volatility and macroprudential policy instruments as possibly 
endogenous and everything other independent variable exogenous 
. xtabond2 Credit_FE lagCredit_FE Deposit_FE IntRate_diff Inf_vol ERR_vol BSRI 
FO  FC_lim FCop_lim FC_LTV FC_RWA d_2008 d_2009 d_2010 d_2011 d_2012 d_2013, 
gmm (lagCredit_FE, collapse lag (2 3)) gmm (ERR_vol FC_lim FCop_lim FC_LTV 
FC_RWA , collapse lag (1 1)) iv (Deposit_FE IntRate_diff Inf_vol BSRI FO d_2008 
d_2009 d_2010 d_2011 d_2012 d_2013) small two orthog robust 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: C_Id                            Number of obs      =       173 
Time variable : Year                            Number of groups   =        25 
Number of instruments = 25                      Obs per group: min =         6 
F(17, 24)     =     25.51                                      avg =      6.92 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =         7 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
   Credit_FE |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lagCredit_FE |   .4601041   .1772338     2.60   0.016     .0943114    .8258968 
  Deposit_FE |   .0031739   .3557006     0.01   0.993     -.730956    .7373038 
IntRate_diff |   .0075717   .0034622     2.19   0.039     .0004261    .0147172 
     Inf_vol |   .0053937   .0044237     1.22   0.235    -.0037364    .0145238 
     ERR_vol |   2.600202   2.158875     1.20   0.240    -1.855498    7.055902 
        BSRI |  -.0088908   .0679064    -0.13   0.897    -.1490427    .1312611 
          FO |   .1098001   .0822422     1.34   0.194    -.0599395    .2795397 
      FC_lim |  -.0821037   .0383345    -2.14   0.043    -.1612222   -.0029852 
    FCop_lim |   .1983008   .1897662     1.04   0.306    -.1933574     .589959 
      FC_LTV |    .152666   .0563411     2.71   0.012     .0363836    .2689483 
      FC_RWA |    .125445   .0348982     3.59   0.001     .0534187    .1974713 
      d_2008 |  -.0190531   .0351839    -0.54   0.593    -.0916691    .0535629 
      d_2009 |  -.0300318    .048598    -0.62   0.542    -.1303331    .0702695 
      d_2010 |  -.0333685   .0376141    -0.89   0.384    -.1110003    .0442632 
      d_2011 |  -.1235889   .0804973    -1.54   0.138    -.2897272    .0425494 
      d_2012 |  -.1116603   .0680596    -1.64   0.114    -.2521284    .0288078 
      d_2013 |  -.0994602   .0673886    -1.48   0.153    -.2385435     .039623 
       _cons |   .0298807   .2555372     0.12   0.908    -.4975221    .5572835 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for orthogonal deviations equation 
  Standard 
    FOD.(Deposit_FE IntRate_diff Inf_vol BSRI FO d_2008 d_2009 d_2010 d_2011 
    d_2012 d_2013) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L.(ERR_vol FC_lim FCop_lim FC_LTV FC_RWA) collapsed 
    L(2/3).lagCredit_FE collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    Deposit_FE IntRate_diff Inf_vol BSRI FO d_2008 d_2009 d_2010 d_2011 d_2012 
    d_2013 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
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    D.(ERR_vol FC_lim FCop_lim FC_LTV FC_RWA) collapsed 
    DL.lagCredit_FE collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -1.63  Pr > z =  0.103 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -1.19  Pr > z =  0.234 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(7)    =   2.54  Prob > chi2 =  0.924 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(7)    =   3.99  Prob > chi2 =  0.781 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.30  Prob > chi2 =  0.583 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(6)    =   3.69  Prob > chi2 =  0.719 
  gmm(lagCredit_FE, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(4)    =   2.45  Prob > chi2 =  0.653 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.53  Prob > chi2 =  0.674 
 
 
Long-run coefficients 6.2b 
. nlcom _b[ Deposit_FE]/(1-_b[ lagCredit_FE]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ Deposit_FE]/(1-_b[ lagCredit_FE]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Credit_FE |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   .0058787   .6579064     0.01   0.993    -1.351973    1.363731 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[  IntRate_diff]/(1-_b[ lagCredit_FE]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ IntRate_diff]/(1-_b[ lagCredit_FE]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Credit_FE |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   .0140243    .008356     1.68   0.106    -.0032216    .0312703 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[  Inf_vol]/(1-_b[ lagCredit_FE]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ Inf_vol]/(1-_b[ lagCredit_FE]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Credit_FE |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   .0099903   .0098976     1.01   0.323    -.0104374    .0304179 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[  ERR_vol]/(1-_b[ lagCredit_FE]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ ERR_vol]/(1-_b[ lagCredit_FE]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Credit_FE |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   4.816117   4.579426     1.05   0.303    -4.635354    14.26759 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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. nlcom _b[   BSRI]/(1-_b[ lagCredit_FE]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ BSRI]/(1-_b[ lagCredit_FE]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Credit_FE |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -.0164676   .1283081    -0.13   0.899    -.2812826    .2483474 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[   FO]/(1-_b[ lagCredit_FE]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ FO]/(1-_b[ lagCredit_FE]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Credit_FE |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   .2033727   .1714857     1.19   0.247    -.1505563    .5573017 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[   FC_lim]/(1-_b[ lagCredit_FE]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ FC_lim]/(1-_b[ lagCredit_FE]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Credit_FE |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -.1520732   .0752891    -2.02   0.055    -.3074623    .0033158 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[  FCop_lim]/(1-_b[ lagCredit_FE]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ FCop_lim]/(1-_b[ lagCredit_FE]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Credit_FE |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   .3672945   .3716134     0.99   0.333    -.3996778    1.134267 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[   FC_LTV]/(1-_b[ lagCredit_FE]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ FC_LTV]/(1-_b[ lagCredit_FE]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Credit_FE |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   .2827692   .1151435     2.46   0.022     .0451248    .5204137 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[  FC_RWA]/(1-_b[ lagCredit_FE]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ FC_RWA]/(1-_b[ lagCredit_FE]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Credit_FE |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   .2323504   .0979831     2.37   0.026     .0301232    .4345775 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Appendix 6.5 The comparison of coefficients of 6.1 and 6.2a and 
6.2b across FE, OLS System GMM estimators 
 
The equivalent model estimated through system OLS and FE to check 
whether the size of the lagged dependent variable of models 6.1, 
6.2a, and 6.2b models estimated through system GMM is within the 
range of the coefficient of lagged dependent variables of FE and 
OLS. 
FE 
 
. xtreg Credit_FE lagCredit_FE Deposit_FE  IntRate_diff Inf_vol ERR_vol BSRI FO 
FC_lim FCop_lim FC_LTV FC_RWA d_2008 d_2009 d_2010 d_2011 d_2012 d_2013, fe 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       173 
Group variable: C_Id                            Number of groups   =        25 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.3502                         Obs per group: min =         6 
       between = 0.7052                                        avg =       6.9 
       overall = 0.6076                                        max =         7 
 
                                                F(17,131)          =      4.15 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.2516                         Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Credit_FE |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lagCredit_FE |   .1843813   .0612466     3.01   0.003      .063221    .3055416 
  Deposit_FE |   .0879813   .1396717     0.63   0.530    -.1883226    .3642852 
IntRate_diff |   .0157463    .003489     4.51   0.000     .0088443    .0226484 
     Inf_vol |   .0002659   .0032329     0.08   0.935    -.0061295    .0066613 
     ERR_vol |   -.730784   2.272184    -0.32   0.748    -5.225707    3.764138 
        BSRI |   .0199012   .0750573     0.27   0.791      -.12858    .1683824 
          FO |   .0188696   .2129053     0.09   0.930    -.4023079    .4400471 
      FC_lim |   .0154504   .0447319     0.35   0.730      -.07304    .1039409 
    FCop_lim |   .1240368    .129032     0.96   0.338    -.1312192    .3792927 
      FC_LTV |   .1341673   .0528955     2.54   0.012     .0295275    .2388072 
      FC_RWA |    .034031   .0392266     0.87   0.387    -.0435686    .1116307 
      d_2008 |   .0092605   .0347673     0.27   0.790    -.0595174    .0780385 
      d_2009 |  -.0117896   .0343198    -0.34   0.732    -.0796824    .0561031 
      d_2010 |  -.0212212   .0344615    -0.62   0.539    -.0893943    .0469519 
      d_2011 |  -.0724875   .0410659    -1.77   0.080    -.1537257    .0087506 
      d_2012 |  -.0791107    .041507    -1.91   0.059    -.1612214        .003 
      d_2013 |  -.0697112    .042101    -1.66   0.100     -.152997    .0135746 
       _cons |   .1495112   .2828361     0.53   0.598    -.4100062    .7090285 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  .11629892 
     sigma_e |  .11205861 
         rho |  .51856235   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(24, 131) =     2.80             Prob > F = 0.0001 
 
OLS 
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. regress Credit_FE lagCredit_FE Deposit_FE  IntRate_diff Inf_vol ERR_vol BSRI 
FO FC_lim FCop_lim FC_LTV FC_RWA d_2008 d_2009 d_2010 d_2011 d_2012 d_2013 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     173 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 17,   155) =   25.94 
       Model |  7.07787751    17  .416345736           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  2.48781424   155  .016050414           R-squared     =  0.7399 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.7114 
       Total |  9.56569174   172  .055614487           Root MSE      =  .12669 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Credit_FE |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lagCredit_FE |    .402561    .058532     6.88   0.000     .2869377    .5181843 
  Deposit_FE |   .2853593   .0785042     3.63   0.000     .1302831    .4404354 
IntRate_diff |   .0044336   .0027864     1.59   0.114    -.0010705    .0099378 
     Inf_vol |   .0035366   .0031898     1.11   0.269    -.0027645    .0098378 
     ERR_vol |   -.547023   1.168793    -0.47   0.640    -2.855842    1.761796 
        BSRI |   .0096996   .0276816     0.35   0.727    -.0449823    .0643814 
          FO |   .1110522    .047618     2.33   0.021     .0169882    .2051162 
      FC_lim |  -.0321501   .0278688    -1.15   0.250    -.0872019    .0229016 
    FCop_lim |   .1365355   .0319302     4.28   0.000      .073461    .1996101 
      FC_LTV |   .1436272   .0305817     4.70   0.000     .0832165    .2040378 
      FC_RWA |   .0086049   .0236614     0.36   0.717    -.0381355    .0553454 
      d_2008 |    .014714   .0372097     0.40   0.693    -.0587896    .0882175 
      d_2009 |  -.0182517   .0372537    -0.49   0.625    -.0918421    .0553387 
      d_2010 |  -.0155117   .0373235    -0.42   0.678      -.08924    .0582167 
      d_2011 |  -.0670194   .0386671    -1.73   0.085    -.1434019    .0093631 
      d_2012 |  -.0639999   .0389796    -1.64   0.103    -.1409997    .0129999 
      d_2013 |  -.0566902   .0397002    -1.43   0.155    -.1351134    .0217331 
       _cons |  -.0366779    .094105    -0.39   0.697    -.2225717     .149216 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Appendix 6.6 Instability of the model in relation to instrumentation 
 
. xtabond2   D_Credit_FE   lagD_Credit_E  D_Deposit_FE IntRate_diff Inf_vol 
ERR_vol BSRI FO  FC_lim FCop_lim FC_LTV FC_RWA d_2008 d_2009 d_2010 d_2011 
d_2012 d_2013, gmm (lagCredit_FE, collapse lag (2 3)) iv (D_Deposit_FE 
IntRate_diff Inf_vol ERR_vol BSRI FO FC_lim FCop_lim FC_LTV FC_RWA d_2008 
d_2009 d_2010 d_2011 d_2012 d_2013) small two orthog robust 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
d_2008 dropped due to collinearity 
d_2009 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-
step estimation. 
  Difference-in-Sargan/Hansen statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: C_Id                            Number of obs      =       124 
Time variable : Year                            Number of groups   =        25 
Number of instruments = 18                      Obs per group: min =         4 
F(15, 24)     =     47.65                                      avg =      4.96 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =         5 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              |              Corrected 
  D_Credit_FE |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lagD_Credit_E |    .519055   .2164729     2.40   0.025     .0722769     .965833 
 D_Deposit_FE |  -.1578004   .9474763    -0.17   0.869    -2.113295    1.797694 
 IntRate_diff |  -.0026207   .0021126    -1.24   0.227    -.0069808    .0017394 
      Inf_vol |   .0046657   .0029359     1.59   0.125    -.0013937    .0107252 
      ERR_vol |  -.8039395   1.374718    -0.58   0.564    -3.641219     2.03334 
         BSRI |  -.0061028    .017784    -0.34   0.734     -.042807    .0306015 
           FO |  -.0051836    .018759    -0.28   0.785    -.0439003     .033533 
       FC_lim |   .0111768   .0111938     1.00   0.328     -.011926    .0342796 
     FCop_lim |   .0013146    .015538     0.08   0.933    -.0307542    .0333835 
       FC_LTV |   .0115354    .012394     0.93   0.361    -.0140444    .0371153 
       FC_RWA |  -.0116014   .0207027    -0.56   0.580    -.0543297    .0311269 
       d_2010 |   .0279394   .0687037     0.41   0.688     -.113858    .1697368 
       d_2011 |    .000962   .0850883     0.01   0.991    -.1746515    .1765755 
       d_2012 |   .0170426   .0380847     0.45   0.659    -.0615603    .0956455 
       d_2013 |   .0231387   .0515768     0.45   0.658    -.0833106     .129588 
        _cons |  -.0001272   .0864123    -0.00   0.999    -.1784734    .1782191 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Instruments for orthogonal deviations equation 
  Standard 
    FOD.(D_Deposit_FE IntRate_diff Inf_vol ERR_vol BSRI FO FC_lim FCop_lim 
    FC_LTV FC_RWA d_2008 d_2009 d_2010 d_2011 d_2012 d_2013) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).lagCredit_FE collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    D_Deposit_FE IntRate_diff Inf_vol ERR_vol BSRI FO FC_lim FCop_lim FC_LTV 
    FC_RWA d_2008 d_2009 d_2010 d_2011 d_2012 d_2013 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.lagCredit_FE collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -1.32  Pr > z =  0.186 
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Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   1.11  Pr > z =  0.268 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(2)    =   0.17  Prob > chi2 =  0.919 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(2)    =   0.87  Prob > chi2 =  0.648 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.02  Prob > chi2 =  0.882 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(1)    =   0.85  Prob > chi2 =  0.358 
 
 
. xtabond2   D_Credit_FE   lagD_Credit_E  D_Deposit_FE IntRate_diff Inf_vol 
ERR_vol BSRI FO  FC_lim FCop_lim FC_LTV FC_RWA d_2008 d_2009 d_2010 d_2011 
d_2012 d_2013, gmm (lagCredit_FE, collapse lag (2 2)) iv (D_Deposit_FE 
IntRate_diff Inf_vol ERR_vol BSRI FO FC_lim FCop_lim FC_LTV FC_RWA d_2008 
d_2009 d_2010 d_2011 d_2012 d_2013) small two orthog robust 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
d_2008 dropped due to collinearity 
d_2009 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-
step estimation. 
  Difference-in-Sargan/Hansen statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: C_Id                            Number of obs      =       124 
Time variable : Year                            Number of groups   =        25 
Number of instruments = 17                      Obs per group: min =         4 
F(15, 24)     =     79.46                                      avg =      4.96 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =         5 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              |              Corrected 
  D_Credit_FE |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lagD_Credit_E |   .8481298   .3950913     2.15   0.042     .0327015    1.663558 
 D_Deposit_FE |  -.5074678   .9283867    -0.55   0.590    -2.423564    1.408628 
 IntRate_diff |  -.0052978    .004015    -1.32   0.199    -.0135843    .0029888 
      Inf_vol |   .0057967   .0031766     1.82   0.081    -.0007596    .0123529 
      ERR_vol |  -.9200313   1.374858    -0.67   0.510    -3.757598    1.917535 
         BSRI |  -.0057018   .0179676    -0.32   0.754    -.0427851    .0313816 
           FO |   .0003105   .0220088     0.01   0.989    -.0451134    .0457344 
       FC_lim |   .0056757   .0159599     0.36   0.725    -.0272639    .0386152 
     FCop_lim |   .0117392   .0220354     0.53   0.599    -.0337396     .057218 
       FC_LTV |    .011023   .0135182     0.82   0.423    -.0168772    .0389232 
       FC_RWA |   -.016962   .0246381    -0.69   0.498    -.0678125    .0338885 
       d_2010 |   .0340827   .0660311     0.52   0.610    -.1021989    .1703643 
       d_2011 |  -.0088187   .0788656    -0.11   0.912    -.1715893    .1539518 
       d_2012 |   .0348933   .0380487     0.92   0.368    -.0436353    .1134219 
       d_2013 |   .0251085   .0482894     0.52   0.608    -.0745559    .1247728 
        _cons |  -.0009414   .0829687    -0.01   0.991    -.1721803    .1702976 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Instruments for orthogonal deviations equation 
  Standard 
    FOD.(D_Deposit_FE IntRate_diff Inf_vol ERR_vol BSRI FO FC_lim FCop_lim 
    FC_LTV FC_RWA d_2008 d_2009 d_2010 d_2011 d_2012 d_2013) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L2.lagCredit_FE collapsed 
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Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    D_Deposit_FE IntRate_diff Inf_vol ERR_vol BSRI FO FC_lim FCop_lim FC_LTV 
    FC_RWA d_2008 d_2009 d_2010 d_2011 d_2012 d_2013 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.lagCredit_FE collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -1.31  Pr > z =  0.191 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   1.09  Pr > z =  0.278 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(1)    =   0.04  Prob > chi2 =  0.833 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(1)    =   0.14  Prob > chi2 =  0.712 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(0)    =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =      . 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(1)    =   0.14  Prob > chi2 =  0.712 
 
 
. xtabond2   D_Credit_FE   lagD_Credit_E  D_Deposit_FE IntRate_diff Inf_vol 
ERR_vol BSRI FO  FC_lim FCop_lim FC_LTV FC_RWA d_2008 d_2009 d_2010 d_2011 
d_2012 d_2013, gmm (lagCredit_FE, collapse lag (2 .)) iv (D_Deposit_FE 
IntRate_diff Inf_vol ERR_vol BSRI FO FC_lim FCop_lim FC_LTV FC_RWA d_2008 
d_2009 d_2010 d_2011 d_2012 d_2013) small two orthog robust 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
d_2008 dropped due to collinearity 
d_2009 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-
step estimation. 
  Difference-in-Sargan/Hansen statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: C_Id                            Number of obs      =       124 
Time variable : Year                            Number of groups   =        25 
Number of instruments = 21                      Obs per group: min =         4 
F(15, 24)     =     22.00                                      avg =      4.96 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =         5 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              |              Corrected 
  D_Credit_FE |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lagD_Credit_E |    .105283    .326244     0.32   0.750    -.5680515    .7786174 
 D_Deposit_FE |   .1956431   .3917312     0.50   0.622    -.6128504    1.004137 
 IntRate_diff |  -.0001221   .0021246    -0.06   0.955    -.0045072    .0042629 
      Inf_vol |   .0037989    .001662     2.29   0.031     .0003686    .0072291 
      ERR_vol |  -.3955535   .6432364    -0.61   0.544    -1.723128    .9320212 
         BSRI |   .0115826   .0174369     0.66   0.513    -.0244055    .0475707 
           FO |  -.0115928   .0192485    -0.60   0.553    -.0513198    .0281342 
       FC_lim |   .0084232   .0117119     0.72   0.479    -.0157489    .0325953 
     FCop_lim |   -.000958   .0149756    -0.06   0.950    -.0318662    .0299501 
       FC_LTV |   .0039293    .011395     0.34   0.733    -.0195889    .0274475 
       FC_RWA |   .0006515   .0162732     0.04   0.968    -.0329347    .0342377 
       d_2010 |   .0334663   .0408275     0.82   0.420    -.0507976    .1177302 
       d_2011 |   .0283653   .0362656     0.78   0.442    -.0464833     .103214 
       d_2012 |   .0169685   .0306738     0.55   0.585    -.0463391    .0802761 
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       d_2013 |     .02984   .0286557     1.04   0.308    -.0293025    .0889825 
        _cons |  -.0696809   .0574825    -1.21   0.237    -.1883188    .0489571 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Instruments for orthogonal deviations equation 
  Standard 
    FOD.(D_Deposit_FE IntRate_diff Inf_vol ERR_vol BSRI FO FC_lim FCop_lim 
    FC_LTV FC_RWA d_2008 d_2009 d_2010 d_2011 d_2012 d_2013) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/6).lagCredit_FE collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    D_Deposit_FE IntRate_diff Inf_vol ERR_vol BSRI FO FC_lim FCop_lim FC_LTV 
    FC_RWA d_2008 d_2009 d_2010 d_2011 d_2012 d_2013 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.lagCredit_FE collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -0.93  Pr > z =  0.355 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.33  Pr > z =  0.742 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(5)    =   4.64  Prob > chi2 =  0.462 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(5)    =   2.80  Prob > chi2 =  0.731 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(4)    =   2.71  Prob > chi2 =  0.607 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(1)    =   0.09  Prob > chi2 =  0.769 
 
 
. xtabond2   D_Credit_FE   lagD_Credit_E  D_Deposit_FE IntRate_diff Inf_vol 
ERR_vol BSRI FO  FC_lim FCop_lim FC_LTV FC_RWA d_2008 d_2009 d_2010 d_2011 
d_2012 d_2013, gmm (lagCredit_FE, collapse lag (1 .)) iv (D_Deposit_FE 
IntRate_diff Inf_vol ERR_vol BSRI FO FC_lim FCop_lim FC_LTV FC_RWA d_2008 
d_2009 d_2010 d_2011 d_2012 d_2013) small two orthog robust 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
d_2008 dropped due to collinearity 
d_2009 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-
step estimation. 
  Difference-in-Sargan/Hansen statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: C_Id                            Number of obs      =       124 
Time variable : Year                            Number of groups   =        25 
Number of instruments = 22                      Obs per group: min =         4 
F(15, 24)     =     26.34                                      avg =      4.96 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =         5 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              |              Corrected 
  D_Credit_FE |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lagD_Credit_E |  -.0479317   .0664076    -0.72   0.477    -.1849904    .0891269 
 D_Deposit_FE |   .2223371   .4042399     0.55   0.587    -.6119731    1.056647 
 IntRate_diff |   .0003745   .0016392     0.23   0.821    -.0030086    .0037577 
      Inf_vol |    .003735   .0014432     2.59   0.016     .0007564    .0067135 
      ERR_vol |   -.334347   .6722895    -0.50   0.623    -1.721884     1.05319 
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         BSRI |   .0116192   .0208475     0.56   0.582     -.031408    .0546464 
           FO |  -.0144024   .0232731    -0.62   0.542    -.0624358     .033631 
       FC_lim |   .0055691   .0136559     0.41   0.687    -.0226153    .0337536 
     FCop_lim |  -.0034228   .0170579    -0.20   0.843    -.0386286     .031783 
       FC_LTV |   .0053652   .0122233     0.44   0.665    -.0198624    .0305929 
       FC_RWA |   .0050257    .014805     0.34   0.737    -.0255303    .0355816 
       d_2010 |   .0334577   .0322456     1.04   0.310     -.033094    .1000093 
       d_2011 |   .0300043   .0335568     0.89   0.380    -.0392536    .0992622 
       d_2012 |    .021329   .0264097     0.81   0.427     -.033178    .0758361 
       d_2013 |   .0298142   .0252798     1.18   0.250    -.0223607    .0819891 
        _cons |  -.0738275   .0728537    -1.01   0.321    -.2241901    .0765351 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Instruments for orthogonal deviations equation 
  Standard 
    FOD.(D_Deposit_FE IntRate_diff Inf_vol ERR_vol BSRI FO FC_lim FCop_lim 
    FC_LTV FC_RWA d_2008 d_2009 d_2010 d_2011 d_2012 d_2013) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(1/6).lagCredit_FE collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    D_Deposit_FE IntRate_diff Inf_vol ERR_vol BSRI FO FC_lim FCop_lim FC_LTV 
    FC_RWA d_2008 d_2009 d_2010 d_2011 d_2012 d_2013 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.lagCredit_FE collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -1.09  Pr > z =  0.274 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -0.75  Pr > z =  0.455 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(6)    =   4.59  Prob > chi2 =  0.598 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(6)    =   3.51  Prob > chi2 =  0.743 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(5)    =   2.93  Prob > chi2 =  0.711 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(1)    =   0.58  Prob > chi2 =  0.446 
 
 
Appendix 6.7 Comparison of coefficients across FE, OLS System GMM 
 
A version of the Model 6.1 estimated through FE and RE, and the 
Hausman test results  
FE 
. xtreg Credit_FE Deposit_FE IntRate_diff Inf_vol ERR_vol FO BSRI FC_lim 
FCop_lim FC_LTV FC_RWA d_2008 d_2009 d_2010 d_2011 d_2012 d_2013, fe 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       174 
Group variable: C_Id                            Number of groups   =        25 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.3054                         Obs per group: min =         6 
       between = 0.5454                                        avg =       7.0 
       overall = 0.4835                                        max =         7 
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                                                F(16,133)          =      3.65 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.0720                         Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Credit_FE |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  Deposit_FE |    .127602   .1427249     0.89   0.373    -.1547024    .4099064 
IntRate_diff |   .0185071   .0034561     5.35   0.000     .0116711    .0253431 
     Inf_vol |  -.0018021    .003243    -0.56   0.579    -.0082166    .0046124 
     ERR_vol |  -.8299774   2.331948    -0.36   0.722     -5.44248    3.782525 
          FO |   .0073461   .2183239     0.03   0.973      -.42449    .4391822 
        BSRI |  -.0107178   .0750116    -0.14   0.887    -.1590879    .1376523 
      FC_lim |   .0217767   .0455451     0.48   0.633    -.0683097     .111863 
    FCop_lim |   .1491293   .1321932     1.13   0.261    -.1123437    .4106022 
      FC_LTV |   .1658583   .0532239     3.12   0.002     .0605835    .2711332 
      FC_RWA |   .0424027   .0397957     1.07   0.289    -.0363116    .1211171 
      d_2008 |   .0098514    .035439     0.28   0.781    -.0602456    .0799484 
      d_2009 |  -.0118638   .0349764    -0.34   0.735    -.0810457    .0573181 
      d_2010 |  -.0245868   .0351705    -0.70   0.486    -.0941526     .044979 
      d_2011 |  -.0891003   .0412758    -2.16   0.033    -.1707423   -.0074583 
      d_2012 |  -.1027848   .0414328    -2.48   0.014    -.1847373   -.0208324 
      d_2013 |  -.0961331   .0419123    -2.29   0.023    -.1790341   -.0132321 
       _cons |   .3028431    .282365     1.07   0.285    -.2556639      .86135 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |   .1390332 
     sigma_e |  .11504529 
         rho |   .5935773   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(24, 133) =     4.70             Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
. estimates store FE_feb 
 
 
RE 
 
. xtreg Credit_FE Deposit_FE IntRate_diff Inf_vol ERR_vol FO BSRI FC_lim 
FCop_lim FC_LTV FC_R 
> WA d_2008 d_2009 d_2010 d_2011 d_2012 d_2013, re 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       174 
Group variable: C_Id                            Number of groups   =        25 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.2797                         Obs per group: min =         6 
       between = 0.7590                                        avg =       7.0 
       overall = 0.6321                                        max =         7 
 
                                                Wald chi2(16)      =    122.87 
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Credit_FE |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  Deposit_FE |   .2850068   .1076446     2.65   0.008     .0740273    .4959862 
IntRate_diff |   .0143879   .0031509     4.57   0.000     .0082123    .0205635 
     Inf_vol |  -.0018635   .0031449    -0.59   0.553    -.0080275    .0043005 
     ERR_vol |  -.8357728   1.774854    -0.47   0.638    -4.314423    2.642877 
          FO |   .1663633   .0834051     1.99   0.046     .0028924    .3298343 
        BSRI |   .0077593   .0419094     0.19   0.853    -.0743816    .0899003 
      FC_lim |   -.021065   .0375164    -0.56   0.574    -.0945957    .0524657 
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    FCop_lim |   .2099435   .0538622     3.90   0.000     .1043756    .3155115 
      FC_LTV |     .18085   .0406047     4.45   0.000     .1012663    .2604337 
      FC_RWA |    .025431   .0307472     0.83   0.408    -.0348323    .0856944 
      d_2008 |   .0123282   .0344512     0.36   0.720    -.0551948    .0798512 
      d_2009 |  -.0188029   .0345646    -0.54   0.586    -.0865484    .0489425 
      d_2010 |  -.0219091   .0347506    -0.63   0.528     -.090019    .0462009 
      d_2011 |  -.0767437    .037494    -2.05   0.041    -.1502305   -.0032569 
      d_2012 |  -.0893823   .0378229    -2.36   0.018    -.1635139   -.0152507 
      d_2013 |   -.085631   .0385563    -2.22   0.026       -.1612    -.010062 
       _cons |   .0566816   .1398051     0.41   0.685    -.2173314    .3306947 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  .09324174 
     sigma_e |  .11504529 
         rho |  .39645436   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. estimates store RE_feb 
 
Hausman Test 
 
. hausman FE_feb RE_feb 
 
                 ---- Coefficients ---- 
             |      (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
             |     FE_feb       RE_feb       Difference          S.E. 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  Deposit_FE |     .127602     .2850068       -.1574048         .093718 
IntRate_diff |    .0185071     .0143879        .0041192        .0014201 
     Inf_vol |   -.0018021    -.0018635        .0000614        .0007913 
     ERR_vol |   -.8299774    -.8357728        .0057954        1.512572 
          FO |    .0073461     .1663633       -.1590172        .2017645 
        BSRI |   -.0107178     .0077593       -.0184771        .0622121 
      FC_lim |    .0217767     -.021065        .0428417        .0258239 
    FCop_lim |    .1491293     .2099435       -.0608142        .1207224 
      FC_LTV |    .1658583       .18085       -.0149917        .0344099 
      FC_RWA |    .0424027      .025431        .0169717        .0252648 
      d_2008 |    .0098514     .0123282       -.0024768        .0083091 
      d_2009 |   -.0118638    -.0188029        .0069391        .0053509 
      d_2010 |   -.0245868    -.0219091       -.0026777        .0054182 
      d_2011 |   -.0891003    -.0767437       -.0123566        .0172597 
      d_2012 |   -.1027848    -.0893823       -.0134026        .0169145 
      d_2013 |   -.0961331     -.085631       -.0105021        .0164334 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
 
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
 
                 chi2(16) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =       19.50 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.2438 
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite) 
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Appendix 6.8 Testing for CFR for FE and RE 
 
Testing for the CFR individually and jointly for model 6.10 
estimated through FE and RE  
Testing for RE 
. xtreg Credit_FE lagCredit_FE Deposit_FE  lag_Deposit_FE IntRate_diff 
lagintrate_diff Inf_vol  laginf_vol ERR_vol  lagerr_vol BSRI  lagb 
> sri FO  lagfo  FC_lim  lagfc_lim FCop_lim  lagfcop_lim FC_LTV  laglfc_ltv 
FC_RWA  lagfc_rwa d_2008 d_2009 d_2010 d_2011 d_2012 d_2013,  re 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       172 
Group variable: C_Id                            Number of groups   =        25 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.3816                         Obs per group: min =         5 
       between = 0.9623                                        avg =       6.9 
       overall = 0.7971                                        max =         7 
 
                                                Wald chi2(27)      =    565.66 
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      Credit_FE |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. 
Interval] 
----------------+-------------------------------------------------------------- 
   lagCredit_FE |   .6350524   .0663864     9.57   0.000     .5049376  .7651673 
     Deposit_FE |   .4533634   .1122596     4.04   0.000     .2333386  .6733882 
 lag_Deposit_FE |  -.3160258   .1162645    -2.72   0.007    -.5439001 -.0881515 
   IntRate_diff |   .0053323   .0035838     1.49   0.137    -.0016917  .0123563 
lagintrate_diff |  -.0021523   .0033143    -0.65   0.516    -.0086482  .0043437 
        Inf_vol |   .0041035   .0031043     1.32   0.186    -.0019809  .0101878 
     laginf_vol |  -.0017727   .0032618    -0.54   0.587    -.0081658  .0046203 
        ERR_vol |   -.931358   1.686806    -0.55   0.581    -4.237438  2.374722 
     lagerr_vol |   1.346795   1.684772     0.80   0.424    -1.955298  4.648888 
           BSRI |  -.0468623   .0407244    -1.15   0.250    -.1266806  .0329561 
        lagbsri |   .0515914   .0401167     1.29   0.198     -.027036  .1302187 
             FO |   .1563947   .0690093     2.27   0.023      .021139  .2916505 
          lagfo |  -.0765311   .0700612    -1.09   0.275    -.2138485  .0607863 
         FC_lim |   .0064174   .0386752     0.17   0.868    -.0693847  .0822195 
      lagfc_lim |  -.0343016   .0384746    -0.89   0.373    -.1097104  .0411072 
       FCop_lim |    .158762   .0495189     3.21   0.001     .0617067  .2558173 
    lagfcop_lim |  -.0889205   .0484237    -1.84   0.066    -.1838291  .0059882 
         FC_LTV |   .1588927    .041238     3.85   0.000     .0780676  .2397177 
     laglfc_ltv |  -.0747295   .0429038    -1.74   0.082    -.1588194  .0093603 
         FC_RWA |   .0238973   .0338732     0.71   0.481    -.0424929  .0902874 
      lagfc_rwa |  -.0262419   .0330919    -0.79   0.428     -.091101  .0386171 
         d_2008 |  -.0532326   .0394315    -1.35   0.177    -.1305169  .0240517 
         d_2009 |  -.1037729    .040551    -2.56   0.010    -.1832514 -.0242944 
         d_2010 |  -.0771066   .0409432    -1.88   0.060    -.1573538  .0031406 
         d_2011 |  -.1490116   .0445791    -3.34   0.001     -.236385 -.0616382 
         d_2012 |  -.1082026   .0391966    -2.76   0.006    -.1850264 -.0313787 
         d_2013 |  -.0941132   .0394762    -2.38   0.017    -.1714852 -.0167412 
          _cons |   .0650288   .0925738     0.70   0.482    -.116412   .24647 
----------------+------------------------------------------------------------- 
        sigma_u |          0 
        sigma_e |  .10790028 
            rho |          0   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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. . testnl (_b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[Deposit_FE]=-_b[lag_Deposit_FE]) 
 
  (1)  _b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[Deposit_FE] = -_b[lag_Deposit_FE] 
 
               chi2(1) =        0.15 
           Prob > chi2 =        0.7012 
 
. . testnl (_b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[ IntRate_diff]=-_b[ lagintrate_diff]) 
 
  (1)  _b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[ IntRate_diff] = -_b[ lagintrate_diff] 
 
               chi2(1) =        0.21 
           Prob > chi2 =        0.6478 
 
. . testnl (_b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[  Inf_vol]=-_b[ laginf_vol]) 
 
  (1)  _b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[  Inf_vol] = -_b[ laginf_vol] 
 
               chi2(1) =        0.06 
           Prob > chi2 =        0.8076 
 
. . testnl (_b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[  ERR_vol]=-_b[  lagerr_vol]) 
 
  (1)  _b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[  ERR_vol] = -_b[  lagerr_vol] 
 
               chi2(1) =        0.46 
           Prob > chi2 =        0.4984 
 
. . testnl (_b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[  BSRI]=-_b[  lagbsri]) 
 
  (1)  _b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[  BSRI] = -_b[  lagbsri] 
 
               chi2(1) =        0.67 
           Prob > chi2 =        0.4126 
 
. . testnl (_b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[ FO]=-_b[   lagfo]) 
 
  (1)  _b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[ FO] = -_b[   lagfo] 
 
               chi2(1) =        0.26 
           Prob > chi2 =        0.6123 
 
. . testnl (_b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[  FC_lim]=-_b[   lagfc_lim]) 
 
  (1)  _b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[  FC_lim] = -_b[   lagfc_lim] 
 
               chi2(1) =        1.28 
           Prob > chi2 =        0.2576 
 
. . testnl (_b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[   FCop_lim]=-_b[   lagfcop_lim]) 
 
  (1)  _b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[   FCop_lim] = -_b[   lagfcop_lim] 
 
               chi2(1) =        0.16 
           Prob > chi2 =        0.6851 
 
. . testnl (_b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[  FC_LTV]=-_b[  laglfc_ltv]) 
 
  (1)  _b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[  FC_LTV] = -_b[  laglfc_ltv] 
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               chi2(1) =        0.92 
           Prob > chi2 =        0.3381 
 
. . testnl (_b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[  FC_RWA]=-_b[  lagfc_rwa]) 
 
  (1)  _b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[  FC_RWA] = -_b[  lagfc_rwa] 
 
               chi2(1) =        0.25 
           Prob > chi2 =        0.6189 
 
. . testnl (_b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[Deposit_FE]=-_b[lag_Deposit_FE]) 
(_b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[ IntRate_diff]=-_b[ lagintrate_diff]) (_b[lagCredit 
> _FE]*_b[  Inf_vol]=-_b[ laginf_vol]) (_b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[  ERR_vol]=-_b[  
lagerr_vol]) (_b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[  BSRI]=-_b[  lagbsri]) (_ 
> b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[ FO]=-_b[   lagfo]) (_b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[  FC_lim]=-_b[   
lagfc_lim]) (_b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[   FCop_lim]=-_b[   lagfc 
> op_lim]) (_b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[  FC_LTV]=-_b[  laglfc_ltv]) 
(_b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[  FC_RWA]=-_b[  lagfc_rwa]) 
 
  (1)  _b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[Deposit_FE] = -_b[lag_Deposit_FE] 
  (2)  _b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[ IntRate_diff] = -_b[ lagintrate_diff] 
  (3)  _b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[  Inf_vol] = -_b[ laginf_vol] 
  (4)  _b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[  ERR_vol] = -_b[  lagerr_vol] 
  (5)  _b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[  BSRI] = -_b[  lagbsri] 
  (6)  _b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[ FO] = -_b[   lagfo] 
  (7)  _b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[  FC_lim] = -_b[   lagfc_lim] 
  (8)  _b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[   FCop_lim] = -_b[   lagfcop_lim] 
  (9)  _b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[  FC_LTV] = -_b[  laglfc_ltv] 
  (10) _b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[  FC_RWA] = -_b[  lagfc_rwa] 
 
              chi2(10) =        5.52 
           Prob > chi2 =        0.8538 
 
Testing for FE 
. xtreg Credit_FE lagCredit_FE Deposit_FE  lag_Deposit_FE IntRate_diff 
lagintrate_diff Inf_vol  laginf_vol ERR_vol  lagerr_vol BSRI  lag bsri FO  
lagfo  FC_lim  lagfc_lim FCop_lim  lagfcop_lim FC_LTV  laglfc_ltv FC_RWA  
lagfc_rwa d_2008 d_2009 d_2010 d_2011 d_2012 d_2013, fe 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       172 
Group variable: C_Id                            Number of groups   =        25 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.4474                         Obs per group: min =         5 
       between = 0.7458                                        avg =       6.9 
       overall = 0.6656                                        max =         7 
 
                                                F(27,120)          =      3.60 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.1784                         Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      Credit_FE |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. 
Interval] 
----------------+-------------------------------------------------------------- 
   lagCredit_FE |   .3448775   .0820306     4.20   0.000     .1824626  .5072923 
     Deposit_FE |   .3194393   .1560857     2.05   0.043     .0104005  .6284781 
 lag_Deposit_FE |  -.3136861   .1223233    -2.56   0.012    -.5558776 -.0714945 
   IntRate_diff |   .0156599   .0045802     3.42   0.001     .0065913  .0247284 
lagintrate_diff |   .0018757   .0034327     0.55   0.586    -.0049208  .0086722 
        Inf_vol |   .0018996   .0032734     0.58   0.563    -.0045816  .0083808 
     laginf_vol |   -.004158   .0035793    -1.16   0.248    -.0112447  .0029287 
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        ERR_vol |  -.3961471   2.325998    -0.17   0.865    -5.001461  4.209167 
     lagerr_vol |  -.1930605   1.779515    -0.11   0.914    -3.716377  3.330256 
           BSRI |   .0054661   .0758492     0.07   0.943      -.14471  .1556422 
        lagbsri |   .0367154   .0422016     0.87   0.386    -.0468409  .1202717 
             FO |   .0411481   .2107636     0.20   0.846    -.3761492  .4584453 
          lagfo |   -.077805   .0736804    -1.06   0.293    -.2236871  .068077 
         FC_lim |   .0251417   .0477877     0.53   0.600    -.0694746  .1197581 
      lagfc_lim |  -.0118048   .0405045    -0.29   0.771    -.0920009  .0683913 
       FCop_lim |   .1241975   .1300899     0.95   0.342    -.1333714  .3817665 
    lagfcop_lim |   .0009626   .0583387     0.02   0.987    -.1145439  .1164692 
         FC_LTV |   .1180447   .0568005     2.08   0.040     .0055836  .2305058 
     laglfc_ltv |  -.0055718   .0474615    -0.12   0.907    -.0995424  .0883987 
         FC_RWA |   .0278233   .0421163     0.66   0.510    -.0555641  .1112107 
      lagfc_rwa |   .0012002   .0349928     0.03   0.973    -.0680831  .0704836 
         d_2008 |  -.0279816   .0387445    -0.72   0.472    -.1046931  .0487299 
         d_2009 |  -.0577795    .040508    -1.43   0.156    -.1379826  .0224236 
         d_2010 |  -.0417203   .0400595    -1.04   0.300    -.1210353  .0375947 
         d_2011 |  -.1068898   .0459628    -2.33   0.022     -.197893 -.0158866 
         d_2012 |  -.0898963   .0425274    -2.11   0.037    -.1740976  -.005695 
         d_2013 |  -.0775624   .0426841    -1.82   0.072    -.1620739  .0069491 
          _cons |   .0990528   .3018866     0.33   0.743    -.4986617  .6967672 
----------------+-------------------------------------------------------------- 
        sigma_u |  .10559419 
        sigma_e |  .10790028 
            rho |  .48919963   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(24, 120) =     1.92             Prob > F = 0.0115 
 
. . testnl (_b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[Deposit_FE]=-_b[lag_Deposit_FE]) 
 
  (1)  _b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[Deposit_FE] = -_b[lag_Deposit_FE] 
 
             F(1, 120) =        3.47 
              Prob > F =        0.0650 
 
. . testnl (_b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[ IntRate_diff]=-_b[ lagintrate_diff]) 
 
  (1)  _b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[ IntRate_diff] = -_b[ lagintrate_diff] 
 
             F(1, 120) =        5.41 
              Prob > F =        0.0217 
 
. . testnl (_b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[  Inf_vol]=-_b[ laginf_vol]) 
 
  (1)  _b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[  Inf_vol] = -_b[ laginf_vol] 
 
             F(1, 120) =        0.85 
              Prob > F =        0.3583 
 
. . testnl (_b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[  ERR_vol]=-_b[  lagerr_vol]) 
 
  (1)  _b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[  ERR_vol] = -_b[  lagerr_vol] 
 
             F(1, 120) =        0.03 
              Prob > F =        0.8575 
 
. . testnl (_b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[  BSRI]=-_b[  lagbsri]) 
 
  (1)  _b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[  BSRI] = -_b[  lagbsri] 
 
             F(1, 120) =        0.67 
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              Prob > F =        0.4160 
 
. . testnl (_b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[ FO]=-_b[   lagfo]) 
 
  (1)  _b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[ FO] = -_b[   lagfo] 
 
             F(1, 120) =        0.40 
              Prob > F =        0.5295 
 
. . testnl (_b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[  FC_lim]=-_b[   lagfc_lim]) 
 
  (1)  _b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[  FC_lim] = -_b[   lagfc_lim] 
 
             F(1, 120) =        0.01 
              Prob > F =        0.9350 
 
. . testnl (_b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[   FCop_lim]=-_b[   lagfcop_lim]) 
 
  (1)  _b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[   FCop_lim] = -_b[   lagfcop_lim] 
 
             F(1, 120) =        0.32 
              Prob > F =        0.5753 
 
. . testnl (_b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[  FC_LTV]=-_b[  laglfc_ltv]) 
 
  (1)  _b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[  FC_LTV] = -_b[  laglfc_ltv] 
 
             F(1, 120) =        0.74 
              Prob > F =        0.3919 
 
. . testnl (_b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[  FC_RWA]=-_b[  lagfc_rwa]) 
 
  (1)  _b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[  FC_RWA] = -_b[  lagfc_rwa] 
 
             F(1, 120) =        0.11 
              Prob > F =        0.7398 
 
. . testnl (_b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[Deposit_FE]=-_b[lag_Deposit_FE]) 
(_b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[ IntRate_diff]=-_b[ lagintrate_diff]) 
(_b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[  Inf_vol]=-_b[ laginf_vol]) (_b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[  
ERR_vol]=-_b[  lagerr_vol]) (_b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[  BSRI]=-_b[  lagbsri]) 
(_b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[ FO]=-_b[   lagfo]) (_b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[  FC_lim]=-_b[   
lagfc_lim]) (_b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[   FCop_lim]=-_b[   lagfcop_lim]) 
(_b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[  FC_LTV]=-_b[  laglfc_ltv]) (_b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[  
FC_RWA]=-_b[  lagfc_rwa]) 
 
  (1)  _b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[Deposit_FE] = -_b[lag_Deposit_FE] 
  (2)  _b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[ IntRate_diff] = -_b[ lagintrate_diff] 
  (3)  _b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[  Inf_vol] = -_b[ laginf_vol] 
  (4)  _b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[  ERR_vol] = -_b[  lagerr_vol] 
  (5)  _b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[  BSRI] = -_b[  lagbsri] 
  (6)  _b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[ FO] = -_b[   lagfo] 
  (7)  _b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[  FC_lim] = -_b[   lagfc_lim] 
  (8)  _b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[   FCop_lim] = -_b[   lagfcop_lim] 
  (9)  _b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[  FC_LTV] = -_b[  laglfc_ltv] 
  (10) _b[lagCredit_FE]*_b[  FC_RWA] = -_b[  lagfc_rwa] 
 
            F(10, 120) =        1.06 
              Prob > F =        0.3949 
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Appendix 6.9 Estimated results of 6.9 RE with AR(1) 
 
Model 6.10 estimated through RE AR(1)  
. xtregar Credit_FE  Deposit_FE IntRate_diff Inf_vol ERR_vol BSRI FO  FC_lim 
FCop_lim FC_LTV FC_RWA d_2008 d_2009 d_2010 d_2011 d_2012 d_2013, re lbi 
 
RE GLS regression with AR(1) disturbances       Number of obs      =       174 
Group variable: C_Id                            Number of groups   =        25 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.2330                         Obs per group: min =         6 
       between = 0.8022                                        avg =       7.0 
       overall = 0.6508                                        max =         7 
 
                                                Wald chi2(17)      =    109.92 
corr(u_i, Xb)      = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------- theta -------------------- 
  min      5%       median        95%      max 
0.1677   0.1821     0.1821     0.1821   0.1821 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Credit_FE |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  Deposit_FE |    .404946   .1068642     3.79   0.000      .195496     .614396 
IntRate_diff |   .0087628   .0031645     2.77   0.006     .0025606    .0149651 
     Inf_vol |   .0008319   .0026075     0.32   0.750    -.0042786    .0059425 
     ERR_vol |  -.6161537    1.59384    -0.39   0.699    -3.740023    2.507716 
        BSRI |   .0001796   .0408268     0.00   0.996    -.0798394    .0801985 
          FO |   .1898269    .077062     2.46   0.014     .0387881    .3408657 
      FC_lim |  -.0322787   .0372821    -0.87   0.387    -.1053503    .0407928 
    FCop_lim |    .164288   .0470834     3.49   0.000     .0720063    .2565696 
      FC_LTV |   .1598601   .0424823     3.76   0.000     .0765963     .243124 
      FC_RWA |   .0216037   .0308663     0.70   0.484    -.0388931    .0821005 
      d_2008 |   .0124012   .0251975     0.49   0.623    -.0369849    .0617874 
      d_2009 |  -.0219662   .0310983    -0.71   0.480    -.0829178    .0389854 
      d_2010 |  -.0186625   .0339049    -0.55   0.582    -.0851149    .0477899 
      d_2011 |   -.075364   .0379728    -1.98   0.047    -.1497893   -.0009388 
      d_2012 |  -.0868967   .0389507    -2.23   0.026    -.1632387   -.0105547 
      d_2013 |  -.0846335   .0399624    -2.12   0.034    -.1629583   -.0063087 
       _cons |   .0666198    .134568     0.50   0.621    -.1971287    .3303683 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      rho_ar |  .57013629   (estimated autocorrelation coefficient) 
     sigma_u |  .05215975 
     sigma_e |  .09904406 
     rho_fov |  .21712375   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
modified Bhargava et al. Durbin-Watson = 1.0027084 
Baltagi-Wu LBI = 1.3322592 
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Appendix 6.10 Complex correlation (model 6.1 estiamted excluding 
deposit euroization) 
 
Model 6.1 estimated through system GMM, whilst treating all 
independent variables exogenous and excluding deposit euroization 
to check for a more complex type correlation 
 
. xtabond2  Credit_FE   lagCredit_FE  IntRate_diff Inf_vol ERR_vol BSRI FO  
FC_lim FCop_lim FC_LTV FC_RWA d_2008 d_2009 d_2010 d_2011 d_2012 d_2013, gmm 
(lagCredit_FE, collapse lag (2 3)) iv ( IntRate_diff Inf_vol ERR_vol BSRI FO 
FC_lim FCop_lim FC_LTV FC_RWA d_2008 d_2009 d_2010 d_2011 d_2012 d_2013) small 
two orthog robust 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: C_Id                            Number of obs      =       173 
Time variable : Year                            Number of groups   =        25 
Number of instruments = 19                      Obs per group: min =         6 
F(16, 24)     =     72.00                                      avg =      6.92 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =         7 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
   Credit_FE |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lagCredit_FE |   .5483765   .1369174     4.01   0.001     .2657929    .8309601 
IntRate_diff |   .0069024   .0033735     2.05   0.052    -.0000601    .0138649 
     Inf_vol |   .0050023   .0043736     1.14   0.264    -.0040244    .0140289 
     ERR_vol |  -.1197573   .6754203    -0.18   0.861    -1.513756    1.274242 
        BSRI |  -.0095316   .0307403    -0.31   0.759    -.0729764    .0539132 
          FO |    .097222   .0663623     1.47   0.156    -.0397429     .234187 
      FC_lim |  -.0393604   .0196757    -2.00   0.057    -.0799689    .0012482 
    FCop_lim |   .1510297   .0500125     3.02   0.006      .047809    .2542504 
      FC_LTV |   .1064655   .0365889     2.91   0.008     .0309497    .1819813 
      FC_RWA |   .0205559   .0221361     0.93   0.362    -.0251308    .0662426 
      d_2008 |   -.008033    .048203    -0.17   0.869    -.1075192    .0914532 
      d_2009 |  -.0306774   .0590073    -0.52   0.608    -.1524624    .0911076 
      d_2010 |  -.0245761   .0474333    -0.52   0.609    -.1224737    .0733215 
      d_2011 |  -.0769915   .0740832    -1.04   0.309    -.2298918    .0759087 
      d_2012 |   -.068981   .0614269    -1.12   0.273    -.1957599    .0577979 
      d_2013 |  -.0557119   .0635725    -0.88   0.390    -.1869192    .0754953 
       _cons |   .0708539   .1349438     0.53   0.604    -.2076565    .3493643 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for orthogonal deviations equation 
  Standard 
    FOD.(IntRate_diff Inf_vol ERR_vol BSRI FO FC_lim FCop_lim FC_LTV FC_RWA 
    d_2008 d_2009 d_2010 d_2011 d_2012 d_2013) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).lagCredit_FE collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    IntRate_diff Inf_vol ERR_vol BSRI FO FC_lim FCop_lim FC_LTV FC_RWA d_2008 
    d_2009 d_2010 d_2011 d_2012 d_2013 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.lagCredit_FE collapsed 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -1.49  Pr > z =  0.137 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -1.07  Pr > z =  0.285 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(2)    =   0.24  Prob > chi2 =  0.889 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(2)    =   0.76  Prob > chi2 =  0.685 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.39  Prob > chi2 =  0.532 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(1)    =   0.37  Prob > chi2 =  0.544  
 
Appendix 6.11 Additional test of complex correlation (model 6.1 
estimated through OLS with deposit euroization o nthe left hand 
side) 
 
A version of the Model 6.1 estimated through OLS, whilst having 
the deposit euroization as the dependent variable and all other 
independent variables of Model 6.1 in the right had side, to check 
for a more complex type correlation 
. regress Deposit_FE Inf_vol ERR_vol IntRate_diff FO BSRI FC_lim FCop_lim 
FC_LTV FC_RWA d_2008 d_2009 d_2010 d_2011 d_2012 d_2013 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     174 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 15,   158) =   16.07 
       Model |  4.31467887    15  .287645258           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  2.82742697   158  .017895107           R-squared     =  0.6041 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.5665 
       Total |  7.14210584   173  .041283849           Root MSE      =  .13377 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  Deposit_FE |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     Inf_vol |   .0094601   .0032232     2.94   0.004      .003094    .0158261 
     ERR_vol |   1.098192   1.230963     0.89   0.374    -1.333073    3.529457 
IntRate_diff |   .0043701   .0028869     1.51   0.132    -.0013318     .010072 
          FO |   .1575378   .0464012     3.40   0.001     .0658912    .2491844 
        BSRI |  -.1391254   .0267442    -5.20   0.000    -.1919476   -.0863032 
      FC_lim |  -.0759015   .0287089    -2.64   0.009    -.1326042   -.0191987 
    FCop_lim |   .2050263   .0275154     7.45   0.000     .1506809    .2593718 
      FC_LTV |   .0449485   .0297305     1.51   0.133     -.013772    .1036691 
      FC_RWA |   .0746187   .0242394     3.08   0.002     .0267438    .1224937 
      d_2008 |   .0300788   .0387772     0.78   0.439    -.0465098    .1066675 
      d_2009 |   .0670512   .0385653     1.74   0.084    -.0091188    .1432213 
      d_2010 |   .0493185   .0387973     1.27   0.206    -.0273097    .1259467 
      d_2011 |  -.0163268   .0403039    -0.41   0.686    -.0959308    .0632771 
      d_2012 |  -.0016491    .040594    -0.04   0.968     -.081826    .0785278 
      d_2013 |   .0104248    .041262     0.25   0.801    -.0710714     .091921 
       _cons |   .5088489   .0891791     5.71   0.000      .332712    .6849857 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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. regress Deposit_FE Inf_vol ERR_vol IntRate_diff FO BSRI  d_2008 d_2009 d_2010 
d_2011 d_2012 d_2013 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     174 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 11,   162) =   10.48 
       Model |  2.96854912    11  .269868102           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  4.17355672   162  .025762696           R-squared     =  0.4156 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.3760 
       Total |  7.14210584   173  .041283849           Root MSE      =  .16051 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  Deposit_FE |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     Inf_vol |   .0034842   .0036613     0.95   0.343    -.0037458    .0107143 
     ERR_vol |   3.428245    1.41508     2.42   0.017     .6338646    6.222624 
IntRate_diff |   .0076853   .0031419     2.45   0.016     .0014809    .0138898 
          FO |   .2651213   .0536073     4.95   0.000     .1592621    .3709804 
        BSRI |  -.2084869   .0278316    -7.49   0.000    -.2634464   -.1535275 
      d_2008 |   .0050528   .0463466     0.11   0.913    -.0864686    .0965743 
      d_2009 |   .0560064   .0461731     1.21   0.227    -.0351724    .1471853 
      d_2010 |   .0440081   .0462618     0.95   0.343    -.0473459     .135362 
      d_2011 |  -.0232084   .0465293    -0.50   0.619    -.1150906    .0686738 
      d_2012 |   -.007542   .0466997    -0.16   0.872    -.0997607    .0846767 
      d_2013 |   .0032683   .0471166     0.07   0.945    -.0897735    .0963101 
       _cons |   .8286425    .085778     9.66   0.000     .6592553    .9980298 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
